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Southeast Asia and the Civil Society 
Gaze
As developing countries with recent histories of isolation and extreme poverty, 
followed by restoration and reform, both Cambodia and Vietnam have seen new 
opportunities and demands for non- state actors to engage in and manage the 
effects of rapid socio-economic transformation. 
 This book examines how in both countries, civil society actors and the state 
manage their relationship to one another in an environment that is continuously 
shaped and (re)constructed by changing legislation, collaboration and negoti-
ation, advocacy and protest, and social control. Further, it explores the countries’ 
divergent experiences whilst also uncovering the underlying basis and drivers of 
civil society activity that are shared by Cambodia and Vietnam. Crucially, this 
book engages with the contested nature of civil society and how it is socially 
constructed through research and development activities, by looking at con-
temporary discourses and manifestations of civil society in the two countries, 
including national and community- level organizations, associations, and net-
works that operate in a variety of sectors, such as gender, the environment and 
health.
	 Drawing	 on	 extensive	 fieldwork	 conducted	 in	Cambodia	 and	Vietnam,	 this	
book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Southeast Asian studies, 
Southeast Asian politics, development studies and civil society.
Gabi Waibel, Judith Ehlert and Hart N. Feuer are all senior researchers at the 
Centre for Development Research (ZEF ) at the University of Bonn, Germany.
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society;	 relations	 between	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 state;	 NGOs	 in	 regional	 and	
country contexts; governance and accountability in civil society; civil society 
and religion; the political role of civil society; the role of foundations, religious 
philanthropy and other philanthropic organizations; business, philanthropy and 
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other organizations; transnational civil society organizations in Asia; the legal 
regulation of civil society; self- regulation and accountability; Asian diasporas 
and civil society; and resources and fundraising for civil society.
 The series is edited by Mark Sidel, Professor of Law, University of Wiscon-
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Preface
This	volume	represents	the	findings	of	a	year-	long	process	of	writing	and	discus-
sion amongst Vietnam and Cambodia scholars from many parts of the world. 
The process started at the University of Bonn, Germany, where a group of 
researchers began questioning how to make light of the growing organizational 
pluralism and the steady increase of so- called non- governmental organizations 
in these two countries. Reviewing the empirical and conceptual literature, they 
found it lacking many facets and ongoing dynamics of civil society develop-
ment;	 furthermore,	 much	 of	 the	 available	 research	 findings	 were	 outdated,	 or	
overlooked Cambodia and Vietnam. Additionally, there was an observable incli-
nation to frame civil society in the context of democratization processes (notably 
in the development aid literature), which tended to produce a reductionist view 
and otherwise limited understanding of what actually happens on the ground. 
Against the background of these broad- base observations, 17 academics and 
development experts with experience and knowledge of the local scene were 
invited for a three- day ‘writeshop,’ which took place 18–20 January 2012, at the 
Center for Development Research (ZEF ) in Bonn.
	 During	this	intensive	workshop,	participants	critically	reflected	on	their	work	
and discussed the conceptual approach and outline of a book we would author 
together. The heterogeneity of the participants, which included practitioners as 
well as scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds, age groups, nationalities 
and	professional	 histories	 (see	 contributor	 profiles),	made	 for	 an	 inspiring	 and	
thought provoking exchange. Furthermore, the workshop was designed as a 
forum where junior and senior academics had an opportunity to meet and lay the 
groundwork	for	the	growth	in	different	academic	fields	and	regional	studies.	The	
combination of working sessions, social activities and a public forum provided 
an ideal ground for relationship- building and networking, which has been essen-
tial for a productive and forward- looking process, and aimed at lasting beyond a 
joint publication.
 During the writeshop, several sessions were dedicated to elaborating on old 
and new insights as well as key lessons from the case and country studies. Most 
of the papers introduced research topics that have hardly been investigated in 
any of the two countries (e.g. civil society networks, community- based organiza-
tions, gender and mobilization, and discourse analysis, among others), and are 
Preface  xv
primarily empirically- based. Lively discussions revolved around ‘politics of civil 
society’ and the question of autonomy, local expressions of civil society, as well 
as the distinctive narratives and forms of civil society in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
These discussions and other results emerging equally from individual chapters 
and from the overall book, are presented in a summary chapter at the conclusion 
of this volume.
 Due to the interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary range in authorship, as well 
as the practical relevance of the subjects covered in the book, the editors wish to 
bring this book to a diverse audience, both within and beyond academia, includ-
ing students, civil society actors and development practitioners. The larger goal 
is to share new insights and methodologies, encourage debate, and broaden as 
well as challenge some of the current understandings of civil society. To that 
end, contact information for the editors and authors is available; we would enjoy 
hearing from readers with questions, challenges and ideas for moving forward.
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Writing on civil society has gone in and out of fashion since the eighteenth 
century, but clearly re- emerged as a political rallying call, development initi-
ative, and academic fixation with the political changes occurring in Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s. The wealth of issues covered by these writings has 
continued to increase since then, and portrayals of civil society now routinely 
capture the stories of local communities, countries, global movements and even 
certain periods in (regional) history. Despite, or perhaps because of the growth 
of this concept, corresponding conceptual frameworks have not only escaped 
consolidation, they continue to diverge. While civil society is broadly under-
stood as a realm of social action and civic engagement outside the state, the 
context and inherent flux of every case tends to defy a unitary (or at least univer-
sally agreed upon) definition.
 This book embraces the idea that forms of civil society are in continual 
change and that ‘tracking’, as opposed to ‘pinning down’, civil society should be 
the long- term goal of academic inquiry. In this respect, civil society remains, 
contrary to recent claims, under- researched, with its value in contemporary 
studies derived less by generalizations and more by situating the functioning of 
civil society in certain contexts. This is particularly true for developing countries 
like Cambodia and Vietnam, where a recent history of war, isolation and extreme 
poverty, followed by restoration and reform, have altered the opportunities and 
the demand for non- state actors to engage in, and more often than not, manage 
the effects of, rapid socio- economic transformation. This is most visible in the 
recent and substantial growth of civil society actors and organizations in the two 
countries. Vietnam, for instance, has a broad range of organizations which are 
affiliated with the party- state and officially classified as civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) (Bach Tan Sinh, in this volume) and, at 51 per cent of eligible 
women, has the highest membership in women’s groups worldwide (primarily 
because of its high level of formal participation in the Vietnam Women’s Union, 
which is discussed more extensively in this volume) (World Values Survey 
Database 1999–2004, cited in: UNIFEM (2008: 19)). In the same vein, Cam-
bodia has, since the 1990s, witnessed a huge expansion of non- governmental 
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organizations (NGOs) as well as community- based organizations (CBOs) 
(Öjendal, in this volume). The terminology and meaning of civil society, never-
theless, remain contested even as the concept is used and instrumentalized in 
these countries. This book examines this contestation openly, looking at (1) con-
temporary discourses and manifestations of civil society in the two countries, 
including indigenous and nascent local groups (Ehlert, Hiwasa, Waibel and Ben-
edikter); (2) national- level NGOs and agencies (Bourdier, Feuer, Pistor and Le 
Thi Quy), as well as; (3) translocal networks (Thim Ly, Wells- Dang) that operate 
in a variety of sectors, such as gender, environmental and health. A crucial 
dimension emerging in the contributions to this volume lies in understanding the 
politics of civil society (which is particularly interesting in the Vietnamese one- 
party system and Cambodia’s external donor- driven environment). As suggested 
by Foley and Edwards (1996: 7 (3), 38–52: 47):
this ‘political variable’ must include both the political associations that play 
important roles in any society and the work of political compromise, 
restraint, and accommodation necessary for reconciling competing interests 
in a peaceful and more or less orderly way.
In Vietnam and Cambodia both, civil society actors and the state seek out and 
develop strategic responses for managing their relationship to one another in an 
environment that is continuously shaped and (re)constructed by changing legis-
lation, collaboration and negotiation, advocacy and protest, and the restrictions 
placed by measures for social control (Bach Tan Sinh, Öjendal, Wells- Dang in 
this volume; Thayer (2009)).
 The authors of this volume do not confine themselves to one particular defini-
tion of civil society, but aim at expanding the largely European- oriented concep-
tual and empirical understandings of the concept. Before discussing the 
contemporary content, however, the following section traces the origins and 
ideological evolution of civil society as an idea and as a development objective. 
Subsequently, trends in civil society research are taken up, paying particular 
attention to two sticking points; first, (the influence of ) the dominant research 
questions in this field of study and, second, the normative conceptions under-
lying much research, which often shape the way civil society is actually investi-
gated. Finally, key approaches and findings from the civil society literature on 
Southeast Asia will be summarized in order to erect a regional frame for the 
studies of the two countries. This introductory chapter concludes by outlining 
the main strands of discussion in this book.
Civil society: a brief history of original ideas1
The idea of ‘civil society’ first emerged with the work of Aristotle and Cicero 
more than two millennia ago, and most of the subsequent works are conceptually 
derived from Western political thought. In the original writings of Roman 
philosophers, ‘civil society’ was understood ‘as [being] synonymous with the 
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state’ and basically described a ‘social order of citizenship’ (Kumar 1993: 376f.). 
More than a millennium later, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) defined civil society 
as, in the words of Ehrenberg (2011: 19), ‘the arena in which interest- bearing 
individuals pursued their private goals’, and argued that it was the sovereign 
state which was tasked with controlling this segment of society. Different ideas 
about civic virtues, social structures, state power and the role and rights of the 
individual were further developed thereafter, but it was only during the Age of 
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century that civil society was written of as a 
realm distinct from the state. Drawing on the pioneering writings of economic 
theory, Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and later 
Karl Marx (1818–83) provided some of the most influential, but also controver-
sial interpretations and visions of civil society. Two of the core themes of their 
studies looked at the role of the (capitalist) economy (in constituting civil 
society) and how ‘civilization’ – as contrasted with the uncivilized, ‘barbarian’ 
world – could be engendered and maintained. Differing understandings of civil 
society contributed to an intellectual divide that, later on, would fundamentally 
shape world history: liberalism vs. socialism. ‘Liberalism developed a theory of 
civil society because it wanted to democratize the state. Marxism developed a 
theory of the state because it wanted to democratize civil society’ (Ehrenberg 
2011: 23). Indeed, Marx’s vision was to overcome the ‘alienation and exploita-
tion’ of the bourgeois civil society by dissolving it into the state (Alagappa 
2004b: 29).
 Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–59), in the mid- nineteenth century, went into 
greater detail about civil society. He argued that, in addition to the state and the 
economic sphere (described by Kumar (1993: 381) as an ‘arena of private inter-
ests and economic activity’), a third dimension, namely ‘the art of association’, 
existed. The latter can be understood as ‘a largely autonomous sphere of freedom 
and liberty encompassing an organizational culture that fosters democracy, both 
political and economic’ and thus constitutes ‘a positive force . . . between the indi-
vidual and the state’ (McIllwaine 2009: 137). It was this three- dimensional model 
which became constitutive of many of the modern appraisals of ‘civil society’.
 However, de Tocqueville’s framework also generated fundamental critique. It 
was assessed as being highly idealistic, overlooking inequality and power imbal-
ances – in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. An important strand of 
theory developed by Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), a Marxist and oppositionist 
of Mussolini’s fascist regime, took these critiques into account. He called the 
assumed distinction between civil society (which included the market) and the 
state into question, and argued that in reality the two realms tend to overlap. 
Gramsci’s theory points out that the state establishes its hegemony through force 
and consent. In this light, he perceived civil society as the realm of consent 
where ‘the exploited classes [are persuaded] to accept the way society developed 
under capitalism as natural and legitimate’ (Howell and Pearce 2001c: 34).2 He 
nevertheless recognized that ‘the state’s hegemony over civil society is never 
complete’ and therefore acknowledged the latter’s ‘potential for radical social 
transformation’ (Landau 2008: 246). Gramsci’s conceptual approach influenced 
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not only ensuing theory building, but also inspired many political activists in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and beyond.3
 Despite the prominent theoretical writings mentioned above, the interest in 
the concept of civil society remained rather low during the end of the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth century (Hann 2004: 44). Other concepts emerging 
from social theory building, however, became constitutive for the civil society 
debate, which re- emerged later on. An influential piece of work reflecting this 
period is Habermas’ (1991) book on the historical evolution of a ‘bourgeois 
public sphere’ in eighteenth century Europe. The idea of a public sphere that 
provides space for citizens to debate and influence politics is one aspect of civil 
society discourse that has been widely adopted. Reis, in this volume, applies this 
conceptual framework in her critical examination of the contextual factors and 
relevance of civil society in contemporary Vietnam.
 The political transformation in Eastern Europe, led by a heretofore unknown 
segment of the population, eventually led to a revival of the concept of civil 
society, which can be explained as follows:
The failure in Eastern Europe of revolution (Hungary 1956) and reform 
from above (Czechoslovakia 1968) led in the 1970s to the idea of a third 
way: reform from below, by the construction or reconstruction of civil 
society.
(Kumar 1993: 388)
In the aftermath of 1989, civil society was thus conceptualized as a counter-
weight to oppressive and authoritarian regimes. In this same period, scholars 
such as Ernest Gellner and Robert Putnam contributed to the advancement of 
theories that were to eventually play an important role in debates about civil 
society (Edwards 2004: 7). Gellner (1994) ascribed civil society the ability to 
counterbalance the state, while Putnam (1993) identified the linkages between 
civil society and social capital. Putnam’s empirical research in present- day Italy 
and the United States provided evidence that a high level of associational activ-
ity fosters solidarity that contributes to society’s collective ability to counterbal-
ance the state.4 This concept of social capital had great influence on the civil 
society debate at the time (Edwards 2004: 7) and spawned numerous studies on 
the role, political and otherwise, of social relations in different cultures and 
societies.
Coming into fashion: civil society as a (development) 
objective
Against this background, policy makers and development aid agencies around 
the globe ‘discovered’ civil society (as well as the related concepts of social 
capital and participation), and, deeming it worthy of sponsorship and promotion, 
from the 1990s onwards started to channel huge funds to parties that they viewed 
as representative of civil society.
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 During the same time, the discourse on NGOs began to appear on the inter-
national political scenes, and newly emboldened organizations began clamoring 
to be heard, respected and funded. The first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, in 
1992, witnessed unprecedented NGO participation and is considered a key event 
in this regard, while the influential NGO forum, organized in parallel to the 
Beijing UN Women’s conference in 1995, confirmed this new trend (Hulme and 
Edwards 1997: 5). As a result, a new global discourse on civil society was born 
and thereafter nurtured by a slew of conferences, research activities and media 
portrayals. The general, if uncritical, understanding during this period of (re)
awakening was that civil society was ‘doing good’.5
 As the strengthening of civil society became ‘big business’ (Hulme and 
Edwards 1997: 6), civil society organizations mushroomed. Typically, this 
involved capacity building programmes for new NGOS as well as the provision 
of project funds aimed at promoting non- state actors, particularly in the service 
delivery and social welfare sectors. Concurrently, indicators for assessing, moni-
toring and evaluating civil society, as well as ‘giving it legitimate substance and 
rendering it amenable to planning’, were being developed (Howell and Pearce 
2001a: 81). Emerging definitions of civil society became instrumental in justi-
fying development interventions, a prominent example of which is the following 
definition from the World Bank (2012):
[Civil society refers to] the wide array of non- governmental and not- for-
profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the inter-
ests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.
The definition employed above presents several artificial dichotomies – govern-
mental versus non- governmental, profit- making versus non- for-profit and public 
versus private sphere – all of which are meant to invoke an idealized notion of 
civil society. In practice, all these boundaries are blurred (Alagappa 2004a; 
Howell and Pearce 2001b). For instance, there are numerous NGOs which 
engage in business (e.g. consultancy work) and depend (to some extent) on gov-
ernment funding; members and staff switch from NGO work to state employ-
ment or vice versa, and some ‘groups’ are ‘the virtual creation of a single 
individual’ (Sidel 1995: 299).
 Moreover, because the relevant national laws actually determine the criteria 
for formal registration and operational space, ‘very different kinds of groups 
may count as NGOs in different countries’ (Weller 2005: 3). Although donor 
agencies generally advocate globally for recognition of civil society through 
 legislations or various types of reforms, they often have to adapt to, and operate 
within, the legitimate space available for non- state actors in a given country 
(which can range from being fairly open to strictly controlled). Salemink (2006), 
drawing on his experience in Vietnam during the 1990s, argued that donors 
tended to re- interpret the encountered concepts in ways that matched their inter-
ests. Primarily through the sponsorship of development aid programmes, several 
6  G. Waibel
new types of organization came into being.6 Among those are, for example, the 
GONGOs (governmental non- governmental organizations) (Hann 2004: 46) – a 
creation which clearly illustrates the interdependence of civil society organiza-
tions, the state, and, sometimes, donor funding. Civil society country portrayals, 
statistical reports, and similar documents, however, tend to disguise this lack of 
clarity and require very critical reading.
 In many aid- receiving countries, including Cambodia and Vietnam, formal 
NGO (or associational) legislation is highly controversial. However, potential 
beneficiaries of development aid, in spite of their heterogeneity, have proven that 
they can adapt dynamically to funding criteria and national restrictions (see Ou 
and Kim, this volume). Some of these mechanisms created various unexpected 
and negative impacts (Hann 2004: 45ff.; see also Ou and Kim in this volume), 
leading some observers to start questioning the idea of civil society as a panacea.
Critical responses and theoretical debates
One of the fundamental critiques challenged the idea that there is something like 
‘one’ or ‘the’ civil society; divisions within civil society in terms of diversity, 
fragmentation, rivalry, unequal power relations and also direct conflicts are 
increasingly recognized. Research (and aid) agendas, as a result, have shifted 
gradually to looking at the ‘quality’ of civil society, including issues of exclu-
sion and ‘barriers to entry’ into civil society (Howell and Pearce 2001a: 86). 
Similarly, concerns have been raised about the new elites managing the NGO 
sector for their own benefit, and the lack of participation of the poor (stimulated 
by the work of Chambers (1983; 1997) and others). This critique of civil society 
dynamics emerged in the context of increasing inequality in other social spheres.
 The emergent heterogeneity of civil society has also raised questions about 
the assumed state–civil society divide. Gramsci’s critical perspective has 
regained prominence in contemporary civil society studies, because it
does not proceed from the distinction between the state and civil society . . . 
[and] also challenges the assumption that civil society is the site of demo-
cratic and egalitarian relationships; . . . it therefore rejects the thesis that the 
state is the primary source of oppression and exploitation.
(Quadir and Jayant 2004: 7, 10)
Moreover, in communist regimes, such as China and Vietnam, such a divide is 
officially non- existent. In contrast, ‘the space of . . . civil society may, in one 
sense, be encompassed within space claimed by the state’ (Hann and Dunn 1996: 
19), which, in the case of Vietnam, is to a great extent filled by mass organiza-
tions and their many affiliates (see Bach Tan Sinh, this volume). Regardless of 
the legally sanctioned space, people are, as the title of an edited volume by 
Kerkvliet suggests, ‘getting organized’. He argues that within the given socio- 
political context it would be more insightful ‘to think of arenas in which bound-
aries, rights, jurisdictions, and power distribution between the state and societal 
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agencies are debated, contested, and resolved (at least temporarily)’ (Kerkvliet 
2001: 240).
 For a number of reasons, diverging views on how to analyse, interpret and 
support civil society continue to exist. The so- called liberal- democratic 
approach, which refers to Tocqueville’s work, is, for example, still in use – espe-
cially in the donor community. Nevertheless, and as Alagappa (2004d: 457) 
argues for contemporary Asia, ‘[which] frame dominates and how different fea-
tures combine are largely a function of the legitimacy of the state and its pol-
icies’.7 As recent history shows, the latter are by no means fixed but rather 
continuously re- shaped and negotiated.
 Another even more fundamental critique about the leading frameworks 
emerged in the new millennium, questioning their ‘fitness’ in the social, cultural 
and political contexts of non- Western societies. The collected edition of Hann 
and Dunn (1996), entitled Civil Society – Challenging Western Models, was an 
important piece of work in this school. The authors (1996: 7) emphasized the 
necessity of anthropological research in order to grasp the local meanings and 
practices of civic engagement and social cohesion, arguing:
An awareness of the shifts in European intellectual debate, and of the 
common rootedness of the dominant modern strands in a specifically 
western theory of autonomous individuals, should alert us to the errors and 
dangers of exporting models of civil society to non- western societies.
This argument became prominent in some of the earlier as well as contemporary 
writings on Southeast Asia, which will be discussed below. However, frustrated 
with the evolution of writing on civil society, Hann (2004: 45ff.) later on rejected 
that the concept of civil society had any analytical value and, according to him, 
should be sent ‘back to the conceptual graveyard’. Yet, and despite a prevailing 
unease and intellectual struggle with the civil society concept, a vast body of 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, as well as countless consultancy 
reports, were being produced – although, more recently, a decline can be 
observed. In addition, a wealth of studies on social capital, social movements, 
participation and public space have investigated similar phenomena. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, there seems to be more confusion than understanding about what 
civil society actually is or should be.
 The various criticisms suggest that a critical reading and judicious use of the 
conceptual frameworks is imperative; they also show that more empirical research 
is needed to uncover the hybrid understandings and practices of civil society in a 
given context. In this regard, scholars have to take the complex cultural and polit-
ical dimensions into account, as well as the multiple interactions, objectives and 
room to manoeuvre of different actors in order to go beyond the unrefined ‘search 
for civil society’.8 A preconceived understanding of civil society, particularly when 
it engenders normative categories of civil society actors, constrains the needed 
openness to local perceptions and manifestations, which, from our understanding 
in the editing of this volume, should be the guiding object of research.
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Civil society research: operationalizing a highly contested 
concept
Broadly speaking, research on civil society encompasses the study of a whole 
range of actors and organizations argued as being part of civil society, dealing 
with different issues at different scales (varying from the local to the global), and 
including both historical and contemporary developments.
 Donor agencies, as mentioned earlier, have had one of the strongest influ-
ences on the contemporary research agenda. The instrumentalization of various 
definitions, such as the one promulgated by the World Bank (see above), is one 
area that this book aims to elucidate. First, the delimitation of civil society actors 
to organizations not only overlooks the plurality of forms of engagement, it often 
constrains research perspectives and outcomes. As a result, some individuals, 
informal groups, networks and other not registered entities, including those 
which lack legal provisions, were (and oftentimes still are) disregarded in assess-
ments of civil society. Furthermore, locally specific manifestations risk to be 
ignored, if the employed definitions of civil society (e.g. organizations) are too 
narrow (Weller 2005: 4). This often includes ‘earlier ties of religion, community, 
and kinship – [which] are important to developing civil societies’ (see also 
Ehlert, this volume). Second, this definition makes no mention of contestation 
that arises as the respective political environments determine which groups and 
associations qualify as civil society organizations. Third, the use of externally 
developed indicators for interpreting and measuring civil society activities tends 
to exclude local perspectives and conceptions. Indeed, the reception, translation 
and adaptation of the concept in different languages, cultures and political 
systems often results in different understandings (Alagappa 2004c: 15), which 
may overlap with or contradict international formulations.
 Some of the more recent conceptualizations of civil society constitute 
attempts to overcome some of these shortcomings. For example, the London 
School of Economics’ Centre for Civil Society uses the definition: an ‘arena . . . 
[which] embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in 
their degree of formality’ (The Change Institute 2008). Yet, apparent difficulties 
in operationalizing the concept still lead to a preoccupation with formally regis-
tered organizations, notably in quantitative surveys. To date, and this is very 
evident in the cases of both Cambodia and Vietnam, many spaces of civil society 
action remain under- researched. Responding to this, the contributions to this 
book fall in line with Hannah (2007: 92, 94), who suggests:
I prefer to look at actions and activities – the processes – that embody and 
promote civil society interests, rather than predetermining which groups or 
organizations are to be included in and excluded from civil society.
[. . .]
Research methods, therefore, need to shift . . . to looking at who within a 
society/state constellation is undertaking which civil society activities and 
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who is accomplishing which civil society objectives. . . . [This] would neces-
sitate that the social actors themselves define which state–society relation-
ships and activities are important, rather than have such normative 
categories imposed on them by (us) outside researchers.
It is obvious that the so- called Western view continues to shape our knowledge 
and understanding of civil society (development). A ‘reality check’ therefore 
often leads to a picture where civil society has ‘failed’ to meet the corresponding 
(ethical) values (Alagappa 2004c: 11); Ou and Kim, this volume). In contrast, a 
critical reflection of one’s own epistemological background as well as an exam-
ination of the local discourses might serve to open our minds and engage with 
multiple perspectives. The chapters of Bach Tan Sinh and Phuong Le Trong (this 
volume), which argue that there is a ‘Vietnamese way’ of conceptualizing civil 
society, are illustrative in this regard.
 A last set of points should be made here about various biases that commonly 
emerge in the civil society literature. First, although research interests have cer-
tainly evolved over time, much emphasis has been (and still is) placed on 
studying the role of civil society in democratic change processes, or – more 
generally – on ‘understanding politics’ (Alagappa 2004c: 16). Many of the con-
tributing authors in this volume also intensively discuss this dimension, as pol-
itics unavoidably shapes the understanding and practice of civil society in 
Cambodia and Vietnam. Yet, as emerges in the contributions to this book, civil 
society actors do not necessarily confine themselves to the ultimate goal of polit-
ical change; the objectives and rationales for associational activity, as well as the 
consequent state–society responses, have to be investigated from a broader per-
spective. A second source of bias is derived from disciplinary boundaries since 
the disciplines are typically preoccupied with investigating certain types of 
social, economic or political structures (Hann and Dunn 1996: 14). Interdiscipli-
nary research, which might alleviate this problem, tends to be rare. Third, biases 
often exist with regard to either urban or rural, regional foci as well as certain 
subjects (in particular, the environment, women, and human rights tend to domi-
nate the literature). The orientation of many research topics can be attributed to 
priorities set by development policies. The preoccupation with service delivery 
functions (Hulme and Edwards 1997: 9), for which the notion of the ‘third 
sector’ has been widely used, is a good example in this regard. The picture of a 
country’s (or a region’s) civil society landscape is therefore always socially con-
structed and consequently non- comprehensive. The following section elaborates 
more specifically on academic and non- academic studies of civil society in Asia/
Southeast Asia and situates the focus of this book in this broader field of study.
Civil society in Southeast Asia: body of knowledge/
knowledge gaps
During the past two decades a host of publications on civil society in Southeast 
Asia/Asia emerged, of which a few employed a regional perspective similar to 
10  G. Waibel
that of this book. Among those, a survey initiated by the Japan Center for Inter-
national Exchange provided the first overview on civil society organizations in 
Asia- Pacific countries (Yamamoto 1995b: 2). The report, which is more practi-
cally than conceptually oriented, contends that the ‘indigenous development of 
the nonprofit sector is a very recent phenomenon in most of the countries’ and 
found that it closely relates to the ‘negative consequences of rapid economic 
growth’ (Yamamoto 1995b: 3, 11). The study also emphasized that the response 
of the state to the newly established, mostly community service and welfare ori-
ented organizations, varied greatly; in some countries leading to significant 
changes (Yamamoto 1995a).
 Following the first insights into the ‘new’ phenomena presented in this report 
were a series of donor- funded workshops aimed at exploring the specific mean-
ings and practices of civil society in the region (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2005; 
Lee Hock Guan 2004a). During these sessions, scholars provided evidence for 
the longstanding existence and tradition of ‘civil society- like’ institutions in 
Southeast Asia and emphasized that significant disruptions in associational life 
occurred during colonial rule. With the struggle for independence and the emer-
gence of trade unions in the 1950s and 1960s, the picture changed again. The 
dominance of authoritarian regimes in the early post- colonial era restricted the 
formation and operation of groups. At least for a period, communist regimes in 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos even banned most types of organization outside 
the party- state. Later on, social movements played a significant role in the over-
throw of the regimes in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, where, in the 
aftermath, NGOs virtually mushroomed (Lee Hock Guan 2004b: 10ff.). 
Although some common historical threads and traces were identified in these 
workshops, the discussants concluded that something as concrete as a Southeast 
Asian civil society can hardly be said to exist (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2005). 
In contrast, they rather highlighted a regional plurality of civil societies and 
expressed their unease with the Western conceptual frame. Hudson (2003: 4) 
summarized this general unease concisely, noting that,
In many Asian societies it is not clear that civil society is a distinct sphere – 
that is non- governmental – or that its institutions are voluntary. Equally, not 
all groups organized for collective purposes outside the economy and the 
state may be civil society groups.
Still, from a regional perspective, several conferences and publications during 
the late 1990s initiated a debate about how civil society in Southeast Asia relates 
to religion, in particular Islam. As Mitsuo (2001: 11–14) suggests, the Muslim 
obligation to volunteer seems to be highly conducive for the development of 
civil society. These scholars also argued that the constitutional linkages between 
religious and state affairs shape the conditions of religious freedom and associ-
ation and that, on the one hand, political Islam flourished with democratization 
processes (Bajunid 2001: 189). On the other hand, whether the strengthening of 
Muslim civil society might ‘lead to democratic civility’ remains a contested 
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issue (Mitsuo 2001: 14). In the same vein, the role of Buddhist values and insti-
tutions for civil society (development) (Queen and King 1996) has also been 
explored, revealing a long tradition of community work in many Southeast Asian 
countries, including Cambodia and Vietnam. Buddhist engagement has been 
especially prominent in environmental protection (Palmer and Finlay 2003) and, 
more recently, in political protest against Myanmar’s military rule supported by 
monks. Similarly, the (Catholic) church is a significant player in the Philippines 
and South Korea, and, to a lesser extent, in a few other countries, including 
Vietnam (where 8 per cent of the population is Catholic). Faith- based civic 
engagement, which is also present outside of the mentioned religions, can have, 
among others, traditional, indigenous and local dimensions. There is also a 
global dimension that describes the funding mechanisms and support systems of 
larger, often international or translocal organizations or networks that help local 
religious groups. As a subject of research, the interest in religious institutions 
and their relationship with civil society has shown recent signs of growth (James 
2007: 2).
 The early debate on Islam and civil society also critically examined the idea 
of ‘Asian values’ (Bajunid 2001: 192), which became prominent during the 
1990s, by suggesting that Asian countries share common characteristics and 
values which were different from those of the West. Advocates of the ‘Asian 
value’ theory, who often represented ruling elites, highlighted values such as 
order and discipline, defended authoritarian regimes as being suitable in the 
given context, and contested the notion of universal human rights, which, they 
argued, was rooted in Western liberal thought (De Bary 2000; Sen 1997). This 
culturalist strand of argumentation was rejected by many activists and scholars, 
who, for example, argued that comparative studies in the region should be 
limited to analyses of the similarities of economic and political features (Weller 
2005: 16f.). Moreover,
the so- called Asian values . . . are not especially Asian in any significant 
sense. . . . The thesis of a grand dichotomy between Asian values and Euro-
pean values [in contrast] adds little to our comprehension, and much to the 
confusion about the normative basis of freedom and democracy.
(Sen 1997: 30f.)
Considering the substantial amount of studies examining the diversity of roles 
played by civil society with regard to democratic change, the idea of universally 
applicable norms and values for (for example) ‘good governance’, remains a 
controversial issue. Alagappa (2004a), who produced one of the most compre-
hensive (and perhaps most quoted) volumes on civil society and political change 
in Asia, comprising 12 country studies (though notably not including Vietnam 
and Cambodia), framed this issue by investigating the ‘nature of civil societies’ 
and the role of civil society organizations in ‘fostering or inhibiting political 
change in the direction of open, participatory, and accountable political systems 
and institutions’ (Alagappa 2004c: 8). Alagappa’s overview confirms a dramatic 
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increase in civil society organizations since the mid- 1980s, despite uncertainties 
about legal status in various countries. According to him, key drivers for these 
developments include rapid economic transition, political liberalization, the 
strengthening of religious and ethnic engagements (often as a response to dis-
criminatory practices), as well as the intensification of regional and international 
integration.
 The scale and scope of activity of these early civil society organizations 
broadened and, sometimes expanded into social movements, while coalitions at 
both domestic and transnational levels, including diaspora communities, 
emerged (Alagappa 2004d: 458ff.). Two chapters in this volume provide empiri-
cal case studies of such linkages: Thim investigates how a community initiative 
in rural Cambodia managed to grow into a major national initiative by success-
fully liaising with other affected villages, national NGOs and international 
players, while Feuer analyses how local Cambodian ecological initiatives render 
parts of the global environmental movements viable for local political 
institutions.
 With regard to state–society relations in view of democratization, Alagappa 
(2004d: 469) concluded that, in Asia, ‘by and large, civil society organizations 
do not fundamentally challenge the state or the political order’. Instead, they try 
to achieve their individual objectives by utilizing the room to manoeuvre pro-
vided by the political system in place (an illustrative empirical account of such 
strategies is provided by Wells- Dang, this volume). This is important because, 
generally speaking, limitations and sanctions on civil society remain widespread 
throughout the region.
 Other studies on Asia come to similar conclusions. A collection of papers, 
edited by Quadir and Jayant (2004: 8), frankly suggest that, ‘the democratic 
potential of civil society in the region is more limited than is widely assumed’. 
Similarly, Weller et al. (2005) found that, in most of their eight- country case 
studies (including one on Vietnam), the relationships between civil society 
agents and governments are rather ‘symbiotic than antagonistic’, being charac-
terized more by ‘corporatist arrangements’ (Weller 2005: 7, 9). Many contribu-
tions in this book take on this criticism by viewing government engagements – or 
the lack thereof – as an aspect of engendering and envisioning civil society 
rather than as a linear oppositional force.
Vietnam and Cambodia
In the above- mentioned edited volumes on Southeast Asia, studies on so- called 
vibrant civil societies tend to be overrepresented. Among those, Japan, Malaysia 
and Indonesia attracted most attention, while South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, 
Taiwan and the Philippines are also well captured. China and Vietnam appear in 
a few (although not in Alagappa’s (2004a) work). In contrast, studies on Laos 
and Cambodia are, with little exception, basically absent (although country- 
specific monographs dealing with civil society in Cambodia do exist, see, e.g. 
the references in Ou and Kim, this volume).
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 This book concentrates on Cambodia and Vietnam, where earliest publica-
tions on civil society came out in the 1990s. The two countries offer many inter-
esting starting points for research and reflection, and we find that analysis of 
common threads and differences in the evolution and discourses of civil society 
is of scientific value. More specifically, the distinct political systems and ques-
tion of donor influence, as well as the reception and adaptation of (the concept 
of ) civil society are worthy of critical, comparative investigation. The existing 
literature is also demonstrative of the plurality of ways that civil society is 
approached and researched (what we call the ‘civil society gaze’). Both coun-
tries also exhibit a variety of local practices for making use of existing civil 
society space, and gaining more of it.
 In Cambodia, the civil society sphere expanded rapidly during restoration 
and, to date, NGOs fulfil a large part of typically state functions and operate at 
all societal and geographical scales. Moreover, democratization and also decen-
tralization policies have built upon the (re)establishment of the indigenous asso-
ciational realm, which was assumed to be non- existent or formerly destroyed – a 
perspective which is only preliminarily challenged in this book. With a gradual 
decline in foreign aid occurring, newer cleavages, such as the competitive nature 
of civil society and local support structures for civic engagement, are starting 
to emerge.
 In Vietnam, the civil society debate similarly emerged during the 1990s but 
research access has remained limited for some time. To date, the topic is con-
sidered politically sensitive, although Đổi mới reforms and the effects of global-
ization have opened opportunities for organizational pluralism. The various 
chapters on Vietnam demonstrate that state–society relationships are particularly 
blurry and therefore challenge many of the Western conceptions of civil society.
The book
This book is structured in three parts. The first one, Framing the Contemporary 
Civil Society in Cambodia and Vietnam, provides country- specific overview 
chapters on the historical and present context of civil society, and critically 
examines the respective concepts, discourses and thematic boundaries in both 
countries. These, as well as the political and social systems, are crucial to under-
standing how local actors, organizations, governments, and even scholars act and 
interact to create, reproduce, and define civil society. Different conceptions of 
civil society and their issues are becoming particularly exciting in their relevance 
for development, civic engagement and political action.
 The second part, Advocacy and Political Space, concentrates on the political 
dimension of the civil society debate. It subsumes six chapters that – in one way 
or another – describe and analyse the relations between state and society. In this 
regard, the political space denotes a space of contestation, in which the state and 
various groups in society negotiate their (development) agendas, their mutual 
obligations and rights, and create room to manoeuvre. The individual chapters 
cover various aspects and forms of advocacy work and its impact at different 
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scales in either Cambodia or Vietnam, while Wells- Dang’s study engages in a 
comparative analysis of advocacy strategies in the two countries.
 The third part of the book, which is headed Traces and Tendencies, holisti-
cally focuses on the interface of locally grown and externally mandated organ-
izations and norms of social engagement. Beneath the broader tendencies 
observed in the evolving institutional forms and practices of contemporary civil 
society are traces left by history and culture. On the surface, the ‘imprint’ of the 
state and international organizations circumscribes the form, functioning, and 
identity, as well as understanding, of the emerging civil society. The analysis of 
Cambodia’s NGO sector by Ou and Kim, for instance, provides an overt 
example of such processes. However, more subtle factors, such as local norms, 
collective practices, and cultural/religious institutions also leave smaller, but in 
no way less important, traces on the patterns of social engagement that con-
tribute to, or restrict, civil society.
 The final chapter, ‘the civil society gaze’, concludes by critically reflecting on 
the contributors’ selection of themes, theoretical and methodological approaches, 
as well as empirical findings. This includes a review of the making and evolution 
of this book, and comments on the range of issues and shortcomings found in 
contemporary civil society research that was outlined in this chapter. The 
authors, in summary, argue that research on civil society, because it serves to 
legitimize or delegitimize based on the lens used by the observer, is, far from 
being a distant analysis, itself a political act.
Notes
1 This section largely draws on secondary literature, but references to the original texts 
are also included. The epistemological history of civil society is extensive and 
complex. Comprehensive overviews are provided by Cohen and Arato (1992), Edwards 
(2004) and Keane (1998).
2 Landau (2008: 245) points out that ‘Gramsci’s conception of civil society is rather 
unclear as he failed to provide a precise definition of the term’. Indeed, his ideas are lit-
erally presented in fragments, noted down in his ‘Prison Notebooks’, written between 
1929 and 1935 (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1971).
3 More recently, analysts of international relations and the contemporary world order 
developed the so- called neo- Gramscian perspective (see, e.g. the work of Robert Cox), 
which focuses on the constitutive elements of the capitalist, transnational hegemony. 
Gramsci’s critical thoughts therefore continue to foster intellectual debates and polit-
ical theory building (Keucheyan 2012).
4 The concept of social capital has been explored from various disciplines and perspec-
tives. In the context of the civil society debate, the following suggestion is illustrative:
Social capital is usually defined as assets accruing from social relations upon 
which people, including poor people, can call to help accomplish either individual 
or collective goals as they navigate through life’s complex landscapes. These 
assets can be mined for both individual and collective benefits, including obtain-
ing work, participating in political activities or implementing community projects.
(Daniere and Hy V. Luong 2012: 3)
After Putnam published his findings, the concept entered the donor platform in the 
1990s. For a critical review see for example Howell and Pierce (2001b).
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5 This refers to the title of one of the various critical reviews by Fisher (1997): ‘Doing 
Good?: The Politics and Anti- politics of NGO Practices’.
6 Lewis and Kanji (2009: 9), for instance, list 46 different NGO acronyms in the English 
language. These include constellations like LINGOs (Little International NGOs) or 
RONGOs (Royal non- governmental organizations). Another interesting form is the 
BRONGO, which stands for Briefcase NGO (e.g. in Ghana).
7 Several Southeast Asian scholars actually discuss the relevance of Gramsci’s and Toc-
queville’s theoretical frameworks for present- day civil society analysis (e.g. Alagappa 
2004, Landau 2008, Tasnim 2007).
8 This expression is picked from the following research paper: White, G., Howell, J. A., 
and Shang Xiaoyuan (1996) ‘In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social 
Change in Contemporary China’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Framing the contemporary 




2 In search of a civil society




The term ‘civil society’ does not sit easily in Cambodian culture and history, 
being marked by the presence of an autonomous elite, steep hierarchies, and a 
massive gap between the ruler and the ruled (Mabbet and Chandler 1995). Or 
maybe the modern conception of the term – formed by various understandings of 
European history, from revolutionary Gramsci to the totalitarian Eastern Bloc, 
from hegemonic neoliberalism to aggressive alternativism, from enlightenment 
to contemporary development practice (Edwards 2011) – is a non- starter for 
understanding the state–society nexus in Cambodia? Either way, the misfit of 
fashionable conceptualizations formed from the European experience and a lived 
reality in Cambodia is stark, or so it seems.
 In the process of recovering from three decades of war, auto- genocide, 
renewed civil war, and a repressive socialist/centralist regime, it is obvious that 
the re- negotiation of state–society relations is a cornerstone for post- conflict 
reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the historically and culturally crafted civil 
society in Cambodia – further twisted through state- led violence and crude 
repression – does neither tally well with the ideas cultivated in a neo- liberal 
development community, deeply intervening in the emerging Cambodian state 
through bi- and multi- lateral donor engagement, nor with requirements for a 
deepening democracy in a liberal society. Rather, the historical civil society is to 
be found in the religious realm, as vertical patronage structures or in kinship- 
based relations (Ebihara 1968; Ledgerwood 2002; cf. Ovesen et al. 1996). These 
are, however, typically seen as archaic and pre- modern (and therefore counter-
productive) in the prevailing development discourse.
 Having said that – and remembering James Clifford’s insight that ‘cultures’ 
do not hold still for their portraits (referenced in Hughes and Öjendal 2006: 417) 
– civil society in Cambodia is undergoing rapid transformation (World Bank 
2009: 7; Öjendal and Kim 2006; cf. Hughes and Un 2012; Öjendal and Kim 
2012). Reasonably, the process and outcome of this ‘shifting portrait’ – i.e. how 
historical and cultural images as well as practices of civil society are mutually 
adapting – is central for the long- term success of post- conflict reconstruction as 
well as for continuous democratization. Hence, fundamental macro- structural 
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change hinges on a ‘successful’ re- negotiation of state–society relations in which 
the organized civil society plays a key role (cf. Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). The 
nature of the state–society nexus negotiated through the civil society is therefore 
not only an intellectual reflection, but a key challenge in the contemporary 
nation- state-building process in Cambodia. If one of the key problems is that 
there has always been a ‘gap’ between the state and its people, the current phase 
of state- building needs to see a social contract between the two form. This would 
include a mutual dependency of a positive nature, where the state does not 
operate autonomously and irrespective of the needs and wants of its citizens, and 
where the citizens have needs from the state that they are able to articulate. In 
such a process the civil society is the only ‘actor’ able to initiate such a dialogue 
or overcoming the ‘gap’ in state–society relations.
 In a Tocquevillian sense, the ‘gap’ is seen as detrimental to effective, demo-
cratic, and sustainable state- building. An active civil society would fill that void 
and provide the intermediary structures not previously present in Cambodia. So 
far, arguably, the electoral democracy has not independently been able to shrink 
that gap. Following Tocqueville, civil society is believed to play a vital role in 
reconstruction and the stabilization of the emerging state. Which role and how it 
is played out largely remains to be seen and will be discussed below. To date, 
our systematic knowledge on this is remarkably thin; as Un (2008) points out, 
this field has neither been well understood nor properly researched, since the 
bulk of attention has gone to analyses of elite rationales. In this chapter, I will 
discuss Cambodian civil society from an historical perspective, focusing on 
dilemmas that emerged from a post- conflict reconstruction phase permeated by 
liberalism and donor involvement, and their impacts on the form of civil society 
that has emerged.
 As a point of reference I will use a classic definition by White, understanding 
civil society as ‘an intermediate associational realm between state and family 
populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in 
relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect 
or extend their interests or values’ (White 1994: 337–8). While this definition 
emphasizes voluntarism and separation from the state, it does neither explicitly 
define how civil society is positioned in relation to the state, nor how it is organ-
ized. Furthermore, due to the special nature of the civil society in Cambodia, 
admittedly stretching this definition somewhat, phenomena of a slightly different 
character (e.g. societal institutions such as patron–client structures) will also be 
addressed and juxtaposed with the emerging contemporary situation.1
 Below, I will present a brief historical background of the conception of Cam-
bodian civil society (or rather, of its absence) and the pressure for change arising 
from the arrival of the neo- liberal international order in 1993. In particular, I will 
juxtapose two differing paradigms that go toward explaining the contradictions 
and uncertainties in emerging in civil society. One the one hand are the histori-
cally and culturally defined perceptions of civil society, and on the other hand 
are the normatively laden and imported modern/liberal conceptions of civil 
society. I then review a series of evolutionary phases the civil society has 
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 undergone in contemporary Cambodia, before I turn to three cases illuminating 
the variety at hand.
The historical role of civil society in Cambodia
The historical literature on Khmer civilization emphasizes two aspects of state–
civil society relations. First, it is ripe with statements on the crude, distant, and 
violent nature of the ancient ‘state’. The great Angkor was a slave society with 
extremely steep hierarchies, distance between rulers and ruled, and a nobility 
completely sheltered from the life of regular people (Vickery 1986; Mabbet and 
Chandler 1995; cf. Chou 1967). People were consumables – a means for achiev-
ing the higher, religiously created, purpose of honouring the rulers and serving 
them in different ways. Ozay Mehmet (1997: 676) expresses and explains this 
elegantly:
[T]he Khmer- Sanskrit idea of devaraja [God- king] legitimizes a tradition of 
cult worship, or ‘legitimacy by divine royalty’, which, by putting emphasis 
on form rather than substance, and ritual rather than accountability, places a 
huge social distance between the ruled and the ruler, elevates the patron– 
client relationship to the divine order and ends up sheltering injustice and 
exploitation.
While these are ancient traits, the contemporary Khmer cosmology is to a 
remarkably high degree defined by its origin both in cultural terms (Martin 1994; 
cf. Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002) and in political terms (e.g. Roberts 2009; Un 
2009; Pak et al. 2007). For instance, the Khmer Rouge regime and its atrocities 
have been explained in these terms (Ovesen 2004). The extreme top- down 
approach, the total insignificance of regular people, and the inherited propensity 
for violence (Seanglim 1991), in combination with particular political circum-
stances, create a ‘vacuum’ and a state–society distance where society can only 
be governed through fear and violence. A related feature is the culture of patron-
age permeating all spheres of Cambodian society (Pak et al. 2007; Hughes and 
Un 2007), which amounts to a tangible societal institution of major significance.
 Second, Khmer society is historically shaped by the fact that people do not 
(historically) bury their dead and have little attachment to their place of birth (in 
contrast to, for example, neighbouring Vietnam), and therefore easily clear new 
land and change location (Thion 1993). Thereby, regular people avoid being 
‘caught’ by the state, creating a certain ‘anarchic’ society that is basically 
mobile, fluid, and loosely organized in very small units. Villages in ethnic 
Khmer Cambodia (in contrast to, for instance, many minority villages) are 
neither defined by social coherence nor geographically centred (Ovesen et al. 
1996; cf. Ebihara 1968). ‘Community’ does not historically carry an intelligible 
meaning beyond extended families and neighbours (cf. Thion 1999), and 
although there are traditional cooperative measures at the village level, partici-
pation, solidarity, and collective action does not come easily (e.g. Chou 2011; 
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Ros 2011; cf. Öjendal 2000). Projected up to the national level, this rural 
dynamic has influenced the evolution of contemporary, donor- driven initiatives. 
As the World Bank (2009: 1–2) puts it:
Civil society in Cambodia is also a product of the country’s unique political 
and social history. Most professional NGOs in Cambodia today owe their 
existence more to the influence and financial support of international donors 
than to the gradual opening up of democratic space, the natural scaling up of 
grassroots organizations, the emergence of a culture of volunteerism/social 
activism or the organized charity of an established middle class.
Current attempts at ‘inventing’ more stable and productive state–society rela-
tions are struggling with both the historical ‘gap’ between the ruler and the ruled, 
and the fact that there is little or no ‘natural’ inclination for people to fill that gap 
with any distinct organizational form, especially when the burden of initiating 
and organizing falls on the community itself. One recent study (Kim 2012) holds 
up the lack of ‘intermediate institutions’, which has also been emphasized by 
Chandler (1991) as one of the key dilemmas for developing a sustainable demo-
cratization as well as for the prospect of exercising ‘good governance’. In terms 
of formal political reforms, democratization and decentralization have aimed to 
(partly) close this gap by inventing a localized state authority. However, broadly 
speaking, there is still a lack of ‘intermediary’ agencies/institutions/organiza-
tions in society. While this is a historical pattern, the situation is evolving and 
the ‘vacuum’ is being filled up, albeit in unexpected and unpredictable ways.
Cambodia enters neo- liberal globalism
Cambodian society is certainly not unique in incorporating what appears to 
be incompatible contradictions within its culture. But seldom has such a cul-
ture’s divergent themes been played out in a more dramatic fashion on the 
contemporary world stage or with the concomitant tragic loss of life and 
human resources.
(Seanglim 1991: xv)
There are distinct and unreconciled contradictions between historical trends and 
the emerging civil society. But Cambodia could be expected to breed contradic-
tions. After two decades of isolation and authoritarian rule, and following the 
UN peacebuilding operation (cf. Doyle 1995), the country opened up in the early 
1990s, almost literally overnight, and introduced a liberal constitution. Attempts 
at creating an authoritarian and centralized command economy throughout the 
1980s (Gottesman 2004) gave way to an anarchic society with a crude liberalism 
(Curtis 1998; Lizee 2000) steeped in traditional social norms which themselves 
are negotiated and unstable. As Kent (2010: 128) more eloquently put it: 
‘The problem of sharing “real” power and responsibility remains trapped in the 
nexus of old and new norms, in a deep anxiety about the loss of tradition and the 
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dissolution of moral order.’ Breakneck social and political change (Hughes 
2003) was wrestling with inherited conservatism (Martin 1994), the shadows 
(and fear) of an authoritarian state (Chandler 1998), ‘random’ hyper- violence 
(Luco 2002; Hinton 2004), and existential reluctance to open public debate 
(Seanglim 1991; cf. Mabbet and Chandler 1995).
 A number of conditions can be added to the historical sketch above describing 
the ‘opening up’ of Cambodia after almost three decades of misery and isolation. 
First, a massive amount of resources became available for reconstruction and 
development. Second, the state was weak, divided, and (in part) dominated by 
international actors and their financial resources (Lizee 2000). Third, there was an 
emerging liberal order – bordering on anarchic (cf. Hughes 2003). Finally, the 
needs were endless, ranging from poverty alleviation to infrastructure rehabilita-
tion, from agricultural services to rights education (cf. Curtis 1998).
 What started as a centralized and foreign- dominated process, the proliferation 
of NGO/CSOs eventually expanded far beyond international NGOs based in 
Phnom Penh. Many Cambodian NGO/CSOs emerged, often financed by the 
international community, but occasionally also in a more home- grown fashion. 
This unfolded further into localized community- based organizations (CBOs), 
which are currently to be found in almost every village (Kim and Öjendal 2012; 
cf. World Bank 2009: 8–9). However, after an initial ‘free- for-all’ in the 1990s, 
the influence of international aid became increasingly more constrained and 
limited in scope. The period of international aid money chasing NGO/CSOs in 
an almost unregulated society with huge needs subsequently led to a period of 
increased political control, culminating in a much- debated and harshly drafted 
‘NGO law’, which would appear to restrict the activities of the NGOs further. At 
the same time, international aid money for the sector began to dry up, altering 
the political dynamics in the sector (Ou and Kim, this volume). The World Bank 
(2009: 27–8) estimates that there are more than 8,000 CBOs, close to 2,000 
NGOs, around 400 labour unions, and lots of ‘other’ organizations, including an 
unknown number of village- based ‘traditional associations’ (with minimal 
organizational structures). The World Bank also notices (as do Ou and Kim, 
this volume) that these numbers are masking a rather low activity level overall, 
and an uncertain degree of sustainability. These figures nevertheless represent a 
huge expansion of the sector since the early 1990s, but it is still far below what 
can be found in other development contexts in places such as India or the 
Philippines.
 What is briefly highlighted in the paragraphs above outlines a powerful and 
intriguing mix of civil society elements, including an emerging local government 
that is assumedly democratic, development- oriented, and approachable, in com-
bination with a vibrant NGO sector with a wide gap to fill that is seeking a viable 
role in the state–civil society matrix. Currently, the fanning out of the activity of 
NGO/CSOs and their increasing local presence, on the one hand, and the demo-
cratic decentralization, on the other hand, provide a complex web of, and a 
promising platform for, experimentation and innovation. In particular, the civil 
society–local authority relations are under negotiation, with both sides searching 
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for new roles and new relations in a sincere and interesting way (Öjendal & Kim 
2012). Below, I will develop some of the key themes introduced above, and at 
the same time elaborate a chronology of this field, taking as a point of departure 
the year 1993 and the opening up of the Cambodian society.
The emerging civil society in Cambodia – from international 
NGO- ism to CBOs aplenty
In this section, I will review the historical emergence of organized civil society 
in Cambodia under five related themes; these themes are essentially ordered 
chronologically, but occasionally they overlap in time.
Development NGO- ism enters Cambodia
Throughout the 1990s, in a ‘post- conflict’ period, there were considerably more 
resources available than there were implementers to be found (cf. Ou and Kim, 
this volume). In addition, there were virtually no Cambodian CSOs available to 
receive and capably manage any major sums of money and undertake any signi-
ficant projects under the conditions the international development community 
demanded. The few that were emerging (see, for instance, AMARA below) were 
tentatively exploring the space, developing their working methods, and slowly 
building trust. As a result, international NGOs found themselves with unpreced-
ented space in which to manoeuvre, with massive resources accessible, and 
generally confronting a tabula rasa. They were, however, also working largely 
without counterparts directly implementing programmes and projects (e.g. SPM 
2003a, 2003b). The slowly emerging Cambodian NGOs were hampered by the 
lack of historical/cultural tradition discussed above, and often resembled consul-
tancy companies, complete with ‘business ideas’, ‘entrepreneurialism’, and 
‘funding plans’, but lacking in popular constituency, bottom- up dynamics, and 
internally participatory practices (ibid.). It was not rare that they had political 
agendas and directly or indirectly engaged in politics (ibid.).
 At the same time, at the local level, civil society – according to the definition 
above – hardly existed. Organized kinship relations were to a large extent 
broken, as a result of genocide and prolonged civil war, and the little ‘com-
munity’ to be found in the 1960s (cf. Ebihara, 1968, Hughes and Conway, 2004; 
cf. Öjendal 2000) had largely degenerated, leaving the society fragmented and 
weakened. The Sangha, the Buddhist order, and its local system of pagodas, 
monks, and laypersons, traditionally important in the local society, was also 
fragmented as a result of violence and the Khmer Rouge’s explicit attempt at 
dismantling it. Finally, the historical patronage system was also undermined and 
was changing in nature (although not really ‘organized’ civil society, patronage 
remained a key social structure in society, cf. Ovesen et al. 1996; Ledgerwood 
2002). None of these internal variations of civil society fit the new political- 
economic order, and did not receive any initial resources in the externally led 
reconstruction period.2
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 Hence, the early phase of emerging civil society was marked by external 
interventions, resources, and preferences, and with very few references to Cam-
bodian society as we had known it up to this point.
From advocacy to development
Although elections of acceptable quality were held in 1993, a constitution 
written, and a government formed, ‘normality’ did not return instantly. In hind-
sight it is hard to view the latter half of the 1990s as a ‘post- conflict’ phase at all. 
Nonetheless, there was a gradual process of balancing and maturity taking place 
in the civil society realm. Two structural shifts tentatively emerged in the forma-
tion of civil society from the end of the 1990s onwards.
 First, over time, international NGOs had been able to partly transfer respons-
ibilities to Cambodian NGOs and, in the process, also transferred the ‘civil 
society discourse’ found in the development sphere. Initially, Cambodian CSOs 
were often not well organized internally as regards statutes and participation, 
largely replicating Cambodian cosmology with steep hierarchies and weak 
downward accountability (also reflecting their sometimes business- like nature). 
At the turn of the century there were a number of spectacular financial corrup-
tion scandals, demonstrating the immature nature of these CSOs and the insuffi-
cient financial control mechanisms in place at the time. In time, many 
Cambodian NGOs improved their internal structures and aimed at getting for-
mally registered with the Ministry of Interior (see e.g. the case of Amara below).
 Second, international NGOs (and later, their Cambodian counterparts) started 
to fan out of Phnom Penh, putting considerable efforts into establishing them-
selves in rural areas and acquiring a broader foundation among the Cambodian 
population. International NGOs also channelled resources – often through the 
local NGOs/CSOs – to more development- oriented activities outside the capital 
(SPM 2003a), such as to issues related to land, fisheries, and forest areas. This 
process was primarily possible by targeting particular areas with particular 
issues. For instance: fishery issues around the Tonle Sap by FACT, rice produc-
tion in the lowlands by CEDAC (see Feuer, this volume), and anti- dambuilding 
advocacy in the northeast (see Thim, this volume). Occasionally, fully Cambo-
dian CSOs emerged through this process (see the case of Buddhism for Social 
Development Action below), working with somewhat different methods to those 
that were integrated in the international development community.
Communities emerging, but remaining thin and weak
The next phase of the growing Cambodian civil society was the emergence on a 
broad scale of community- based organizations (CBOs) in the early 2000s. While 
they have roots in traditional Cambodia, many of these CSOs are not a ‘natural’ 
part of local mobilization. Nevertheless, by the mid- 2000s they were mushroom-
ing in virtually every village (cf. World Bank 2009). A combination of a basic 
recovery process in rural areas, the acceptance of participatory political 
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pluralism, a decade of role- modelling by NGOs, and even the impacts of some 
government- run projects (e.g. ‘Seila’) had served to introduce basic organiza-
tional skills and some participatory ambitions, providing the groundwork for the 
capability of self- mobilization. This increasingly rendered localized and func-
tional CBOs fit to fill a space where no civil society actors had previously oper-
ated (Öjendal and Kim 2006).
 The opportunities and contexts for local mobilization were also expanding. 
Basic state services were (re)instated (although they were woefully incomplete 
and needed support); there was a national policy promoting irrigation (but little 
in the way of technical services was made available); primary education was 
systematically organized (yet local teachers needed extra income to make them 
appear in classrooms regularly); elderly people without family of their own 
needed support (but no such service was offered); fisheries became legally regu-
lated (but illegal fishing was rampant). Hence, water utilization committees, 
school and parent committees, elderly committees, and fishery communities rose 
in relation to a need, thrived as a result of external organizational and financial 
support, and enjoyed formal state recognition (cf. Kim and Öjendal 2012; 
Öjendal and Kim 2012).
 Having said that, it should be mentioned that the tasks these CBOs engaged 
in (water, education, elderly care, etc.) were hardly new. Historically, there have 
been local embryos of ‘CBOs’, albeit in considerably less organized forms and 
usually materializing unevenly and incompletely. Sometimes labelled ‘Tradi-
tional Associations’ (World Bank 2009: 8), these precursors to modern CBOs 
were led by anyone with engagement and some capacity. Thus, these are neither 
entirely new phenomena, which simply replicate self- help systems from the early 
post- Khmer Rouge era or even from the Sangkum era in the 1960s, nor are they 
as professional and ‘organized’ as they may appear. While there is no doubt 
these CBOs exist as a result of community initiative (see below for a case of a 
fishery organization), they have some unexpected features. First, although they 
serve the community by providing a much- needed service, and occasionally 
have broad popular legitimacy, they are typically pursued by a few individuals 
who define the nature of their work. Second, they often include local officials 
who are often acknowledged (and even registered and trained) by local state 
authorities (throwing their ‘autonomous’ nature in doubt). Third, they are often 
set up and initially financed by a foreign NGO or Cambodian CSO with foreign 
support, rendering their local legitimacy (in the eyes of both local authorities and 
local citizens) somewhat tarnished (Kim and Öjendal 2012).3 To be financed 
from (and therefore accountable to) outside interests, and be accepted and coop-
erating with local authorities, and remain broadly legitimate/popular is a great 
balancing act for CBOs and local CSOs. This entails trade- offs that are imper-
fect. Therefore, these ‘community- based’ organizations are very much a hybrid 
phenomenon, where local, state, and foreign development interests co- exist.
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Decentralization creating local space for civil society
Since 1993 Cambodia has had four consecutive national elections and three 
commune- based ones, has mostly enjoyed freedom of speech and freedom to 
organize, and has enjoyed a stable constitution; yet it is commonly considered a 
democracy with severe deficiencies (cf. Un 2009). While this debate is beyond 
the scope of this chapter (cf. Öjendal and Lilja 2009), there seems to be little 
doubt that the funding and space for NGOs – and especially for those working 
with advocacy issues – has diminished (Öjendal and Kim 2012). The state has 
reduced the liberties of NGOs, tightened regulation, and raised demands for 
various forms of registration. This is felt most acutely by NGOs working in sens-
itive sectors, while other sectors (see Feuer, this volume) renegotiate a plural 
relationship with the state. The year 2005, in which several human rights advoc-
ates were arrested, could be seen as the year in which political space for NGOs 
started to shrink (cf. Heder 2005; McCargo 2005), while around the same time 
democratic decentralization started to sink in and open for political pluralism 
locally (Öjendal and Kim 2011).
 The paradox is that although central authorities are putting more pressure on 
major NGOs working with advocacy, decentralized authorities (commune coun-
cils) are more open to working with local NGOs on most issues, and certainly on 
service delivery and poverty alleviation. In recent studies the decentralized – and 
fairly democratic – local authorities have been seen as part of the reason for 
increased gender equality in politics (Kim and Öjendal 2011; cf. Hiwasa, this 
volume), and increased space for NGOs to work locally (Öjendal and Kim 
2012). In a survey for the latter study it was found that commune councillors 
regard NGOs as crucial for local development, and that the commune authorities 
perceived themselves as more dependent on the NGOs than vice versa (ibid.), 
demonstrating that NGOs appear more threatening to central than to local 
powers. It was also overwhelmingly clear in that study that the commune coun-
cils wanted the NGOs to be active in their respective communes. Feuer (this 
volume) highlights a similar duality, with the state embracing and distancing 
NGOs while, at the same time, being locked into a relationship of mutual 
dependency.
Revival of the historical civil society
For more than a decade and a half (at least) there has been a sustainable re- 
growth of historical societal institutions. This is true for Buddhism and its insti-
tutional organization, driven by a local need for spiritual and moral guidance and 
various elites’ (both from the diaspora and Phnom Penh) desire to gain merit 
through financing the building of pagodas (Marston 2009: 240). This is a highly 
uneven process with sometimes randomly distributed resources, creating pockets 
of strong presence and major local significance but also leaving some areas with 
institutions that are financially, organizationally, and morally weak. One possib-
ility is that Buddhism has more significance as a localized institution, providing 
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a moral model and guiding people in everyday life, than as a strictly religious 
institution or as a development agent (cf. Ehlert, this volume).
 As was noted above with regard to the post- genocide period, family and 
kinship networks were broken, which added to the historically anarchic structure 
of Cambodian society, producing a rather extreme situation (cf. Ovesen et al. 
1996). This was further emphasized by the absence of generalized trust follow-
ing the extreme violence of the 1970s and the civil war of the 1980s (cf. Luco 
2002). However, gender equality, family ties, and generalized trust are far more 
widely entrenched now, and wider kinship structures are emerging (albeit still in 
a comparatively modest fashion). A modernized version of patronage is also 
emerging, although not so much based on local landholdings and the typical 
dynamics of the rural areas, as on money, business, and political connections (cf. 
Pak et al. 2007; Hughes and Un 2007; Roberts 2009). Moreover, the highly 
mobile nature of contemporary Cambodian society, driven by partial urbaniza-
tion, labour migration, and the overall pragmatic/loose family structure, often 
keeps families separated – furthening the fragmentation of social institutions.
 An example of other organizations occupying a space between the family and 
the state are youth organizations; up to 70 per cent of the population is under 30 
and this group is becoming increasingly educated. Youth organizations are stead-
ily increasing their membership, although many remain local and issue- oriented. 
Trade unions also attract a major following; 40 per cent of the workforce is 
estimated to belong to one of the 370 registered unions (Makin 2006: 25; cf. 
World Bank 2009: 9). Both unions and youth organizations were recognized 
during the socialist era and, because both are now possible power- houses, they 
are subject to intense co- option attempts by state interests.
 For better or worse there is a ‘normalization’ of sorts taking place, in which 
historical civil society reconstitutes itself (in new forms), functional organiza-
tional entities slowly emerge, and the development- oriented, externally funded, 
civil society is shrinking and searching for new ways forward. As one NGO 
worker told us during the fieldwork for this chapter: before it was ‘money 
chasing NGOs’, but now it is ‘NGOs chasing money’. NGOs adapt economic-
ally in different ways, one way being through commercialization and private 
sector engagement. This path is most notably exhibited by ACLEDA, followed 
by CEDAC (cf. Feuer, this volume). Furthermore, many knowledge- based 
organizations are now increasingly pursuing private consultancy, while many 
others are simply scaling down. Adaptation to political pressure occasionally 
forces rights/advocacy NGOs to open a ‘development window’ in order to justify 
their presence and enhance their legitimacy (in the eyes of the state). For the 
moment the state seems to quite satisfied to co- opt or reduce the ‘threatening’ 
(i.e. the politicized and rights- based) spread of organized civil society, a venture 
that is inadvertently facilitated by the financial withdrawal from Cambodia of 
the international donor and NGO community.
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The growing associational civil society4
Currently, there are many different creatures filling the ‘intermediate associa-
tional realm’, and doing so in different ways. A crude categorization5 based on 
scale suggests three varieties of intermediate associations. First, we have the pro-
fessional and (reasonably) well- funded NGOs working with formal statutes, 
internal organization, work plans, and educated staff (e.g. AMARA, ADHOC). 
These are typically supported by international counterparts, which also influence 
them quite a lot (albeit indirectly) in terms of ideology and practice. They rarely 
have a defined constituency or broad membership registration.6 Second, there are 
the more home- grown CSOs, working ‘less professionally’, often with a limited 
geographical spread and a limited budget but operating from a more culturally 
adapted point of departure (e.g. BSDA, see below) and in close cooperation with 
local authorities. Third, we have CBOs, which arise from a functional need of a 
localized nature, with limited organization and no professional skills. This third 
category differs wildly in significance and success, in scope and engagement, 
but shares a typically para- statal characteristic, in that they are set up under 
directives from the local state machinery and often include village and/or 
commune officials (in a non- official role). In spite of their localized nature, they 
often also have outside patrons financing their activities and supporting their 
organizational structure. Below, I will provide a glimpse into the nature of these 
organizations by presenting three different cases.
 AMARA, the first case, represents the large- scale, increasingly professional, 
and maturing NGO that is invented in Cambodia, by Cambodians, but deeply 
ingrained in international NGO- ism. BSDA (‘Buddhism and Society Development 
Association’) represents the home- grown and self- reliant NGO, working with 
culturally adapted methods. Finally, the fishery CBO represents a common form – 
albeit unusually successful here – of village- based community organizations 
arising from sheer need. Since other categories and other cases can be found, these 
should be seen as illuminative rather than representative in a strict sense.
AMARA – professional but ‘domestic’
AMARA was established in Banteay Meanchey in 1994 and was immediately 
successful. It focused primarily on gender- based violence, which was highly rel-
evant as the civil war had just ended, and was therefore extremely ‘fundable’. 
The sources of funding have varied but include international NGOs and bilateral 
donors. In 1997, AMARA applied, and was approved, for registration with the 
Ministry of Interior as a local NGO. Back then, a representative recalls, the 
organization was blamed for being politically biased against the ruling party (the 
Cambodian People’s Party or CPP), but, as we were also told, it was ironically 
also blamed for being too close to the CPP because of its strategy of engaging 
with the government. No hard evidence for either allegation has surfaced. As 
time went on, people in the government got used to the work of AMARA and 
acknowledged the results of its work. Looking back, representatives from 
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AMARA claim that, in the 1990s, it was really difficult to work with the govern-
ment or to get its approval for working on women’s rights and democracy. They 
were not allowed to train women in local leadership/rights at the commune level, 
but could do so at the district office – closely watched by the government. The 
organization was warned a few times by the provincial governor of Banteay 
Meanchey about the nature of its work. By 2005, the organization started to 
openly discuss women in politics and carry out other advocacy work, such as 
training men and women in community development (for a similar situation in a 
different context, see Hiwasa, this volume).
 AMARA is shaped by the hierarchy and top- down perspectives of Cambo-
dian society and applies a respectful attitude vis- à-vis government officials. At 
the local level, NGO work is less formal. Government, however, demands dif-
ferent things than do AMARA’s donors, which makes it important to explain the 
organization’s reasons and work plan to both parties. Issues of rural develop-
ment and service delivery are easier to receive acceptance for from the side of 
the local authorities than issues of local governance or leadership, which do not 
provide material outputs. In AMARA’s experience, in order to maintain good 
relations with the government, close engagement and participation are very 
important. The overall trend, one interviewee stated, is that local authorities are 
now easier to work with than before, as decentralization reforms bed in. The 
government also seems more straightforward than before, and the organization 
can even work on, and discuss with authorities, the issue of anti- corruption. 
Since late 2011, however, AMARA has faced a serious funding challenge; many 
international donors are pulling out of Cambodia and no obvious alternative 
funding is forthcoming.
Buddhism for Social Development Action (BSDA) – a home- grown 
CSO with close relations to local authorities and communities
The founding ideas of BSDA came from the venerable Thorn Vandong in 2001, 
but the organization was not registered as a CSO until 2005. The group was 
started informally by 40 members who worked without payment for three years 
and was financed by minor membership fees and contributions collected at Bud-
dhist ceremonies. BSDA is currently operating in five major areas:
• Education and Buddhist leadership initiative: teaching street children, gangs, 
and other vulnerable young people about morals and social values, as well 
as how to behave properly and help society;
• Improvement of basic social morality in society: through a radio talk show, 
improving multi- cultural life skills and awareness about health issues, such 
as HIV and drug addiction;
• Orphanage program: BSDA works through scholarships, providing poor 
children, such as scavengers and street children, with skills to survive;
• Agriculture and livelihood: helping single- headed households (i.e. widows) 
and the most destitute families;
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• Good governance and advocacy: helping to build the capacity of commune 
councillors and local authorities.
A BSDA interviewee said there is a need to have good internal management, 
including accountability, transparency, personal commitment, and care and 
concern for the public, rather than for individual interests. This helps, we 
were told, to build internal trust while making the organization a role model for 
behaviour. In line with Buddhist thinking, the personal behaviour of BSDA 
leaders is important for its popular appeal and its relationship with the authori-
ties. As a leader of an organization, ‘one needs to be humble, show respect and 
get everybody involved in the decision- making process’. This is important, as 
BSDA is dependent on membership fees from people that are voluntarily 
contributing.
 CSO activities, it is often assumed, should also be adapted to, and understood 
in, the local context of culture, norms, and values. Since the Cambodian society 
was seriously wounded in the past, BSDA argues that it is extremely difficult to 
get people to engage with the authorities. Therefore, CSO activities must not 
imply further confrontation but should rather be geared towards healing the 
wounds. Overall, in the engagement with the commune, district, and province, it 
is very important not to be seen to be ‘teaching’ officials how to act. Instead, 
CSOs should, it is said, cooperate and work in partnership on the basis of mutual 
respect/trust; for example by being clear about what the organization can and 
cannot do. In return, in the experience of BDSA interviewees, the authorities 
tend to be supportive and helpful.
A successful community- based organization managing fishing
In the mid- 1990s, fishing areas were awarded to private companies by the 
Fishery Department, while villagers were disallowed from fishing in these blocs 
even for subsistence. By 1995, three villages in this area had experienced tre-
mendous hardships and suffered from harsh crackdowns by military and police 
officers hired by private fishing lot owners to protect their fishing zones. Any 
fishing by villagers was considered illegal and could lead to arrest and punish-
ment. The key problem was that the private companies claimed fishing rights as 
far as the water went, which, during some wet seasons, was all the way up to the 
village houses.
 With the assistance of an outside CSO, villagers sought to formally establish 
a community fishery,7 and they organized workshops, conferences, and meetings 
with local authorities and line ministries to achieve this goal. In 2000, there was 
a new policy from the government implying that less fishing lots would be 
awarded to private companies and that some areas were allocated for community 
management/fishing. This suited the local community and they subsequently set 
up a fishery community, which was officially recognized by the government in 
2001. They then set up a committee spanning three villages, established internal 
rules and regulations, mobilized members, and prepared working strategies.
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 The fishery community is headed by one chairman and three deputies, one 
from each of the three villages. These four are elected by the village populations 
in elections organized by the CSO and monitored by the commune council, the 
police, the military police, the district governor, and officials from the Fishery 
Department. The community committee, consisting of nine members from the 
three villages, has a lot of work but no formal mandate since the work is on a 
voluntary basis. It is funded by multilateral donors through domestic CSOs.8
 Working with the local authorities and the Fishery Department, the fishery 
community carefully follows rules and laws as defined by the government, and 
encourages others to do so, especially people in the community. When fishing 
rights are violated, the fishery community members call upon and inform the 
commune councillors. The fishery community can then intervene by confiscating 
the illegal fishing equipment on the spot and by reporting the violation to the 
Fishery Department at district level. Due to this informal channel, crimes can be 
more quickly and effectively prevented than if they had to wait for approval 
from the Fishery Department and other authorities.
 Before the fishery community was established, villagers were, as they recall, 
frustrated with the local authorities, the police, guards, and the Fishery Depart-
ment, considering them their enemy and not communicating with them at all. 
Although the overall problem of illegal fishing is not completely solved, the situ-
ation is reportedly different now. The Fishery Department provides technical 
support, such as a legal framework, and helps to stop illegal activities. Mean-
while, commune and district authorities provide security through policing efforts 
and grant legal authorization for interventions.
Conclusions – growth, change, and contradictions
The emergence of the civil society in Cambodia is fed from a variety of interests 
and is in flux (cf. World Bank 2009). The flux is occurring during the process of 
change from historically and culturally defined positions and practices towards 
internationalized and development- oriented ones. There is potentially a swing 
back taking place, and even a hybridization of sorts. Another aspect of this flux is 
within the internationalized civil society realm, with links to various cultures and 
ideologies. We are forced to think of not one civil society, but of civil societies, 
occupying different spaces with different hallmarks, functions, and appearances.
 In terms of plurality, we can juxtapose two extreme poles framing the nature 
of the organized civil society; one extreme is the confrontational position 
drawing on a Gramscian perspective, and the other extreme is a liberal Toc-
quevillian one. From having had an alien and oppositional/confrontational char-
acter – i.e. defined from the outside, inhering political opposition, focusing on 
advocacy for creating new societal norms, operating in the centre – civil society 
has now moved towards a more adapted character, aligning with the state, pursu-
ing a problem- solving role inside the system. In other terms, the pattern of the 
civil society’s (ies’) progression is such that it has been moving away from a 
Gramscian position toward a Tocquevillian one.
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 In terms of interests, various forces drive the change described above. The 
balance between outside interests and those of domestic Cambodian ones has, 
during the last decade, shifted dramatically to the benefit of the latter. In a parallel 
movement, the state, previously overwhelmed by the shifts, is now attempting to 
control and co- opt this realm more systematically. Ironically, to some extent, the 
‘missionary’ approach of international civil society has succeeded in triggering 
local capacity and a will to organize, which has invariably caused an amalgamation 
of sorts where local traits now are permeating a fair share of the civil society realm.
 What seems to be beyond doubt is that the significance of the civil society has 
increased drastically during the last two decades, and that civil society serves 
many important functions. To some extent it has risen to populate the ‘interme-
diary’ sphere that has, historically, been an empty space. Having said that, this 
intermediary sphere is occasionally subject to processes of intense co- option 
attempts by the state, which harbours a reflex to close this space (cf. Ou and 
Kim, this volume), and which is generally repulsed by collective engagement 
and organization by the population at large. Actors and agents in this sphere may 
have space to refrain or accept various pressures and interests, but they must 
inevitably relate to government engagement. In this sense, civil society positions 
are in constant transition, mirroring a broader political economy and the possible 
space it allows for ‘an intermediate associational realm’.
 The civil society is growing, yet being co- opted; it is consolidating itself as a 
force to be reckoned with, yet adapting itself to the realm of the (politically) 
possible; and, in this growth, it is simultaneously under increasing pressure. 
In contemporary Cambodia, this process remains dynamic, multifaceted, and 
contradictory. More than anything, it is undecided, important, and interesting, 
the details of which are further explored in other chapters of this volume.
Notes
1 These societal institutions are hardly ‘associational’, but they have at times an over-
whelming presence, and they may act as if they were associational.
2 Subsequently, rural pagodas received ‘donations’ from the Khmer diaspora and Phnom 
Penh- based politicians and tycoons, while family networks were mended and patron-
age returned to force with a more business- like character (contrasting to the historically 
localized landowning strongman patron).
3 Admittedly, some of these transform into self- financing operations (cf. Wells- Dang, 
this volume; Öjendal and Kim 2012).
4 The cases are based on an extensive qualitative fieldwork financed by The Asia 
Foundation, to which we are grateful. Ten qualitative case studies were reviewed, 
which are drawn upon here. The cases review NGO/CSO members’ perceptions about 
their roles, their evolutions, and the conditions they work under. These case studies 
were researched by Kim Sedara and Duong Viriroth.
5 The World Bank suggests a different typology, namely: (1) Traditional associations; 
(2) ‘Modern’ community- based organizations (CBOs); (3) Non- governmental organi-
zations (NGOs); (4) Trade unions; (5) Youth organizations; (6) Other categories 
(World Bank 2009: 8–9).
6 Un (2004: 272) states that the Cambodian NGO sector is a ‘civil movement without 
citizens’.
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7 Community Fishery is the term for the phenomenon of governing local fisheries 
locally. ‘The fishery community’ is the name of the actual community in our case.
8 The fishery community does not receive any funding from the commune councils’ 
budgets, but they are very supportive in terms of liaising and networking with higher 
authorities and assisting with security issues. The fishery community gets good techni-
cal support from the Fishery Department, and support in terms of administration, 
security, and mobilization from the commune council and district authorities.
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3 Bringing past models into the 
present
Identifying civil society in 
contemporary Vietnam
Bach Tan Sinh
With a long history of decentralized state–society relations and formally 
recognized associational activity, the Vietnamese experience of civil society 
is not easily captured by current definitions. The one- party political system 
building off a base of historical local groups and colonial structures presents a 
model of civil society that must be explained from the ground up. Building 
from a platform of historically active parts of society, Đổi mới, or market 
reforms, in the mid- 1980s, have resulted in a fundamental transformation of 
Vietnam’s economic and social structure, especially in its civil society. Major 
changes in economic opportunities have provided the society with an impetus 
for the development of new mediating groups such as non- governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), community- based organizations (CBOs), and civil society 
networks. These new groups not only need to situate themselves in a civic 
realm dominated currently by state- sponsored mass organizations, but they are 
also challenged to reinvent the idea of Vietnamese civil society in general. 
The interpretation of the civil society concept in the context of Vietnamese 
society inevitably needs to take into account the fact that this concept was ini-
tially developed in the West (see Reis and also Waibel, both in this volume). 
This is partly illustrated by the fact that it has been difficult to translate the 
concept into Vietnamese. The term most commonly used seems to be ‘xã hội 
dân sự’ (roughly translated as ‘society of citizens’), which has appeared recently 
but is still only sporadically used. If civil society can be defined as a separate 
public sphere (công), ‘it is a well understood term going back centuries in 
Vietnam, representing the space in which people conduct affairs beyond family 
or private sector (tư), but not specifically under the jurisdiction of government 
officials (quan)’ (Marr 1994). However, it is increasingly clear that con-
temporary definitions of civil society and their embeddedness in the Vietnamese 
language are becoming more differentiated as they come into jargon and prac-
tice; for a more detailed account of this, please read Phuong Le Trong’s contri-
bution in this volume.
 As the concept of civil society takes shape in response to outside influences, 
economic trends and political changes, the civic space it constitutes invariably 
needs to reshape itself and grow. Strictly speaking, the Constitution of Vietnam 
provides a principal basis for the development of civil organizations that are 
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established by citizens and independent from the government. Article 69 clearly 
states  that,  ‘the citizen shall enjoy  freedom of opinion and speech,  freedom of 
the press, the right to be informed, and the right to assemble, form associations 
and hold demonstrations in accordance with the provisions of the law’. Although 
this is under the current circumstances something of an ideal rather than a prac-
tical framework for civic engagement, Article 69 does provide a foundation for 
various changes. For  example,  this  article has  come  to play a more prominent 
role in a context of limited and declining subsidies for the bureaucracy as well as 
the increasing demand of the economy, which has created openings for other 
actors and renegotiating the roles of existing actors. Indeed, the government of 
Vietnam has come to acknowledge that many functions which used to be per-
formed  by  government  institutions  can  now  be  carried  out  by  self- established 
organizations and individuals (Kerkvliet et al. 2008; Norlund et al. 2008; Wisch-
ermann 2010). This is particularly so in the field of research and application of 
science and technology, and of economic, governance and social development 
policies  (Sinh  2011;  Centre  for  Cooperation  Human  Resource  Development 
2010). Indirectly, this has also encouraged the growth and differentiation of civil 
society in many other realms (Norlund et al. 2008).
 In this overview chapter I will illuminate the evolving landscape of civil 
society in Vietnam, paying close attention to the organizational forms that 
have  emerged  or  been  renegotiated  over  time.  To  understand  the  unique  case 
of  Vietnamese  civil  society,  I  first  call  into  question  the  various  definitions 
of civil society that may apply, or have been applied, to Vietnam. Following this, 
I describe the historical precedents of Vietnamese social organization, which 
plays  a  significant  role  in  bracketing  the  development  of  civil  society.  There-
after, I lay out the contemporary institutional sphere set up by the state, and 
elaborate the many organizational forms that both align with, and operate outside 
of,  the  state  apparatus.  Before  concluding,  I  discuss  how  civil  society  has 
adapted itself to Vietnam and how Vietnam is adapting to the evolution of civil 
society.
Defining civil society in Vietnam
The concept of civil society proposed by Kaldor can be seen as a classic refer-
ence  point  for Vietnam. She  defines  civil  society  as  intermediate- level  associ-
ation, which manifests as ‘self organisations outside the formal political circles’ 
and which expand the ‘space in which individual citizens can influence the con-







lation, civil society is
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the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self- generating, (largely) 
self- supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a  legal order or 
set of shared rules.  It  is distinct  from society  in general  in  that  it  involves 
citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, pas-







different  from the  international concepts. The condition of separation  from the 
government should be exempted to some degree, since all organizations, in prin-
ciple,  fall under  the aegis of  the Communist Party and  the state. Even without 
the  presence  of  a  specific  law  on  non- governmental  organization,  all  NGOs 
which  were  listed  in  the  Vietnam NGOs  Directory  (Tran  Tuan  and  Le  Quoc 
Hung, 2002), are formally established and registered with government agencies 
and mass  organizations.  For  example, many  of  them were  registered with  the 
former Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment  (MOSTE),1 particu-
larly as  research centres under  the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology 
Associations  (VUSTA).  Party  directives  and  government  decisions  not  only 










understood within the framework of Vietnamese society, history, and the evolv-
ing framework guided by the state and Party.
Interpreting civil society in the context of the Vietnamese 
history of social organization
Research on the traditional organization of Vietnamese society points to the 
cooperative relationship between state and villages, whereby the state would not 
intrude deeply into village affairs and thereby grant some degree of local auto-
nomy.  In  this  narrative,  however,  geographical  differences  and  the  impacts, 
cultural and structural, of Chinese domination (over  the course of 1,000 years) 
play  an  important  role. Villages,  particularly  in  the  north,  sustained  a  form of 
organization that emphasized independence from the state as well as internal 
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time span further enhanced the tradition of local solidarity intersecting with 
national engagement. There were also several dimensions which formed a basis 
for  the  existence  of  the  villager’s  ‘civic  engagement’  in  the  countryside:  (1) 
mutual dependence in agricultural production among families stimulated recip-
rocal respect, equality and egalitarianism; (2) craft guilds (phường) and associ-
ations (hội)  added  to  this  interdependence and mutual  respect;  (3)  age groups/
cohorts (giáp), egalitarian themselves, enabled a hierarchy with age roughly cor-
responding to rank; (4) the administrative organization of the village was based 
on the triangle of advisory (kỳ lão), legislative committee (kỳ mục), and execu-
tive council (kỳ dịch) that interfaced with ‘giáp’ to form a very stable volunteer 
form of association. In addition, each village had its own laws (huong ước) and 
decentralized governance (hội đồng kỳ mục). To  some extent,  the  idiom,  ‘The 
King’s  rule stops at  the village gate’  reflects a sort of democratic  interdepend-
ence between state and village sector.
 In urban centres in the past, social groupings called phường (ward) and hội 
(association), also existed. The old Ha Noi,  the capital of Vietnam since 1010, 
was formed by an assembly of 36 phường. These phường produced and traded 
goods of high quality, such as silk, jewellery, leather, metal goods, and other dif-
ferent  types  of  handicrafts.  Internally, members  of  the phường were bound to 
help each other in the production of goods by, for example, providing technical 
assistance  or  loans  to  one  another.  In  an  expression  of  solidarity,  they  also 





significant  emergence  of  civil  society  in Vietnam with  the  formation  of many 
self- established  associations  that  played  counterpoint  to  the  colonial  govern-
ment. The most prominent one was the Reform Association founded in 1904 by 
Phan Boi Chau,2 who, among other things, sought to train young Vietnamese 
reformers in Japan and China. He called for general reforms, including the dis-
semination of the Romanized script, the development of industry and commerce, 
as well  as  the  establishment  of  charities  and  farmers’  associations.  Phan  Chu 
Trinh,3 another reformist, organized campaigns against outdated customs and 
encouraged charitable activities. Most members of the Reform Association were 
intellectuals  or  social  activists  and  mainly  from  urban  areas.  The  financial 
resources were derived mainly from contributions by members and from wealthy 
families who opposed the colonialist government. Beyond the reform movement 
there existed many other forms of associations in economic, social, political, and 
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cultural arenas. The trend among them was to favour overarching social reforms, 
of which many had anti- feudal, anti- colonialist, and revolutionary elements.
 With the introduction of socialist construction in the north of the country 
since the mid- 1950s, a new socio- economic and political space was established. 





trum of social groups, are also organized by the state with a mandate to mobilize 
people to achieve nationally defined goals. Despite the national orientation, the 
presence of these mass organizations indicates recognition of the need for local 
participation. In this respect, the government counts on the mass organizations. 
Thus, although organized and funded by the government, and therefore not non- 
governmental in a conventional sense, mass organizations play an important role 
in voicing local interests and needs to the government. With the market reforms 
initiated in the mid- 1980s, a new socio- economic environment emerged that was 
more conducive to the development of civil society organizations and to the 
renegotiation of existing associational ties.
Legal and institutional framework for civil society in 
Vietnam







the broader civil society apparatus is at odds with the expectations of inter-
national  observers  of  civil  society.  Indeed,  the  sceptics  insist  that  in Vietnam 
there is no non- governmental organization because all organizations are placed 
under the leadership of the Party and under the management of the state (Vasa-
vakul 2003: 25ff.). While this type of categorical dismissal of Vietnamese civil 
society is not without its basis, it fails to consider the deviation from formal 
structures and the pre- existing diversity in associational forms.
 While there is little precise agreement as to which associational forms should 
be included within civil society in Vietnam, particularly in terms of political and 
economic associations, they generally refer to the following classification:
1  the mass organizations (đoàn thể)
2 popular associations (hội quần chúng), including the professional 
associations
3  funds, charities, and supporting centres, often set up by government decree
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4  professional  centres  or  research/education  centres  (Vietnamese  NGOs 
(VNGOs) – (tổ chức phi chính phủ), such as the ones listed in the VNGOs 
Directory4 (Tran Tuan and Le Quoc Hung 2002)
5  community- based organizations (CBOs).
In  addition  to  these,  there  are  also  civil  society  forms which  do  not  fit  a  par-
ticular category. In general, however, all of these five categories of actors have 
managed to reach the provincial, district and even commune level, the extent of 
which depending naturally upon the nature of their work and their available 
resources. Therefore, it is very interesting to have a look at the hierarchy found 
amongst these actors, as well as the ways in which these actors communicate 
with each other and orient their systems of power within the landscape of civil 
society. Below,  I will  illuminate  this broader  landscape by exploring each cat-
egory of group as well as discussing groups that are not easily sorted.
The landscape of civil society organizations in Vietnam
Group 1 – mass organizations
Article 9 of Vietnam’s Constitution of 1992 (revised in 2001) states that:
the Vietnam Fatherland Front  and  its member organizations  constitute  the 
political  base  of  people’s  power.  The  Front  promotes  the  tradition  of 
national solidarity, strengthens the people’s unity of mind in political and 
Table 3.1 Political structure in Vietnam
Level Communist Party Legislative 
body
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spiritual matters, participates in the building and consolidation of people’s 
power,  works  together  with  the  State  for  the  care  and  protection  of  the 








which  involve  millions  of  citizens.  For  example,  the  VWU  has  12  million 
members across the country with a very well organized structure linking its 
central, provincial, district and commune levels. The Youth Union has 5.1 million 
members (Taylor et al. 2012: 6). The mass organizations generally aim at secur-
ing the people’s active participation in the implementation of the Party’s policies.
 As mentioned earlier, mass organizations in accordance with the legal frame-
work constitute a pillar of the state structure of Vietnam and thus may not be 
considered as components of civil society in a strict sense. However,  if we are 
considering their recent transformation and ongoing activities, then increasingly 
mass  organizations  are  playing  an  important  role  in  civil  society.  Indeed,  the 
contemporary  role  of  mass  organizations  has  shifted  remarkably.  From  being 
overtly political organizations with the mandate to promulgate the policies of the 
Party and the government to all groups of society, and to convince and mobilize 
support from citizens for implementation of policy, mass organizations have 
shifted more towards to a position in which they represent and protect the inter-
ests of  their members  in various decision- making processes  (see,  for  example, 
Pistor and Le Thi Quy, this volume). With the economy moving to market- based 
and the services of public agencies unable to expand fast enough to meet 
growing  demand,  mass  organizations  have  often  diversified  their  positions  as 
economic service providers for their members. The advancement of the market 
economy also brings changing incentives for member participation in the sorts 
of economic activities of  the mass organizations. The continued willingness of 
so many members to remain with mass organizations in this rapidly changing 
period suggests that the shift towards service and welfare provision is serving to 




with the government and Party ensures that the activities of the state and citizens 
are interwoven from the top to the bottom of the government chain. At the same 
time it should be noted that mass organizations are well placed to influence the 
government process, and therefore constitute an important entry point for 
informing policy- makers with respect to rural development and natural resources 
management. A few examples of  the diversified social and economic activities 
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organized by mass organizations in the shifting political and economic landscape 
will be presented below.
Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA)
VUSTA  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  mass  organizations  under  the  VFF. 
VUSTA is an umbrella organization comprising four elements: the central organ-
ization,  member  professional  associations,  province- level  unions,  as  well  as 
research centres and institutes (often referred to by donors as NGOs) registered 
under VUSTA. It has about 650,000 members, or about half of the total number 
of  Vietnamese  intellectuals  (defined  as  those  graduating  from  university).  Its 
periodicals are ‘khoa học và tổ quốc’ (Science and Fatherland) and khoa học và 
đời sống’ (Science  and Life). VUSTA’s budget, which  is  indicative of  its  rel-
ative autonomy, comes not only from government subsidies, but also from the 
returns  from  various  scientific  and  technological  activities  and  enterprises,  as 
well as donations from individuals, institutions and members.
Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU)






Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL)
The VGCL  is  a  labour- oriented mass  organization  in Vietnam.  In  2005  it  had 
76,678 grassroots trade unions with about 5,250,000 members.5 Article 10 of the 
Constitution defines the functions of the VGCL as a political and social organ-
ization under  the  leadership of  the Communist Party, with  a mandate  to parti-
cipate in state administration and ‘social management’. The VGCL plays a dual 
role, expected to both protect the rights and interests of workers as well as to 
promote production and create jobs. In this capacity, the President of the VGCL 





Vietnam Union of Literature and Arts Associations (VULAA)
VULAA is a cultural- oriented mass organization under the VFF. The statute of 
VULAA, revised at its Sixth National Congress in 2000, states that the Union is 
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a political, social and professional organization (tổ chức chính trị xã hội, chuyên 
nghiệp). VULAA’s structure consists of  the central union structure,  ten central 
professional  associations,  and 61 provincial  and municipal unions. The central 
union structure (liên hiệp) serves to coordinate activities of professional associ-
ations  and  provincial  and municipal  unions.  Its  periodical  is  called  ‘Diễn đàn 
văn nghệ’ (Literature and Arts Forum). The central Union’s financial resources 
come from the government, income generated from its activities, and contribu-
tions from individuals or domestic organizations.





on  the  rise  and,  in 2010,  the  former Vice Minister  of Home Affairs  estimated 
that, ‘there were nearly 15,000 associations across Vietnam’ (quoted in Taylor et 
al. 2012: 6). These include, for example, professional associations in natural sci-
ences, social sciences, applied sciences and technology, which constitute the 
second element of VUSTA’s  structure. Within  this  category we also find such 
groups as the Association of Vietnamese Writers, and Association of Vietnam-
ese  Folklorists,  which  fall  under  the  umbrella  of  VULAA,  and  the  Vietnam 
Association of Mathematics, and Vietnam Gardening Association (VACVINA), 




associations;  an  additional  300  organizations  are  affiliated.  VUSTA members 
run 197 newspapers, magazines and websites.6
 Popular and professional member associations report to the central unions of 
their  respective  mass  organization  biannually.  Member  associations  take 
responsibility for their own finances. To set up a popular or professional associ-
ation,  for example under VUSTA, Vietnamese scientists  in a particular profes-
sional branch will have to hold discussions with the central union to see whether 
a new association is needed. The central union will then seek approval from the 
Ministry  of  Home Affairs.  The  new  association  has  to  submit  a  draft  statute, 




 In turn, the professional associations often sponsor smaller clubs or associ-
ations. For example, the Hanoi Union of Science and Technology Associations 
(HUSTA),  which  reports  to  VUSTA,  has  developed  34  popular  professional 
associations,  such  as  the  Hanoi  Gardener’s  Association  and  Hanoi  Lawyer’s 
Association.7 Some of  these member associations have complex organizational 
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features, such as operating their own research centres or even private schools 





has ten central professional associations such as the Associations for Vietnamese 
Writers, Musicians,  Artists,  Film Makers,  Photographers,  Dancers,  Architects, 
Folklorists, and for themes such as Fine Arts or Minorities’ Arts and Literature.
  Formally,  professional  and  popular  associations  are  independent  from  the 
central  unions  of  the  mass  organizations.  They  run  their  own  organization, 
recruit their own personnel, and make their own decisions on how and to whom 
they grant membership. All of  them publish  their own newspapers and period-
icals and some run their own publishing houses and clubs. The Association for 
Vietnamese Writers, for example, runs six newspapers and periodicals and its 
publishing house produced around 200  titles  in 1999, while  the Association of 
Vietnamese Architects issues two periodicals.
  The main task of professional member associations is to assist their members 
in  professional matters.  In  addition  they  advise  the  state  on policies  related  to 
science, as well as to the arts and culture, and contribute to state projects when 
requested. The Association of Vietnamese Musicians, for example, proposed that 
music be taught in kindergartens and primary schools, while the Association for 
Vietnamese Architects assisted the government with urban planning and legal 
issues  related  to  construction.  The  Association  for  Vietnamese  Writers  also 
assisted the Ministry of Education with the reform of literature textbooks, while 
the  Association  for Minorities’  Literature  and  Arts  helped  with  textbooks  for 
ethnic minority primary schools.
Vietnam Gardening Association (VACVINA)
Set  up  in  1986  under  VUSTA, VACVINA  is  a  typical  example  of  a  popular 
association. VACVINA  promotes  sustainable  agriculture  through  the  develop-
ment  of  the VAC ecosystem model. VAC  is  an  acronym of  three Vietnamese 
words: vườn which means garden or orchard, ao, físh pond, and chuồng, animal 
shed. The main strategies adopted by the VAC system are to recycle solar energy 
through spatial arrangements of crops, and to use residue from one farming 
sphere as material for another. The VAC model developed a systematic coher-
ence over time and was adopted as an economic model (kinh tế VAC). Later  it 
was expanded and applied to ecosystems of the delta, mountains, coast, and 
forest. Because  it has been used  to  increase  the  income of  rural households,  it 
became a poverty reduction mechanism and, due to its ecological orientation, it 
has been used to promote sustainable development. By the mid- 1990s, the VAC 
model had been adopted and applied nationwide by various groups. Colleges of 
Agriculture  typically  have  a  department  focusing  on  the  VAC model.  During 
the  third  phase  of  its  development, which  began  roughly  in  the mid- 1990s,  it 
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has become the baseline for advice and assessment of other rural models of 
development.
  VACVINA is organized from the central  to  the local  level with branches in 
most provinces. In addition to the nationwide network of gardeners, VACVINA 
also  runs  five  centres  and  three  companies  that  support  the  promotion  of  the 
VAC  ecosystem.  The  five  centres  are  the  Centre  for  Rural  Communities 
Research  and  Development,  the  Centre  for  Marine  Products,  two  centres 
responsible for the transfer of technology, and one centre responsible for consul-
tancy  work.8  VACVINA  communicates  through  newspapers  and  conferences 
with  the  Ministry  of  Labour  or  the  cabinet.  Beyond  its  connection  through 
VUSTA, VACVINA has separately established relationships with the state struc-
ture,  especially  with  the  Ministries  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development, 
Education,  Finance,  Planning  and  Investment,  and  Science,  Technology,  and 
Environment. VACVINA also has direct relations with the Party structure. Their 
horizontal linkages include other popular associations such as the Association of 
Fertilizer Producers and the Association for Vietnamese Planters.
Group 3 – funds, charities, and supporting centres








organizations,  such as  the Fund  for Protection and Support of Children, estab-
lished by the Vietnam Committee of Protection and Care of Children (a minis-
terial level government body in charge of children’s issues, which was, in 1991, 
transformed  into  the Committee  for  Protection  and Care  of Children  (CPCC). 
Funds are also formed under mass organizations,  like  the Compassion Fund of 
the Vietnam Women’s Union. Finally, there are funds under local governments; 
for  example,  the  Fund  for  Housing  Development  of  Hanoi  under  the  Hanoi 
People’s Committee.
  Supporting centres, which were legalized through Decree 25/ND- CP in 2001, 
have since mushroomed. The main function of  these centres  is  to provide care 




cies  or  through  their  umbrella  organizations.  Individuals  rarely  set  up  such 
centres.
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Group 4 – research/training professional centres
Within the current institutional framework, mass organizations such as VUSTA 
or VULAA, as well as some government agencies such as the institutes and uni-
versities, have set up many professional research/training centres. These organ-
izations have the highest degree of autonomy from the government and therefore 
are often referred to as ‘local NGOs’ or VNGOs. The activities of these NGOs 
are primarily in research and consultancy, covering a wide range of economic, 
social and cultural dimensions of development. Most of  these research/training 
centres are listed in the VNGO directory, published in 2002 (Tran Tuan and Le 
Quoc Hung,  2002).  A more  recent  survey  of  the Asia  Foundation  indicates  a 
total  number  of  607 VNGOs  in Hanoi  and  another  223  in Ho Chi Minh City 









increased  to  56  (Taylor et al. 2012:  6).  The  centres  and  institutes  concentrate 
mainly in the areas of business management, urban and rural development, 
poverty  reduction,  community  development,  gender  equality,  environmental 
issues and training.
  A recent survey (Taylor et al. 2012) summarizes the main characteristics of 
the  research centres and  institutes based  in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The 
vast majority  of  these  organizations  operate  in more  than one field  and  some-
times shift their focus, as they adapt to new policies and emerging development 
paradigms and  fashions  (such as climate change). They  traditionally engage  in 
service delivery and, more recently, capacity building, research and advocacy 
activities. The process of registration and other legal procedures are complex and 
contribute to regulating the institutes’ opportunities for accessing donor funding. 
In general, the economic situation of the centres and institutes is often precari-
ous, which might be one reason that they also face challenges with regard to 
their human resources. However, despite the weaknesses mentioned here, as pro-
fessional organizations, occasionally their voices have created considerable pres-
sure to deal with economic and social misconduct of state ministries or local 
authorities (see Wells- Dang, this volume).
 Nevertheless, there are also critical voices concerning the research centres 
and institutes. There have been claims that a few of these civil society organiza-
tions carry out unregistered activities and therefore operate outside the legal 
framework. As a response to these suspicions, national unions like VUSTA have 
started reviewing the licences for some of these associations.
Identifying civil society in Vietnam    51
Group 5 – community- based organizations (CBOs)
CBOs in Vietnam are numerous and are on the rise. Thousands have been estab-




The  first  is  externally  established  through  projects  and  development  pro-
grammes. The second  is self- established for  the provision of services for com-
munities and members.
Externally established groups and projects
















become  responsible  for  the overall management of  local  development projects 




the role of mediating institutions, in which representatives from community 
work for the interests of local people rather than strictly following the directives 
of  the  local  government.  The  Commune/Village  Development  Boards  (CDB/
VDB) or the Project Management Committees at the commune and village levels 
are one example. Typically, members of  these groups are  selected  from grass-
roots  elected  bodies  and  representatives  from  local  communities.  In  Tuyen 




construction  through  the  established CDBs, which  consisted of  representatives 
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from the commune authority, mass organizations and local people. In the poorest 
districts  of  the northern mountainous provinces of Son La, Lai Chau  and Hoa 
Binh, the UNDP- funded project on aquaculture for poverty reduction established 
Commune Action Groups in each of its target communes, which was composed 




Self- established groups, projects and committees
The second type of grassroots community organization comes much closer to the 
ideal  of  civic  groups  that  anyone  can  voluntarily  join  if  they  have  a  shared 
interest. This second group includes those CBOs that directly provide services to 
their members  and  to  the  community.  These  organizations  often  do work  that 
would normally be under the charge of local state agencies. Typical examples of 
these  organizations  include  agriculture/aquaculture  extension  groups,  WUGs, 
and credit savings groups. Those groups are usually formed in response to a spe-
cific need in a community (see Waibel and Benedikter, this volume).
  CBOs  of  this  type  have  developed  rapidly,  particularly  in  the  rural  areas, 
because the services of government agencies have not met the demands of the 
fast developing rural market. One example of self- established CBOs is the agri-
cultural extension clubs (currently regulated by Decree No. 151 on cooperative 
groups  from  2007),  which  developed  extensively  in  the  south  of  Vietnam. 
Farmers voluntarily join these clubs to share their experience and information on 
the markets of agricultural  inputs and outputs. Another prominent example are 
WUGs, which are established by farmer households which share a common 
water supply system for their cultivation and consumption (see an example in 
Reis,  this  volume;  also  Bach  Tan  Sinh  2002). WUGs  in  many  provinces  are 
facilitated by the local authorities and are entitled to levy irrigation fees from 
farmers for their self- maintenance – a task that would normally be the responsib-
ility  of  the  local  government’s  irrigation  service  company.  WUGs  are  now 
widely found in Vietnam, having largely replaced the bureaucratic irrigation 
service provided by state companies that charged high irrigation fees while pro-
viding poor maintenance due to constraints in government allocation.
Group 6 – organizations of other forms




izations can be very large and, like professional organizations, can have an 
impact on local authorities and state departments. For example, self- established 
advocacy groups in some localities voice critical views against various agencies 
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or  businesses;  for  example  requesting  them  to  pay  attention  to  environmental 
concerns. As a result of such activities one factory was forced to install air filters 
to  improve  the  quality  of  discharged  air,  while  other  factories  were  relocated 
(O’Rourke 2000).
 It should be emphasized that in the past, once an association was allowed to 
be formed, its operations would be subsidized and closely supervised by the state 
apparatus. Nowadays the government still partly funds administrative work and 
coordination of the large unions and associations, but most associations and 
organizations are self- financed. As a result the government has less influence on 
the orientation and activities of these organizations (as long as they do not 
violate the law).
Adapting civil society to the Vietnamese context
Given  the  inter- linked  and  increasingly  differentiated  roles  of  state- sponsored 
organizations  and  their  subsidiaries,  Vietnam  has  a  unique  landscape  of  civil 
society. In order to give credit to the good works of groups (nominally) linked to 
the state, CSOs in Vietnam should refer to any organization or group that people 
are entitled  to  join  to accomplish collective objectives  that are practical and/or 




bling and articulating individual interests and helping these interests win 
consideration  during  the  decision- making  processes  of  government.  Addition-
ally,  CSOs  in  various  forms  can  not  only  help  the  government  in monitoring 
socio- economic development issues,  they also provide a substitute for many of 
the functions performed by the state, such as agricultural extension, credit man-
agement,  irrigation  maintenance,  information  exchange,  etc.  (see  Waibel  and 
Benedikter, as well as Reis, both in this volume).
  By this definition, CSOs should also include the mass organizations and the 
popular associations that are formally under the Party or state control, particu-
larly as these are undergoing a gradual functional transformation towards activ-
ities that are commonly associated with CSOs. Indeed, mass organizations (and 
their subsidiaries), in addition to NGOs and other civic associations, have proven 
their complementary roles in government service provision, especially in the 
areas of social welfare and poverty reduction. In no particular order, these activ-
ities  now  include:  (1)  organizing  activities  that  aim  at  increasing  the  income, 
either directly or indirectly, of people (mass organizations, CBOs, credit groups, 
funds); (2) representing people in forming links and negotiating with local gov-
ernment  authorities  (mass  organizations,  NGOs,  CBOs,  cultural/religious 
groups);  (3)  spreading  knowledge  and  exchange  of  experience  (professional 
organizations,  NGOs);  and  (4)  providing  feedback  between  government  and 
communities (mass organizations, NGOs, advocacy groups, CBOs, cultural/reli-
gious groups).
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  Although  there  are  advantages  to  working  within  the  current  legal,  socio- 
economic and political framework, these organizations commonly face con-
straints and challenges that include: (1) lack of a clear legal framework for their 
operation; (2) poor transparency of the state administration concerning access to 
public  resources,  particularly  in  bidding  and  selection  of  sub- contractors;  (3) 
limited access to available information held by state agencies; (4) no, or limited, 
support from authorities at all levels in terms of infrastructure, incentives and 
other  logistical  assistance;  and  (5)  very  limited  participation,  if  any,  in  policy 
formulation.
  To  allay  the  government’s  reluctance  to  provide  widespread  legitimacy  to 
CSOs,  the  development  community  can  facilitate  by  demonstrating  to  policy- 
makers,  in  both  theory  and  practice,  that  autonomous CSOs  are  effective  and 
efficient  for socio- economic development  in Vietnam, and  that  the  transforma-
tion  of mass  organizations  is  necessary  in  the market  economy.  The  areas  of 
poverty reduction through sustainable natural resources management would be 
amongst  the  most  visible  and  measurable  socio- economic  dimensions.  At  the 
same time, the conditions for entry for CSOs must be prioritized in some way, as 
there  are  already  many  existing  models  from  CBOs,  NGOs  and  professional 
associations in poverty reduction and natural resource management that are 
available  for  research,  evaluation,  demonstration,  replication  and  finally 
institutionalization.
Conclusions – key opportunities and challenges
With the partial retreat of the state from the provision of subsidized and organ-
ized welfare, existing (planned) social safety nets have increasingly been in 
decline. In addition to this, the relative decline in the capacity of family networks 
or informal mechanisms to provide alternatives have been mounting pressure on 
individuals to seek a way to access economic and social services, which has been 
an  incentive  for  CSOs  of  varies  types. At  the  same  time,  current  government 
policies for grassroots democracy have increasingly opened opportunities for 
individuals and communities to actively participate in economic, social and 
political affairs.9 Increasingly, the government has come to recognize its chang-
ing role and the importance of developing a strong civil sector to provide com-
plementary services, which used to be the government’s sole responsibility.




establishment  and  operations  of  these  CSOs.  Decentralization  and  grassroots 
democratization policies have contributed to an enabling environment that has 
significantly  increased  CSOs’  involvement  in  various  economic,  social,  and 
political  affairs  at  different  levels.  The  government’s  need  to  develop  a  state 
with a rule of law, social equality, wide participation, and sound governance, has 
clearly  required  a  supporting  contribution  from  the  civil  and  private  sector  in 
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order to keep pace with these challenges. In addition, the challenge of establish-
ing regional and  international  integration (e.g.  to participate  in  the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Free Trade Area, World Trade 
Organization, etc.) has also reinforced the necessity of this third sector. Finally, 
growing involvement of international organizations and donors has given more 
impetus for the growth of this sector.
  In any case, the present trend is irreversible as these CSOs continue to dem-
onstrate  their  indispensability  to  the socio- economic and political development 
of the country. Against a backdrop of various macro processes, and with growing 
recognition  from  the  government,  these  quasi  civil  society  organizations  are 
firmly on their way to becoming civil and professional.
Notes







a  new  group  called  the  ‘Vietnamese  Restoration  League’  (Việt Nam Quang Phục 
Hội), modelled after Sun Yat- Sen’s Republican Party. In 1925 French agents seized 
him  in  Shanghai.  He was  convicted  of  treason  and  spent  the  rest  of  his  life  under 
house  arrest  in  Huế.  See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phan_Boi_Chau  (accessed  1 
October 2012).
  3  Phan Chu Trinh,  also known as Phan Châu Trinh  (1872–1926) was a  famous early 
twentieth century Vietnamese nationalist. He also used the alias, Tây Hồ. He sought 
to end France’s brutal occupation of Vietnam. He opposed both violence and turning 
to other countries for support, and instead believed in attaining Vietnamese liberation 








  5  See:  www.congdoanvn.org.vn/details.asp?l=1&c=23&c2=23&m=580  (retrieved  25 
November 2012).
  6  See: www.vusta.vn/home3/news/?42624/Gioi- thieu-chung- ve-Lien- hiep-cac- Hoi-Khoa-  
hoc-va- Ky-thuat- Viet-Nam.htm (accessed 25 November 2012).
  7  See: http://husta.org.vn/Husta.aspx?Module=News&Id=2 (accessed 1 December 2012).
  8  The  three  companies  run  by  VACVINA  are  VAC  Co.,  VACVINA  Co.,  and 
RUDECO.  VAC  Co.  buys  and  sells  fruit;  VACVINA  Co.  sells  fertilizer  and  rice 
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10  Decree  35  issued  by  the Council  of Ministers  on  the management  of  scientific  and 
technological activities, Decree No. 35/HDBT of 28 January 1992.
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Tổ Chức Phi Chính Phu ̉ (Directory of Vietnamese Organizations that have Characteris-
tics  of  Non- governmental  Organizations),  Hanoi:  Research  and  Training  Center  for 
Rural Development.
Vasavakul, Thaveeporn (2003) ‘From Fence Breaking to Networking: Popular Organisa-
tions  and  Policy  Influence  in  Post- Socialist  Vietnam’  in  Kerkvliet,  B.  J.  T.,  Koh, 
D. W. H.,  and Heng, R. H.-k.  (eds), Getting Organized in Vietnam: Moving in and 
around the Socialist State, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Weimer, D. L., Vining, Aidan R. (1999) Policy Analysis, Concepts and Practice, Third 
Edition, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall.
Wischermann J. (2010) ‘Civil Society Action and Governance in Vietnam: Selected Find-












In Cambodia and Vietnam, networks of non- governmental organizations 
(NGOs), individual activists and local communities have formed in the past two 
decades to advocate collectively for the common concerns of their members. 
Responding to challenges of rapid, unequal development and to shifting political 
opportunities, networks bring actors together across geographic, sectoral and 
social boundaries and have engaged on a range of issues including health care, 
education, poverty reduction and environmental protection.1
 The emergence of networks has created new spaces for social action in 
both countries and contributed to existing civil society structures. In Vietnam, 
networks share a space previously occupied by Communist Party- sponsored 
mass organizations and state- owned media; in Cambodia, they are partially 
replacing competing political parties and professionalized NGOs. Most networks 
are unregistered entities. Neither Cambodian nor Vietnamese law contains 
the category of networks, although some networks register as NGOs or busi-
nesses. Cambodian networks have developed autonomously from the state, as 
‘three- sector’ theories of civil society would predict. Vietnamese networks, by 
contrast, straddle the boundaries between society and the state, including 
members both within and outside state institutions (Read and Pekkanen 2009; 
Wells- Dang 2012).
 Following an introduction to network approaches to civil society, this chapter 
presents empirical case studies of networks in Cambodia and Vietnam – with a 
focus on environmental controversies over dams and forests that link the two 
countries – and illustrates divergent network structures and advocacy strategies. 
Although Cambodian and Vietnamese networks struggle with similar social and 
developmental issues, the outcomes of their advocacy efforts have been dis-
tinctly different.
Civil society as networks
Recent scholarship on civil society has moved away from the question of ‘who 
is in civil society?’ to asking ‘what does civil society do?’ Drawing in part on 
Gramscian roots, many analysts of Vietnam have theorized civil society as an 
arena of struggle and contestation clustering around a range of possible  advocacy 
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activities and forms of engagement with the state (Hannah 2007; Kerkvliet et al. 
2008; Thayer 2009). Regarding Cambodia, critical political economy theorists 
have shown how NGOs’ independence is limited by donor funding and manipu-
lation by the authorities (Öjendal and Lilja 2009; Hughes 2009).
 The extent of civil society in Cambodia and Vietnam may be evaluated dif-
ferently depending on the selected criteria. A conceptualization of civil society 
as made up of voluntary, non- profit associations autonomous from the state 
(Cohen and Arato 1992; Anheier et al. 2003) applies more closely to Cambodia, 
with its large, diverse NGO sector. Local and international NGOs in Cambodia 
have organized themselves, without involvement of state authorities, into two 
membership networks, the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia and the NGO 
Forum on Cambodia. In Vietnam, the concept of autonomy is problematic, since 
no registered organization is completely independent from the state. The major-
ity of Vietnamese NGOs participating in networks are registered through 
VUSTA, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (Liên hiệp 
các Hội Khoa học và Kỹ thuật Việt Nam). Founded by a revolutionary scientist 
and former Minister of Defence, VUSTA is a ‘socio- political organization’ with 
special status to ‘advise, give feedback, and act as a check on society’ (tư vấn, 
phản biện, giám định xã hội) from within the Party- state system (Government of 
Vietnam 2002, 2010). Corporatist in structure and intent (Vasavakul 2003: 
34–45), VUSTA has effectively used its quasi- state ‘umbrella’ status to register 
and supervise Vietnamese NGOs, while also offering links to Communist Party 
and state authorities (Pistor and Le Thi Quy, this volume).2
 Thus, if civil society is theorized as an intermediate sphere of activity 
between individuals, families and the state (Habermas 1992; Öjendal, this 
volume), Vietnamese civil society appears more robust. Vietnamese participate 
in many local associations, such as farmer groups, that may or may not be vol-
untary, non- profit and autonomous (Waibel and Benedikter, this volume). A 
focus on NGOs alone misses much that is taking place in Vietnam, while making 
Cambodian civil society seem more dynamic than it actually is, at least at the 
village level. In comparison, if one includes Party- sponsored mass organizations 
in the Vietnamese intermediary sphere, it overstates the level of advocacy and 
deliberation that actually takes place in these associations.
 A network perspective offers a locally relevant path through the definitional 
pitfalls of civil society. Without overlooking the importance of NGOs, a focus 
on networks as the component parts of civil society presents a broader and more 
balanced view of contemporary dynamics in Cambodia and Vietnam. Networks 
have been described as ‘the new social morphology of our societies’ (Castells 
1996: 469), extending from personal social ties to business connections and 
international relations. Network analysis stresses the importance of personal ties 
among members in building social capital, understood as ‘trust, norms, and net-
works’ (Putnam 1993: 167). These social associations are most clearly expressed 
in informal associations, especially in rural areas, that often ‘have most value for 
citizens’ (Krishna 2002: 5). ‘Civil society networks’ are a subset of networks 
that engage in advocacy, which is defined as a range of forms of engagement 
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with various state authorities, corporations, and other elites on behalf of a col-
lective interest (Wells- Dang 2012).
 Networks may be formal, with fixed structures, organizational or individual 
membership, meeting schedules, and budgets, among other features. By contrast, 
informal networks are based on personal ties among individuals and unregistered 
groups, ranging from community volunteer groups to virtual networks. In either 
case, the makeup of civil society is not limited to legally registered ‘civil society 
organizations’. Networks may have individual, organizational, or community 
membership, or a mixture of these, but they are not reducible to organizational 
or personal interests alone. Despite close connections to NGOs and outward 
similarities in functioning, networks are presented here as a distinct form of civil 
society action.
 Networks perform many functions: they train and support their members, 
build civic identities, share information, link with international partners, and 
conduct advocacy.3 The existing network advocacy strategies in Vietnam and 
Cambodia can be summarized as embedded, media, and community- based 
(Wells- Dang 2012). Embedded advocacy consists of working within the system 
and making direct contact with elites using personal and institutional ties (Ho 
2008). Networks employing media strategies work through state- owned news-
papers, online media, blogs and international media to reach advocacy objects 
indirectly. Finally, community advocacy is used to put public pressure on advo-
cacy objects by involving more people and building links between local residents 
and elites.
 Within a particular advocacy strategy, networks choose among multiple tactics 
(or methods), such as personal lobbying and blogging, to reach an objective. A 
network may have more than one strategy and use multiple tactics within these 
strategies, constituting an advocacy repertoire. After forming strategies and 
tactics, networks conduct specific advocacy activities or events, such as meeting a 
particular official over tea or posting an open letter online. As networks seek 
appropriate frames and audiences for their advocacy messages, their repertoires 
often take shape organically through trial and error or ‘venue shopping’ (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998: 18). The prevailing strategies and tactics vary to some extent 
among networks in different sectors in Cambodia and Vietnam, depending on the 
perceived sensitivity of an issue and the openness of elite allies.
 The following case studies present the history, structure, mission, and advo-
cacy activities of issue- based advocacy networks in both countries, as well as 
their relations with government and donor agencies. The selected cases in the 
areas of natural resources and land management may be characterized as moder-
ately contentious – generally more than gender equity or health policy, but less 
than human rights or labour organizing – although individual cases vary. 
Although environmental issues link Cambodian and Vietnamese networks 
through transnational impacts on water resources, forests and livelihoods, dis-
tinct advocacy repertoires have been adopted in the two countries, with embed-
ded and media strategies generally favoured in Vietnam and community 
strategies predominant in Cambodia.
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Advocacy within the system: the Vietnam Rivers Network
Advocacy networks in Vietnam have developed through relationships between 
scientists, media, local NGOs and state officials. The Vietnam Rivers Network 
(Mạng lưới Sông ngòi Việt Nam) is an illustrative example of such cross- sectoral 
networking. VRN began in 2005 as a discussion group among scientists and 
local government officials concerned about dams and flooding. It has since 
expanded to 150 individual and 20 organizational members,4 with three regional 
nodes (or sub- groups) based in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. Initially 
focused on information sharing, VRN has developed a greater advocacy orienta-
tion over time, for instance by submitting comments and revisions to the Law on 
Water Resources. Its advocacy efforts sharply increased in 2011 through parti-
cipation in a high- profile regional campaign against construction of dams on the 
mainstream of the Mekong River in Laos and Cambodia. Advocacy makes up 
one of VRN’s four objectives, the others being information exchange, capacity 
building of members, and domestic and international network- building 
(VRN 2011a).
 VRN has no separate legal status. It is officially a project of a local NGO, the 
Centre for Water Resources Conservation and Development (WARECOD) in 
Hanoi. WARECOD hosts the secretariat of VRN, consisting of a coordinator and 
two support staff. Funding for VRN activities passes through WARECOD from 
international donors in the Netherlands and USA. According to VRN members, 
this system has largely functioned smoothly but has resulted in some overlap and 
confusion between the roles and responsibilities of WARECOD and VRN. 
WARECOD is registered with VUSTA, which serves as a theoretical political 
check on VRN’s activities but does not interfere in day- to-day operations. In 
fact, VUSTA has proven a useful advocacy channel and ally on several occa-
sions. Through such arrangements, Vietnamese networks have considerably 
more space to operate in practice than restrictive regulations on associational 
activities, such as Decree 45 (Government of Vietnam 2010), appear to indicate.
 Many of VRN’s individual members are local government officials, staff of 
government research institutes, journalists employed by Vietnam’s state- owned 
media, or university lecturers. The regional core groups in the north, centre, and 
south are each coordinated by a local NGO. The southern group has been the 
most active, including a Mekong Delta- based node of scientists, professors and 
supportive provincial officials. Some advocacy activities, such as sign- on letters, 
are circulated through the whole network’s e- mail list. Direct communications 
with government leaders, for instance at the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MONRE) and the Government Office, are mostly conducted pri-
vately by an informal working group within VRN’s membership. The Ho Chi 
Minh City- based NGOs Centre for Biodiversity and Development (CBD) and 
Forest and Wetlands Research Centre (Forwet), both VRN members, have 
spoken out in the media about the ecology of the Mekong Delta (Nguyen 
Huu Thien 2011). One Vietnam- based international observer terms this activism 
‘still mostly undercover, but with legitimacy since they know what provincial 
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governments are thinking’. While advocacy is included in VRN’s public profile, 
a significant portion of advocacy efforts are kept separate from open, official 
network activities.
 In 2011, VRN’s primary advocacy focus was the proposed Xayaburi Dam on 
the Mekong River. Xayaburi is the first of 11 dams proposed on the Lao and 
Cambodian sections of the river; Vietnamese corporations are the lead investors 
for two of the dams: Luang Prabang in Laos and Stung Treng in Cambodia 
(Hirsch 2010). As the plans were publicized, Vietnamese officials and civil 
society realized that if constructed, mainstream dams could be more damaging 
to the ecology of the Mekong Delta than the effects of climate change 
(IUCN 2011).
 VRN members tailored their advocacy messages to the primary concern of 
Vietnamese officials: the potentially devastating livelihood and economic 
impacts of upstream dams on the Mekong Delta. In April 2011, leading up to the 
Mekong River Commission’s (MRC) annual meeting in Vientiane, VRN held a 
press conference with VUSTA repeating their concerns about the Xayaburi Dam. 
Their interventions appear to have tipped the balance. The Vietnamese govern-
ment representative took the lead in pressuring Laos to postpone dam construc-
tion for ten years until further study on its environmental impacts, which was 
eventually endorsed by the full MRC in December.
 VRN’s advocacy includes engagement with domestic, in addition to trans-
national, environmental controversies. In 2011 the VRN secretariat and southern 
core group members joined with a Vietnamese NGO, PanNature, to oppose con-
struction of the Dong Nai 6 and 6A Dams in southeastern Vietnam. A cascade of 
seven ‘run of the river’ hydroelectric power projects on the Dong Nai River had 
been under development since 2003 (Brown 2011). Two of these dams lie within 
protected land in Cat Tien National Park and a forest buffer zone, but this did 
not appear to pose a threat to approval of the projects until the director of Cat 
Tien, with support from members of VRN’s southern core group, issued a state-
ment to journalists criticizing the dams. On a visit to the park, scientists and 
activists then discovered that the environmental impact assessment for the dams 
had been falsified (Thanh Nien 2011). In August, VRN, VUSTA and Cat Tien 
National Park held a joint workshop to examine environmental and social 
impacts of the project and recommended its suspension (VRN 2011b). In 
November a provincial workshop in Dong Nai reinforced this conclusion. The 
combined testimony of scientists, journalists and NGOs resonated sufficiently 
with local officials to halt the encroachment of dam projects on protected land.
 In both the Xayaburi and Dong Nai cases, the recommendations of advocates 
were presented in nuanced scientific language, far from criticism of the govern-
ment or appeals to nationalism. But their heterodox implications were clear, and 
officials listened: a sign both of the power of embedded and media advocacy, 
and of a ‘general broadening of public discourse in the last decade’ (Brown 
2011: 15). VRN members conducted embedded advocacy through circulation of 
a petition against the Xayaburi project, open letters, workshops, and personal 
communication with Vietnamese leaders, both at the national level and with 
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provincial government officials in the southeast and Mekong Delta. VRN joined 
with VUSTA on several of these activities, in part to provide political cover, but 
also since many of VRN’s organizational members are registered there, and indi-
vidual members are frequently part of other VUSTA- linked scientific and techni-
cal associations. Rather than VUSTA controlling VRN activists, the activists 
effectively used VUSTA’s quasi- state umbrella status to legitimize their cam-
paigns and organize policy dialogues between experts and relevant branches of 
the state.
 The Vietnamese media has also been heavily involved in advocacy, both as a 
channel for communication and as direct participants in VRN activities. Network 
members have written their own articles for publication in print and online 
media, and others have been interviewed by journalists of key newspapers, such 
as Thanh Niên, Tuổi Trẻ, and Lao Động, and online news sites such as VNN and 
VNExpress. Some journalists are individual members of VRN and/or the 
Vietnam Federation of Environmental Journalists (VFEJ), a loose network with 
over 100 members who specialize in writing about environmental issues (Bass et 
al. 2010: 30). Through platforms such as VFEJ, certain journalists have become 
civil society actors in their own right.
 Both VRN and PanNature are part of the regional Save the Mekong cam-
paign, a civil society network that has co- organized workshops in Vietnam and 
gathered over 23,000 individual signatures on a petition to the Prime Ministers 
of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, calling for a moratorium on dam 
construction. Through Save the Mekong, VRN is connected to the NGO Forum 
on Cambodia and to other transnational networks in Thailand, Laos and beyond.
The rise of community advocacy in Cambodia
Advocacy around water resources in Cambodia has proceeded without signi-
ficant involvement of national or local government agencies. The NGO Forum 
on Cambodia has selected river protection as one of its priority issues and is a 
member of the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia (RCC), ‘an alliance of civil society 
organizations working to protect and restore river ecosystems and river- based 
livelihoods in Cambodia’ (Baird 2009). The six members of the RCC are local 
NGOs and networks with overlapping membership and mandates.5 The RCC, in 
turn, engages with the NGO Forum’s working group on river protection and the 
regional Save the Mekong campaign. This convoluted network structure may 
appear redundant, but is actually a source of strength, as members are connected 
to each other through multiple channels.6 Unlike VRN, the RCC includes no 
government participants or individual members, but several of its member organ-
izations represent local community interests and voices in a way that has not yet 
occurred in Vietnam.
 The most active RCC member is the 3SPN Network, named after the three 
rivers (Sesan, Srepok and Sekong) that flow through northeastern Cambodia’s 
Ratanakiri province (Ly, this volume). While 3SPN organizes communities, the 
RCC structure provides channels to engage with donors and the Cambodian 
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government. This division of roles has led to some tension, as communities and 
local networks take a more principled, radical stance against dams while Phnom 
Penh- based NGOs urge dialogue. In the words of an NGO Forum leader, ‘we 
understand why communities are against dams. They have no information: the 
companies tell them nothing. From the NGO side, we can see lessons learned 
from other countries and take a broader view’. Like VRN, the NGO Forum and 
RCC engage in tactical advocacy, recommending a delay and full environmental 
impact assessment, since they sense that a strong anti- dam position would be 
perceived as anti- government.
 To some 3SPN members, this tactical approach is self- defeating: ‘The gov-
ernment will listen to communities, not to NGOs!’ In their view, authorities are 
able to dismiss the concerns of urban- based NGOs, and therefore allow them 
apparent freedom to speak out with lower risk of suppression. Rural community 
organizing, by contrast, has a stronger potential political impact, hence attracts 
more government attention. Both Khmer and international activists express criti-
cism of ‘so- called engagement’ by well- funded, professional NGOs who avoid 
challenging the system, while local residents are prepared to go to jail to protect 
natural resources in their communities.
 Cambodia has traditionally been a decentralized society with substantial auto-
nomy for village chiefs. However, village structures have re- formed over the 
past 30 years under the influence of a growing state apparatus as well as new 
right- based conceptions of citizenship. The first community networks self- 
organized in the early 2000s around fisheries and forest concession issues, at a 
time when authorities initiated privatization of what had been common resources 
(Öjendal, this volume). Community voices at that time were successful in 
forcing elites to back down. Over time, these efforts led to the formation of 
cooperative structures between professional NGOs and networks based in the 
capital city and grassroots community groups in the provinces. One of these 
efforts became the Community Peacebuilding Network (CPN), a ‘national grass-
roots advocacy project’ consisting of a group of advocates in each province of 
Cambodia who work with communities on land rights and community forestry 
issues (CCD Cambodia, undated). As an unregistered entity, CPN does not serve 
an ‘umbrella’ function; it is more like a loose federation of representatives of 
other local networks.
 Initially, CPN was funded by the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) through the Asia Foundation. Funding was channelled through one of 
the five coordinating members, whose power in the network was strengthened as 
a result. According to participants, CPN has made many disparate efforts at 
organizing, yielding few cohesive results and often raising questions of account-
ability and internal governance, in addition to creating tension among NGOs and 
between NGO hosts and community activists. The network re- formed itself at a 
2010 assembly, selecting a new grassroots- based steering committee of 24 
members, one per province. One international NGO partner, Bridges across 
Borders, trained grassroots facilitators from across community networks and 
conducted local legal education. Some community networks have also received 
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small grants from the East–West Management Institute’s (EWMI) Program on 
Rights and Justice, funded by USAID.
 In 2011, an innovative example of community networking emerged around 
the Prey Lang Forest, which stretches across four northern Cambodian prov-
inces. A CPN affiliate, the Prey Lang network had been meeting since 2000 or 
2001 when the forest was first threatened by commercial logging. With a direct 
democratic form of community representation, villages in Prey Lang have 
formed what one of its coordinators terms a ‘natural network’. The structure 
consists of a core leadership group of 20 plus an assembly of over 100 village 
representatives, many from the Kuy ethnic group. In all, more than 70 villages in 
the forest area participate fully in the network, with an additional 70 villages 
having some active members. Network members conduct outreach to the remain-
ing 150 villages in the forest. Most communication is by direct contact and 
mobile phone, with few written materials. The Prey Lang network is unregis-
tered, which makes engagement with higher levels of government difficult, but it 
has support from some local commune councillors. Village- level activities, such 
as forest patrols, are funded through contributions from villagers of 500 riel 
(US$0.12) per month. External events are funded through CPN and other donors, 
and network members also benefit from meetings and other events organized by 
CPN, EWMI and others.
 In early 2011, as forest clearance in Prey Lang by Vietnamese and Cambo-
dian rubber companies accelerated, the network ventured into national and inter-
national advocacy for the first time, using images linked to the movie Avatar 
(with villagers and supporters painting their faces blue for a public rally) and a 
national day of prayer in Buddhist wats, dubbed ‘Pray long for Prey Lang’ (Prey 
Lang Community Network 2011). Unable to attract coverage in Khmer language 
newspapers, network members turned to radio programmes of Voice of America 
and Radio Free Asia’s Khmer service. The Avatar campaign attracted the atten-
tion of international cable television channels, and finally the Cambodian public. 
Thanks to CPN’s nationwide membership, the prayer day activities in August 
2011 attracted participants in every province, making the government sit up and 
take notice. The network has since made efforts to communicate via the internet 
and social media, but mainly for the purpose of gaining international contacts; 
few Khmer, outside a small urban elite, have access to these technologies. The 
Prey Lang network’s website, blog and printed materials are mainly in English, 
although training and community education materials have been developed in 
Khmer.
 According to Prey Lang network members, they do not aim to convince gov-
ernment leaders through personal contact, but rather to create public pressure by 
creating local power bases that the government will have to respect in order to 
maintain its authority. The main network activities continue to be constituency- 
and community- based, i.e. direct organizing of villagers and linkages with other 
local networks. At the same time, the Prey Lang campaign has fostered a 
network of grassroots and international supporters (‘Friends of the Forest’) in 
Phnom Penh. One significant secondary effect of greater public and international 
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attention has been an increase in Kuy ethnic identity and pride, and a positive 
shift in Khmer public attitudes towards indigenous people.
 Cambodian community network members engage with government officials 
when possible, but frequently reach the conclusion that engagement produces 
limited results. ‘We tried cooperation with government first’, says one network 
coordinator, ‘but this got us nowhere’. Local network leaders say they keep 
some contact with local authorities at the commune level, who may be receptive 
but have no power to change the situation. Anyone above this level cannot coop-
erate with networks because there is ‘too much pressure from the top’. Members 
of the Prey Lang network, as well as the Boeung Kak campaign profiled below, 
have been arrested and spent time in jail. 3SPN facilitators have also been har-
assed and threatened. Yet network members insist that their efforts are not anti- 
government and are not connected with any political movement:
Working with political parties is pointless. Opposition parties can’t get any-
thing done, and [if networks try to link with them] then the ruling party will 
just label you as part of the opposition and start a crackdown. Opposition 
politicians may try to latch on to networks’ agendas, but this is for their own 
purposes. It’s better not to register and keep on operating as a community 
network!
(interview with network coordinator, Phnom Penh, October 2011)
Both the 3SPN and Prey Lang networks emerged from community leadership 
capacities that developed organically in response to perceived external threats. 
The local activists attempted to use embedded advocacy strategies first, but 
seeing no positive response from authorities they moved on to media and com-
munity strategies, seeking to reach a wider audience of NGOs, urban Cambodi-
ans and international supporters. Prey Lang’s advocacy has drawn effectively on 
unassailable Buddhist religious and cultural images, as well as Hollywood 
movies: a powerful combination of mobilizing frames that aim not only at short- 
term policy victories, but ultimately the transformation and democratization of 
Cambodian society.
 To this end, Cambodian networks have employed what is known in human 
rights advocacy as the ‘boomerang strategy’: faced with a blockage or weak con-
nections at the national level of government, activists appeal to powerful inter-
national interests in the hope of compelling the obstructing authorities to change 
their position (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002). Unable to stop 
thousands of forced evictions and property seizures around the proposed Boeung 
Kak Lake redevelopment project in Phnom Penh, a network of housing and land 
rights advocates appealed in 2009 to the World Bank Inspection Panel on the 
grounds that a Bank- funded land titling programme should have applied to the 
lakeside residents. The network’s previous community organizing and legal rights 
strategy had encountered difficulties due to internal capacity limitations and the 
lack of unity among affected urban residents, as well as a widespread perception 
that the government and investors would work around the law when it suited their 
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interests. The World Bank panel eventually found in favour of the complainants 
and put a temporary hold on lending to Cambodia in August 2011 (Tran 2011). 
Under pressure, the authorities offered a compromise outcome to reserve some 
space in the redevelopment area for evicted families, which although too late to 
help many evictees, shows the potential of the boomerang approach.
Cross- border connections
A Prey Lang network representative recounts that when villagers in the forest 
began to organize, they went to initiate a dialogue with a group of Vietnamese 
labourers who were clearing land for a rubber plantation in the forest. When the 
Vietnamese workers saw local residents approaching, they fled and later claimed 
they were under attack.
 This anecdote illustrates a level of mistrust between Khmer and Vietnamese 
in which honest attempts at dialogue can easily be misinterpreted. Communica-
tion on the government- to-government level, in contrast, is strong. Indeed, the 
rubber workers are in Cambodia thanks to an agreement between a confederation 
of Vietnamese state- owned enterprises and the Cambodian government. Civil 
society contacts have been fewer. NGO delegations from Vietnam have visited 
Cambodia, and some exchanges have taken place on capacity building, ethnic 
issues and counter- trafficking, but these contacts have not yet yielded in- depth or 
long- lasting ties. To the extent that Cambodian and Vietnamese networks do 
cooperate, it is most often in the context of a regional campaign, such as Save 
the Mekong.
 Cambodian NGOs have participated in regional networks for some time, 
dating from the UNTAC period and contacts formed in refugee camps on the 
Thai border. Vietnamese involvement is more recent. Indeed, in the case of the 
Save the Mekong Coalition, the participation of Vietnamese NGOs is unpreced-
ented (Hirsch 2010: 320). The first major network forum to address effects of 
mainstream Mekong dams in Vietnam was organized in January 2010 at Can 
Tho University. As one of the Thai- based network partners describes, ‘at the 
beginning, Save the Mekong used space at the regional level when it was not 
possible to do advocacy directly in Vietnam. Vietnamese groups used the 
regional platform to report back to Vietnam. That created more space’.
 Even if the immediate benefits of conferences and study tours are unclear, the 
personal relationships arising from them have the potential of developing later 
into joint actions. These opportunities, however, are generally only open to indi-
viduals who speak English and are able to obtain external funding. Community 
network members, such as from CPN and Prey Lang, have had few chances for 
cross- border exchange. In autumn 2011, for the first time, a group of Cambodian 
community facilitators including Prey Lang network members travelled to the 
Earthrights International Mekong School in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
 The potential benefits of increased connections between Vietnam and Cam-
bodia are indisputable. The advocacy issues profiled in this chapter involve both 
countries: Vietnamese companies invest in rubber plantations and conduct 
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logging operations in Cambodia, while dams planned for construction along the 
Mekong affect water flows in the Tonle Sap as well as the ecology of the 
Mekong Delta. Advocacy on the Mekong has facilitated new interactions among 
networks: since Vietnam is a downstream country, the effects of dam construc-
tion have raised public and official concern in a way not previously encountered 
in regard to downstream effects on Cambodia of Vietnamese dams on the Sesan 
River. 3SPN network members say they would like to increase collaboration 
with communities in Vietnam in addition to their existing contacts with VRN 
and PanNature. According to the current 3SPN coordinator, ‘when the dams [on 
the upper Sesan in Vietnam] were being built, Vietnamese civil society didn’t 
say anything. Now they are raising their voices, but the dams are done!’ The 
coordinator has attended Save the Mekong meetings in Vietnam and hosted a 
‘media tour’ for Vietnamese journalists to the Sesan. On the Vietnamese side, 
PanNature has begun to monitor Vietnamese investments in Cambodia, includ-
ing logging, land concessions and mining. But overall, such advocacy connec-
tions are still limited.
 Cultural and historical factors certainly play a role. Memories of Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia are not too distant, and the loss of the Mekong Delta 
region7 remains a legacy that can be exploited for political purposes. In this 
context, efforts at cross- border advocacy, or even youth exchange, risk escalat-
ing sensitive issues of national security. Despite these political fears, and a sub-
stantial language gap, Cambodian and Vietnamese activists often relate well 
personally to each others’ experiences. Cambodians can learn from Vietnamese 
tactics of engaging authorities through dialogue and alliance- building, and Viet-
namese can benefit from the community organizing and rights- based approaches 
practised in Cambodia. Networks in each country may well choose to keep their 
core network strategies intact, but selecting from multiple strategies could lead 
to more creative advocacy.8
Conclusion: the varied meanings of networks
Civil society networks in both Vietnam and Cambodia demonstrate the existence 
of more underlying activism than is often publicly acknowledged. Observers 
who restrict their views of civil society to registered NGOs or intermediary asso-
ciations miss much of the diversity and vibrancy that is actually occurring. Inno-
vations in civil society organizing are taking place primarily in informal and 
issue- based advocacy networks, such as the cross- sectoral Vietnamese alliances 
and Cambodian community networks profiled in this chapter. These networks 
have the potential to influence not only the specific issues they advocate on, but 
the entire socio- political terrain in which they operate. As one Cambodian activ-
ist states, ‘political parties and NGOs have been unable to change Cambodia. . . . 
We will continue as networks. We will rise up and speak for the people. We are 
Cambodia’s civil society’.
 While keeping this vision in mind, it is essential to realize that both 
Cambodian and Vietnamese networks have their respective strengths and 
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weaknesses. At present, Cambodian networks have autonomy from state control 
and influence at the cost of limited access to policymakers. Although they 
operate independently from authorities, they are only able to draw on a 
weak reserve of bridging social capital. Vietnamese advocacy, in contrast, can 
usually rely on a fair hearing from at least one part of the state, as well as from 
a literate and educated public that can boast high levels of newspaper readership 
and access to the internet. Despite having less autonomous space, networks 
in Vietnam have achieved a degree of policy impact. Arguments based on 
expert scientific opinion have widespread traction. By involving sympathetic 
local and central government officials in networks, activists can sometimes 
use one part of the state to counterbalance another, a form of ‘jujitsu advocacy’ 
combining embedded approaches with appeals to public opinion (Wells- 
Dang 2012).
 These strategies are less evident in Cambodia, where most networks have 
weak linkages to government and limited alliances and dialogue with other 
elites. In spite of an ostensibly multi- party system and decentralization pro-
gramme, the Cambodian state appears less open to influence from civil society 
than the Vietnamese state. The greater autonomy of Cambodian networks from 
the state has not necessarily resulted in more successful outcomes. In the Cam-
bodian case it is harder to engage in multi- level advocacy in a small country 
with less fragmentation of power across levels and bureaucracies. The presence 
of opposition parties has little, or even a negative, impact: networks avoid them 
for the practical reason that they are not seen as effective and association with 
them may result in a political backlash from the ruling party. Several inter-
national NGO representatives in Phnom Penh conclude that the Cambodian gov-
ernment is simply less open to dialogue and ‘intelligent argument’, since rational 
appeals do not get far in what they describe as a state characterized as ‘a klepto-
cracy pure and simple’.
 Media strategies are important in both countries, but in contrasting ways. In 
Vietnam, the state- owned print and online media plays a more positive role as a 
sounding board for public opinion than many observers assume. In Cambodia, 
activists have successfully used international media to reach a wider audience 
and overcome the limited circulation and freedom of domestic newspapers and 
television. Cambodian networks benefit from a larger domestic NGO sector, in 
which registration and operations have generally been smoother than in Vietnam. 
With greater international connections, civil society in Cambodia has also had 
more exposure to the language of human rights and civic participation. In part 
due to this influence, Cambodian networks have engaged in more community 
organizing than their counterparts in Vietnam, where authorities are still wary of 
the political potential of direct organizing. The ‘boomerang strategy’ for lever-
aging international actors has not been adopted in Vietnam, since the central 
government and large state- owned enterprises are less susceptible to public pres-
sure (Ly, this volume). In fact, calls for external intervention or open protest can 
easily boomerang back onto the activists themselves if authorities frame them as 
tools of foreign interests.
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 From another viewpoint, Vietnamese networks have less need of such pres-
sure tactics, since channels for participation within the system already exist to a 
certain extent, and the national government is not necessarily the main source of 
blockage. The engagement strategies of Vietnamese advocates have had a 
stronger impact on policy to date than the more confrontational ‘civil society 
versus the state’ approaches of some Cambodian activists. Given this observa-
tion, it may be worth re- examining assumptions about the intractability of the 
Cambodian state to well- targeted engagement; there may be more diversity and 
venues for pluralism than many actors think (Feuer, this volume).
 Networks in both countries face a significant challenge of mediating between 
elite and community interests, which often parallels the urban–rural divide. 
Some Cambodian rural communities have self- organized into networks, but are 
still isolated from NGOs in Phnom Penh. In Vietnam, most NGOs and networks 
are based in major cities, with limited membership and capacity in rural prov-
inces. The advocacy strategies selected by Vietnamese networks are focused on 
reaching power- holders and elites, not expanding their membership base. Net-
works that receive donor funding are at risk of becoming dependent on grants, 
rather than striving for accountability to their local constituencies. These risks 
are lower in community networks, where almost all network members are volun-
teers. It is precisely community networks, however, that can benefit most from 
international linkages, not primarily for funding but to build transnational alli-
ances and share advocacy strategies.
 Both Cambodian and Vietnamese networks face challenges in their national 
political contexts. As Cambodia’s ruling party consolidates its power, one scen-
ario might be that the Cambodian civil society context becomes more like 
Vietnam – and consequently less like the idealized model of an autonomous civil 
society. If networks cannot advocate openly using their current repertoire, they 
may shift to more informal tactics. As Vietnamese advocates have found, link-
ages to government can sometimes lead to positive outcomes. Whether political 
trajectories in Cambodia and Vietnam converge or separate, networks in both 
countries will continue to have much to learn from each other’s structures, strat-
egies and aims of inclusive social change.
Notes
1 Research for this chapter was conducted while living and working in Vietnam, with 
frequent visits to Cambodia (including nine in 2011 alone). A total of over 50 semi- 
structured interviews were conducted with network coordinators and members in both 
countries between November 2010 and December 2011. Since some respondents prefer 
to remain anonymous, no personal details are given in citations of interview data. An 
earlier version of this chapter was presented to the Washington Indochina Roundtable, 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (USA) in 
November 2011.
2 VUSTA currently has over 600 members, of which 240 are registered local NGOs 
(VUSTA 2011). With a stated mission to ‘build networks of NGOs’, VUSTA considers 
itself a network and claims to be the most effective Vietnamese organization in policy 
advocacy. While VUSTA arguably has more of a state than civil society character, its 
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members and leaders participate in numerous networks and contribute to opening space 
for advocacy of others. VUSTA’s structure does not include working groups or facil-
itation of horizontal links, but members have formed multiple, overlapping issue- based 
networks of their own without interference.
3 The focus in this chapter on advocacy strategies as a characteristic activity of civil society 
networks does not imply that other network functions are less important: successful net-
works balance external advocacy with services to their members (Wells- Dang 2012).
4 The author is one of a handful of international individual members of VRN. All of the 
network’s organizational members are Vietnamese, and most VRN meetings and publi-
cations are in Vietnamese language only.
5 The six RCC members are CDCam, FACT (a fisheries coalition that spun off from the 
NGO Forum), 3SPN, CIVS, Culture and Environment Preservation Association, and 
the NGO Forum itself.
6 This redundancy is seen in another Cambodian network, the Housing Rights Task 
Force in Phnom Penh, which has the NGO Forum as one of its members, while other 
core members are separately part of the NGO Forum. The Task Force, in turn, is a 
member of a Land and Housing Working Group that also includes some of the task 
force’s individual members. When one of the task force’s member organizations, Sah-
makam Teang Tnaut (STT) was suspended by the Cambodian government for six 
months in 2011 for alleged ‘illegal’ activities in opposition to an ADB- financed rail-
road project, the multiple ties of this network enabled STT members to continue 
engagement through alternate pathways.
7 In Cambodia the Mekong Delta is sometimes referred to as ‘Kampuchea Krom’ (Lower 
Cambodia), with historical ties that remain politically contentious.
8 Comparative research on China and Vietnam finds that networks with multiple advo-
cacy strategies and a diversity of members who ‘wear different hats’ are more effective 
overall in both short- term policy impact and longer term influence on political space 
(Wells- Dang 2012).
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The idea that a vibrant civil society is beneficial for the political and social 
development of a nation has been popular at least since de Tocqueville’s (2008 
[1835]) analysis of nineteenth century America. In the twentieth century, the 
idea of civil society has gained popularity in particular due to the democratic 
movements in Eastern Europe since the 1970s, making it a central point of refer-
ence in the debate about democratization processes (Klein 2001: 19). Further, 
Putnam’s work on Italy and the US has been highly influential, showing the pos-
itive relationship between high levels of civic engagement, a strong associational 
life, and the functioning of political institutions (Putnam 1993, 2000). Civil 
society has consequently entered Western governments’ and international organ-
izations’ political agenda in developing countries, considered ‘the key ingredient 
in promoting democratic development’ (Jenkins 2001: 251). In short, ‘civic 
groups figure large in visions of a better society’ (Lichterman 2005: 395). Prob-
lematic about such expectations is not only to which extent civil society can 
meet them, but also the assumption that civil society is a universal concept. 
International donors mostly understand the concept of civil society in general 
terms; as ‘the wide array of non- governmental and not- for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their 
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or 
philanthropic considerations’ (World Bank 2010).
 Dalton and Ong (2005) question whether such a definition can capture civic 
engagement in a one- party system like Vietnam, and in particular, whether the 
mere existence of civic organizations can be seen as a step towards democracy. 
As Lichterman suggests, civic engagement is not the same everywhere, but 
‘means very different things in different settings, with different consequences for 
public discussion and intergroup ties’ (Lichtermann 2005: 394). Different set-
tings may also create different civic customs that ‘carry different potentials for 
realizing different kinds of collective goods’ (ibid.: 389). How can we conceptu-
alize the different settings under which civil society exists and operates? What 
kinds of ‘collective goods’ or social processes can be expected to emerge from 
civic engagement in Vietnam?
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 One way of understanding the diversity of civil society is to approach it from 
the perspective of (political) culture. Following Archer’s critical realist approach 
to social theory, ‘culture’ is defined as ‘referring to all intelligibilia, that is to any 
item that has the dispositional ability to be understood by someone’, while a Cul-
tural System is ‘that subset of items to which the law of contradiction can be 
applied’ (Archer 2005: 24). This chapter analyses the cultural dimension of civic 
engagement: the system of meanings and values under which citizens engage in 
their society as well as the knowledge that underpins the practices of active cit-
izenship, and thus builds the situational basis for societal elaboration. Next to 
material- structural conditions, such as available resources, infrastructure, or 
limits posed by physical violence, cultural conditions are vital for civic engage-
ment, since they shape social practices just like material structures do.
[T]he [Cultural System] is the product of historical [Socio- Cultural] inter-
action, but having emerged (cultural emergence being a continuous process) 
then qua product, it has properties but also powers of its own kind. Like 
structure, some of its most important causal powers are those of constraints 
and enablements. In the cultural domain these stem from contradictions and 
complementarities.
(Archer 2005: 25)
The question is thus how a specific Cultural System enables or constrains civic 
action in Vietnam, and how the practices of civic engagement may in turn repro-
duce or change it.
 The chapter begins by outlining the emergence of the idea of civil society. I 
argue that the ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor 2004) is a particularly relevant element 
of political culture on which civic action draws. The idea of civil society is based 
on the historical legacy of the development of an independent economic sphere 
in Europe and the ideas accompanying this process. In making central the idea of 
free and equal individuals together making up society for mutual benefit, the 
modern social imaginary fundamentally differs from the Vietnamese social 
imaginary – which is based on the idea of hierarchical differentiation. After ana-
lysing the implications for the forms and meanings of civil society in Vietnam, I 
will discuss the constraints and possibilities for the rapidly increasing number of 
civic groups to bring about change.
Civil society in the ‘modern social imaginary’
Political culture theory suggests that differences in attitudes about authority and 
power are key to the analysis of political systems and their development (Pye 
1985; Bukovansky 2002). Therefore, an assessment of the potential of civil 
society for political development in Vietnam requires an understanding of the 
substantive content of the Cultural System in which the idea of civil society 
emerged, particularly attitudes to power. The idea of civil society is part of a 
Cultural System that Taylor (2004) describes as the ‘modern social imaginary’, 
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which is ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together 
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations 
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie 
these expectations’ (ibid.: 23). The social imaginary can thus be understood as 
the way(s) in which humans are imagined as social beings.
 The social imaginary of Western societies started its ‘long march’ in Renais-
sance times and, over the centuries, turned from an elite idea into the common 
way in which ordinary people imagine their social surroundings (ibid.: 32ff.). 
The core of the idea is that of human beings forming society as free and equal 
individuals for their mutual benefit (ibid.: 4). The presumption of equality funda-
mentally distinguishes the new social imaginary from earlier ones.
Premodern social imaginaries . . . were structured by various modes of hier-
archical complementarity. The hierarchical differentiation is seen as the 
proper order of things. It was part of the nature or form of society. Any 
attempt to deviate from it turned reality against itself, society would be 
denatured. . . . The modern idealisation of order departs radically from this. 
Whatever distribution of functions a society might develop is deemed 
contingent. It cannot itself define the good; the basic normative principle is, 
indeed, that the members of society serve each other’s needs, help each 
other, in short, behave like the rational and sociable creatures they are. The 
modern order vies no ontological status to hierarchy or any particular struc-
ture of differentiation.
(Taylor 2004: 11f.)
This social imaginary is the core of the ‘system culture’ (Almond 1989: 28) of 
modern Western societies,1 in which the idea of civil society plays a significant 
role. In its classical meaning ‘civil’ was a quality of society – the opposite of 
‘uncivilized’ society (Kumar 1993: 376ff.). The privatization of economic activ-
ity, and the advent of the idea of a society formed of free and equal individuals 
in the eighteenth century, shifted its meaning. Civil society came to mean a soci-
etal sphere distinct from the state. Civil society is ‘interpreted to signify a 
reality’; state and civil society are not only categories to be distinguished analyt-
ically, but also seen as referentially discrete or even causally independent (Dunn 
2001: 53). The semiotic separation of state and civil society in the West means 
that the idea of civil society is an element of a specific Cultural System in which 
‘the state’ is seen to exist for the benefit of free and equal individuals.2
 As a sphere independent of the state, the privatized economy laid the ground 
for the second dimension of civil society, namely the notion of the public sphere, 
within which the requirements of privatized societal reproduction were secured. 
With the detachment of the economic sphere from the polity, a common interest 
of individuals emerges for the first time, which manifests in the central signifi-
cance of the rule of law. Political interventions in a market without laws are 
incalculable, and thus fundamentally run counter to the degree of rationality 
required by individuals who are privately acting market participants. For the law 
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to become law, that is, to apply to all without exception, the public itself, com-
prised of private individuals, has to take charge of legislation (Habermas 1989: 
80ff.). This moment signified the final break with the imaginary of a hierarchic-
ally differentiated society, where authority (Herrschaft) is conferred only to a 
specific group of people. After all,
[i]n its intention, the rule of the law aimed at dissolving domination alto-
gether; this was a typically bourgeois idea insofar as not even the political 
safeguarding of the private sphere emancipating itself from political domi-
nation was to assume the form of domination. The bourgeois idea of the 
law- based state, namely, the binding of all state- activity to a system of 
norms legitimated by public opinion (a system that had no gaps, if possible), 
already aimed at abolishing the state as an instrument of domination 
altogether.
(Habermas 1989: 81ff.)
Civil society not only achieved an identity different from the polity, but became, 
through its function of creating the public sphere, a moral requirement for the 
legitimacy of the state. The core requirement of this idea is the sovereignty of 
the people: all state activities are only legitimate when based on the opinion of 
the public. The public sphere stands, ‘mentally, outside of the polity, as it were, 
from which to judge its performance’ (Taylor 2004: 87).
Government is then not only wise to follow [public] opinion; it is morally 
bound to do so. Governments ought to legislate and rule in the midst of a 
reasoning public. In making its decisions, Parliament or the court ought to 
be concentrating together and enacting what has already been emerging out 
of enlightened debate among the people. . . .The public sphere is, then, a 
locus in which rational views are elaborated that should guide government.
(Ibid.: 88ff.)
Civil society thus became a sphere whose function lies in the political intermedi-
ation between state and society (Klein 2001: 31).
 However, in the modern idea, civil society is not only bound to the legitimi-
zation of the state as viewed in deliberative political theory. In occupying the 
domain between the individual and the state, civil society also invokes an idea of 
salvation. It is ‘the attempt to grapple with the central problem of modern 
society: how to find a “third way” between “the atomization of competitive 
market society”, on the one side, and a “state dominated existence”, on the 
other’. Most commonly, this has referred to the space of groups and organiza-
tions where ‘the individual develops the sense of social solidarity and civic parti-
cipation’ (Kumar 1993: 380).
 Investigations of ‘civic culture’ (Almond and Verba 1963) found that the 
‘rationality- activist’ model of citizenship cannot be seen as the only element of 
a functioning democratic state. ‘Only when combined in some sense with its 
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opposites of passivity, trust, and deference to authority and competence was a 
viable, stable democracy possible’ (Almond 1989: 16).
 The idea of deliberative democracy has been further criticized for being naïve 
in that it believes too much in the power of public debate (Ottmann 2006: 319). 
It would thus be too simplistic to view Western political culture(s) as devoid of 
passive subjects who trust or even subordinate themselves to political authority. 
Nevertheless, this does not affect the conception of civil society as a sphere dis-
tinct from the state, in and through which the moral idea of a society existing of 
equal individuals is continuously expanding, both in extensity (more people are 
claiming it) and in intensity (its demands are heavier) (Taylor 2004: 5). Today, 
this materializes in the claim of rights to privacy, property, publicity (free speech 
and association) and equality before the law (Cohen and Arato 1992: 345).
 As a discursive structure, ‘civil society’ has spread from Europe around the 
world with the advent of colonialism. By establishing ‘states’, there was already 
an ‘implicit distinction from civil society’ (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 4):
[T]he language used to describe, evaluate and express the experiences of 
politics are the same everywhere. For historical reasons, nearly all societies 
speak a Western language. It is a language which identifies states and civil 
societies, speaks of bureaucracies, political parties, parliaments, expresses 
political desires for the establishment of liberal, Communist or socialist 
political forms, and evaluates political systems in terms of democracy and 
dictatorship.
To what extent has the dissemination of terminology gone along with the dis-
semination of culture? How is society imagined in Vietnam, and what is the pre-
vailing idea of the state?
The idea of the state in Vietnam
Traditional Vietnamese society and its political system were based on Confucian 
political philosophy, which employed the patriarchal family as the basic model 
for the political system and did not concede any political or civil rights to 
citizens. During the 1829–41 Minh Mang regency, printing was restricted based 
on the idea that ordinary people were incapable of making decisions and did not 
need to know how to write or read (Porter 1993: 4). A hierarchically structured 
society is traditionally believed to be in ‘the nature of things’, to represent ‘the 
intrinsic structure of the universe’ (Jamieson 1993: 16). Attitudes to power in 
Vietnam also involve a great deal of non- Confucian, in particular Buddhist, cul-
tural heritage (Pye 1985: 238ff.). Nevertheless, the overall political Cultural 
System still differs fundamentally from the Western one in that it is of a 
distinctively hierarchical kind. The view of power and authority is paternalistic 
in emphasizing ‘dependency and . . . expecting superiors to be nurturing and 
generously supportive in both strength and wealth’ (Pye 1985: 239). At the heart 
of the Vietnamese cultural heritage is also the idea that only proper social 
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relationships following this natural order ‘will produce social harmony, creating 
happy and prosperous families, villages and nations’ (Jamieson 1993: 12). The 
rejection of Confucianism by the Communist movement did not mean the end of 
this imaginary.
Like Confucianism, Marxism- Leninism gave legitimacy to the claims of the 
collective and the society over those of the individual. . . . For the fund of 
ancient wisdom and practice on which the legitimacy of the traditional Con-
fucianist elite was based, the Vietnamese Communist movement substituted 
a ‘scientific’ system of thought that gave party leaders the ability to discern 
the truth and to point to the correct path.
(Porter 1993: 7ff.)
Hue- Tam Ho Tai (1992: 259ff.) demonstrates that the victory of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology over liberalist and individualistic ideas in the 1920s can 
largely be attributed to its ability to unite the ‘ingrained elitism’ among the revo-
lutionary vanguard with the promise of national independence (‘the victory of 
the oppressed masses’).
By emphasizing the importance of class at the expense of the individual, 
Marxism- Leninism brushed aside the humanist concerns – in particular the 
desire for personal freedom and moral autonomy as distinct from social 
justice, equality, or political independence – that had brought so many 
young Vietnamese into revolutionary politics.
(Hue- Tam Ho Tai 1992: 262ff.)
In spite of the liberalist movement in which the revolution originated, it finally 
ended in the reproduction of a Cultural System that placed the individual in the 
service of the collective. Elitism and anti- liberalism were deeply ingrained in the 
new leading ideology. As Lenin saw it, the selected cadre of vanguard revolu-
tionaries was to take over the role of teachers who dictate the uneducated masses 
which way to go (Scott 1998: 148).
the ‘masses’ in general and the working class in particular become ‘the 
body’, while the vanguard party is ‘the brain’. . . . [T]he vanguard party not 
only is essential to the tactical cohesion of the masses but also must literally 
do their thinking for them. . . . Its authority is based on its scientific intelli-
gence. . . . There is no need for politics within the party inasmuch as the 
science and rationality of the socialist intelligentsia require instead a techni-
cally necessary subordination; the party’s judgments are not subjective and 
value laden but objective and logically inevitable.
(Scott 1998: 149ff., citing Lenin)
Ho Chi Minh’s political thought and the foundation of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam in 1954 embraced the decisively authoritarian Soviet model, in 
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which human freedom was subordinated to the (party- defined) interests of the 
collective (Brocheux 2007: 187). This model, incorporating the idea of the infal-
libility of the Party, was strongly supported by the neo- Confucian principle of 
Chính nghĩa (exclusive righteousness) of the political elite, which, in this form, 
lived on in spite of the significant ideological differences between Confucianism 
and Marxist- Leninism (Gillespie 2002: 183). As Metzger (2001: 230ff.) assessed 
in the case of China,
in addressing the question of political improvement, modern Chinese polit-
ical thought has not turned toward a non- utopian, bottom- up approach. 
Based on the traditional optimism about political practicability, it still 
reflects the traditional paradigm of a morally and intellectually enlightened 
elite working with a corrigible political centre morally to transform society, 
instead of emphasising the organisational efforts of free but fallible citizens 
forming a civil society with which to monitor an incorrigible political 
centre.
This assessment resonates strongly with the Vietnamese case and explains the 
ethical justification of hierarchical differentiation in society. As in the Western 
imaginary, political decision- making should be based on a rational, enlightened 
view of the world. However, it is not public opinion that is enlightened, it is the 
political authorities (Taylor 2004: 88). In contrast, it is the Party that is the 
embodiment of reason. This worldview prevails until today, explaining why
the very notion of an oppositional sphere, or a domain outside of the 
state, remains anathema – an affront even. . . . [T]he idea of an oppositional 
sphere simply does not fit with the philosophical underpinnings in which 
the Communist Party of Vietnam is rooted and still draws. To suggest 
otherwise is insulting because it is to question the party’s commitment to 
the people.
(Gainsborough 2005: 37)
If Vietnamese political culture differs in such a substantial way from the Western 
one, can civil society still be thought to exist, and in what sense?
Civil society in Vietnam
Unlike other international development terminology that has entered Vietnamese 
policy discourse, ‘civil society’ is normally not used in official documents or in 
the media (Hannah 2007: 103; Phuong Le Trong, this volume). Nevertheless, 
group membership is significantly higher in Vietnam than in other Asian and 
even Western countries (Dalton and Ong 2005: 33; Norlund 2007: 78). More-
over, the popularity of ‘civil society’ in international policy discourse has signif-
icantly increased the number of community- based organizations (CBOs) in 
Vietnam through donor engagement (Thayer 2008: 5ff.). Vietnamese mass 
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organizations, as well as other organizations, ‘try to pass themselves off as 
“genuine” civil society groups out of self- interest’ (ibid.: 13). In what way do 
civil society practices in Vietnam differ from those in the West, and what is their 
foreseen and actual role in society? From a cultural perspective, the answer to 
this question lies in the ways civic engagement ‘fits’ the Cultural System.3 Two 
‘ideal types’ of active citizenship in Vietnam can be identified.
 The first type, foremost manifested in the mass organizations (Women’s 
Union, Farmers’ Union, Youth Union and Veterans’ Union) and professional 
organizations (Bach Tan Sinh, this volume), has to be understood in relation to 
the role of the public sphere. The public sphere in Vietnam cannot be understood 
as an independent, public expression of private people in opposition to the state. 
In the democratic West, the public can be regarded as part of the societal sphere 
of private persons (Habermas 1989: 30). In Vietnam the public cannot be seen as 
such, since there is no binary idea of state and society as separated spheres. The 
public in Vietnam, rather, must be viewed as a sphere of education: there is no 
private, and thus no public, independent of the party state. Public discourse is 
not debate between private individuals, but rather public opinion controlled 
through the state apparatus. The public sphere is, so to speak, the sphere where 
the one- party state accesses the people, and where the party’s policies and values 
are transmitted to the different groups in society (cf. Rittersporn et al. 2003: 14). 
Therefore, the government’s strategy is to initiate and direct the participation of 
citizens in social groups (Dalton and Ong 2005: 33). The mass organizations are, 
next to the state and party organizations at every administrative level, the core 
instrument for ensuring the effective education of the masses. This is evident, for 
example, in water supply and sanitation, where it is the task of the Women’s 
Union to communicate party views on environmental and hygiene issues to the 
people, following a clear top- down approach.
The Women’s Union has the function of mobilization and communication 
on good hygiene and sanitation, improving the awareness of the people, 
training. . . . We get the decision about the strategy from the provincial 
 People’s Committee.
(Interview, Women’s Union, Tra Vinh province, 10 July 2008)
We train and mobilize the women [on district level] to become facilitators 
in communication and education for rural water supply and sanitation. The 
rural women should participate in the protection of the environment, 
improvement of hygienic latrines, collecting waste, digging holes for col-
lecting chicken and duck droppings, and establishing families with good 
health.
(Interview, Women’s Union, Can Tho province, 3 June 2008)
We try to communicate about environmental issues to all members of the 
Women’s Union. To protect health, the people have to use well water, install 
hygienic latrines and drink boiled water.
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[NR: How do you cooperate with the Women’s Union on provincial level?] 
Cooperation is not the right expression. We get the decision from the pro-
vincial level and we follow.
(Interview, Women’s Union, Co Do district, Can Tho province, 
11 July 2008)
Women’s Union officers are appointed by the party.
[NR: How did you become the leader of the WU?] Previously, I worked in 
the hamlet, then the commune suggested that I work in the commune. I 
became the deputy manager, and after a few years, I became the leader.
[NR: Who from the commune suggested you for the commune Women’s 
Union, was it the People’s Committee?] No, it was people from the party.
[NR: Does the party always appoint the leader of the Women’s Union?] 
Yes.
[NR: Do you have to be a party member to become the leader of the 
Women’s Union?] I have been a member since 1998.
(Interview, Women’s Union leader, Truong Xuan commune, 
Co Do district, Can Tho province, 23 October 2008)
The mass organizations can thus be seen as the ‘civil arm’ of the party apparatus, 
through which the political elite propagates its views on virtually all aspects of 
life. To illustrate, the Women’s Union is also responsible for ‘communicating’ 
the party’s two- child policy to the population through ‘birth control officers’ 
active in the communes. Hence, the Vietnamese social imaginary implies that 
the public, in the sense of society as a whole, is fully entitled to control the 
private (cf. Rittersporn 2003: 413).
 The second ‘ideal type’ of active citizenship in Vietnam relates to the moral 
imperative for devoting oneself to the wellbeing and harmony of the societal 
whole. One of the components of the Vietnamese Cultural System, with origins 
in Buddhist rather than Confucian thought, is a morality steeped in self- sacrifice 
and ‘destruction of the ego’ (Pye 1985: 238ff.). Civic engagement can thus be 
seen as a way of becoming a ‘good’ citizen. The agents of this project of civic 
engagement can be individuals as well as collectives.
 On the individual side, the water sector can exemplify the cultural repre-
sentation of this kind of civic engagement. In order to supply the rural areas 
in Can Tho City with clean domestic water, provincial authorities began to 
install water supply stations with piped networks at the end of the 1990s 
(Reis 2012: 74ff.). However, as research has revealed, the budget of the 
provincial agency responsible for rural water supply is so low that the operation 
and management of the local water supply stations is essentially dependent 
on the commitment of individuals. The stations are commonly constructed on the 
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property of a household willing to donate a piece of land (usually in their 
back yard) for constructing the station; they then take over its management. 
The task involves maintaining the station and tubes, washing the water container, 
collecting water fees from households, implementing minor repairs and 
installing household connections. However, the station managers are not 
government employees, and only receive a small allowance of VND140,000 
(approx. US$7.43) per month. In addition, they receive VND2,500 for every 
household that uses more than 3 m3; i.e. a manager whose piped water is used 
by 100 households can receive VND390,000VND (approximately US$20.72) 
per month.
 How many days the station managers work for the water supply station 
depends on how often the water container is cleaned and how frequently repairs 
are needed. Station managers stated that they worked between three and 16 days 
per month,4 and represented their work as a personal commitment for the 
community.
I do not consider the money from [the government agency] as a salary. It is 
just for serving the people.
(Station manager, Thanh Quoi commune, Vinh Thanh district, 
23 September 2008)
I do not consider the money I get as a salary, I just do it because I want to 
serve the people.
(Station manager, Truong Xuan commune, Co Do district, 
23 October 2008)
The salary for the station management is not too much; but because the gov-
ernment invested to serve the people, I also work to serve the people.
(Station manager, Truong Long commune, Phong Dien district, 
28 October 2008)
The salary of the managers is very little considering the considerable responsib-
ility. Proper operation of the stations effectively depends on the commitment of 
the station managers. For example, the water quality depends on how often the 
container is cleaned. Therefore, authorities select families with a strong sense of 
civic duty.
The land is usually offered by the families. They have to choose a family 
which has high social spirit. The area is usually 48 m².
[NR: What are the important characteristics of the families?] High social 
spirit, responsibility, good health. If the guy is drunk all the time it is not 
good! [laughing]. . . . In this area, the social spirit is the most important.
(President, PC Thoi An ward, O Mon district, 15 September 2008)
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The station managers in Can Tho are very kind. They have good social 
spirit. They manage the public property very well. The manager is supported 
by the local authorities and the communities very much.
(Head of Office, provincial water supply agency, 15 October 2008)
Similar to the idea of ‘social spirit’, the morality of civic engagement is illus-
trated by the conception of a ‘good hamlet’ (Ấp văn hóa). Becoming a ‘good 
hamlet’ is achieved by ‘creating a culture among the people’ (interview, Peo-
ple’s Committee Troung Long commune, Phong Dien district, Can Tho City, 2 
March 2009).
 The culture of ‘serving’ the wellbeing of society also materializes in CBOs, 
many of which were established after 1986 (Wischermann and Nguyen Quang 
Vinh 2003: 186). CBOs fulfil a prominent role in the policy of ‘socialization’. 
The government encourages the establishment of non- profit organizations pro-
viding public services to citizens that the government is not able or willing to 
provide (CIEM/FES 2006: 19ff.). In 2005 an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 such 
groups existed in Vietnam; working in the health, education, environmental and 
religious sectors (Norlund 2007: 13). As pointed out by Waibel and Benedikter 
(this volume), in the case of irrigation management CBOs play a key role in the 
implementation of government policy.
It is necessary to clearly emphasize that socialization is to mobilize material, 
intellectual, and spiritual strength of the whole society to better meet daily 
demands of people on education, healthcare, culture, gymnastics and sports, 
[and to] better implement social equality in these fields.
(Address of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to the National Conference, 
26 July 2005, cited in CIEM/FES 2006: 23)
These words of the Prime Minister make the case for viewing CBOs as vicarious 
agents of the government, and as a manifestation of the idea that civic engage-
ment is to serve the wellbeing of the society at large.
Discussion and conclusion
In the Vietnamese social imaginary, civic engagement takes place within the 
boundaries of the party state. Therefore, if ‘civil society’ exists in Vietnam, it 
cannot be seen as a sphere outside of the state, or even a sphere in which the 
activities of the state are guided and judged. On the contrary, ‘active citizenship’ 
in Vietnam functions as an important mechanism for the reproduction of the 
social imaginary, which can be understood to be the ‘cultural property’ of the 
one- party state (Reis 2012: 215ff.).
 How does this analysis assess the changes in Vietnam since the economic lib-
eralization of the late 1980s? Waibel and Benedikter (this volume) show that the 
reform process has produced a growing number, and new types, of civic organ-
izations, such as religious groups, environmental groups, educational/cultural 
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groups and business organizations. Thayer (2008: 13) recognized an increasing 
number of ‘explicitly political organizations dedicated to the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and religious freedom’ in Vietnam. Religious leaders 
and networks have been a particularly active source of political unrest.5 Will 
these new groups initiate political change and transform Vietnam into a demo-
cracy? A simple answer would be that only history will tell: society is an open 
system. The political Cultural System is a structural condition, not a determi-
nant, which means that the exercise of its causal powers is dependent upon their 
activation by people (Archer 2005: 25).
 Nevertheless, as a structural condition, the Cultural System exercises its own 
powers on socio- cultural interaction because it engenders specific mechanisms 
that enable or constrain the variation, selection and retention of social practices. 
Social imaginaries possess discursively selective powers (Jessop 2008: 239). The 
key driver for the reproduction of the political Cultural System through civic 
action is that people become carriers of various structures as their behaviour is 
formed by processes of socialization, in particular cultural and cumulative social 
learning (Eckstein 1988: 792). It is for this reason that Dalton and Ong (2005: 
41) found that civic groups in Vietnam, instead of developing political skills and 
interests (as postulated by classical civil society theorists), ‘convey the values of 
hierarchy and collective decision- making that underlie the current communist 
regime’.
 What if ideas that contradict the prevailing social imaginary still emerge? 
Clearly the reproduction of the Cultural System also depends on material- 
structural forces and the interests associated with them. ‘Although there may be 
a plurality of ideas and interests at play in any given socio- political structure, the 
dominant legitimacy conceptions and rules constituting that structure will favor 
some sorts of interests and modes of action over others’ (Bukovansky 2002: 43).
 In Vietnam the cultural properties of the state are carried by the interests of 
one societal group, one which has expanded numerically with economic liberal-
ization but one which has not diversified to the extent that conflicting political 
ideas would gain weight (Reis 2012: 217). The concentration of resources within 
a single elite, and its strong interdependence with a long- established idea of the 
state, creates a strong incentive for closing off the system against alternative 
ideas. The modern idea of equality has to be suppressed because it is subversive 
to the core features of social order. Hence, the prevailing Cultural System is pro-
tected, most notably, by the hindering or closing off information sources, anti- 
pluralist propaganda, and finally, physical violence against political dissidents.6 
In summary, the properties of the cultural and material structures of the Viet-
namese state system provide more reason to assume that civil society actors will 
continue to contribute to the reproduction of social and political order rather than 
to democratic transformation.
 Nevertheless, there are signs that civic action in Vietnam could push forward 
the ‘modern idea’ in a more modest sense. The central features of the Vietnam-
ese Cultural System, emphasizing the creation of harmony through hierarchical 
order and elitist paternalism, may also be seen as a ‘primary civilizational layer’ 
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(Arnason 2003: 17) that is not only exceptionally capable of absorbing external 
ideas without disruption,7 but also of adapting (to a certain extent) to new social 
realities. Until now, the strategy of the majority of civic organizations for intro-
ducing change has consisted of pushing the Cultural System to its internal limits 
rather than challenging the system by exploiting potential contradictions.
[T]hey view themselves as representative of marginalized groups and lobby 
the state for change in policy. In this role Vietnamese NGOs attempt to 
negotiate and educate state officials rather than confront them as a tactic to 
bring about change. In other words, their activities were in direct support of 
existing government programs or in support of larger state- approved policy 
goals (national development or poverty alleviation).
(Thayer 2008: 9)
By focusing on cultural complementarities instead of contradictions, their prac-
tices have strengthened the dominant Cultural System, but at the same time they 
may be able to initiate processes of structural elaboration. Rather than initiating 
a radical transformation process, civil society actors could bring about gradual 
change towards less controversial views in certain societal spheres. The first 
signs of such elaboration may be glimpsed in the field of environmental manage-
ment (Wells- Dang, this volume), gender relations, and people living with HIV/
AIDS (Wischermann 2011). It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the 
idea of equality (and which facets of it) can be accommodated and manifested 
within the Vietnamese social imaginary.
 To conclude, the cultural conditions under which civic engagement takes 
place in Vietnam differ fundamentally from those in which the concept of civil 
society originated, and civic action thus also takes on different forms and mean-
ings than in Western societies. By analysing the meanings of civic engagement 
in Vietnam, it has become clear that there is no automatic logic that ‘civil 
society’ functions for increased citizen participation in political decision- making 
and democracy. Rather, it depends on the demands civic actors make of their 
political leaders, and to what extent the Vietnamese state will become more of a 
project of the people than the project of a self- proclaimed enlightened elite.
Notes
1 In the following, the term ‘modern’ is used (in line with Taylor 2004) with reference to 
the dominant, European form of modernity, leaving open whether modernity can also 
exist in other forms (cf. Eisenstadt 2000).
2 I leave aside the debate on concepts of ‘freedom and equality’ in Western capitalism, 
and the practices of the idea/ideology of civil society in Western societies. This chapter 
focuses on how structures of meaning (or ideologies) emanating from a particular cul-
tural setting find application in other contexts, like Vietnam.
3 The empirical material presented derives from a year of field research in the Mekong 
Delta on policy practices in domestic water supply and sanitation.
4 It is unclear how many hours they work per day.
5 See, e.g. UCA News, 2012.
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6 For information on government restrictions and suppression in Vietnam see Human 
Rights Watch (2012). In response to recent popular movements in the Arab world, the 
VCP has, in particular, increased surveillance and repression of bloggers (Thayer 
2012).
7 On the absorption of Western donor terminology as ‘mobilising metaphors’ (Mosse 
2004: 663) in development cooperation in Vietnam, see Reis (2012: 185ff.).
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6 Enclosing women’s rights in the 
kitchen cabinet?
Interactions between the Vietnam 
Women’s Union, civil society and 
state on gender equality
Nora Pistor and Le Thi Quy1
Introduction
Vietnamese civil society working in the fields of women’s rights and gender 
equality was considered fragile during the mid 2000s. Over the course of just 
half a decade, the landscape of organizations promoting these issues developed 
remarkably. Supported by the government’s stronger commitment in these areas, 
this process has been driven by international directives, practical implementation 
of related policy, and numerous projects by the emerging civil society. The 
Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), with its hybrid character as a semi- state, 
semi- civil society organization and with long- standing ties to the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP), is playing a major role in the development of the 
progressive issues of women’s rights and gender equality while maintaining 
a generally conservative position. In this chapter we argue that, despite its 
frequent classification as being part of civil society, the VWU is merely fulfilling 
the function of a state propaganda instrument that reaches down to communities 
at the grassroots level. Its existence allows the government to abdicate 
its responsibility for dealing with the subject, leaving the real civil society to 
take on the risk of increasing participation in advocacy and policy development, 
and to bravely address delicate topics on which the VWU often prefers to 
maintain a silent position. As a result, the opportunities of influencing 
state policy remain limited for both the VWU and for other civil society organ-
izations (CSOs).
 This chapter explores interactions of the VWU with the government and the 
emerging civil society actors, such as the newly formed networks, highlighting 
some remarkable achievements and shedding light on the remaining challenges 
and risks.
Civil society organizations on gender and women’s rights 
issues in Vietnam: an overview
The Asian Development Bank’s ‘Gender Report’ from 2005 assessed civil 
society working on women’s rights and gender equality (hereafter together 
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referred to as women’s rights) as weak and in need of support, noting 
that, without support, these issues ‘would fall off the political agenda’ (ADB 
2005: 58). The report summarizes that, ‘as such, civil society . . . in terms of 
critical engagement with the government, is somewhat lacking in Viet Nam’. 
The civil society working on women’s rights was largely considered to be 
echoing the programmes of the Vietnamese state- sponsored mass organizations, 
especially those of the VWU, particularly as there were not many other 
organizations of a governmental nor non- governmental kind to be taken into 
account.
 Despite this negative assessment in 2005, the current picture is a different 
one. Indeed, numerous Vietnamese CSOs are now active in advancing women’s 
rights. Some non- governmental organizations (NGOs) have specialized in 
women’s issues with rather small- scale projects at the grassroots level, such as 
the ‘Little Rose Shelter’,2 which has, since 1992, provided a safe place for young 
girls who have been victims of human trafficking or who are at high risk of 
becoming victims. Research institutions such as the Center for Gender, Family 
and Environment in Development, established also in 1992, represent some of 
the first women- oriented Vietnamese NGOs focusing research on reproductive 
health and related health topics (Tran Thi Van Anh et al. 1997: 57). Others 
organizations working on research and a broad spectrum of women’s topics 
include the Center for Education Promotion and Empowerment of Women, the 
renowned Center for Studies and Applied Sciences on Gender and Adolescents,3 
the Research Center for Gender and Development belonging to the Hanoi Uni-
versity of Social Science and Humanities, and the Center for Promoting Devel-
opment for Women and Children. In addition, in the 1990s, three significant 
networks all directly targeting women’s and children’s issues, have emerged 
within the civil society community:4 The Gender Communication Network com-
prises 20 NGOs according to its own account, the Domestic Violence Prevention 
Network has 22 member NGOs, and the Network for the Empowerment of 
Women (NEW) has 60 NGOs. Collectively, these offer a wide landscape of 
potential for interactions between civil society and the state.
 Although most of these organizations and networks undertook the discursive 
shift from the ‘women in development’ approach (WID) to the more inclusive 
approach of ‘gender and development’ (GAD) in the mid 1990s, the understand-
ing of gender equality remains limited. The shift to GAD generally coincides 
with a broadening of analytic perspective to categories such as gender relations 
within the household and at work, within marriage and outside of it, to sexuality, 
and to the impact of kinship (Werner et al. 2002: 15). The combination of Con-
fucianism within the socialist ideology, and the impacts of the economic reform 
(Đổi Mới), have been nominally examined from a gender perspective since 1986, 
yet it is striking that gender equality is still mainly understood as a synonym for 
the equality of women, recognizing women as the only vulnerable and discrimi-
nated gender in Vietnam. Homosexuality, for example, is being neglected in the 
discussion about gender, having been officially labelled a ‘social evil’ by the 
Vietnamese government. As Rydstrom comments:
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Homosexuality, pornography, prostitution, drug and alcohol addiction, gamb-
ling, theft, abuse and violence as well as paintings (e.g. pin- up calendars), 
music videos and music referring to sex . . . have been linked with ‘social 
evils’ by the Vietnamese government. ‘Social evils’ is a category widely 
associated with the types of sexual practices condemned as being ‘dirty’ 
(bẩn) . . . which, in turn, are linked with assumptions about HIV and  AIDS.
(Rydstrom 2006a: 284)
There are few Vietnamese CSOs supporting the interests of lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender and intersexual persons, and even fewer donor organizations 
interested in supporting this target group in Vietnam. The diverse rights and 
challenges of these persons, as well as their gender identities, are only starting to 
be addressed by the civil society and the media in conferences and meetings on 
gender equality, although, at least so far, the LGBTI community remains largely 
under- explored (US State Department 2011: 38).
 An umbrella for these organizations, centres and networks is being provided 
by the Gender Action Partnership (GAP), which is chaired by the Ministry of 
Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), the ministry responsible for the 
implementation of gender equality and gender mainstreaming (with considerable 
support of UN Women). GAP was created under the secretariat of the National 
Committee for the Advancement of Women (NCFAW) in 1999 as an inter- 
ministerial committee to bring together members from the 63 provincial Com-
mittees for the Advancement of Women. Today, GAP comprises around 45 
member organizations in a partnership of relevant governmental agencies, 
national and international organizations, networks, as well as CSOs. Its explicit 
aim is to provide a space for CSOs to present their projects, advocate for specific 
causes and promote their organizations to governmental agencies, international 
organizations and donors.5 Often, however, GAP is seen as initiated and domi-
nated by the government and donors such as UN Women, a fact that might result 
in a hesitant participation and filtered expression of needs and interests by the 
civil society actors.
 The development of an organizational landscape since the early 1990s, which 
was strongly reinforced after the beginning of the millennium, can be viewed as 
the second feminist wave in Vietnam, focused less on the details of the discourse 
on women’s rights and more on concrete activism and the realization of a higher 
quantity of qualitatively improved projects to support women. Though, as Soucy 
(2000: 124) suggests, unlike its earlier Western equivalents, Vietnamese fem-
inism does not seem to challenge the hegemonic masculine structure but rather 
‘tends to become only a vehicle for carrying broader policy issues; it has become 
a Trojan horse of nationalism’, manifesting itself as a quiet, rarely critical, social 
development without aspirations of transformation into a genuine political 
movement. While the first feminist wave was, in contrast to the second, closely 
linked to a socialist liberation movement (against the French colonial regime) 
(Tran Thi Van Anh et al. 1997: 52), it did not aim at improving women’s 
rights in the frame of a human rights approach but – following the communist 
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model – looked at integrating women into the nationalist struggle for freedom 
and encouraging the participation of women in the process, defeats and achieve-
ments of political and social development (Turley 1972). While a human rights 
approach would have argued for the rights of all women based on their being a 
human being, the first feminist wave, initiated and lead by the state, focused on 
military, economic, demographic and social needs. In this respect, the state 
enlisted women to fight in the war, materially support the country’s economy, 
and bear children to counteract the human losses in society. Analysing the inher-
ent contradiction of the constructed image of the Vietnamese women, Soucy 
points out that, ‘it depicts women as being labourers and freedom fighters, pur-
portedly showing how women are equal to men, while maintaining the primacy 
of the traditional roles and responsibilities’ (Soucy 2000: 124).
 Little research on the current new wave of feminism has been undertaken so 
far by the organizations working on the topic of women’s rights; in fact, analyt-
ical and empirical research about the feminist and gender movements from 
within civil society in Vietnam seems to be non- existent. The lack of a ‘critical’ 
stance regarding women’s rights and gender issues, and the ‘chaotic situation’ 
for NGOs having to operate without formal laws (Kerkvliet 2003: 3), are two 
contributing factors to the negative assessment of civil society working on these 
issues up to 2005 (ADB 2005: 58). Since then, with international support and 
heightened awareness within society about women’s rights, the circumstances 
have become more attractive for new CSOs and NGOs to establish and imple-
ment projects. Considering the recent mushrooming of initiatives and projects 
throughout the country, which appear to be following an action- and interaction- 
centred approach as suggested by Wischermann (2010: 9), an immense increase 
of civil society activity in the field of women’s rights is evident. Despite this, 
international NGOs and donors often choose the VWU as a partner, given the 
fact that it can provide the necessary organizational structure, capacities and 
long- term experiences at the central, provincial and community level.
Paper doesn’t blush: Vietnam’s policies on women’s rights 
and gender equality
Written along Marxist principles, the first Vietnamese Constitution of 1946 
already recognized the necessity of equality between men and women and codi-
fied it in a simplistic form. The Law on Marriage and Family of 1959 confirmed 
this principle (Turley 1972: 798). The Vietnamese Constitution, in its current 
form since 1992, provides for gender equality in a broad sense for all citizens of 
the country in all areas of ‘political, economic, cultural, social (life) and in the 
family’ (National Assembly 1992: 11), in line with the wording of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Violence against Women 
(CEDAW).6 A year after the new constitution was written, in 1993, the NCFAW 
was established with a mandate to advise the Prime Minister, support the imple-
mentation of the five- year Plans of Action for Women’s Advancement, and 
support the achievement of gender equality (ADB 2005: 32). According to a 
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decision of the Prime Minister in 2008, this inter- sectoral body, filled by repre-
sentatives from various ministries and mass organizations, and headed by the 
female minister of MOLISA, the vice- minister of MOLISA and the president of 
the VWU,7 is tasked with researching and coordinating interdisciplinary initia-
tives concerning the advancement of women. Despite the positive signal sent by 
institutionalizing a political forum for advancing women’s issues, NCFAW 
remains a recommending entity without legislative or executive powers.
 The new Law on Marriage and Family of 2000 formalizes equal rights for 
marriage and divorce, guardianship for children, and child rights, similar to the 
law of 1959 (National Assembly 2000). However, the minimum age for women 
to marry was set at 18, while for men it is 20, a simple clause that is symbolic of 
unequal treatment of women, and one which fortifies gender stereotypes to the 
disadvantage of women, and may result in higher violability of younger women 
(Martignoni 2001: 11).
 In November 2006 the Government of Vietnam took the step of approving 
the Law on Gender Equality, leading to the establishment of the Gender Equality 
Department in MOLISA (National Assembly 2006). The law explicitly but 
vaguely states that ‘all acts of discrimination against women and all acts dam-
aging women’s dignity are strictly banned’. The Law on Gender Equality tends 
to narrow the focus on gender equality to the immediate social and family life by 
consistently referring to these gendered areas of female responsibility throughout 
the legal document, while other important issues for the realization of gender 
equality, such as equal economic opportunity, equal work and pay, and possibil-
ities for equal political decision- making, seem to play a minor role. The imple-
mentation of the Law on Gender Equality is supported by three decrees as well 
as various policies and directives aiming to enhance the realization of gender 
equality, such as the Party Directive of 1994, which enforced the 20 per cent 
quota for women in the Party and governmental organizations (NORAD 2010: 
9ff.). However, since there are neither legal nor practical consequences if this 
quota is not met, the scope for implementation of this, and many other related 
policies, remains limited.
 MOLISA is the government focal point for the CEDAW follow- up reports 
mandated by the CEDAW Committee since 2007.8 Under this framework, a 
National Strategy for the Advancement of Women in Vietnam was approved by 
the government for the period 2002–10, and a second one for the period 
2011–20, highlighting the importance of gender equality for national socio- 
economic development. Along with this National Strategy, a National Targeted 
Program on Gender Equality for the period 2011–15 was developed in July 2011 
with the aim of
making a fundamental transformation in the public awareness to promote 
behavior changes in substantial gender equality; to make steps towards 
bridging the gender gap and promoting women’s status in areas where there 
is actual occurrence or high risks of inequality.
(Government of Vietnam 2011: Article 1)
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The National Assembly, in turn, supervises the process of mainstreaming gender 
in legal documents as well as in the 1992 Constitution, as provided for in the 
Law on Gender Equality. The development of these strategies was strongly sup-
ported by UN agencies, especially the new entity of UN Women, which was 
counting on the active participation of civil society.
 One of the topics within MOLISA’s purview that has been a matter of intense 
discussion since 2006 is the unequal retirement age of 60 for male and 55 for 
female civil servants, as codified in the Labour Law of 1960.9 The differential 
treatment is officially justified on the grounds that women need to take care of 
their household responsibilities, and the belief that elderly women are physically 
weaker than men. Ironically, this provision was meant – and is considered by 
more than 85 per cent of the population (male and female) according to a survey 
by the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences – as preferential treatment to the 
advantage of women, allowing them more time to take care of their health and 
family (World Bank and ILSSA 2009: 21; Rama 2001: 18). However, a different 
study published in 2005 found that:
There was uniform opposition to the idea of an earlier retirement age for 
women among all the stakeholders interviewed for this project. . . . The con-
sultations produced a strong consensus that the retirement age should be the 
same for both women and men with the option for retiring earlier extended 
to both.
(Kabeer et al. 2005: 19)
A consequence of this provision is that fewer women are allowed to participate 
in vocational training after reaching a certain age as they would have to retire 
shortly thereafter, and there is correspondingly less opportunity for women to 
reach high- level and better- paid positions. From an economic perspective, ‘the 
gender bias represents a financial burden to the pension system’ (World Bank 
and ILSSA 2009: 36) while, from a rights- based perspective, it results in a clear 
violation of the provisions of CEDAW demanding a substantial equality between 
women and men. Based on the UN recommendations on the implementation of 
the CEDAW in Vietnam (UNIFEM 2009: 233), both the official CEDAW report 
prepared by state agencies (Government of Vietnam 2005), and the NGO 
CEDAW reports (so- called ‘shadow reports’) facilitated by NEW (Gencomnet 
2006; Gencomnet 2010), address the disadvantages and discrimination of the 
unequal retirement age. While all reports agree on the importance of an equal 
retirement age for men and women without any distinction based on sex, the new 
models currently under discussion still foresee an age gap of either three or 
five years. The official government report states that ‘in a bid to address these 
problems, the VWU and other relevant agencies are working on proposals to the 
Government on measures to be taken in the near future’ (Government of 
Vietnam 2005: 17).
 Current trends at VWU suggest, however, that any such proposals will likely 
not advocate for drastic changes to the unequal retirement age.
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 With the enactment of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Domestic 
Violence in 2007, the high prevalence of domestic violence was acknowledged 
by the Government of Vietnam, which also assigned state agencies as well as 
non- governmental organizations and civil society to jointly implement the legal 
provisions. Perhaps reflecting their mixed feelings about acknowledging this 
phenomenon, it was the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and not 
MOLISA, that was named the state managing agency for this law, thereby taking 
on responsibility for the provision of counselling and support services for 
victims of domestic violence.10
 Aside from these selected legal inconsistencies to achieve gender equality, 
weak participation of the VWU and civil society in policy formulation, and the 
fragmentation of implementation, have led to convoluted bureaucratic proced-
ures and the prolongation of administrative and legal processes.11 This scattering 
of responsibilities in the topics of gender equality and domestic violence – topics 
that are genuinely intertwined with each other and which require high adminis-
trative collaboration – suggests a lack of unity regarding the promotion of 
women’s rights in Vietnam.
On the social inappropriateness of gender equality
Despite positive achievements well documented in various development reports 
in the fields of health, education, economy and politics, the understanding of 
gender equality and the role of women and men in Vietnamese society, as lived 
by the people and watched over by civil society and the VWU, is still indicative 
of unequal relations between women and men. The current nationwide move-
ment led by the VWU, which was started in 2010, encourages women to strive 
for a ‘mutual assistance among women’ in the economic development of house-
holds.12 This has reinforced the taken- for-granted responsibility of women in the 
domestic sphere and revealed the stubbornness of the patriarchal hierarchies 
deriving from Confucian social traditions, which have discriminated against 
women on the basis of an inherent assumption of the superiority of men over 
women (Rydstrom 2006b: 333).13
 In Vietnamese society, strong gender stereotypes and gender- specific identifi-
cations influence the appropriateness of behaviour, appearance, and the forms of 
expressions between men and women of different ages. Examples of these 
stereo types can be found in nearly all areas of everyday life, such as the carrying 
out of ritual ancestral worship, which is reserved for men due to their ‘innate 
honour’ (Long et al. 2000: 26); in the responsibility for the maintenance of 
‘happiness in the family’, which lies exclusively within the female sphere 
regardless of the husband’s actions (Long et al. 2000: 29); as well as in numer-
ous proverbs in the Vietnamese language that bear discriminating connotations 
against women (Khuat Thu Hong et al. 2009: 236ff.).
 Initiatives addressing gender- related discrimination are often classified as 
inappropriate or unsuitable for Vietnamese society, even by representatives from 
the VWU and members of CSOs who are actively promoting women’s rights. 
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This was the case, for example, with the topics of domestic violence and traf-
ficking in women and children. During the set up of the first pilot project to 
support female victims of domestic violence through shelter and counselling 
services, the VWU opposed the idea of a shelter project as they found this to be 
inappropriate for Vietnamese society and they disagreed about the prevalence of 
domestic violence (Hardinghaus 2009: 93). Despite this initial denial, the preva-
lence of domestic violence has been evidenced in nationwide research conducted 
in 2010 and has, since then, found wide- ranging support from state authorities 
and international donors to local development partners (General Statistics Office 
Vietnam 2010).
 A similar resistance was encountered in the first projects to prevent traffick-
ing in women and children that was to be implemented from 1997 to 2000 by the 
Youth Research Institute in cooperation with the VWU (Le Thi Quy 2000). It 
was not until 2000 that the first publication on trafficking of women was printed, 
revealing that, indeed, human trafficking constituted a major problem in 
Vietnam, especially in the provinces bordering Cambodia in the south and China 
in the north, with an estimated tens of thousands of women and children being 
trafficked since 1998 (Le Thi Quy 2000; Gencomnet 2010). Before that no 
research project and no literature was made available in Vietnam, and the topic 
was regarded too sensitive to be discussed publicly.14 As a result, the first initia-
tives to support victims of human trafficking were established after research was 
carried out in 2000 by the Research Center for Gender and Development, the 
Institute for Tradition and Development, the Centre for Promoting Development 
for Women and Children, the international NGO Nordic Assistance Vietnam, as 
well as the VWU through its Center for Women and Development. Initiatives 
sponsored by CSOs and the VWU are now increasingly being supported by the 
government, international organizations, and the media. In fact, cooperation 
between the police and civic service providers are being fortified, and the part-
nership between the government and VWU has been defined by the recent Anti- 
Human Trafficking Law (National Assembly 2011).
 These remarkable achievements show that civil society is daring to challenge 
the status quo (under certain conditions) rather than reproducing gender discrim-
ination in the existing socio- political setting. CSOs have been playing a catalytic 
role in advancing taboo topics such as domestic violence, human trafficking and 
LGBTI rights by overcoming the initial resistance of governmental agencies 
through independent research, persistent advocacy and international support.
The elephant in the house: the Vietnam Women’s Union
The VWU is the biggest mass organization under the umbrella of the Fatherland 
Front. A review of available reports shows that the classification of the VWU as 
part of the civil society is highly contested (Norlund 2007: 9). In fact, some 
reports list the union as part of the national machinery for gender equality (ADB 
2005); others call it a ‘quasi- state, quasi- NGO mass organization’ (Angeles 2000: 
7). Despite its frequent classification as a civil society organization domestically 
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(Norlund 2007: 11), the VWU constitutes, de lege, a part of the political system 
of Vietnam.15 It is affiliated with the government through its participation in pol-
itics, policy development and its presence in various official organs, and with its 
status as a formally recognized consulting and commenting body.
 The structure of the VWU echoes that of the Communist Party, with a gov-
erning body made up of 15 women leaders who are announced for five- early 
terms at the National Women’s Congress. This central authority branches out in 
a rigidly hierarchic pattern down to the provinces, districts and communes, with 
its decisions being made in a top- down process (JICA 2011: 15ff.). In practice, 
however, the local chapters of the VWU enjoy some degree of autonomy in the 
implementation of their programmes. This informal autonomy, however, can be 
restricted by the local Provincial People’s Committees.16 A brief overview of the 
VWU’s historical background and the political context will help shed light on its 
role and current position.
A civic mass organization under Leninist ideology
In socialist revolutionary ideology, bodies such as the VWU stem from the need 
to mobilize women to help liberate the country; in the case of Vietnam, first 
from French colonialism and later from American imperialism. Along with 
optimism for the liberalization of the country and equality of all people, the 
VWU’s social programmes designed in the aftermath of the American War 
designated the place for women in society by assigning them explicit tasks in the 
nationalist struggle, thereby contributing to the construction of a new female role 
in times of revolution.
 The innovative nature of this role lay in its combining of the stereotypical 
role of women as mothers responsible for reproducing and nurturing society with 
the extraordinary war- related task of replenishing the dwindled male labour 
force.17 The underlying ideology acting to improve women’s status in society 
was alimented by the necessity to maintain the mostly agricultural economy of 
the country with the female labour force while men were fighting against the 
foreign aggressors; needless to say, women were not allowed to fight in the 
regular army (Turley 1972: 797). Women participated mostly as informal war 
workers or volunteers, thus not benefiting from any post- war indemnification.
 The era of Đổi Mới, starting in 1986, brought about the beginning of funda-
mental change, not only in economic terms but also in terms of social develop-
ment, which caused a decline in the public sector and produced a consequent 
shift of female labour into the informal sector and home- based work (Werner 
2002: 35). Along with economic disadvantages faced by women at this time, 
gender- related changes also resulted in increasing responsibilities of women for 
family healthcare, and – with the concurrent deconstruction of traditional gender 
roles – an increase in domestic conflict (Long et al. 2000: 29). The VWU con-
tributed to national development through capacity building and the improvement 
of the living standards of women through various programmes, campaigns and 
projects. At the same time, many of these initiatives reproduced conventional 
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stereotypes such as kind- heartedness and altruism, typical female attributes 
deriving from Confucian traditions (Schuler et al. 2006: 385ff., see also Le Thi 
Nham Tuyet 2005).
 Since the 1990s, the prominent VWU campaign for women to ‘Study Act-
ively, Work Creatively and Build Happy Families’ was launched, implying addi-
tional responsibilities and burdens for women, including increasing the 
household’s economic status through new enterprise, enhancing capacities and 
knowledge, as well as taking care of the well- being of the family. Even engender-
ing happiness of the family and of its members – an emotion that can hardly be 
obtained through a governmental top- down process for economic development 
and stability (Kwiatkowski 2011: 3) – was defined as the task of a good wife 
(Schuler et al. 2006). With the new millennium, the VWU continued in the same 
direction, namely supporting the economic and social development of women by 
promoting women’s dual roles in the family and income generation. At the same 
time, the VWU became increasingly engaged in regional and international coop-
eration. From 2002–7, the goals of the VWU were vaguely codified,
to raise the all- sided capacity and knowledge, and improve the material and 
spiritual livelihood for women, to effectuate gender equality. To cultivate 
the Vietnamese women who are patriotic, knowledgeable, healthy, dynamic, 
innovative, well- cultured, kind- hearted, and attentive to social and com-
munity interests.
(VWU leaflet: undated)
The operational objectives of the VWU in this period were focused on building 
up the capacities of the organization, enhancing international and regional net-
works, exercising its role as a policy recommending body, supporting the imple-
mentation of existing laws, improving the ‘qualities and capacities’ of 
Vietnamese women, and ‘building plentiful, equal, progressive and happy fam-
ilies’ (ibid.).
From society or for society?
The question remains open how to position the VWU and what the reasons are 
for the difficulties of its classification. According to the NGO Resource Center 
of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO NGO Resource 
Center), in the VWU’s own view, it is being classified as part of civil society:
[T]he [Women’s] union and other [mass organizations] are part of civil 
society on two grounds. First, they represent sectors of society. Second, they 
are not state- managed entities (không phải là cơ quan quản lý nhà nước). 
True, they are organizations within the state system, but given that their role 
is to represent societal functions and that they are not state- managed, these 
informants claim they are part of civil society.
(VUFO NGO Resource Center 2008: 20)
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The Vietnamese concepts of the notions of NGO and civil society are even more 
vague than their Western- derived analogues (Wischermann 2004: 205). While 
there is no agreed definition for civil society in the Western academic com-
munity, Thayer (2008: 13) summarizes its characteristics for the case of Vietnam 
as follows:
When the term civil society is used in discussions with foreigners it 
generally refers to Vietnamese organizations closely linked to the state. 
These organizations try to pass themselves off as ‘genuine’ civil society 
groups out of self- interest. The so- called NGOs sector in Vietnam is a site 
of struggle over normative ideals between foreign donors and the one- party 
State.
The Vietnamese term for non- governmental organization (tổ chức phi chính phủ) 
literally means organization not of the (main) government. According to Norlund 
(2007: 10), this includes mass organizations such as the VWU, which are, in 
fact, organizations created, supported and directed by the VCP. In contrast, the 
Vietnamese term for civil society (xã hội dân sự) (see Phuong Le Trong, this 
volume) has a strong connotation of work for the community or even ‘social’ 
work;18 thus in Vietnamese, it is not exclusively the nature of the organization 
that matters for its classification as belonging to civil society, but also the func-
tion and purpose of its work. In short, a simple dichotomy of governmental 
versus civil or non- governmental, cannot be applied to Vietnam.
 The VWU has been active in communities, advocating in a populist manner 
for the comprehensive development of women and the realization of women’s 
rights (Fforde 2011: 171). It has, among other achievements, gained a strong 
reputation for supporting ethnic minority women and poor women in rural areas. 
Its prominent micro- credit programme has further contributed to high popularity 
at the grassroots level as it lends special support to poor women. In this respect, 
we suggest understanding the self- characterization of the VWU as belonging to 
civil society as more closely resembling a situation in which its purpose is to 
work for the society.
Narrow windows of influence
Within a legal framework allowing various forms of political participation, the 
Government of Vietnam acknowledges the importance of the VWU, and its 
close links to society, by conceding to it the role of advising the Fatherland Front 
and allowing to to provide a check on the executive. As such, the VWU was 
appointed as one of 30 members of the Drafting Committee for the Amendment 
of the Constitution in the current constitutional reform process. This would, in 
theory, confer a remarkable potential for political influence in the field of 
women’s rights. Furthermore, according to Decree Number 163 of 1988, the 
government needs to consult the VWU on issues concerning women and 
children, which suggests a significant role for the VWU in sectoral policy 
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development (ADB 2002: 34). That said, the actual degree of involvement con-
ceded to the VWU varies from case to case.
 In 1999, with the intention ‘to strengthen the close tie between the people and 
the Party and the State’, the Law of the Vietnam Fatherland Front was issued. In 
Article Two of this law, the Fatherland Front is assigned responsibility to super-
vise the activities of the state and its functionaries, to represent people’s opin-
ions, and issue recommendations to the Party and the state, to support the 
administrative body of the state, and to support the people’s legitimate interests. 
Despite this, in the list of priority topics of the Resolution of the Eleventh 
National Congress of the Communist Party, women’s rights and gender equality 
are not mentioned. Evidently, in its movements and programmes, the VWU is 
following the VCP’s directive without openly pressing for the inclusion of crit-
ical issues on the Party agenda. Since the VWU is financed partly by the state 
budget, there is an influence on the VWU’s spending and independence, but with 
increasing support from international donors, the budgetary influence of the state 
may decrease (JDR 2009: 113). Thus far, however, neither budgetary nor techni-
cal sovereignty have been given to the VWU.
 The restricted space for intervention by the VWU amounts to limited poten-
tial for political influence on decision- making processes. However, the VWU is 
continuously consulted by various governmental organs, especially when it 
comes to commenting on ‘traditional women’s topics’ such as education and 
health. As such, the VWU is complementing the line ministries in their respons-
ibilities, specifically MOLISA, which is responsible for mainstreaming gender in 
all governmental institutions and programmes, the Ministry of Education and 
Training in its endeavours for equal education access, and the Ministry of Health 
on reproductive health issues.
 In practice, whether acting under the influence of the Vietnamese state or 
international donors, the VWU generally applies a pragmatic approach to its 
operations, implementing them based on the possibilities and constraints with a 
focus on the practical needs of the female population. Through its structure and 
communication channels down to the grassroots level, the VWU is an efficient 
agent for gathering the views and voices of the people and conveying them in an 
amplified way towards the state. This capacity, for example, can be used when 
the Fatherland Front reports during the opening sessions of the National Assem-
bly’s plenary meetings (JDR 2009: 113). Although this rarely takes place, it is 
one clear forum in which the National Assembly, the Party and the government 
can be addressed with the challenges and constructive criticism of the society.
 With regard to its populist outreach, the VWU, like the other mass organiza-
tions (but to a lesser degree), has developed structures present at every level of the 
administration, which allows it to reach and mobilize the masses. On the provin-
cial level, most aspects related to women’s rights, such as awareness- raising and 
efforts to reduce female poverty, are commonly shifted to the VWU – this being 
an opportunity for governments to escape difficult responsibilities. Especially at 
the local level, the state agencies acknowledge their lack of awareness and limited 
capacity to advance women’s rights issues. In the end, the reality that is created on 
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the ground includes a national government that has established a formal organ for 
women’s rights and gender issues but yet concedes only limited influence to that 
organ (the VWU), preferring to retain decision- making power within the VCP and 
to itself; at the provincial and local levels, the VWU cadres are recognized as the 
only potentially capable agents, though without the allocation of sufficient 
resources to implement their tasks. Thus, with the existence of the VWU, its 
limited resources and minor influence on decision- making processes, local gov-
ernments tend to cold- shoulder women’s rights in their constituencies.
‘When the buffalo and the ox fight, flies and mosquitoes get 
squashed’
In contrast to other civil society organizations, the VWU is prominent due to its 
massive membership and its close relationship with the state. While the VWU 
represents itself as an inflated, strong, CSO, Vietnamese NGOs appear to be 
‘vulnerable, caught as they are between the dominant powers of state and donor, 
depending on the former for their social and legal legitimacy and on the latter for 
the lifeblood of funding’ (Hannah 2007: 172).
 This situation can be one of the factors hindering cooperation with smaller- 
scale civic organizations, which have difficulties viewing the VWU as an equal 
partner, since, as the World Bank reports, ‘its sheer size and presence makes it 
difficult for alternative forms of civil society organizations aimed [at] promoting 
gender equality to flourish’ (World Bank 2011: 90).
 Nevertheless, efforts by the VWU to enhance the collaboration with civil 
society on an equal basis, e.g. by technical cooperation at the central level and in 
the provinces, are becoming more common.19 At the same time, according to 
many accounts, CSOs increasingly invite the staff of the VWU, especially in the 
communes, to participate in their development projects. However, as suggested 
by Werner (2002: 44), attempts at cooperation from both sides are still overshad-
owed by hesitation and mistrust given the fact that the VWU also plays the func-
tion of watchdog over other civil organizations, which it does more often than 
observing the activities of state agencies. Nevertheless, civil society outside of 
mass organizations maintains the potential to compensate for some of the weak-
nesses of the VWU, such as its overly bureaucratic structure, its hesitation to 
utter criticism, and its adherence to traditional values by applying more innov-
ative models and high quality projects in the field of women’s rights. With this 
perspective in mind, a closer cooperation between civil society and the VWU 
needs to be envisaged.
 The government is showing increased interest in the work of civil society and 
conceding some, if limited, space for advocacy and action; such as during the 
consultation meeting of representatives of civil society with UN Women on the 
occasion of the finalization of the seventh and eighth CEDAW reports of 2012 
(ibid.). According to its own accounts, NEW has been able to contribute to the 
drafting of the Gender Equality Law, the Law on Domestic Violence, and the 
Law on Human Trafficking through recommendations and participation in 
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consultation meetings with the government that allow for community models 
and the views of the grassroots to be presented. Noteworthy is that the presidium 
of NEW consists of former government officials from various agencies, as well 
as from governmental research institutes which initiated the establishment of 
new civic organizations upon their (usually compulsory) retirement. Thus, it can 
be imagined that the identity and views of personnel formerly working in the 
governmental sector may even be perpetuated through civil society. This can be 
viewed as alliance- building with the government (as suggested by Wells- Dang, 
this volume), or, as we interpret, as a denigration of civil society precepts in the 
field of women’s rights, marked by a dearth of independent civil society agents 
who are ‘actors in their own right’ (a condition called for in the Accra Agenda 
for Action (OECD 2008: 18)).
Conclusions
Vietnam looks back at a long development of promoting equality between 
women and men. The commitment of the government is evident in its policies 
and at the institutional and structural level. Along with the improvement of the 
judiciary, a process of including more comprehensive impact- oriented methods 
has been initiated by the relevant governmental agencies in order to improve the 
quality of women’s lives. However, between the laws and everyday practice, big 
gaps remain.
 The VWU, other mass organizations, CSOs, and networks have become 
important driving forces to advance women’s rights on behalf of citizens. The 
significance of Vietnamese civil society has increased even beyond the borders 
of the country through participation in regional and international activities that 
allow the sharing of common concerns and knowledge. However, in the end, the 
capacity of CSOs and the VWU for consulting on and influencing the develop-
ment, implementation and monitoring of policies in the field of women’s rights 
remain limited.
 The organizational boundaries between civil society and the VWU as an 
organization of the masses and for the masses are not easily delineated; the 
massive, traditional VWU is often perceived as a facet of civil society with 
limited political influence, while the recently established NEW, which networks 
a large amount of NGOs together, is headed by, and likely influenced by, the 
perspectives of former government officials. The emerging initiatives of the 
VWU and CSOs generally share a common goal of advancing women’s rights, 
although the VWU maintains a more conservative approach that is capable of 
flexibility only within a narrow state- mandated agenda.
 In sum, the VWU’s position between the government and society engenders 
an ambiguous picture of hesitant civil society action. Despite, and perhaps due to, 
its vague positioning and set of roles, the VWU’s structure is ubiquitous within 
the Vietnamese system, which suggests a sustainable presence. With its massive 
outreach capacities, it represents a chance of bringing about change. However, 
the VWU finds itself in urgent need of modernizing its structure in order to avoid 
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getting lost in its own bureaucracy; of showing more openness towards a post- 
feminist viewpoint by widening its mandate from the classical women’s topics to 
a gender equality perspective; and of fulfilling its role of critical advocacy and 
monitoring agent vis- à-vis the government. A stronger cooperation with civil 
society can support these functions since civil society actors have demonstrated 
their capability of following more modern approaches and initiatives in topics 
perceived as ‘too sensitive’ by the VWU. To start with, analytical research with a 
critical perspective on the VWU and from within the VWU needs to be initiated 
or,20 as we have suggested, the VWU might end up reproducing gender stereo-
types within the system and the society, or even hindering the modernist tenden-
cies of the CSOs. By doing so, it would increase its own political isolation, 
enclose women’s rights in its own designated kitchen closet, and play but a token 
role in the process of gender mainstreaming in Vietnam.
Notes
 1 The authors, Nora Pistor and Le Thi Quy, combine practical experiences from within 
the sector of the Vietnamese civil society and the VWU. Pistor has gained insights as 
an advisor to the Center for Women and Development, one of the departments of the 
Vietnam Women’s Union, through a partnership with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Le Thi Quy is director of the Research Center 
for Gender and Development at the University of Social Science and Humanities, 
Hanoi, and the president of the recently established Network for the Empowerment of 
Women (NEW).
 2 See the website of the Little Rose Shelter at: www.hcs.harvard.edu/~rose/whoweare.
html (accessed 15 November 2011).
 3 See the website of the Center at: http://csaga.org.vn/Desktop.aspx/HomeEn/ (accessed 
15 November 2011).
 4 The currently available references do not offer a comprehensive list of Vietnamese 
NGOs and CSOs working on women’s issues. The JICA Country Gender Profile for 
Vietnam (JICA 2011: 50 et seq., provides a compilation of organizations and gender 
projects in Vietnam up to December 2010, covering eight governmental organizations 
(including the Vietnam Women’s Union), 12 international organizations, and only 
two NGOs (including the National Committee for the Advancement of Women, 
which is also an inter- ministerial committee located inside MOLISA). Even the NGO 
Resource Center, an organization established by the Vietnam Union of Friendship 
Organizations (VUFO), which receives part of its budget from the state for the 
purpose of facilitating information transfer as well as sharing and enhancing the dia-
logue between NGOs, does not broach the issue of women’s rights despite counting 
130 member INGOs (as of January 2010) of many different sectors. A working group 
on ‘Women in Development’ existed at the NGO Resource Center in 1992 but is not 
in operation anymore (see Hannah (2007: 166)) and the website of the Center at: 
www.ngocentre.org.vn/ (accessed 11 December 2011). Currently, the annual gender 
mapping conducted by the Gender Action Partnership provides the most complete 
overview of organizations, governmental as well as non- governmental, along with 
implemented and planned projects in the field of women’s rights. As only members of 
the partnership get to participate in the mapping exercise, the list is not exhaustive; in 
particular, small- scale civil society initiatives are not being taken into account.
 5 Even the GAP focuses nearly exclusively on the ‘classical’ women’s issues when dis-
cussing gender equality.
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 6 See the full text of CEDAW online, at: www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/
econvention.htm (accessed 25 October 2011). Although Vietnam was one of the first 
countries to become a signatory to CEDAW in 1982, it has expressed reservations 
about the implementation of the Convention’s paragraph 1 Article 29, and has not yet 
signed the optional protocol, which would provide the right of individual redress for 
aggrieved citizens.
 7 In 2005 the NCFAW was headed by the president of the VWU. This can be interpreted 
as having resulted in a strong influence of the VWU over this body, but consequently 
also in a low impact for the NCFAW over governmental decision- making procedures.
 8 See the website of UN Vietnam at: www.un.org.vn/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1083%3Anational-structures- for-gender- 
equality&catid=116%3Awhat-we- do&Itemid=1&lang=en and MOLISA at http://
english.molisa.gov.vn/ (both accessed 21 November 2011).
 9 The Labour Code contains an extra chapter on separate provisions concerning female 
employees (Chapter X), granting equal rights in all aspects of work to female workers 
and providing favourable conditions for female employees, such as preferential treat-
ment in the recruitment processes, the right to prenatal and postnatal leave of four 
months, the provision of sanitary facilities, crèches and kindergartens ‘where a high 
number of female employees are employed’ (italics by authors). Curiously, women in 
their ‘menstruation period(s) [are] entitled to 30 minutes off in every working day 
with full pay’, according to Article 115.
10 The National Plan of Action to Prevent and Control Domestic Violence, developed by 
the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, has set a target that by 2015, 40 per cent 
of the detected victims of domestic violence will receive legal and social counselling 
as well as healthcare support at specialized establishments, while 70 per cent of the 
perpetrators of domestic violence may receive free counselling services.
11 To compare with a case indicative of more concentrated responsibilities, please see 
the description of Cambodia in Hiwasa (this volume).
12 These formulations are used for the current nationwide movement of the VWU 
(2010), available online at: http://hoilhpn.org.vn/newsdetail.asp?CatId=66&NewsId 
=819&lang=EN (accessed 20 November 2011).
13 According to Confucian philosophy, a woman has to be obedient in three familial 
relationships: towards her father before she gets married, towards her husband once 
she is married, and towards her own son after her husband dies.
14 From an interview with the presidium of NEW, March 2012.
15 Law of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (1999).
16 From interviews with representatives of the VWU cadres in the provinces of An 
Giang and Soc Trang, March 2012.
17 Under the leadership of President Ho Chi Minh, war- related propagandist imagery of 
women was referenced in a speech on the occasion of the VWU’s anniversary in 
1966:
From the beginning of the first century A.D. when the two Trung sisters rose up 
to fight the enemy and save the nation, until now, whenever our country has 
faced danger, our women have contributed whatever they could towards the 
cause of national liberation. Our people are grateful that our mothers from North 
and South alike have born and raised our nation’s generations of heroes. Under 
the socialist system, tens of thousands of women have become specialists in dif-
ferent fields and, as cadres, serve as directors and vice- directors of factories, 
leaders of farming cooperatives, presidents of People’s Committees, and general 
secretaries of Party cells. . . . And so, the women of Vietnam from ancient times 
until now, from South to North, from young to old, are truly heroes.
(Excerpt from the speech on the anniversary of the VWU on 20 October 1966, 
quoted from the homepage of the VWU)
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18 The notion of xã hội, meaning both society or social, and dân sự, meaning civil or 
civic, which can be understood as civil/civic society or social civics. The latter 
stresses the social orientation of the organization’s work while the former includes all 
organizations that are not, at least not entirely, governmental and which can be 
working in all sorts of fields, not necessarily in the social field.
19 From an interview with the presidium of NEW, January 2012.
20 A comparison to the developments of the All- China Women’s Federation could 
provide useful lessons on the process of organizational change of a women’s mass 
organization. For a start, see Howell (2003).
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Health sector development in Cambodia has largely been conditioned by exter-
nal players, beginning with the colonial French and continuing with the Viet-
namese and international development agents (Bernader et al. 1995). Healthcare 
infrastructure and public institutions created during and after the colonial period 
were left in ruins after the revolution (Ovesen and Trankell 2010) and serious 
reconstruction only began when the Vietnamese liberated and occupied the 
country from January 1979 to the end of 1989 (Mysliwiec 1988). Abandoned 
hospitals had to be reconstructed in order to function at a basic level. Before the 
1990s, funding to improve services started to come from outside sources 
(Lanjouw et al. 1999). Indeed, the late 1980s saw an increasing number of NGOs 
and international agencies inaugurating new health infrastructure and initiating 
projects in a growing number of provinces (Khus 2000). From the 1990s 
onwards, and in the face of persistent insecurity and political instability, most of 
Cambodia’s development efforts were undertaken under the auspices of, and in 
cooperation with international NGOs, bilateral agencies and, although not 
without critique (Jennar 2010; Oxfam International 2003), the United Nations. 
This historical legacy largely engendered a dependent relationship between 
Cambodia and the aid community.
 At the same time as changes in healthcare were progressing, the notion of 
‘civil society’, which had, for decades, been a ‘forgotten concept’,1 started 
timidly to reappear. It received increasing attention by the turn of the century. 
The objective of this chapter is to focus on this period by following the sharp 
resurgence of what might be known as ‘civil society’, from 2005–7. I chose 
these three years because they correspond to a crucial moment in the visibility of 
civil society in relation to health questions. For Cambodia, the health sector in 
this period is emblematic in the analysis of the emergence of civil society for 
two reasons: first, because some members of the civil society engaged directly 
with health initiatives at the international level with the expectation of subse-
quently receiving better recognition and visibility at the national level; and 
second, because Cambodia signed up to a worldwide strategy encouraging 
 people’s involvement in the struggle against malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS 
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and other communicable diseases. Following Clayton’s framework (1996), this 
chapter aims to elaborate how, and under which conditions, civil society is in a 
position to contribute to healthcare development and, in particular, to the strug-
gle against the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Keeping in mind that access to care became 
a key issue during this time, specifically the quest for universal provision of 
antiretroviral treatment (ART),2 the beginning of this chapter will examine the 
issue of access before enlarging its scope to broader aspects of civil society 
participation.
 During 2005–7, the combination of NGO interventions, national health pol-
icies and international guidance coming from the United Nations resulted in an 
innovative orientation towards grassroots participation in health development. In 
particular, a new kind of local actor, collectively the people living with HIV 
(PLWHIV), were expected to collaborate with health decision- makers and plan-
ners by strengthening the implementation of the programmes, acting as interloc-
utors with the general population, collecting relevant health information, and 
providing care and support to their peers. Substantial financial support, mainly 
provided by the Global Fund (GF ),3 offered new opportunities to mobilize indi-
viduals to engage in civil society. As a result, during this period increasing 
numbers of people living with HIV/AIDS became either career professionals or 
volunteers involved with the epidemic (Bureau 2010).
 Beyond the rhetoric of participation, little is known about the mechanisms 
that have enabled PLWHIV and other actors from civil society to contribute to 
improving the health management system through their professional, technical 
and ideological positioning. This chapter attempts to elucidate this area of inves-
tigation. The team of researchers (composed of French and Cambodian research-
ers) carried out long- term open interviews and participatory observation 
methodologies, primarily in Phnom Penh, as well as a systematic review of the 
literature dealing with health activities. Suggestions made in the text derive from 
this fieldwork as well as personal observations.
National meanings and interpretations of social mobilization
A common statement elaborated and repeated in most parts of the world by inter-
national experts, health developers and policy planers is that social mobilization 
has become valuable in and of itself as a tool for contributing to development, 
particularly in lesser- developed countries like Cambodia.
An ideological shift
Since the turn of the century, civil society’s involvement in development efforts 
has been increasingly recognized by development agencies and governments as 
an essential tool for promoting better governance and improving responsiveness 
of national policies and programmes. Nowadays, most international aid provid-
ers agree that civilian cooperation is crucial for expressing the needs and the 
views of populations targeted by development programmes. A declaration 
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elaborated by the former United Nations Secretary- General, Kofi Annan, argues 
that the civil society sector should serve as a critical element for holding 
accountable external agencies involved in HIV/AIDS policies. Domestically, the 
first generation of social activists envisioned civil society as a supplementary 
means for ensuring that the national government invests in qualitative, afford-
able, equitable and accessible healthcare and treatment. On a more practical 
level, selected representatives of the population should keep an eye on the pro-
tection of human rights and should verify that the government is held account-
able for the fulfilment of these goals.
 Although discussions concerning mobilization did not achieve a strictly 
uniform agreement, a more theoretical and fundamental consensus has material-
ized, at least on paper (WHO 2004). In general, however, the need for mobiliza-
tion was taken for granted by the majority of international agencies, but less so 
by the national government which has oscillated between resistance and open-
ness. For the government, social mobilization has not necessarily been viewed as 
an unavoidable approach or a crucial strategy. It enables people to organize for 
collective action by pooling resources and building the solidarity required for 
resolving common problems and working towards community advancement. It 
was also said to be a process that empowers people to organize their own demo-
cratic self- governing groups or community organizations, which enables them to 
initiate and control their own personal and communal development. It contrasts 
with participatory programmes initiated and designed either by government or 
by external organizations. In fact, it was this division that created programmatic 
dilemmas and often made such an ideology difficult to accept by civil servants 
and Cambodian decision- makers.
Legacy of the past and flexible appropriations
The socio- cultural and political context implies different interpretations of 
mobilization, which, in addition to local dynamics, need to be understood and 
adjusted in order to facilitate successful implementation. To that end, the first 
step of the present analysis involves clarifying not only the vernacular relevance 
but also the meaning of some concepts embedded in the international discourse, 
such as social mobilization, collective action and community participation, 
which are supposed to be exported, rearranged and implemented in Cambodia.
 First, culminating in the extremist Maoist regime of Pol Pot (1975–8), the 
Cambodian historical authoritarian political context has not allowed people to 
spontaneously gather or organize as groups looking toward a common perceived 
interest; particularly when it comes to addressing grievances, protesting against 
the abuse of human rights, or opposing authoritarian local governance. This con-
tinued, but with much less brutality, during the Vietnamese occupation. 
However, since 1993, when the first national election was organized with the 
assistance of the United Nations, local people have started to be encouraged 
to work as groups and form associations, unions and NGOs. Based on the 
idea that civil society must participate in order to reinforce the bold process of 
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democratization, one goal was to involve organized citizens (e.g. from self- help 
groups, care associations, local NGOs) in national governance and possibly a 
few decision- making processes.
 However, this has led to comments by both external and internal observers, as 
well as a few written studies, questioning whether the chosen persons actually 
represent civil society (Gollogly 2002; Bourdier 2006). It can be observed that 
not all movements and activities of established groups necessarily stemmed from 
people’s voluntarism or actually served the common interest they claimed. 
Indeed, it became generally accepted that involvement was driven by material 
motivations, whereby people submitted to training and performed service for 
their own economic interest. In addition to supporting development, they were 
seeking new opportunities that would enable them to be financially comfortable 
(Ou and Kim, this volume). The self- interest guiding personal participation 
could seriously divert initiatives from their original objectives (i.e. the well- 
being of target groups). On the one hand, it is neither surprising nor wrong that 
people pursue personal gain, but frequently it comes at the detriment of the ben-
eficiaries.4 Indeed, common goals shared between development practitioners and 
beneficiaries were rarely a central focus. On the other hand, the task was not 
easy; most representatives of civil society who were part of the small, emerging, 
NGOs were facing increasingly discriminatory organizational obstacles, includ-
ing opposition to both their participation in public debates and their contribution 
to the implementation phase that followed.
 Second, mobilization cannot be separated from the idea of ‘community parti-
cipation’. This concept has often been oversimplified and translated in a techni-
cal fashion by Khmer and Western developers, while local people have more 
complex understandings or use other Khmer terminologies. Sahakum is associ-
ated with the existence of a group of people or restricted social unit living in a 
delimited area, having a moral socio- religious contract for helping each other.5 
This can be the village, the commune or the sangkat (downtown residential 
area).6 In the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the phrase kochorum robo 
sahakum refers to community participation in its colloquial definition; it involves 
people living nearby, including administrators, families and monks. But there 
can be factions due to social frictions, resulting in a loss of cohesion in the 
sahakum. The original sahakum is transformed into divergent and competing 
sub- groups, in which case the imported notion of community participation falls 
into a vacuum. Worse, this may accentuate internal divisions and exacerbate 
inequalities. In comparison, samakum is an association of people who voluntar-
ily gather as a group and share common interests. In its formal manifestation, 
members of the same samakum register and pay fees. For example, the Phnom 
Penh based Antiretroviral Users’ Association (AUA), which acts as a lobby 
group for increasing the quality of health services, is an archetypal samakum 
working for specific interests that are not systematically shared by the popula-
tion. The last term for community participation is more inclusive but less fre-
quently employed in the context of HIV/AIDS: sangkum comprises the whole 
society, even if it can be disaggregated into social units like sangkum krusar, 
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which references family matters in society. Unlike other countries, such as Brazil 
(Parker 1997; Bourdier 2011), the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia has not gal-
vanized the national community by socio- economic categories, sex, or other-
wise. However, during our fieldwork we met national decision- makers, 
implementers and observers who considered that such a collective movement 
could be initiated, as has already been demonstrated for other situations that 
have demanded national mobilization.7 They personally believed (indeed, they 
frequently used this evasive term), but did not try, or dare to try, to put collective 
movement into practice. Despite their beliefs no concrete action was taken and 
no social and political mobilization was ever initiated.
 Besides the nuances in terms surrounding community mobilization, which are 
not only linguistic but full of socio- cultural implications, a fundamental element 
is the emphasis on autonomy and self- reliance in community participation. It has 
been demonstrated elsewhere (Crewe and Harrison 1998), and it remains valid 
from my personal observations in Cambodia, that people’s participation rarely 
covers everyone in an identifiable community. Often, power is diverted by local 
elites who have a strong voice in decision- making; participation means little to 
the voiceless majority who have little access to resources and power. Other dis-
tinctions can be made between an authentic participation that involves the typical 
criteria (empowerment, self- decision, ideological autonomy) and a pseudo- 
participation that limits community involvement to the mere implementation, or 
ratification, of decisions already made by external bodies (Cooke and Kothari 
2001). The latter type of manipulation has been analysed in a study dealing with 
the so- called participation of the ethnic minorities in Ratanakiri province 
(Bourdier 2008).
 Because of the loose definition and internal divisions, the concept of com-
munity remains ambiguous. A few authors remain satisfied to describe it as the 
smallest unit (after the family) of socio- spatial organization, often evoking the 
idea of the ideological homogeneity of a village. Failing to reflect on the local 
context, imported Western theories about the concept of community participation 
tend to regard ‘people’ as a systematic and unified group potentially able to be 
mobilized for collective action. International NGOs, in particular, have misunder-
stood this dynamic. A few anthropologists like Soizick Crochet (2000: 45–77) 
and Jan Ovesen and his colleagues (1996) have demonstrated that persons living 
in a so- called community often have nothing more in common with each other 
than that they live in the same area, perhaps belonging to the same religious or 
political group. This means that they do not systematically share similar chal-
lenges or have collective goals, which is contrary to what the idealistic concept of 
community participation implicitly suggests. Moreover, its implication is unclear 
for decision- making processes regarding the formulating of policies, planning, 
and the implementation of economic and social development programmes. Under 
these conditions, the ideals of autonomy and self- reliance pertaining to a group of 
concerned persons can hardly be taken into account.
 In the Cambodian social context of health, mobilization is rather associated 
with its technical, and not political, dimension. Implicitly formulated with this 
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restriction, ‘technical assistance’ was supposed to be the main axis of a process 
in which leading agencies should grant low budgets to grassroots- level groups, 
associations and small local NGOs for their involvement in particular activities. 
Among the responses understood as priorities, community participation was def-
initely put forward, although it was misinterpreted as I already mentioned. 
However, a few important NGOs managed to develop partnerships with a 
number of grassroots NGOs and associations. But these leading organizations 
were mostly working under the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and were obligated to match the conditions and ideologies of the inter-
national donors, whose policy was devoted to home- based care, care- support and 
home visits rather than access to ART (at least up to 2004). Funds for local 
groups rarely existed for more than one year and these recipients were constantly 
monitored and evaluated, sometimes by persons having limited country experi-
ences, poor qualifications and low motivation. Leaders of various NGOs and 
community- based organizations (CBOs) remembered that they had to spend 
their time writing endless reports, plans and updated strategies. Ironically, little 
time could be devoted to the implementation of the project itself. Reciprocity 
and interaction between the donors and recipients were not encouraged.8 Ulti-
mately, money remained available if local NGOs kept up their activities along a 
very specific scope of intervention that was imposed by external agencies.
 Although not explicitly stated, personal interviews indicate that donors, along 
with the international NGOs they fund, maintain that such guidance is theoreti-
cally adequate to promote and encourage a gradual process of local NGO self- 
reliance. The logic is that once the funding period is completed, both local NGOs 
and grassroots- level NGOs will have developed their capacity to run autono-
mously. This is referred to as the ‘trickle down effect’. But the expected percola-
tion from top to bottom is more hypothesis than fact, especially when necessary 
qualifications, such as creativity and access to an enlarged knowledge base has 
not been provided during the process. In the end, bureaucratization and adminis-
tration became the primary activities encouraged, when more attention should 
have been directed at the projects’ beneficiaries.
National governance as step toward social visibility of civil 
society
The epidemiological outbreak9 of HIV/AIDS and the energetic public measures 
that followed have been depicted elsewhere (Bourdier and Gnep 2011: 67–116), 
but we should keep in mind that Cambodia became the most affected Southeast 
Asian country in the late nineties, with the HIV adult prevalence rate reaching 3 
per cent in 1997. After considering new transmission routes, the years 1994–5 
showed the highest rates of infection. Transmission routes were, in decreasing 
order, male clients of sex workers (nearly 75 per cent), husband to wife (15 per 
cent), sex workers themselves (7 per cent) and mother to child (3 per cent). The 
prevalence went down to 2.2 per cent in 2001 and was against reduced to 0.9 per 
cent in 2003 (UNAIDS 2006). Since then, it has been reported as low as 0.7 per 
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cent in the United National General Assembly Special Session of HIV/AIDS in 
2009. The most recent data provided by the government shows an ‘expected’ 
rate of 0.6 per cent in 2011.10 Even if sex workers (both male and female) con-
tinue to remain the most vulnerable group, the other two transmission routes 
(husband to wife and mother to child) are significant contributors. To summarize, 
Cambodia’s response to the epidemic has been depicted as one of the few 
‘success stories’ (along with Brazil, Thailand and Uganda) in reversing the trend 
of the epidemic, as shown by declining prevalence. In addition, the number of 
adults with HIV/AIDS receiving ART has increased dramatically, with more 
than 50 per cent of patients receiving ART by 2005. As of September 2005, 
12,355 active patients were receiving ART, of which 1,071 were children.11 
According to national authorities, the scaling- up of treatment was reinforced in 
the aftermath of the ‘universal access’ strategy promoted by the UN. It reached 
nearly 90 per cent of people who needed the treatment in 2007, and it reached 99 
per cent at the end of 2011, according to official sources from the Ministry of 
Health. But what can we say about the contribution of civil society to this 
encouraging result?
 As elaborated above, some public measures were launched promptly after the 
first HIV case was made made public in 1991 (e.g. national policy, prevention 
measures, condom promotion, health system strengthening, authorization for 
massive NGO intervention, etc.). Other measures (e.g. early diagnosis and access 
to care and treatment) were introduced without overly significant delay. In the 
coming years, but mostly during and after 1995, some members of civil society 
infected by the virus, specifically in Phnom Penh, decided to join together and 
form a group. They were encouraged by the local NGO Khana to raise their 
voice and to combat social discrimination. After some time this group was fol-
lowed by others. Some of them eventually came to be recognized and registered 
as civil society entities, but not before 1998. When the discovery of new 
effective ART was announced during the International AIDS Conference, some 
civil society groups expanded and spread their activities to wider social net-
works. In this context, they continued to develop primary activities at the grass-
roots level (e.g. referral, practical health information, human rights’ awareness, 
hospital guidance, social welfare, access to treatment, general care, etc.) but 
started to recognize that access to ART would become the most important issue 
in Cambodia. Their activities led them to reach out to persons at home (home- 
based care activities) and to eventually accompany patients to the main hospitals 
where the first international NGOs were conducting medical operations at the 
end of the 1990s.12 Nevertheless, the availability of funds devoted to this first 
‘spontaneous’ generation of civil society was not only restricted but extremely 
conditioned by top- down decisions. Budgets were frequently provided for a short 
period under the cover of umbrella organizations (like the HIV/AIDS Alliance), 
which consolidated funds from abroad in order to distribute small incentives to 
minor local groups via well- established local NGOs like Khana. The perform-
ance of the groups representing civil society was, in spite of notable exceptions, 
restricted to home- based care activities. While this was necessary, it was hardly 
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sufficient. Advocacy (for human rights, healthcare, equal and non- discriminatory 
access to treatment) was also one of their objectives, but was not always encour-
aged; it was not yet considered a priority by most donors, either nationally (Min-
istry of Health, National AIDS Authorities, provincial health departments, etc.) 
or internationally (USAID, World Bank, many religious NGOs, etc.).
 It was in this socio- political environment that a Cambodian civil society 
emerged with an intention to contribute to the fight against the epidemic. This 
was not a general and widespread movement as had happened in other countries 
in the world (such as those in Africa and South America), but it was unquestion-
ably present and was not at risk of disappearing. Some members of civil society 
organizations were committed to promoting better care and treatment for the 
infected population. At the same time, external funding from various agencies 
(bilateral, multilateral, private, etc.) let to the creation of local and international 
NGOs able to implement their own programmes, most of them with the intention 
of involving communities. However, a preliminary study showed that, of the 
numerous HIV/AIDS projects which existed before 2000, many have long since 
disbanded (Crochet 1998).13 Most of the health actors from international NGOs 
used to work in isolation due to frequent ideological and methodological disag-
reements. For many years health initiatives in Cambodia were atomized and char-
acterized by contradiction, controversy and competition. The situation changed in 
early 2000 with the government’s attempt to enforce a national HIV/AIDS policy. 
Local authorities, together with international NGOs, bilateral institutions and UN 
agencies started to share the responsibility for supervising and monitoring efforts 
to fight the disease, and started providing access to treatment.14
A new worldwide solidarity
The year 2002 is key because it saw the creation of the GF and its rapid financial 
support to Cambodia. It facilitated the elaboration of a national health policy by 
enabling new management and organizational developments which were previ-
ously unthinkable, including making the participation of civil society official and 
financially feasible as opposed to something ‘to be shown’ anecdotally. In the 
beginning, that participation was not clearly articulated and most of the health 
actors declared that it was a challenge to maintain a coherent overview of the 
current situation (Pillai et al. 2004). It was unclear who was doing what, even 
for those working in a similar geographical area. Lack of coordination prevailed 
among external agencies like the UN, whose organizations had separate agendas, 
sometimes with externally imposed and overlapping interventions (Curtis 1998). 
Further, many of the NGOs considered each other as potential rivals for funding. 
Institutional bridges between development agents remained fragmented and 
exceptional. As a result, comprehensive understanding of the social, political, 
economic and cultural dynamics influencing the trend of the epidemic remained 
limited because agencies working on AIDS issues rarely shared information, 
data and analyses. As a result, health officials were unwilling or uncomfortable 
dealing with a civil society that was, from their point of view, barely integrated.
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 The situation has changed with Cambodia having benefited from more than 
ten years (2002–12) of GF money. This funding partner has facilitated innovative 
programmes, including an ART distribution project that has required the recruit-
ment of hundreds of ‘patient experts’ who can all be considered part of civil 
society (Bureau 2010). To illustrate, in 2002, US$101 million worth of grants, 
through four rounds of funding, were for the HIV/AIDS component alone, 
making the GF one of the largest sources of funding for combating HIV/AIDS. 
Studies conducted locally have been completed; some, concerning the GF, were 
written during its early phase of implementation (Wilkinson 2004). Since 2002 
further rounds of funding have been proposed every year, changing the dynamics 
of the process of ART delivery as well as ensuring a better visibility of the parti-
cipation of civil society. However, no system is perfect. In particular, administra-
tive barriers made small associations reluctant to apply for GF grants. Many of 
the smaller organizations had insufficient human resources to meet the required 
system of documentation and to write regular reports demonstrating transparency 
in the execution of their programmes. Government bodies and bigger NGOs felt 
more comfortable because they were in a position to employ staff to concentrate 
on administration and management of the GF funding.
 Projects implemented under the GF regulations and mechanisms differ based 
on organizations and social actors (Brugha et al. 2002). A significant determi-
nant is the role of health actors and their interactions during proposal- writing 
and implementation, which includes procurement, training, public relations, 
monitoring, capacity building, as well as material and human resources manage-
ment. All these activities theoretically have direct implications for the quality of 
care related to HIV treatment. These fundamental activities are supposed to be 
handled by the contribution of the civil society, but can only be engaged in with 
support of funded NGOs. Without these partnerships, smaller- scale actors in 
civil society can hardly implement programmes and activities on their own.
 In every domain of intervention, a social institution acting as a sub- recipient 
(to the government, who is the principal recipient) is supposed to comply with 
GF requirements. After years, and due to external criticism, the international 
organization from Geneva has adapted its position. It tries nowadays to have a 
lighter structure by providing flexibility for the implementation strategy and by 
strengthening health structures as a whole. But most of the social actors who are 
associated with sub- recipients continue to argue that the rules laid out by the GF, 
to which institutional beneficiaries are bound for the implementation of the activ-
ities, have virtually no voice.15 This occurs because ART procurement and oper-
ational guidelines are controlled by the principal recipient based in the Ministry 
of Health, in which the civil society is only theoretically represented.
Promoting communication and homogeneity at the health 
organizational level
Over time, some improvements have become observable. The government 
officers in charge of health project planning – including GF coordination and 
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supervision – deserve recognition for their attempt to integrate and work with 
some members of civil society. They developed skills for health management 
and for creating information and structural links with the sub- recipients who 
received the money. The GF has become an incentive for strengthening networks 
and encouraging dialogue between social actors working at different levels in 
the various domains of HIV/AIDS intervention. In spite of ongoing resistance by 
a small number of international NGOs to coordinate their activities with the 
national programme, a local agenda aimed at better governance was developed 
from 2005–6. Its goal is far from being achieved, but a process has been initiated 
among individual parties who recognize that effectiveness relies on their mutual 
interdependence. Furthermore, the funding mechanisms reward the beneficiaries 
not only for going into the field but also force them to sit together around a table 
and monitor every single account. Such financial and logistic issues provide a 
new economic credibility to the government, in spite of some problems with cor-
ruption (local and international) that the GF cannot prevent alone.
 There are other constructive ongoing processes. One is linked to the ideo-
logical independence (not related to financing) and freedom of expression 
offered by an independent organization such as the GF that maintains its role as 
a funding agency, intervening only lightly in the contents of the projects submit-
ted. The GF, which is morally neutral,16 acts indirectly as a counterweight 
against agencies that not only fund, but also attempt to shape the ideological ori-
entations of the programmes they support. The GF provides incentives but does 
not interfere, or at least does so very little, in the choice of the programmes. The 
sub- recipients, should they want to strengthen civil society participation, thereby 
have a free space to implement activities under the sole condition of respecting 
management, transparency and reporting mechanisms.
 The relative freedom and security offered by the GF prevents the hegemonic 
influences of powerful agencies arriving with huge amounts of funding and 
trying to influence development procedures with a strict moralistic approach or 
with a revisionist version of an ‘appropriate response’ to HIV/AIDS. The Emer-
gency Plan for managing the HIV/AIDS epidemic coming from the US Bush 
administration (Pepfar), in 2003, is emblematic of such an initiative. Its policy 
has been justified by controversial scientific methods, sometimes severely criti-
cized by activists, academic researchers, national and international NGOs (NGO 
Forum 2004). The GF, in contrast, allows national and alternative programmes, 
mostly those that encourage the mobilization of society and which would other-
wise not be supported.
 The safety valves act at another level. An institution does not systematically 
exercise control over its own members. For instance, while USAID has no 
choice but to outwardly comply with the conditions put forward by the Emer-
gency Plan, people working within the agency accept modifications to the other-
wise well- articulated Emergency Plan (promotion on fidelity, abstinence and 
restriction to condom use, limitations of generic drugs, ban on projects focusing 
on sex work). Some of these individuals have previously worked as medical or 
political activists, sometimes belonging to militant groups like Act- Up. It is not 
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uncommon to find some of them actually recruited by USAID and then inter-
nally fighting within the institution. Such an alternative space of negotiation 
exists in practice, even if it is not written on paper. In other words, it would be a 
mistake to categorize social actors involved in a particular institution as obedient 
agents or unconditional ‘soldiers’ of their organization. On the contrary, some 
individuals are strong supporters of a bottom- up approach and try their best to 
act on behalf of civil society, or at least as part of civil society.
External interferences in national policy and civil society 
mobilization
The GF openly supports ‘institutional capacity building’. Broadly speaking, 
members of GF- supported institutions include the whole chain of social health 
actors, from implementers to representatives of civil society. The GF has increas-
ingly been pushing for a more formal and a more standardized way of imple-
menting grants by encouraging the creation of different assemblages: self- help 
groups, community- based organizations, medical staff assistant groups, care 
groups, etc. In spite of these efforts, GF support has led to greater dominance by 
the government and less involvement of civil society. In spite of its initial expec-
tation, the GF has not yet provided sufficient tools to counter government control 
by creating more channels for a civil society contribution liable to lead to active 
mobilization. This point requires greater investigation and will be elaborated 
upon below.
A 20-year inheritance transformed by growing mistrust
At the intervention level, it could be expected that decisions and strategies pro-
posed by various social health actors (from national decision- makers to members 
of civil society) would be complementary. This has been hardly the case, but is 
not surprising given that a health system is also a social and political system 
(Hours 2001). Its evolution depends on the quality and the nature of relations 
between social agents. But, in the case of Cambodia, limited mechanisms have 
been created to enable the cross- fertilization of ideas among actors from differ-
ent professions belonging to either national or international agencies.
 A conducive social environment for cooperation has yet to be established. 
Active partnership at the national level remains a challenge, even if some local 
NGOs and Cambodian doctors have managed to organize sustainable active col-
laborations in some public health clinics.17 Indeed, the long- term control over 
local health officials by international bodies has had a negative impact. This 
approach, taken for granted over the years by external developers, can often be 
interpreted as deliberate manipulation and has led to strong reactions by national 
leaders in the field of HIV/AIDS. Over time, some national figures managed to 
obtain positions that they do not want to share anymore, mostly with ‘non- 
educated’ people.18 Furthermore, it is commonplace to find contempt for non- 
Khmers who, despite poor awareness of the socio- cultural and political reality, 
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want impose ready- made ideas in Cambodia. National HIV/AIDS professionals 
hardly accept criticism from foreign counterparts and do not hesitate to drive 
them away if they insist on a direction which is not perceived as a priority. 
Moreover, some of these international agents are accused of ‘spoiling civil 
society’ by giving them ideas from outside and not respecting ‘local 
traditions’.19
A new expression of civil society
New forms, or expressions, of civil society cannot be fully understood without 
analysing the broader health context in which they have emerged. For the last 20 
years, it has been repeated that the emergence of civil society was a crucial 
factor for health improvement in general. With the HIV pan- epidemic, civil 
society was offered a key role for the improvement of the national programme 
against HIV/AIDS. In the first section I outlined some of the ambiguities con-
tained in such a discourse, mostly when it meets practice. Although civil society 
mobilization was strongly encouraged at the international level by the UN in 
2002, and even became a more formalized subject of interest at the national level 
in the foregoing years, its implementation and its acceptability deserve to be 
scrutinized in the diverse socio- cultural context of Cambodia. After long- term 
observations and interviews with NGO representatives, we found that Khmer 
civil society was not able, from 2002–5, to work autonomously (Bourdier and 
Ou 2005; Bureau 2010). We already mentioned that the government, with GF 
mechanisms, was in a position to act as leader for the debate and controlled the 
privilege of decision- making due to its position as principal financial recipient. It 
had the capacity to control financial transactions and subsequently had more 
facility to control and pressure NGOs and CBOs. This can be interpreted as a 
constructive effort in terms of national governance, as, indeed, it had been under-
stood among development agents in Cambodia.
 Then came the time for ‘normalization’ under the auspices of the UN, with 
consequent financial encouragement from international agencies in Geneva. 
Important funding to implement the participation of civil society throughout the 
developing countries came to be available mostly through the Global Fund. 
Before the early phase of the civil society mobilization encouraged by the UN in 
the early 2000s, a few members of society had already become official ‘repre-
sentatives’ of the civil society and been granted opportunity to meet civil groups 
from other countries and participate in exchange tours, seminars and meetings. 
When returning, they passed their knowledge and lessons learned from abroad to 
colleagues and friends (see Wells- Dang, this volume). As a result, people even-
tually came up with an idea of how to work as an autonomous group and tried to 
cultivate their civil society representation. People who have recently started to 
be involved in the national struggle against HIV/AIDS in Cambodia often have 
similar backgrounds based in grassroots activities. But only a few prominent 
activists have actually emerged. This means that the hoped- for objectives of 
civilian leadership were not fulfilled. Instead, individuals appeared to be 
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reluctant to engage themselves in the long term. This might be because of 
budgetary constraints, fear of repression (a political syndicate activist’s assas-
sination and details of recent imprisonments published in newspapers focus 
 people’s minds on this possibility) and lack of any decentralized system that 
could have strengthened their unity or at least augmented their courage to 
assume positions of responsibility. In addition, despite a growing activism occur-
ring in other spheres of development activities (Landau 2008), there was little 
space for open public debate and, in hindsight, few candidates in the health 
sector were really in a position to lobby on behalf of the HIV/AIDS campaign.
 From this period onwards, however, the number of PLWHIV who started 
working in the health sector grew dramatically (exact figures are not available). 
This trend started in 2005 and carried on until 2011. A new social visibility was 
emerging. But who are they and what are they doing? Often they are employed 
by the national programme, international agencies, and by small local NGOs 
with their extended networks in the villages. Most of them are voluntary while a 
few are working under contract and have a mandate to fulfil specific tasks. 
Despite this, a two- year study showed PLWHIV are not welcome to take per-
sonal and collective initiatives. Ongoing research beyond this period goes in the 
same direction (e.g. Pen and Bourdier 2011). Most of the people studied by Eve 
Bureau (2010) recognize that they lose their freedom once they have been integ-
rated into normative healthcare interventions. They cannot raise unexpected 
issues that have not been previously approved at the top level. Apart from very 
exceptional cases, they have little choice but to comply with external constraints 
and priorities. Negotiation is not a prevailing dynamic; they are rarely invited to 
join public debates (or do so as mere observers) and very few of them are in a 
position to attend official meetings or even conferences and events where they 
could raise their voices, which is the case in other countries such as Brazil, Thai-
land and Uganda. Most of the infected persons who became ‘expert patients’20 
are expected to fit into the pyramidal hierarchy. Political mobilization is absent, 
even though there are many who would be motivated to join and put pressure on 
the government to open up public debates on sensitive issues like the long- term 
sustainable availability of generic drugs, access to second line treatments, the 
lack of medical care for opportunistic infections, top- up fees that patients have 
to pay, and absence of equitable social and nutrition support.
 The link between government, international agencies, funded organizations, 
local NGOs, and PLWHIV involved in the fight against the epidemic can be cat-
egorized more in terms of allegiance than cooperation (Bureau 2010). The hier-
archy is somewhat more complex than it appears, but it seems that any 
autonomous mobilization at the grassroots level is interpreted by the majority of 
decision- makers as an attempt at destabilization or as a threat to national 
sovereignty. Emerging militants and social groups who started criticizing 
some achievements claimed by the government, or by international agencies, 
have been denied access to public and official meetings where they could 
have justified their declarations and contributed positively to reorient national 
health policies.
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Recent considerations
Social mobilization initiatives as they have been understood, reappropriated, and 
put into operation in Cambodia during the last decade, can be divided into two 
tendencies. In the first category, some NGOs funded by external donors are man-
dated to promote community involvement and grassroots- level NGOs that are 
supposed to strengthen HIV/AIDS awareness, mass media communication, vol-
unteer training, social support and access to care. These small groups are 
selected and strongly guided by the bigger NGOs that fund them. In the second 
category, which has become ‘thinkable’ only recently but still remains uncom-
mon, are individuals and people organizing themselves more independently and 
eventually managing to be registered as an association, CBO or NGO. In con-
trast to the first category, they encourage advocacy, sometimes through overseas 
networking alliances with southern hemisphere movements in India and Thai-
land, or with activist groups in Europe (see Wells- Dang, this chapter). They are 
more prone to oppose and criticize government policy. This tendency is relat-
ively spontaneous, but sometimes organized via worldwide networks, and the 
civil society members aspire to be autonomous as much as they can. In contrast, 
the groups in the first category have more links with planned and ‘polished’ ini-
tiatives already prepared, supervised and controlled by the government and 
leading international NGOs.
 As a result, civil society in Cambodia has become divided. Look, for example, 
at the scaling- up of ART delivery: for some patients anxious to follow govern-
ment policies, it has been perceived largely in its quantitative dimension, i.e. the 
more patients under treatment the more successful the health policy is deemed to 
be. Qualitative aspects, which are, in fact, essential for the infected populations 
have so far been neglected. It came to a point that an emerging section of the 
civil society, which we can say is more ‘wilful’, started to mobilize around this 
unique issue. Even in the first category, although still minority voices, some 
NGO workers and social activists raised their voices and started commenting 
that it would have been better to avoid the quantitative focus, and insist instead 
upon the more fundamental socio- medical aspects, including adequate access to 
opportunistic treatment, better counselling for HIV testing, free exams, rehabil-
itation efforts and economic support for vulnerable populations.
 Although more examples could have been presented, apart from a few excep-
tions that may allow us to forecast future changes, the majority of them would 
have led to similar observations. Our findings show that the nature of the link 
between government, international agencies, international NGOs, and small local 
NGOs, is more about subordination than genuine cooperation and can be charac-
terized more in terms of participative obedience than autonomous mobilization. 
Manipulation of local NGO activities appears to be the standard norm not only 
when it is related to HIV/AIDS activities, but also when it concerns other health 
development issues.
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Conclusion
At this point we may wonder about the emergence of relative autonomy in civil 
society in the coming future. Isolated actions, hesitant attempts, early signs and 
scattered aspirations obviously exist. But if social mobilization, as it is guardedly 
realized in Cambodia, does not manage to empower people or allow them to 
become intellectually independent, it will neither inspire or harness the creativity 
of the population nor will it promote autonomous decision- making. Additionally, 
the potential for advocacy is still limited as long as community participation is de 
facto inhibited by the government. Cambodia’s recent history clearly shows that 
when community participation becomes fashionable, and when international 
intervention increases such participation’s systematic activity, one of the govern-
ment’s main responses has been to control and absorb it into the framework of its 
own policy rather than let it become a potential alternative voice for the people.
 To more specifically address the meaning of community participation at the 
grassroots level, medical staff and volunteers perceive community more gener-
ally as a group of people including family, neighbour, authority, villager and 
monks. As a slogan, ‘mobilizing communities to respond to HIV/AIDS’ has 
been promoted by a funded NGO under the control of a bilateral agency. But the 
meaning of the slogan has been neither sufficiently defined nor explained in 
detail. One blurry justification claims that ‘HIV/AIDS community participation’ 
comprises the contribution of infected persons as well as the solidarity of the 
social environment towards reducing stigma and discrimination and increasing 
psychological and social support. Unfortunately, such an aspirational statement 
does not provide methodological tools for executing any strategy that will take 
into account the socio- cultural logic and predisposition of the society. Yuvany 
Gnep’s work focusing on monks’ involvement in the cultural context of Cam-
bodia (Gnep 2006; Bourdier and Gnep 2011) demonstrates that there is evidently 
a need to pursue broader research on this issue.
 Through the observation of dominant practices related to national health inter-
ventions intended to encourage people’s participation, I have noted that decisions 
from the top have shaped, if not formatted, the population’s initiatives. Even over 
an apparently unpoliticized issue like HIV/AIDS, the creativity and enterprise of 
ordinary people has been subsumed by the superficial and questionable fashions 
of imported advice. If the situation does not evolve, it may allow the grip of 
imposed officialdom to suppress popular choice and individual freedom.
 Popular mobilization has to be re- invented. At the same time, there is an 
incredible potential to reactivate a related concept of collective participation. 
The strength of the country resides not only in people’s aspirations towards 
justice and access to healthcare and treatment, but also in the behaviour of 
certain government representatives, whose function it is to communicate with 
the movement. These individuals, such as Dr Tia Phalla from the National AIDS 
Authority, are sincerely willing to promote cooperation more constructively with 
civil society by encouraging a more open space of negotiation. Resolutions over 
the following years will reveal more about the future outcome.
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Notes
 1 This was due to successive political regimes from the 1970s to the late 1980s.
 2 In the late 1990s Cambodia was the most HIV- affected country in Southeast Asia.
 3 The Global Fund is a Geneva- based international agency which is receiving money 
from developed countries in order to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in 
developing countries.
 4 Based on personal enquiries with a leading medical and political activist, Ms Mony 
Pen (2008).
 5 Typically, sangkum is accompanied with samaki (solidarity) and ataun oknia (indul-
gence), two cultural values in Cambodian Theravada Buddhism.
 6 Neak sahakum refers to villagers.
 7 For example, in 2009 when the Preah Vihear temple and its borderlands were invaded 
by Thai nationalists.
 8 A few funding NGOs like Action Aid and Christian Aid acted as collaborators in 
Cambodia. They also showed sincere willingness to interact constructively at the 
grassroots level with the small groups receiving financial support from them. Unfortu-
nately, they did not represent the mainstream position and their funding capacity was 
limited.
 9 The first HIV case was diagnosed in Phnom Penh in 1991 (blood donor).
10 This epidemic projection was still awaiting verification when this chapter was finalized.
11 Data available online, at: http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/20060801_ 
cambodia_turning_tide_en.pdf.
12 From 2000–4, only five NGOs (operating in five different hospitals in the capital, plus 
one in Siem Reap Province) were receiving infected persons for treatment. ART was 
provided at first by MDM (Médecins du Monde) then by MSF France (Médecins sans 
Frontières) and by MSF Belgium/Holland.
13 There were more than 120 NGOs working in the HIV/AIDS shere in Cambodia before 
1998.
14 This does not necessarily mean that civil society is unified. Indeed, even by 2012, the 
few groups maintaining a certain visibility were marked by internal conflicts, mutual 
distrusts and ideological disputes.
15 Personal interviews with a civil society’s representative of the Global Fund in 2011.
16 So far, no counter example has been identified in Cambodia.
17 Personal observations in Kampot, Oddar Meanchey and Battambang provinces.
18 All outspoken HIV/AIDS activists that I know have repeatedly received this kind of 
subjective dismissal by national decision- makers, specifically during periods in which 
they enjoyed a recognized position, whether abroad or in Cambodia. For instance, Ms 
Pen Mony, whose voice had a tremendous international impact at the beginning of the 
Mexico Conference, and Ms Dy Many, who participated in different meetings of the 
UN General Assembly Special Session.
19 This is a recurring statement orally communicated by national decision- makers to 
local activists. Information: Ms Mony Pen (2010).
20 This is the accepted official title position devised by international agencies.
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8 Changing gendered boundaries in 
rural Cambodia
Community- based organizations as a 
platform for empowerment
Ayako Hiwasa
In Cambodia, women’s participation in politics and the public sphere is often 
viewed as limited due to rigidly defined gender roles, a gendered public- private 
divide (Lilja 2008: 55) and the hierarchical nature of society. After three decades 
of war, however, political stability and socio- economic growth as well as devel-
opment interventions have challenged traditional gender norms and opened 
space and opportunity for change (Aing 2004; Hill and Heng 2004). This move-
ment was galvanized in the early 1990s by Cambodian non- governmental organ-
izations (NGOs) backed by international donors. The first Cambodian NGO and 
women’s organization, Khemara (see Ou and Kim, this volume; Frieson 1998) 
was established in 1991, followed by women’s movements and initiatives by 
civil society organizations (CSO) such as Amara, which focused on gender- 
based violence (see Öjendal, this volume). Many of the larger Cambodian 
NGOs are headed by Cambodians returning from overseas to join in efforts to 
rebuild society. In addition to the influence of returnees, these organizations are 
financially dependent on, and influenced by, the agendas of donors (Malena and 
Chhim 2009; Ou and Kim, this volume). Concepts of gender and gender equality 
are imported into the Cambodian development agenda through international aid 
programmes and policies influenced to a great deal by Western feminist dis-
course (Hiwasa 2010; Mohanty 1984). This is partially responsible for the gap 
cited by a number of scholars between Phnom Penh- based professional NGOs 
and the communities they serve (Malena and Chhim 2009; Ou and Kim, this 
volume).
 Despite the rapid growth of Cambodian NGOs, the shortcomings of top- down 
development approaches to development in the 1980s (Cooke and Kothari 2001) 
encouraged a growing trend in participatory approaches to development that led 
to the establishment of many grassroots associations and community- based 
organizations (CBO) as a way to promote community engagement in local devel-
opment (Malena and Chhim 2009). Compared to the traditional form of CBOs 
based on religion, such as pagoda associations (see Ehlert, this volume) and 
Buddhism for Social Development Action (Öjendal, this volume), modern asso-
ciations and grassroots CBOs outside of the religious sphere are relatively new 
and their impact is considered limited in facilitating citizen–state relationships 
due to their small scale (Malena and Chhim 2009).
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 This study looks into the detail of how women’s groups, a modern form of 
CBO facilitated by a livelihood improvement project in Takeo province, have 
provided a platform for women’s empowerment1 and filled some of the ‘gap’ in 
intermediaries referenced by Öjendal (this volume). Unlike most professional 
NGOs headed by elites (see examples in Ou and Kim, this volume), these 
women’s groups consist of voluntary members who share some degree of mutual 
interest as well as personal outlook and are headed by elected leaders. Case 
studies in four villages provide evidence that despite the fact that women’s 
groups initially focused on livelihoods rather than gender- specific issues, they 
have ultimately initiated processes of women’s empowerment, and gone on to 
challenge traditional gender norms. I will argue that these groups open up oppor-
tunities for ordinary women to participate in public space. In addition, they 
present the potential for a more autonomous and self- sustaining form of CBO 
that can link the masses – women in this case – and the public sphere.
 In my discussion, I take a postmodern feminist approach for understanding 
how women’s groups have challenged power relations and become active in the 
public sphere, which has previously been considered a male- dominated domain. 
The postmodern feminist approach (McNay 1992; Parpart 1993; Parpart and 
Marchand 1995; Jackson and Pearson 1998) accepts and understands the power 
of discourse to situate women’s voices and experiences in the specific historical, 
spatial and social context. My attempt here is to contextualize these voices and 
bring them into discussions about the formation of civil society in Cambodia.
 This chapter is based on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in 2007 and in 
2011 (Hiwasa 2010).2 The methods of data collection include participant obser-
vation, in- depth individual interviews using semi- structured guidelines, and 
focus group discussions. Over the course of five months, I made frequent visits 
to four villages, attended relevant meetings, and lived in the homes of female 
leaders over two months in two out of four of the villages in the study.
Changing gender norms in Cambodia
Gender relations have undergone substantial changes as economic, social and 
political development opened up new opportunities for women outside of the 
household (Derks 2008; UNIFEM et al. 2004). A number of factors have con-
tributed to these changes, including skewed demographic patterns resulting from 
the toll of civil wars, free market reforms, economic pressures, educational 
attainment, political decentralization, gender mainstreaming policy, and the 
adaption of an anti- domestic violence law (Derks 2008; Frieson and Chan 1998; 
Kim and Öjendal 2011; Nakagawa 2006). Although there is change in this field, 
reigning gender norms still firmly place women lower than men, despite the fact 
that women have played a comparative role as income providers for their fam-
ilies and are now viewed as a driving force for economic development (UNIFEM 
et al. 2004; Nakagawa 2006; Hun 2004).
 Relations in Khmer society are determined by a combination of factors such 
as reputation, political position, wealth, sex and age (Ebihara 1968; Ledgerwood 
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1992; Öjendal, this volume). Women are compelled to conform to traditional 
gender norms in order to develop and maintain their status in the social hierarchy 
(Ledgerwood 1992).
Traditional gender norms
Gender ideologies and cultural ideals often place conflicting demands upon 
women. A woman should be shy, soft and sweet in her communication, avoid 
speaking loudly, move without being heard, and she must be protected, ideally 
never leaving the company of her relatives before her marriage. Such ideals for 
proper behaviour and attitudes in the household, and interactions with her 
husband (Zimmerman 1994: 24), are elaborated and widely taught through the 
chbap srey (Women’s Code of Conduct). For example, a woman’s anger with 
her husband or with family members is described as a fire that she can extin-
guish with her calmness (Ledgerwood 1996: 124). The chbap srey is written in 
rhyme and children used to sing some parts of it at school until it was recently 
taken off the curriculum. Some elements of the chbap srey are still passed on 
from generation to generation (Aing 2004).
 Another aspect of the proper woman is that she must know how to run a 
household and manage its finances. One of the symbolic women, or srey kroup 
leakkh (perfectly virtuous woman), in Khmer mythology named Mea Yoeng 
exemplifies the qualities of an ideal woman, which rarely exists in reality (Aing 
2004). A srey kroup leakkh is obedient to her husband (Nakagawa 2006) but also 
presents the image of an intelligent woman. In the folk tale, Mea Yoeng helps in 
educating her husband to become a valued servant of the king instead of a poor 
fisherman. It portrays images of a wife who acts as an advisor to her husband as 
well as acting as his servant (Ledgerwood 1992, 1994).
New patterns of behaviour and employment
All of the traditional ideals described above form part of the foundation of 
women’s lives. These ideals inform new patterns of behaviour in a variety of 
situations in the changing society (Ledgerwood 1992: 5). During the reconstruc-
tion period, the population was imbalanced due to war- related casualties (Hill 
and Heng 2004; Ledgerwood 1992: 7). In rural areas, women bore the burden of 
performing typically male tasks, including heavy agricultural work such as 
ploughing and construction, in addition to traditionally female duties in agricul-
ture such as planting, transplanting, harvesting, milling and marketing (Frieson 
and Chan 1998; Kraynanski 2007; Ledgerwood 1992: 7). In urban areas, 
employment with the government and state- run factories opened up new oppor-
tunities for women (Ledgerwood 1992).
 After market reforms took place in early 1990s, the growth in the industrial 
sector encouraged women’s labour migration. Labour intensive and export- 
oriented manufacturing sectors, mainly garment and shoe production, grew 
rapidly and opened up employment opportunities for low- skilled labour (Derks 
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2008). Garment factories alone employed more than 300,000 workers in 2010, 
of which 85 per cent were women; most of the factories prefer a female work-
force (Better Factories Cambodia 2010 and 2006; NGO- CEDAW and 
CAMBOW 2011; interviews with several mothers of factory workers in 
November 2011).
 As rural households struggle to make ends meet, there is a strong push factor 
for young women to work at factories far from home. While sending unmarried 
daughters away from home is generally considered inappropriate (Derks 2008), 
economic necessity has increasingly overridden this (Aing 2004). This has 
resulted, on the one hand, in an increase in the number of women in waged 
employment (MoWA 2009; NIS et al. 2006; NIS et al. 2011), but, on the other 
hand, with women disproportionately occupying low- skilled and low- paid jobs, 
which remains a concern regarding the impact of women’s employment (NGO- 
CEDAW and CAMBOW 2011).
Decentralization and women’s participation in the public sphere
Since decentralization and deconcentration reform was put into effect by the 
election in 2002, the number of women in the public domain has increased, espe-
cially at the commune council level (Kim and Öjendal 2011). However, the 
increase in the number of women appointed does not necessarily translate into 
an increase in active participation. Women who are elected as council members, 
or appointed as assistants in charge of women’s and children’s affairs (Women 
and Children Focal Points, hereinafter ‘the focal points’) face many challenges 
and struggle to meet the expectations placed upon them (Kim and Öjendal 2011; 
Wild 2006).
 Due to prevailing gender norms, women persistently see themselves – and are 
seen by men – as inferior to, and in the service of, men, which prompts many to 
stay home to take care of the household. Work outside of the household is gener-
ally considered to be in the male domain. In rural areas especially, women lack 
self- confidence and often do not vote for female candidates because they do not 
feel confident having women as leaders (workshop with women community 
leaders, 18 November 2011). Within the conservative and politicized party 
system, women struggle as party candidates during election campaigns (Kim and 
Öjendal 2011). Nevertheless, the fact that there are more women in leadership 
roles, and strong advocacy efforts through campaigning and the media, sends a 
signal to the population. It is generally accepted and viewed as a concrete sign of 
change; even relatively conservative villagers often say, ‘women have equal 
rights as men now because women can take up leadership positions’ (interviews 
in 2007 and 2011). To move beyond this first step, a shift in social norms upheld 
by both men and women is necessary for achieving gender equality (Wild 2006; 
Kim and Öjendal 2011).
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Development discourse and the role of the government in gender 
issues in Cambodia
The ideas of gender and gender equality were brought primarily by international 
development agencies to Cambodia. The term ‘gender’ is not found in the 
Khmer language and new concepts carry ambiguous meanings. As in other 
developing countries, gender and development (GAD)3 became an important 
policy agenda in the 1990s, and a gender mainstreaming framework is now an 
integral part of the national development strategic plan in Cambodia. In 2004, 
the prime minister pronounced that, ‘women [are] the backbone of the economy 
and society’ (Hun 2004) when he introduced the so- called Rectangular Strategy. 
The Rectangular Strategy is the political platform which recognizes the import-
ance of fostering the environment for gender equality. The National Strategic 
Development Plan operationalizes the Rectangular Strategy and includes gender 
equality as one of the priority areas.
 The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) and the Cambodian National 
Council for Women make up the national machinery to promote gender equality. 
Both institutions play central roles in implementing gender mainstreaming in all 
the development efforts in partnership with line ministries and donors. The min-
istry launched the first five- year strategic plan, Neary Rattanak (Women are Pre-
cious Gems) in 1999, and is currently implementing the third five- year strategic 
plan (2009–13). Civil society is mentioned as one of the stakeholders in these 
policy documents; however, they do not articulate or elaborate on the role of 
CSOs or CBOs in realizing their agendas, despite the focus placed on com-
munity participation. The ministry leads the technical working group on gender 
with memberships of other ministries, donors and NGOs, which helps to coord-
inate work on gender and facilitates knowledge- sharing within the policy frame-
work. In one of the latest joint initiatives, MoWA published music videos that 
present alternative ways of understanding masculinity in Cambodia and celeb-
rate the wide range of diverse and respectful female roles in Cambodia. The 
videos promote positive attitudes towards gender equality amongst young 
people, offering progressive images of masculinity, modern self- confident 
women, and equal partnerships. By intention or lack of space, however, the 
videos do not show images of women in decision- making roles or as community 
leaders.
 In the vernacular, the word yender (gender) already implies equal rights for 
women. The term ‘women’s empowerment’, or phdal amnach oy satrey in 
Khmer, means the provision of power to women (MoWA 2006). Yender, there-
fore, is inherently political as it implies activism and assumption of power by 
women. Comparing 2011 to 2007, I noticed that more people are aware of the 
term yender when I was interviewing both female and male leaders, and people 
use the term with greater familiarity.
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A platform for empowerment: the case of women’s 
community- based organizations
The livelihood improvement project entitled, ‘Improvement of Livelihood of 
Small Farmers in Tram kok’ (ILFARM- TKK, hereinafter ‘the project’) was 
implemented by the Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agricul-
ture (CEDAC4) between 2003 and 2009.5 The primary objective of the project 
was to promote ecological agriculture technologies through farm- to-farmer 
extension, and establishing associations that help improve the livelihood of small 
landholders. By the end of the project in 2009, CEDAC had facilitated 169 
farmer associations with 5,087 members in a district containing 223 villages. 
Typically, local people establish a central farmer association and subsequently 
set up sub- groups according to the specific interests of the villagers. Usually, this 
included groups focused on saving, organic rice production, and ecological live-
stock raising. Groups targeting specific population segments, such as women and 
the very poorest, are also created depending on the leadership and interest of 
each village.
 In 2004, CEDAC realized that the participation of women tended to be low 
despite the fact that women played an essential role in applying the agricultural 
technologies CEDAC was promoting (i.e. the System of Rice Intensification 
(SRI) and the improved making of compost). A study conducted in 2004 about 
the association building process and gender mainstreaming found that women 
feel more comfortable speaking out and expressing their opinions and ideas in 
women- only groups. In villages where female CEDAC community workers were 
placed, women’s groups were often set up first. One of the case villages 
described below is a good example of this. The evaluation report also recom-
mended that exclusive women’s groups can function as an incubator to foster 
leadership in women, particularly if the group is set up early on, which helps 
prepare women to speak out and participate in the general farmer association 
meetings. The report also suggested diversifying the activities beyond what are 
typically ‘suitable for women’ (Kusakabe 2004).
Background to the case studies
Four women’s groups in four villages within four communes were selected as 
case studies in Tram kak district for the original study. Instead of examining the 
four cases in isolation to one another, this section extracts some themes that are 
relevant to the message of this book.
 All four villages are located between 7–20 kilometres from the district centre 
where the major market, public offices and NGO offices (including CEDAC and 
microfinance institutions) are located. The numbers of households range between 
100 and 150 in villages A and C, between 250 and 300 in village B, and between 
150 and 200 in village D. The majority of villagers rely on rain- fed agriculture, 
primarily focusing on rice cultivation, livestock and fish, and vegetables on a 
small scale for home consumption and cash sales. Many men are hired on 
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 occasional construction projects, such as building and repairing roads, houses 
and community facilities. Others work as motorcycle taxi drivers, teachers, 
policemen and local authorities. A significant number of young women migrate 
to cities to work at garment factories and provide a cash income to their rural 
families.
 Small grocery shops, battery charging stations, and rice milling stations are 
common family- owned businesses in the communities. Grid- quality electricity 
services and piped water have not reached the villages yet. The villagers collect 
wood as cooking fuel and use candles, kerosene, and lead acid rechargeable bat-
teries for lighting.
 Khmers are very pragmatic in their residency patterns. They live wherever 
the conditions are most suitable, which changes over time (Ebihara 1977, cited 
in Ledgerwood 1992), but with a preference for matrilocal residence.6 In all four 
villages, the woman’s side of the family lives close to each other within the same 
village and such family ties seem to provide a background support mechanism 
for women. Of nine women in leadership positions in the four villages, seven are 
originally from the village they live in.
 In agriculture, the division of labour is based on the composition of the house-
hold (Ledgerwood 1992) and is generally not based on sex, except that a few 
physically demanding tasks such as ploughing and making field levees typically 
fall to men. Labour exchange between relatives and neighbours is common 
during busy times of the year. Outside of cultivation, the division of labour in 
common activities such as fishing, gardening, taking care of livestock, collecting 
firewood, fetching water and other similar tasks vary slightly depending on the 
family composition and the availability of labour. Such divisions have not 
changed very much from the pre- revolutionary period as noted in Ebihara’s 
(1968: 682) ethnographic work.
 Two categories of task, however, follow strict divisions of labour by sex: 
household maintenance and finance. Both of these fall in the domain of women. 
There is an unchallenged view that household chores and caring for the elderly, 
sick and young siblings remains the exclusive responsibility of women and girls 
(Aing 2004; Velasco 2001; Ledgerwood 1992). Even though a majority of inter-
viewees believe that both boys and girls have equal rights to education and 
support the idea of educating girls, families often hold their daughters back to 
provide for their family (Hiwasa 2010). Women are also responsible for family 
finances (Ledgerwood 1996: 143) and literally responsible for all financial trans-
actions including decision- making over everyday expenditure, family savings, 
and the taking of loans.
 Decision- making in the household, in contrast, is relatively mutual. All the 
households I interviewed said they make decisions together, especially about 
important matters concerning their families; however, it is hard to know how 
this plays out in practice.
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Women’s group activities
Women’s groups usually meet once a month for one or two hours. The number 
of members is between 15 and 40. Each women’s group has a leader, deputy and 
a secretary elected by the members, which demonstrates that they share a con-
sistent formal structure. The leaders are generally the outspoken ones who have 
relatively good literacy and numeracy skills. The members learn various agricul-
tural techniques such as SRI, home gardening, compost making, and livestock 
raising. Meetings usually start with information being shared and discussion of 
some hot topics such as how to cope with insects if they are destroying rice 
fields, how to prevent dengue fever and diarrhoea during the rainy season, inci-
dences of violence in the village, and so forth. The common activity in all the 
women’s groups, and the primary interest of most members, is collective 
savings. At every meeting, the total capital, amount collected, and current total 
lending are announced. The interest rate for lending is around 3–4 per cent per 
month and members share the capital earned through lending at the end of the 
term.
Practical utility and social relevance of women’s groups
What makes women’s group activities attractive for the members? One of the 
great achievements of women’s groups is to improve the skills of women in 
Figure 8.1 Women’s group meeting in one of the case study villages.
Changing gendered boundaries in Cambodia  139
managing their livelihoods. Given the general impoverishment in rural areas, 
women are typically most concerned with their hard economic reality rather than 
social status or gender inequality. Improving the situation in their households 
often requires that women fulfil practical needs such as increased productivity 
and crop diversification, easy access to financial resources through savings activ-
ities, and income generating activities (mainly livestock). Because women are in 
charge of the financial management of households, easy access to credit through 
group savings seems to be one of the most important and practical reasons for 
women to join women’s groups. All of the women interviewed in the four vil-
lages mentioned it as a benefit of participating in women’s groups. Most of the 
husbands also agreed. And even though some women’s groups disbanded when 
outside facilitation by CEDAC was discontinued, group savings remain active.
 In general, women are more likely to say they are happier after experiences in 
women’s groups and, due to improving livelihood skills gained through group 
exchange and savings activities, many women are satisfied by their capability to 
feed their families. And as long as it helps the family to save money and provide 
a culturally embedded educational outlet, husbands are generally supportive 
about their wives’ engagement in women’s groups (interviews with husbands 
in 2007).
Indirect impacts of women’s groups
This is not to say that women’s groups only promote the stereotypical role of 
women within traditional boundaries. While the main purpose of women’s 
groups is to improve livelihood- related skills and techniques, the opportunity 
presented by meeting, sharing ideas, exchanging experiences, and solving prob-
lems creates a culture of mutual help and strengthens social capital among 
women. Many women exhibit an overall improvement in their self- esteem by 
being able to improve their living standard. The non- livelihood effects are 
captured by various narratives highlighted by members of women’s groups in 
case study villages (interviews and focus groups, 2007):
• women can cooperate and help each other
• women can be leaders like men
• women dare to speak out like men and can express themselves
• women can participate in the public sphere and have an understanding and 
knowledge of politics
• women have roles beyond the household.
Many of these elements are outlined by an enthusiastic women’s group member 
in village A:
When I join the group, I can learn from other women; how they do things in 
their families . . . when I join a meeting of the group, we get to know each 
other and improve cooperation. It’s better than before. Before, I only stayed 
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at home and knew people around the house. . . . But after we formed the 
women’s group, I got to know other women and dared to make jokes with 
them . . . when I became a member of the women’s group, we could save 
money, exchange experiences with others, and help each other. For example, 
when I don’t have enough crops, the members share with me. If I have crops 
and they don’t have enough, I share with them . . . we learn about food 
processing such as preserving cucumber. I didn’t know how to do it. If the 
members know how to pickle the cucumber well and preserve them for a 
long time, they share the knowledge with me . . . when I go to learn new 
technologies, I share what I learned with the members, and when they go, 
they share with me.
(Interview, July 2007)
Association building contributes to the creation of social capital, which is 
expressed by increased happiness, connection with other women, and sharing 
access to information and ideas. Before they joined, many members of women’s 
groups perceived themselves to be like ‘frogs in a well’, who are blind and 
ignorant. Many of them articulate their constrained situation in the household 
with the saying satray bongbal chongkran mun chom (women cannot even come 
out from behind the cook stove), which prescribes housework as women’s 
Figure 8.2 A member of the women’s group speaking out at a public meeting.
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primary role, and undervalues their capacity for growth (Hiwasa 2010). The nar-
ratives regarding the impacts of women’s groups suggest that this perception is 
changing as a result of having opportunities to learn new skills and techniques, 
sharing ideas and experiences, participating in workshops, going on exposure 
trips outside of their villages, and speaking out in public.
Emergence of grassroots leadership
The presence of strong female leadership seems to be an essential element for 
the success of and continuous development of women’s groups. The characteris-
tics of active leaders vary from community to community, but one common way 
in which women develop leadership motivation and skills is by reflecting on 
males around them and negotiating their position in relation to the male members 
of their families (Frieson 2001). The case studies below present two types of 
female leaders: those whose husbands hold political positions and those who are 
divorced.
Wives of local political authorities
Two female leaders of the women’s group in village A are the wives of the 
village chief and the deputy village chief. Their marriages to men in positions of 
authority do not necessary translate to a leadership role for themselves, but this 
opens certain avenues for learning and acting. The folk tale Mea Yoeng, men-
tioned earlier, describes a wise wife who is expected to be industrious and 
shrewd in supporting her husband’s attempts to be successful. His success is 
therefore facilitated and dependent on the woman behind him. One Khmer 
proverb relates, ‘If you do not listen to the advice of a woman, you will not have 
any rice seed next year’. Such proverbs and tales like Mea Yoeng symbolize the 
important supporting role women play for men.
 A leader of the farmer association and deputy leader of the women’s group 
named Bopha,7 in her late 40s, said ‘I didn’t join [associations in the beginning] 
because my husband is already a leader’ (interview, July 2007). The family has 
five daughters, and Bopha used to sell vegetables at the nearby market and raise 
animals to support her family as her husband’s earnings as a deputy chief is 
minimal. Initially, she did not take part in any group activities. Her eldest daugh-
ter had joined earlier when the group was at an early stage. Bopha eventually 
replaced her daughter when she married, which is how Bopha became involved. 
When the time came to formalize the group, Bopha was elected as a leader. Her 
husband was not fully supportive initially because the family income declined. 
As Bopha became increasingly active and busy attending meetings and training, 
she stopped selling vegetables and raised less livestock. He became critical about 
his wife not maintaining the living standard of the family but he conceded that, 
‘she is also the wife of the deputy chief of the village, so I cannot say anything’ 
as he would lose face as the deputy chief if he did not support her (interview in 
village A, July 2007).
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 The leader of the women’s group and wife of the village chief, a woman 
named Pay in her early 60s, had long desired to form an association for women 
but admitted that she did not know how to do so. CEDAC’s project interested 
her and helped her to put her ideas into action. Pay leveraged the opportunity 
presented by CEDAC’s project in the village to challenge the power structure 
and her husband. Even as the wife of the village chief, traditional social norms 
limited her capability to take any direct initiative without the intervention of an 
external actor like CEDAC.
 Pay’s husband, who is in his early 70s, has held leadership roles since 1979, 
and primarily acted within traditionally circumscribed gender roles and value 
structures, which largely deny women’s participation in the public sphere. He 
described the changes to this situation:
Before, women didn’t have rights. But now, women have equal rights [as 
men]. [Women] can know and join meetings and understand. Even if they 
are illiterate, they can join, listen and get some ideas. . . . In the past, there 
was no plan for women [to participate in public affairs]. No plan from 
society for women. Regardless of whether it is far from home or close, 
women didn’t have a chance to join.
(Interview, July 2007)
It seems that it was only possible for these women leaders to organize a women’s 
group with external facilitation and technical support. Establishment of women’s 
groups has created a public sphere where women’s participation is justified and 
encouraged, at least regarding improvements in their households and com-
munities. After achieving significant improvement in their livelihood and foster-
ing mutually supportive relationships, both the chief and deputy chief 
acknowledge the importance of women’s participation in the development of 
their communities. Indeed, the village chief is proud of the women’s group in 
village A having achieved more than women’s groups in other villages (inter-
views, September 2007 and November 2011).
Divorcee – strong independent women
Divorced women are typically seen as lower in status and, consequently, they 
have to be very strong to raise their family without much male support. 
However, they are also more independent and free to do as they like (interview 
with a divorcee, 2007). The women leaders in villages B and D are divorcees 
who separated from their husbands due to domestic violence and raised their 
young children alone, which contrasts with the leadership figures presented 
above from villages A and C.
 In village B, one of the women leaders, Veasna, raised seven children by 
herself. She worked as a nurse during the Khmer Rouge period and continued to 
work as a health- related volunteer in the village for many years. She was elected 
as a deputy chief of the village after four years of active engagement with the 
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farmer association and women’s group. Another leader, Saran, who is somewhat 
quieter than Veasna, also raised seven children by herself. She divorced around 
the time of the birth to her seventh child. Saran was eventually appointed leader 
of the women’s group. She emphasized her appreciation of the women’s group 
as a venue where women can discuss their struggles. In fact, she thinks that the 
women’s group is one of the most important groups in the village because:
Women face many difficulties. For example, for women who have a 
husband . . . many husbands do domestic violence, so women need to stand 
up for themselves. For those women who don’t have a husband, it is diffi-
cult to raise children alone. So we discuss, exchange ideas and find a way to 
solve the problems in the family.
(Interview with Saran, September 2007)
As divorcees, they have struggled to raise their children and are aware of the dif-
ficulties other women face with domestic violence. This generates respect for 
their leadership from many women in their villages.
 In discussions with women leaders about the issues related to persistent 
domestic violence (carried out in a workshop, November 2011), it emerged that 
women often fear that they will be looked down upon, lose income and male 
labour, lose security, and will be a poor model of marriage for their children. 
As a result, many women do not dare to divorce but rather tend to tolerate 
domestic violence. Veasna, the deputy chief and the leader of the farmer associ-
ation in village B regularly argued that women should not tolerate violence 
because of social norms, advocating instead for building self- esteem and 
their capacity to earn a living independently. In addition to showing solidarity 
towards divorcees, the female leaders in villages B and D strongly emphasize 
the importance of women’s capacity to earn income as key to their autonomy 
and independence.
Women’s groups as a link between the masses and other actors
Women’s groups create various links between different actors: women’s groups, 
other CBOs/CSOs, local authorities and the national government. They play a 
role in potentially filling the lack of ‘intermediaries’ in society because of their 
broad grassroots coverage (see Öjendal, and also Ou and Kim, this volume). As 
of January 2012, over 700 women’s groups facilitated by CEDAC exist through-
out the country. A network called the National Women Farmers’ Network 
(NWFN) is active in organizing national- level activities involving women’s 
groups. NWFN operates under the umbrella of the Farmer and Nature Network, 
the farmer association federation formally registered with the Ministry of 
Interior. In the first general meeting of the NWFN, organized in October 2007, 
the five tentative committee members were elected by the participants (see 
Figure 3). As of March 2012, NWFN has 390 member groups representing 8,291 
women in ten provinces.
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 The NWFN organizes quarterly meetings for capacity building and sharing 
best practices and other relevant information at the national level. However, the 
provincial and district levels are still somewhat disconnected and the results of 
the national- level meetings do not benefit every group member because the 
network lacks financial capacity to organize sufficient training and meetings 
(email correspondence with director of the national farmer association). Should 
the NWFN improve its financial capacity and organizational structure to involve 
other stakeholders effectively, the network has the potential to be an intermedi-
ary body (see Öjendal, this volume).
Women’s groups as hubs for development cooperation
The success of women’s groups has attracted attention from local authorities and 
the national government as well as other NGOs working in different sectors such 
as child issues, education and health. Many of these actors have asked women’s 
groups to be hubs for their activities. For example, a facilitator from one local 
NGO focusing on teaching women about reproductive health asked the leader of 
a women’s group to gather the members for training (this was observed in all four 
case study villages). Women’s groups also play a role in disseminating informa-
tion to all the women in the villages. Women’s groups are so often used to coord-
inate activities with other NGOs (i.e. to collect members for meetings) that, if 
Figure 8.3 Five tentative committee members of NWFN.
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they are ever dissolved, it becomes difficult for other organizations to reach 
people (interview with the promoter in one of the case villages, November 2011).
Women’s groups and local government
Some of the women active in women’s groups and farmer associations are 
involved in commune monitoring committees, which evaluate development 
activities implemented by the commune council.8 Committee members parti-
cipate in monthly meetings of the commune council to monitor delivery of serv-
ices and expenditure, as well as to help to improve the relevance, efficiency and 
transparency of the activities (Ngin 2008). For example, an unmarried woman in 
her late twenties from village A, who is the secretary of the women’s group and 
farmer association, and another women’s group leader are active members of 
commune monitoring committees. They are knowledgeable about current activ-
ities at the commune councils and share information from the committee meet-
ings with neighbours and members of the women’s group. Another example is 
the female leader of the farmer association and a deputy chief in village B, who 
helped the commune council to organize a village meeting to identify the prior-
ities of the village for the annual development plan. The presence of CBO 
members at commune council meetings is a great opportunity for CBOs to bring 
Figure 8.4  A facilitator from a local NGO teaching the members of a women’s group 
about birth spacing.
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up the needs identified within CBOs, as well as to collaborate with the commune 
council (Ngin 2008).
Women’s groups and the state
The staff from the district office of MoWA and the focal points from commune 
councils are often invited to attend the women’s forum, which is a quarterly 
gathering of women leaders in the district organized by CEDAC since 2007. It is 
not only an opportunity for female grassroots leaders to learn from each other 
and share their experiences, but also to advocate their needs and to be heard by 
government officials. These opportunities, however, do not necessarily yield tan-
gible outcomes because there are no clear terms between the project and MoWA, 
and no budget allocation for collaboration on advancing women’s interests to the 
provincial level. While more linkage with the government (see Wells- Dang, this 
volume), in this case between MoWA and commune councils, can strengthen the 
advocacy power of women’s groups, without a specific framework for involve-
ment in the project, it is challenging to forge a link between female grassroots 
leaders and the government officials as there is no order and budget allocated 
from MoWA (interview with district staff, September 2007).
Sustainability and dependency of CBOs
Sustaining externally initiated groups based on voluntary participation can be a 
challenge given uncertainty of funding. At the end of the project in 2009, 
CEDAC left one of the case villages entirely but remained engaged with new 
projects in the other three villages. Nevertheless, all of the women’s groups con-
tinue to be active in different ways.
 In the village without CEDAC’s presence (Village D) after 2009, the women 
continued saving activities and working together without a formal structure (as 
of November 2011). The leader of the women’s group, who is a divorcee and 
committee member of the commune monitoring committee, remains pivotal for 
various development activities in her village. In village C, however, the group 
was dissolved in 2009 when the leader quit due to illness and none of the other 
members wanted to take over her responsibilities. However, they reorganized 
themselves as a savings group on their own initiative in 2011. In village A, 
where the women’s leaders are the wives of local authorities, the women con-
tinued with savings activities but shifted their focus to the farmer association, 
which they hoped to formally register with the Ministry of Interior, in addition 
to continuing their engagement with CEDAC. In village B, where divorcees are 
the leaders of the women’s group, the activities generally focus on group savings 
and reducing violence in their village, and maintain their group activities.
 Regardless of CEDAC’s presence, each women’s group has chosen how they 
want to continue their activities based on their leadership and interests. Even 
though they were externally initiated, the women’s groups have demonstrated 
the capacity to grow on their own and engage with other stakeholders.
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Blurring the gendered division of roles and social spaces
It is almost a slogan in Cambodia that ‘women now have the same rights as men’ 
when both women and men regard the changes to women’s status in recent years. 
Practically, however, equal rights have advanced only superficially (Kim and 
Öjendal 2011; Hiwasa 2010) as the traditionally hierarchical nature of Cambodian 
society persistently prevents women from equal access to public decision- making 
(Malena and Chhim 2009). This begs the question: are women and men ready to 
go beyond the traditionally defined roles they play in public and private, within 
and outside the household? Although this is changing, it seems that attitudes in the 
personal and private domain are more resistant to change than in the public domain 
(interview with women leaders and government officials, 2007 and 2011). The 
deputy chief of one of the case villages, who is also the husband of the farmer 
association leader, described this change in the following narrative:
In the past, I didn’t understand [why it was important for women to join] 
and I was not comfortable with it. Before, if a wife went to the field, the 
husband wouldn’t do any housework and would wait until the wife comes 
home. . . . When I was young, if a wife went out and came back, the wife and 
husband would have an argument [because a meal is not ready]. It’s not like 
that now. In my village, awareness of villagers about domestic violence has 
increased. . . . If a woman goes to plough the field, the husband cooks the 
meals. Not so many husbands wait around for their wives to come home and 
do the housework.
(Interview, November 2011)
Figure 8.5 A woman ploughing her land.
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 The deputy chief refers to ploughing, one of the farming activities that has 
traditionally been a man’s role, and cooking and housework, which are tradition-
ally women’s roles, to illustrate the change in the attitude towards gendered roles 
in the private domain. In some cases, however, this change does not come easily. 
For example, one official of the department of Women’s Affairs in Tram kak dis-
trict complains that even though she has a full- time and respectable position in a 
public office, her husband does not help her with any housework (interview in 
September 2007). Changes in the private domain, particularly attitudes towards 
household chores, have yet to become mainstream. The burden of household 
duties and child rearing continue to pose a challenge for women trying to be 
active in the public sphere. Nevertheless, many husbands that I interviewed 
expressed encouragement for their wives to participate in the women’s group. If 
their wives occasionally join an all- day workshop far from home, they would 
cook and take care of the children at home (interviews with husbands between 
July and October 2007). This attitude indicates men’s growing acceptance of 
going beyond the traditionally defined division of public and private space.
From women’s issues to gender issues
Development approaches have shifted from focusing on women, a half of the 
story to gender, to the social construction of gender relations which critically 
look at the power relationship between men and women in specific context. In 
practice, however, workshops about women’s empowerment and gender equality 
typically exclude men. Organizers think that women feel more comfortable 
talking about sensitive issues without having any male presence. This was prob-
ably true in the beginning of the project as women were getting used to the idea 
of speaking out at public gatherings (CEDAC 2004; Kusakabe 2004). However, 
female leaders now agree that it is necessary to have male leadership present in 
meetings discussing domestic violence and women’s leadership roles in society 
in order to gain understanding and support from their male counterparts. Among 
other things, this helps to create an enabling atmosphere for more women to 
become active outside of their households (workshop in November 2011).
 A similar change is perhaps necessary in the content of female- oriented pro-
gramming. For example, the training provided by CEDAC to the leaders of 
women’s groups focuses on skills related to household work, such as how to 
balance nutrition, improve kitchen hygiene, and how to care for health 
issues particular to women and children. Kusakabe (2004) criticized that the 
content of this training is overly focused on skills that are ‘suitable’ for women, 
which perpetuates women’s traditional roles in the household rather than 
challenging them.
Conclusion
Empowerment, in contrast to the way the term is often employed in development, 
is not merely capacity development in the sense of livelihood improvement. 
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Indeed, livelihood- focused activities of women’s groups can be criticized for 
reproducing and emphasizing women’s traditional roles in the household. 
However, by applying a postmodern feminist perspective to the context of rural 
Cambodia, this type of empowerment can be understood as a logical step for 
women to improve their status as well as to fulfil cultural ideals that enhance 
their self- esteem. By enhancing their capacity to improve the livelihoods of their 
households and communities, they earn respect from male counterparts and local 
leadership and fortify their sense of self- worth. As a result, both women and men 
more often proclaim that ‘women can now come out from behind the cook stove’ 
and that women are no longer ‘a frog in a well’. By bringing women together (in 
women’s groups) and cultivating social capital that provides support, female 
leaders are coming out to challenge the boundaries of traditional gender norms. 
When women themselves not only redefine what is possible for them but also 
become figures in case studies, one can say that empowerment is at least 
under way.
 This success in engaging women in group activities fosters a culture of 
women’s participation in the public realm, a place where the majority of women 
never had access to before. None of the female grassroots leaders in these case 
studies had the opportunity to be an active agent in the public sphere prior to 
their participation in a women’s group. These women can be considered as pio-
neers and role models, and it will be interesting to observe whether participation 
will spread to women more generally (i.e. not only to divorcees and wives of 
village leaders).
 This chapter presents women’s groups as ‘artificial’ seeds of CBOs that not 
only advance women’s participation in the public realm, and generate local civil 
society, but also provide stepping stones to national engagement (Öjendal, this 
volume). Women’s groups at the village level can reach out and raise their 
agendas more broadly by leveraging, among others, the women’s forum at the 
district level as well as national networks. Nonetheless, these groups do require 
some facilitation and capacity building for female grassroots leaders in order to 
get organized, sustain and differentiate their activities, raise funds, strengthen 
their networking capacity, and actively partner with other stakeholders. The 
growth of CBOs shows great potential in advancing gender equality from the 
grassroots level.
Notes
1 For a more detailed discussion of the concept of power, see Hayward (1998), and 
Mosedale (2005: 250). For a more detailed discussion, and definition of, empower-
ment, see Rowland (1997: 13), Parpart et al. (2002: 4), Kabeer (2003; 2005), as well as 
Alsop et al. (2006).
2 These results were published as a monograph through VDM Verlag Dr Müller in 2010 
with minor edits from the original 2008 thesis accepted by the Royal Tropical Institute, 
Amsterdam.
3 The GAD approach focuses on the social construction of gender relations. The 
approach in GAD is more critical in its perspective of women’s subordinate status rel-
ative to men. This is a reflection of the failure of the previously promoted approach, 
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women in development (WID). WID regards women’s subordination in terms of their 
exclusion from the market and limited access to, and control over, resources (Revees 
and Baden 2000) but lacks consideration of power relations, which underlie the causes 
of such subordination.
4 The acronym CEDAC derives from the French name of the organization, the Centre 
d’Etude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien.
5 It was financed by Japan International Cooperation Agency.
6 Newly married young women who live far from their own mother and relatives feel 
anxious and lack social support compared to those who live near their own mothers and 
relatives throughout their pregnancy, delivery and post- partum periods (Hiwasa 2010).
7 All the personal names used in this chapter are pseudonyms in order to protect the con-
fidentiality of the study participants.
8 This is a good governance project supported by PACT, financed by the US Agency for 
International Development.
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9 Mobilizing against hydropower 
projects
Multi- scale dimensions of civil society 
action in a transboundary setting
Ly Thim
Introduction
At the end of February 2000, a sudden flood swept away properties and claimed 
lives among the communities living along the Se San River in Ratanakiri prov-
ince, Cambodia. Due to the unusual timing and intensity of the flood for the dry 
season, a preliminary media investigation revealed that the tragedy was caused 
by sudden water release from the Yali- Falls Dam, located upstream on the Se 
San River in Vietnam. This chapter uses a civil society lens to look at how the 
response to this and other harmful dam impacts have been organized at different 
levels. As a framework, this chapter employs an actor- oriented approach to 
social interfaces for analysing conflicts, in which contestation over resources, 
practices, knowledge and value take place between social actors. This chapter 
views the evolution of civil society as an organic process, in which affected 
people and sympathetic parties create and reinvent new types of interfaces to 
achieve wider representation and national voice. At these interfaces, institutions 
are founded and grow in scale and differentiation with the aspiration of mean-
ingfully influencing national politics. This is a form of gradual empowerment 
and strategic inclusion. Because boundaries of various types continually crop up, 
multi- scale cooperation often becomes necessary to achieve larger goals.
Methods of data collection
This chapter is based on the results of the author’s PhD research conducted for 
the Center for Development Research (ZEF ) at the University of Bonn, includ-
ing fieldwork in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos from May 2007 to February 2008. 
This study mainly employed qualitative methods of data collection using semi- 
structured interviews, focus group discussions, informal interviewing, and parti-
cipant observation, focusing on both the local level and with relevant 
non- governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and gov-
ernment officials in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Some 45 of 60 villages 
located adjacent to the river were studied with a view towards uncovering com-
munity perception towards hydropower dams and their activities, focused on 
coping with the changing river flows and managing transboundary concerns of 
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the entire Se San River basin. Secondary data collection on certain subjects was 
carried out throughout this period and continued until the end of 2009.
 For this chapter only the affected communities in Ratanakiri province were 
selected for investigation (see geographical location in Figure 9.1). The choice 
of this province is instructive because (1) it borders on Vietnam and is therefore 
proximate to the dam site, (2) it constitutes a significant cohort of people living 
along the Se San River, (3) the affected population were informed about poten-
tial dam impacts by local and international NGOs as early as 2000, which has 
sharpened their opinions and perspectives, (4) the presence of local NGOs and 
the community- based Se San protection network is active in this region, and (5) 
the affected communities in Vietnam are not considered in the scope of this 
study because this study is about responses of transboundary issues where Cam-
bodian local communities petition their own government to find solutions with 
the Vietnam government.
An actor- oriented approach to social interface: the landscape 
of civil society
In this chapter the concept of social interface in the context of civil society con-
cerns the dynamics of negotiation between different actors operating with differ-
ent agendas, and at different scales. It allows us to analyse the processes by 
which affected communities and civil society actors respond to development 
processes, develop strategies for dealing with intervening parties, and use local 
resources to shape the actual outcome of potential policy interventions. The 
actor- oriented approach, developed primarily by Norman Long, is useful in ana-
lyses of situations in which various actors repeatedly interact and fight over 
resource use and meaning in the development process.
 Long (1989) develops the social interface perspective within the actor- 
oriented approach as an analytical tool for understanding cultural diversity, 
social cleavages and conflict inherent in the processes of development and policy 
intervention. Interfaces are seen as the dynamic social spaces where conflictive 
or cooperative interaction take place (Long 1989) and convey the idea of some 
kind of face- to-face encounter between individuals with differing interests, 
resources and power bases (Arce and Long 1992; Long 2001: 177). The study of 
interfaces is also concerned with the analysis of discontinuities, characterized by 
discrepancies in social interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power. 
These discontinuities are mediated and transformed at critical points of confron-
tation and linkage (Long 2001: 89). Interface analysis reveals the dynamic and 
contingent character of the struggles and interactions that take place, showing 
how actors’ goals, perceptions, interests and relationships are reshaped by the 
process.
 The flooding from the Yali- Falls Dam prompted the emergence of groups and 
social networks on both sides of the border, creating open interfaces around the 
issues of flood control, river flows, compensation and vulnerability. However, 
interfaces contain within them many levels and forms of social linkage and 
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discontinuity. Because of such discontinuities in spatial and institutional coher-
ence, the Cambodian groups grew and differentiated themselves so as to harmo-
nize their mutual interfaces and create a more unified and powerful voice. 
However, as Arce and Long argue (1992: 214)
studies of interface should not be restricted to observing what goes on 
during face- to-face encounters, since these interactions are in part affected 
by actors, institutional and cultural frameworks, and resources that may not 
actually be physically or directly present.
Indeed, the group formation and stabilization of interest- group interfaces was 
driven partly by foreign aid and accompanying frameworks of rights, empower-
ment, and social mobilization. So although the methodology of interface analysis 
focuses upon specific social interactional processes, the analysis is situated 
within these broader institutional and power fields (Long 1989).
 Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of common interest, 
Long (2001) points out that interface analysis is also concerned with multiple 
realities made up of potentially conflicting social and normative interests and 
diverse and contested bodies of knowledge. Negotiations at the interface are 
sometimes carried out by individuals who represent particular groups or organi-
zations. Their position is inevitably ambivalent since they must respond to the 
demands of their own groups as well as to the expectations of those with whom 
they must negotiate. One should, however, not assume that because a particular 
person ‘represents’ a specific group or institution that he or she necessarily acts 
in the interests, or on behalf, of his or her fellows (Long 2002). Long and Long 
(1992) posit that it is in the field of intervention that struggles over social mean-
ings and practices take place. In short, one should not assume that harmonious 
cooperation along interfaces necessarily means an absence of conflict. Therefore, 
when looking at responses to development intervention one should look at who 
is part of the conflicts and how these conflicts are fought. Long refers to these 
contexts as arenas, or ‘social and spatial locations where actors confront each 
other, mobilize social relations and other cultural means for the attainment of 
specific ends’ (Long 2001: 59).
 The concept of arena is especially important for identifying the actors and 
mapping out the issues, resources and discourse entailed in particular situations 
of disagreement or dispute (ibid.). The analysis of arenas, however, is not limited 
to local actors or settings only, but also takes into account distant actors and 
social networks which shape the social processes, strategies and actions that take 
place in these localized settings. Hence, studies of social interfaces analyse how 
matters of scale and complexity shape organizing practices of civil society. By 
and large, for most observers, civil society in the Cambodian context mostly 
refers to NGOs, local associations, and local community networks (see a survey 
in Öjendal’s introduction to this volume). In this chapter, however, civil society 
may also be defined as ‘organized activities by groups or individuals either per-
forming certain services or trying to influence and improve society as a whole, 
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but they are not part of government or business’ (Jørgensen 1996). In addition, 
civil society is not only limited to organizations but also includes networks (see 
Wells- Dang, this volume).
Transboundary hydropower impacts on Se San River: the 
source of conflict
The Se San River originates in the central highlands of Vietnam and flows 
through the two Vietnamese provinces of Kon Tum and Gia Lai, before descend-
ing through two provinces in the northeast of Cambodia, Ratanakiri and Stung 
Treng, before finally feeding into the Mekong. A map of the Se San River is 
found in Figure 9.1.
 The Se San River is well- known for its hydropower development potential. 
The total capacity of energy that can currently be generated from this river is 
estimated at 2,600 megawatts (MW). Six hydropower projects with a combined 
capacity of about 1,800 MW are located in Vietnam, while five others with a 
combined capacity of approximately 800 MW, are found in Cambodia.
 The Yali- Falls Dam was the first large hydropower dam constructed on this 
river located in the territory of Vietnam. Construction of the dam, with a poten-
tial capacity of 720 MW, began in 1993. By 1996, villagers living along the riv-
erbanks in two downstream districts (Oyadao and Andong Meas) of Ratanakiri 
province in Cambodia began to experience the impacts of the dam’s develop-
ment in the form of intense flooding as early as September 1996. During the 
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1996 floods the villagers were not aware of the Yali- Falls Dam construction and, 
at that time, according to their ethnic cultural belief, they assumed that the floods 
were caused by the angry spirit of the water. One villager described that, ‘after 
the excessive floods, our villagers gathered and held a ritual ceremony to 
worship the river water spirit, but, not long after the ceremony we observed more 
changes in river water such as more extreme fluctuation, surges and dirty water’ 
(focus group discussion, 2007).
 After the 1996 events, the riverbank villagers started to search for information 
regarding the changes in river water particularly from communities living 
upstream in Gia Lai province, which is located just downstream of the Yali- Falls 
Dam in Vietnam. The ethnic Jaray community living in Oyadao and Andong 
Meas districts, who are often in contact with their ethnic minority counterparts 
in Vietnam for reasons relating to commodity exchange, reported that, referring 
to the Yali- Falls Dam, the floods were caused by large- scale dam construction in 
Vietnam. The information circulated within the community was that the dam 
builders used poor Vietnamese cement instead of Japanese cement, which caused 
the dam to break and flood downstream. After recognizing that changes in water 
flow were being caused by dam construction, the riverbank villagers in Oyadao 
and Andong Meas districts stopped holding ritual ceremonies. Similar cultural 
beliefs and practices were also abandoned by riverbank villagers in the down-
stream districts of Taveng and Veunsai, who became aware of the dam impacts 
after flood events in February 2000.
The landscape of civil society: responses to dam impacts
The February 2000 flood event caused by water release from the Yali- Falls Dam 
was identified as a watershed moment, in which conflict over water resource use 
in the Se San basin began to emerge and take shape. The main parties were the 
affected communities in Cambodia and the dam owners in Vietnam. The essence 
of the actor- oriented approach is the concept of ‘agency’, which attributes to the 
individual actor the capacity to control social relations and devise modes of 
coping with life (Long 2001). Because of the heterogeneity of actors involved, 
groups with different interests engaged in the conflict in ways that reflected their 
collective capacity and reach within different socio- political levels. At the local 
level, responses began to emerge concretely as a result of interaction between 
the affected communities and staff from local and international NGOs working 
in Ratanakiri province. The section below outlines how civil society evolves and 
differentiates itself from its informal roots to into formalized structures, typically 
graduating from groups, to organizations, to networks, and from local to national 
and international levels.
Creating social space to fight dam development and impacts
After the February 2000 flood events, staff from various NGOs in Cambodia 
began to form the Provincial Se San Working Group (PSWG) at the provincial 
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level. Oxfam America and the NGO Forum of Cambodia (NGOF ) had been 
paying a visit to Ratanakiri province and collaborated with the local organiza-
tion, Non- Timber Forest Products (NTFP), to investigate and study dam- related 
impacts on river flows. The PSWG identified that human resources should be 
mobilized locally with technical assistance from international experts while 
funds could be obtained from Oxfam America through the NTFP project. 
Although an unlikely alliance, this cooperation set the stage for many further 
ones. With the availability of financial resources, a survey team was established 
and led by an international consultant through NTFP, which also drew in indi-
viduals from provincial government departments, such as the Agriculture, For-
estry and Fisheries Department, Environment Department, and Rural 
Development Department. In addition to these institutional partners, indigenous 
peoples originating from the Se San River basin in Ratanakiri province were also 
involved in the survey.
 The team surveyed all the villages located along the Se San River in Ratana-
kiri province between April and May 2000, resulting in a 43-page report entitled 
‘A Study of the Downstream Impacts of the Yali- Falls Dam in the Se San River 
Basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia’. The report documented the 
impacts of the Yali- Falls Dam construction, including the serious consequences 
upon livelihoods among downstream communities in Cambodia since late 1996, 
and called upon the Cambodian government to begin addressing the issue and 
negotiate with Vietnam. Through this report, the affected communities living 
along the Se San River made several significant statements and issued a number 
of appeals to the government:
• The Vietnam Government, and those international organizations, foreign 
countries and companies who supported them in building the Yali- Falls 
Dam should take responsibility for the losses that local people have already 
experienced, including the loss of life and the loss of livelihoods. Compen-
sation will need to be provided on a continual basis if the impacts from the 
dam are not alleviated.
• The villagers living along the Se San River would like to see the Yali- Falls 
Dam decommissioned, and the Se San River returned to its natural state. 
However, if this is not immediately possible, strong measures need to be 
adopted to mitigate the downstream impacts in Cambodia, including releas-
ing water from the dam in a way that replicates natural flows.
(Fisheries Office 2000: 38)
After the study had been released, activity at local level did not stop, but actually 
intensified with the establishment of a local grassroots NGO called Se San Pro-
tection Network (SPN), which was to advocate for social and environmental pro-
tection for riverbank communities. SPN was formally launched in 2001 and was 
quickly followed by the establishment of the Se San Community Network 
(SCN), aimed at strengthening networking at village level in order to more 
effectively disseminate and collect information on dam issues and to mobilize 
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community support for advocacy initiatives. The local- level SCN consists of 
focal persons and elder groups from district and village levels and, by early 
2004, was active in all 60 affected villages in Ratanakiri. By the third quarter of 
2005, SPN extended its working location to two other rivers (Sre Pok and Se 
Kong) which join the Se San River about 10 km before entering the Mekong 
River. As a result, SPN was then renamed the 3S Rivers Protection Network 
(3SPN). At the national level, 3SPN networks with various NGO partners to 
advocate on behalf of constituents in order to put pressure on government agen-
cies to protect the environment and the social well- being of riverbank com-
munities. Such advocacy includes restoration of the rivers, livelihood promotion 
3 S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN)
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and compensation for dam- related impacts. At the international level, 3SPN and 
its allies established ties with international organizations, which it can poten-
tially leverage to help stop dam building and/or fight for compensation.
Strategies and choices of Se San Protection Network
SPN, and later 3SPN, have employed various strategies to influence river basin 
development policy at national and international levels, which I will present 
below.
Utilizing Se San River issues to generate transboundary dialogue
SPN realized early on that an important step for promoting their cause would be 
to hold a national workshop in order to draw the attention of major players, such 
as the government, donors, and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). In the 
first workshop on issues relating to the Se San River, which took place in Phnom 
Penh on 27 November 2002, findings of an impact study were presented and 
affected communities were provided an opportunity to speak up and suggest res-
olutions. Furthermore, the workshop was organized in such a way that affected 
communities could be motivated to participate and address the audience using 
their own words.
 Central to SPN’s strategy was to invite key stakeholders who were likely to 
be influenced by the scale of civic participation. Among others, these invitees 
included Cambodian government officials from the Cambodia National Mekong 
Committee (CNMC), the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
(MOWRAM), representatives from the Mekong River Commission (MRC) Sec-
retariat, and representatives from the Vietnam National Mekong Committee 
(VNMC). In a late decision by SPN’s Se San Steering Committee, the invitation 
to the VNMC was withdrawn based on the view that engaging only national 
figures and the multilateral MRC would help build and attract initial support 
from within the Cambodian government (Hirsch and Wyatt 2004). In the end, 
none of the above- mentioned parties attended the workshop. While Cambodian 
officials from CNMC and MOWRAM declined to attend, citing other commit-
ments, representatives from the MRC Secretariat declined on the grounds that to 
attend might have been seen as partisan since Vietnam had not been invited 
(ibid.). The absence of these major players tends to indicate that there was funda-
mentally little motivation for listening and answering complains made by the 
community networks.
Forming a rivers coalition network: linking local actions to national 
and international arenas, and vice- versa
SPN was the first local group created as part of the civic response to hydropower 
dam impacts in Cambodia. While SPN had been working to form a strong 
network at the local level, the idea of forming a broader coalition group 
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(eventually called the Se San Working Group (SWG)) was initiated in 2003 by a 
coalition of three Cambodian NGOs including SPN, the NGO Forum on Cam-
bodia (NGOF ), and the Culture and Environment Preservation Association 
(CEPA). The main aim of this coalition group was to strengthen inter- group 
solidarity and to advocate for policy reform in cross- border hydropower devel-
opment in order to mitigate the negative impacts on communities living down-
stream of the Se San River in Cambodia. While the role of SPN was to establish 
and strengthen SCN at the local level in Ratanakiri province (CEPA performed 
similar tasks in Stung Treng province), NGOF took on the responsibility of sup-
porting and coordinating advocacy efforts at the national level. As a result, 
national- level advocacy initiatives were often coordinated via NGOF. For 
instance, NGOF assisted local communities in sending their statement demand-
ing resolutions and compensation to the Cambodian prime minister. Supporting 
this coalition group were also international NGOs and an advisory group that 
included many development INGOs and other water and natural resource- 
specific NGOs working globally.
 Due to the fact that dam building grew significantly on the Sre Pok and Se 
Kong Rivers, which merge into the Se San before flowing into the Mekong in 
Stung Treng province, the 3SPN coalition, formalized in 2005, included these 
rivers as well. By 2007 3SPN was joined with a new coalition network called 
Rivers Coalition in Cambodia (RCC), in response to the expanding efforts to 
manage dam- related issues in the entire territory of Cambodia (see also Wells- 
Dang, this volume).
Building the capacity of the network
While structures for civic engagement at local level had become well- 
established, 3SPN believed that the next step was to strengthen and build the 
capacity of the local network in order to enable members of SCN to not only be 
able to understand and gain knowledge about dam- related issues, but also to be 
in a position to act upon this knowledge to claim their rights regarding shared 
water resources. Central to this strategy, 3SPN started developing opportunities 
for local network members to access training, workshops, study tours and meet-
ings, all of which has significantly improved their ability to learn, express their 
opinions, organize their communities, carry out advocacy work, analyze the 
causes of problems that they encounter, and strengthen their planning, documen-
tation and reporting skills. With access to this capacity- building programme, the 
local network members have become more confident in their capacity to leverage 
public forums and better able to articulate their concerns, needs and complaints 
to elected representatives at all levels, especially to top government officials 
(SPN 2005). For instance, since 2003, a statement has been drafted annually by 
the representatives of SCN and sent to the prime minister informing him about 
impacts from hydropower development and seeking solutions.
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Formally researching and documenting the situation
After realizing the relevance of the plight of the Se San and other local rivers 
internationally, 3SPN recognized that cooperation with national and international 
stakeholders was critical for acquiring technical, political and legal assistance. 
Through the RCC, which serves as a communications platform for member 
groups, 3SPN and other groups have produced a number of studies and reports 
documenting the wide range of impacts of hydropower construction, including 
social and cultural aspects, economic issues and legal aspects. These studies 
have served as a basis for increasing public and stakeholder awareness, engaging 
international donors, and creating space for dialogue between Vietnamese and 
Cambodian actors and authorities. As mentioned above, the first example of such 
a documentation effort was the impact study jointly conducted with NTFP 
between April and May 2000. Although the physical impacts were claimed to 
have occurred since mid- 1996, this participatory study process provided a 
chance for most of the population living along the Se San River to become aware 
of, and formally document, the widespread impacts of the dam only in 2000. 
These studies serve as both public awareness measures and as platforms for 
communities to press the Cambodian government to negotiate with Vietnam.
 In this spirit, 3SPN has been strengthening the capacity of local network 
members by promoting community- based research for SCN teams. In order to 
do so, 3SPN provides training on research methodology, data collection tech-
niques, analysis and reporting, as well as in structuring and editing reports to 
finalize them for publication. While the research conducted by local communities 
constitutes internal efforts to improve civic engagement, local members are also 
increasingly aware that such reports serve as evidence in ongoing disputes over 
the actual impacts of hydropower development and provide a basis for initiating 
dialogue and increasing public and stakeholder awareness (Trandem 2008).
 One of their achievements is the research on ‘Abandoned villages along the 
Se San River in Ratanakiri Province, Northeastern Cambodia’, which was con-
ducted by 17 local researchers from SCN teams between May and July 2006. 
With technical and financial assistance from the 3SPN Secretariat, the report was 
published in August 2007. It documents homesteads that have been abandoned 
and households that have moved away from the river to resettle on higher ground 
due to the degradation of fisheries and water quality, as well as fears of dam 
structural failures. The 68-page report, which was printed in colour in both 
Khmer and English, is an indication of how local community network members 
have built up their capacity by moving from verbal expression to formal written 
documents that can be used as tools for advocacy and propaganda for reaching a 
much wider audience. The published report also provides an empowering effect 
(see a similar situation in Hiwasa, this volume) that increases incentives for 
engaging in further civic action in other domains. Moreover, the reports can be 
used by SCN teams to disseminate their research findings to the affected com-
munities along the Se San River for building awareness and raising the level of 
advocacy support at the grassroots level.
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Outcomes and challenges
This section discusses the outcomes and challenges resulting from the advocacy 
work of groups responding to hydropower development in Cambodia. The two 
most prominent outcomes identified include the growth in community awareness 
and support for advocacy, and the acknowledgement of dam impacts by the 
Vietnamese and Cambodian governments.
Community awareness and support for advocacy
Most of the population living along the Se San River became aware of the effects 
of Yali- Falls Dam only after the first comprehensive impact study was carried 
out by NTFP in 2000. Although some upstream communities were nominally 
aware of the dam earlier than this study (some as early as 1996), information 
prior to 2000 was sketchy and not much understood. During the process of the 
Rapid Rural Appraisal for the study, the team methodically informed com-
munities about the reasons for observed changes in the river flow. The study not 
only resulted in wider awareness about the effects of Yali- Falls Dam, it also pro-
vided a launching point for communities to appeal to government, as well as 
national and international agencies, to restore their livelihoods and to potentially 
help stop dam construction on the Se San River. Indeed, after this study, SPN 
was set up, and local communities, as described in detail above, began formally 
participating in network advocacy activities in order to receive, among other 
things, compensation and acknowledgment of their situation. Since 2001 at least 
500 individual members from grassroots level have been involved in the 
network, representing hundreds more in their communities. In short, since the 
formation of this network, affected communities have received regular informa-
tion on current events regarding the river and dam construction, and can parti-
cipate in meetings, workshops and other forums that increase their legitimacy 
and create opportunities to advocate for intervention.
Acknowledgement of dam impacts
Through the community network’s advocacy efforts, the Vietnamese and Cam-
bodian governments eventually acknowledged that the Yali- Falls Dam has 
caused negative impacts downstream. According to Trandem (2008: 111–12),
the first recognition came in the form of a verbal apology at a November 
2002 conference, when a representative of Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry 
stated ‘we are very sorry for the losses of the people living downstream on 
the Se San River, caused, of course, by releasing water from Yali Falls 
dam’s reservoir in February 2000’ (SPN 2003). The second acknowledge-
ment came in August 2003, when, at the recommendation of SPN, the 
CNMC sent a facsimile to VNMC, stating the concerns of the Se San vil-
lagers and requesting that Vietnam respond accordingly.
164  Ly Thim
The acknowledgements of dam impacts described above led to two significant 
responses by Vietnam. First, Vietnam began construction in November 2004 of 
the Se San 4A re- regulatory reservoir, located about one kilometre from the 
Cambodian border. As stated by the government of Vietnam, the rationale 
behind this reservoir is to provide re- regulation of the intermittent outflow from 
the upstream hydropower projects, thereby providing a steady flow without daily 
variations into Cambodia (SWECO 2007). This meant that the erratic daily water 
level fluctuations, which downstream communities often complained of, would 
be solved; although the problem of water quality would remain. Second, an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted in November 2005, 
evaluating the past impacts and future risks of the dam on social, economic, cul-
tural and environmental dimensions. The findings of this report, including pro-
posed mitigation measures, were presented to the Cambodian government on 5 
July 2007.
Challenges facing local communities and the Se San Protection 
Network
Even though the Cambodian and Vietnamese governments have acknowledged 
the impacts of Yali- Falls Dam on the Se San River, there has yet to be any miti-
gation or compensation for affected communities in downstream Cambodia, and 
Vietnam continues to build more dams on the river. Furthermore, access to 
information about ongoing hydropower development, and the river’s hydrology, 
remains restricted (Trandem 2008). Additionally, the two successes of the com-
munity network’s initiative, outlined above, demonstrate, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, the necessity of perpetuating and expanding upon monitoring and 
advocacy efforts.
 First, while the construction of Se San 4A re- regulatory reservoir mitigates 
the most dramatic effects of hydropower development (i.e. flooding events), 
there is no guarantee that water quality will be improved or that Vietnam will 
maintain its control over water flows. Indeed, it is possible that Vietnam could 
turn this reservoir into an additional hydropower dam at a later date. Even 
though Vietnam assured Cambodia that this reservoir will only be used to sta-
bilize water flows downstream, at least one Vietnamese news outlet has indi-
cated that Se San 4A will become another hydropower dam with a capacity of 
60 MW, scheduled for completion in 2010 (Than Nien News 2008).
 Second, even though a Vietnamese EIA for hydropower development on the 
part of Se San River in Cambodia has been conducted, and demonstrates that the 
Yali- Falls operation has disrupted the river flow, there have been concerns about 
the process of this assessment and its eventual implementation. For example, 
while about 100 participants from Cambodian government agencies, and local 
leaders from affected areas, attended the presentation of the EIA, SPN and its 
allies, surprisingly, boycotted the meeting. They argued that because the EIA 
report was delivered to them only a week before the workshop began, they had 
insufficient time to review it and respond to questionable issues; additionally, 
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they were offended that representatives of the affected communities were not 
invited. After the EIA was presented, disputes centred on how Vietnam would 
translate compensation and mitigation measures outlined in the report into real 
action, including setting up aquaculture programmes, developing alternative 
livestock and crop systems, introducing electricity supply, erecting drinking 
water and sanitation systems, improving healthcare infrastructure, and acting on 
measures to prevent erosion.
Conclusion
The ability to influence others or to pass on a command (e.g. to get them to 
accept a particular message) rests on the actions of a chain of agents [. . .] 
and power is composed here and now by enrolling many actors in a given 
political and social scheme.
(Long and Long 1992: 23)
The foregoing discussion shows that civil society, consisting of a group of local 
and international NGOs has, since 2000, been leveraging the community 
network model to advocate for policy reform and better river basin management 
to address the consequences of transboundary hydropower development. Since 
2001 this community network has been established and strengthened through 
capacity building and institutionalization spearheaded by the SPN Secretariat. 
Over subsequent years of this network’s operation, affected communities not 
only became well- aware of hydropower development and its consequences 
through information dissemination, but have increasingly joined in local, 
national and international advocacy efforts. Around 500 members representing 
affected communities have directly participated in (3)SPN’s activities, calling on 
the Cambodian government to negotiate with Vietnam, and documenting the 
reasons why they deserve compensation. This is just one indicator showing how 
the affected communities became engaged in advocacy.
 Achieving success in the long term, however, has also been furthered by the 
SPN Secretariat’s initiatives to establish linkages from local to national and 
international levels, and to formalize these movements. While perhaps the 
minimal role of a local community network is to disseminate information on 
dam impacts to affected communities, and to document these impacts, SPN also 
helps local community network members to carry out their own research and 
documentation, and thereafter facilitates the distribution of these reports to con-
cerned agencies at national and international levels in order to press Vietnam for 
compensation. Through SPN activities such as supporting community- based 
research, forums and workshops, local communities are able to speak to policy- 
makers at national and international level about dam impacts on local liveli-
hoods, and to call for action at all political levels. Over time, and as other similar 
movements joined forces, NGO coalition networks formed to mobilize foreign 
NGOs and donors in Cambodia and abroad to press for policy reform in river 
basin management and for justice for affected communities.
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 Through the community network’s efforts the Vietnamese government has 
publicly acknowledged that the Yali- Falls Dam has been negatively impacting 
upon local livelihoods in downstream Cambodia. These efforts have also yielded 
some redressive action to mitigate effects felt by local communities. Although 
the promised interventions have caused new concerns, the construction of the Se 
San 4A re- regulatory reservoir near the Cambodian border, and the formal draft-
ing of an EIA covering the Cambodian part of the Se San River, are considered 
tangible achievements. These successes, however, seem to be associated with 
other challenges such as the failure to agree on measures for compensation for, 
and restoration of, local communities. While affected communities have been 
receiving strong support from NGOs in the field of advocacy, most affected 
communities continue to face problems with water quality and food shortage; 
there is a limit to what national NGOs and the government can achieve. On the 
one hand, this implies that local network activities must persist to suit other pur-
poses. On the other hand, as long as problems persist, the drive for advocacy 
weakens participation of affected communities. Some affected community 
members perceive that the local community network has not produced any tan-
gible results; there has been no compensation from Vietnam and livelihoods con-
tinue to be impacted by the deteriorating river system. Therefore, the challenge 
is to promote the living conditions and livelihoods of local communities while 
maintaining advocacy and pressure for policy reform.
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10 Tracing the discourses on civil 
society in Vietnam
A narrative from within
Phuong Le Trong
Introduction
This chapter attempts to make light of the heterogeneous conceptualizations of 
civil society in Vietnam by academics, representatives of organizations, and 
policymakers. To this end, my goal is to sift through the various concepts of civil 
society and analyse their place in the state’s self- image and their influence on the 
establishment and functioning of established and nascent non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Written in the absence of a clear legal framework in 
Vietnam, this discussion will focus on how civil society is rather unevenly taking 
shape as a consequence of discussions in the media and certain scientific circles, 
and of accumulating facts on the ground. A chapter on Vietnam, however, cannot 
ignore the role of the state, but the key issue for the understanding of the nature of 
the contemporary system in Vietnam is assessing the relative strength of state and 
society when they square off and interact (Koh 2006).
 Beyond issues of consensus and dissent, this chapter assesses how social con-
structionism, authority and the political status quo impact on conceptions of civil 
society. In this chapter, the evolution of civil society is analysed through two 
interlinked approaches: (1) ‘structural dominance’, which suggests that there is 
little space for society to self- regulate or influence the party- state other than 
through approved channels in the multi- layered hierarchy (Koh 2006: 2–3); and 
(2) the ‘accommodating state’, which sees state–society relations as character-
ized by tolerance, responsiveness and mutual influence, and the provision of 
space for society to manoeuvre beyond the party- state norms and perhaps even 
influence them. In practice, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
Rather, as will become clear later in the chapter, they reflect the idea that state–
society relations are dialogical and that the Vietnamese state is usually ‘domi-
neering’ and ‘accommodating’ at the same time (Koh 2006: 10). This is further 
clarified by the approach to the conceptualization of civil society of many Viet-
namese observers, who strategically respond to and also shape definitions 
derived from international (Western- dominated) discourse. The current trends 
are mixed in their expression; the population increasingly associates civil society 
with associations and social organizations, but it is sometimes regarded by 
Vietnamese scholars as a model of democratization and/or a third sector acting 
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in partnership with the state. Illuminating how these different models are shaped 
and legitimated in Vietnam is the goal of this chapter.
 The paper begins with an initial linguistic analysis of civil society terminol-
ogy and its embeddedness in various narratives of Vietnamese social history. 
The paper continues with discourse analysis of conceptions and contributions to 
civil society from international and Vietnamese sources.
Civil society vernacular in Vietnam
Between international scholars of civil society and local Vietnamese academics, 
there is a general consensus that civil society is, at the same time, both old and 
new. In addition to the newer wave of NGOs and other manifestations from 
development discourse, civil society is also viewed as a built- in element of the 
Vietnamese party- state system, and as a fundamental piece of traditional village 
and regional governance. In its abstract form, civil society is understood as an 
inclusive and ubiquitous part of social relations. The cleavages in the debate 
appear when one party or another tries to specify what is not civil society. In this 
section, I explore some of the narratives that inform this civil society debate by 
drawing out the various themes from Vietnamese texts and syntax.
 Some Vietnamese authors argue that civil society has been demonstrably 
present throughout the nation’s history. The director of the Vietnam Institute of 
Development Studies, Đặng Ngọc Dinh, a sociologist, proposes the following 
definition (2006: 14):
Through research, we found that civil society in Vietnam has existed for a 
long time. In simple words, they are the social organizations located outside 
the state, and outside the activities of the market, outside the family, with 
the aim to connect people together to work for a common goal. In this sense, 
the important components of civil society are associations, groups of people, 
in communities, with community cohesion.
This view is based on the idea that Vietnamese civilization has integrated, and 
successful, social institutions based on a vernacular form of civil society. In this 
respect, the difference between ‘traditional social space’ and ‘civic space’ is 
always something tacit in the assessment of Vietnamese civil society. Some 
Vietnamese scholars even suggest that civil society can be considered habitus, in 
that it lies in people’s unconscious cultural framework and is reproduced in an 
organic way (see Đặng Việt Phương and Bùi Quang Dũng: 2011). Nguyễn Mạnh 
Cường (2009) stresses these shared mental models and organic practices are 
inherent to Vietnamese society:
according to the common notion, civil society is actually not a strange realm 
to Vietnam. In ancient times, the community, village, village relationships, 
mutual caring were clearly characterized by traditional cultural values, 
beliefs, community, sharing responsibility for joint tasks.
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This formulation, with its nationalistic undertones, is perhaps a response to the 
implicit suggestion in Western discourse that civil society is part of being a 
modern ‘civilization’.
 The yearning to achieve ‘civility’ (văn minh) is idiomatically connected with 
the advancement of culture (văn hoá). The meaning of văn minh refers to those 
qualities associated with developed societies: education and health standards, 
economic discipline, real prospects for prosperity and political order. At the 
same time, the văn minh discourse in Vietnam links these criteria to elements of 
spiritual strengthening, to revitalized traditions that embody the state’s newest 
vision of modernity. From a sociological perspective, focusing on rules that con-
stitute a society, ‘civility is critical not just for private, personal relationships, 
but also for relationships of power and authority’ (Pye 1999: 765). Pye (ibid.: 
767) suggests that a feature of Southeast Asian cultures, which applies to 
Vietnam, is that civility is also wrapped up in the idea of strict rules for conduct-
ing social relations. So even though civil society may be viewed as a desirable 
modern aspiration, its growth must contribute not as a rowdy oppositional force, 
but as a promoter of harmony in society.
 It is, then, unsurprising that, at least within academic circles in Vietnam, there 
is almost common acceptance and recognition of the importance and necessity 
of civil society (see Bach Tan Sinh, this volume). The majority of texts appear-
ing in recent years in Vietnam favour a definition of civil society that views it 
more generally as a model for the formation of something like a prosperous, ide-
alistic, communal society. The Communist Review – a journal adhering largely 
to the official Party line – has printed that civil society is ‘a society marked by 
autonomy, benevolence and solidarity, that promotes and serves the interests of 
the community; people that are not selfish individuals who are enslaved to the 
market, but mindful of the needs of others’ (Tạp chí Cộng sản 2007).
 The trend of viewing civil society exclusively as some kind of ‘moral com-
munity’, however, is coming under question due to globalization and the input of 
various international and multilateral organizations. It has been increasingly 
identified with formal associations and social organizations, although not neces-
sarily with advocacy. For example, Nguyễn Thanh Tuấn (2007), a Party theorist, 
considers civil society as a domain of social life, including all organizations and 
associations with self- regulated, self- managed activities conforming to the basis 
of the constitution and the law, that will debate, monitor and coordinate with 
government. This increasing technocratic dimension of civil society is reflected 
in the vernacular usage and meanings of civil society.
 Within Vietnamese language, and in popular usage, the concept of civil 
society itself has progressively experienced a linguistic shift towards a more 
benign understanding of state–society relationships. Currently, the term ‘xã hội 
dân sự’ (civil society) is widespread among Vietnamese scholars. Rather than 
dualism and antagonism between state and citizen, it stresses the two- way inter-
action between state and society. This interaction, mediated by civil society, is 
based on the principles of community spirit and communitarianism rather than 
competition. More concretely, civil society is meant to serve first and foremost 
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as an interlocutor between legal persons, their mutual relations, and the state. In 
contrast to this, the formerly popular term ‘xã hội công dân’ (citizen society, 
relating to Habermas’ concept of ‘Bürgergesellschaft’) connotes a more confron-
tational relationship between state and the politically mature ‘công dân’ 
(citizens). The effect of this linguistic shift has been to reduce the spirit of indi-
vidualism and liberalism of ‘civil society’ found in ‘xã hội công dân’ by assign-
ing to ‘civil society’ the aspects of community spirit and harmony implied by the 
term ‘xã hội dân sự’. By employing ‘xã hội dân sự’ in their work, Vietnamese 
scholars and journalists implicitly emphasize this positive meaning of civil 
society.
 In practical usage, the more benign term ‘xã hội dân sự’ is often conceptually 
boiled down to a more technically- oriented reference to civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs). This was demonstrated in the report, ‘Image of civil society organ-
izations in the Vietnamese press’, published by the Institute of Social Studies, 
Economics and Environment on 19 December 2011. The research was carried 
out with several newspapers and internet portals covering issues on Vietnamese 
NGOs and CBOs, and international NGOs. According to the results,
in a year, the media carried 472 news articles referring to these organiza-
tions. The contents of the news confirmed the usefulness of CSOs for the 
people, and viewed CSOs as having a complementary role to the state in 
social activities, policy debates, as well as monitoring and inspection activ-
ities of state agencies.
Although this report covers CSO activities and some of their confrontational 
activities, the word ‘civil society’ is rarely used in comparison to the more con-
crete ‘civil society organizations’.
 Intellectuals in Vietnam, in contrast, do not shy away from the terminology of 
civil society but instead often bury the definition in moral platitudes and ideals 
of virtuousness, in which civil society is repositioned as an abstract force that 
does not imply negative feedback between the state and society. Đặng Ngọc 
Dinh (2006), for example, suggests that civil society is more of a ‘forum’, in 
which state and market activities are facilitated by social enforcement and by 
taking care of the moral aspects of society. He writes,
Civil society supports people to follow the law and reflects the aspirations 
of the people. If government institutions act on the basis of law, the market 
operates according to the pursuits of profit, civil society is still subject to the 
law and to the market, but it enforces the moral, promotes the humanity and 
the community.
(Đặng Ngọc Dinh 2006)
He cautions, however, that ‘one should not regard civil society as in opposition 
to the government or assume that the government does all the work so that 
people do not need civil society. One can say, civil society and government are 
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complementary to each other’ (ibid.). In an interview with the magazine Tuổi 
Trẻ cuối tuần, he answered the question, ‘Why has civil society long been con-
sidered a sensitive issue, and not discussed in VN?’
The reason is that in some countries there are some attempts to use the civil 
society opponents of the government to create instability. So some argue 
that if we continue research and dissemination of civil society in Vietnam, it 
would proceed to tap the opposition to the government. One should under-
stand that civil society is a diverse field and we need to examine its negative 
and positive sides. Even people also know very little about civil society. 
Therefore it is necessary to study and understand the role and impact of civil 
society, first of all the scientific research community, managers.
(Đặng Ngọc Dinh 2006)
In this answer, Đặng Ngọc Dinh hints at some of the contradictions in the civil 
society debate in Vietnam that I have traced in this section. Civil society is, on 
the one hand, viewed as a moral imperative in the context of civilization, that 
has historical roots and should be understood in its vernacular context. On the 
other hand, the potentially critical standpoint of civil society can be considered a 
political liability and must be carefully managed. In this regard, for the state, 
which is strategically interested in reinforcing its grip on society, civil society 
presents both opportunities and risks. As I present below, the state has two broad 
approaches for getting the most out of civil society: structural dominance and 
accommodation. Although these two approaches oftentimes overlap and comple-
ment each other when looking at the dynamic on the ground, it is instructive to 
look at which approaches inform the arguments of different parties under certain 
conditions, which is a task I turn to now.
Structural dominance in Vietnamese state action
Vietnam has been represented as a country in which the monopoly on decision 
making is firmly held by the state and bureaucracy. While đổi mới beginning in 
1986 represented a turning point in state–society relations, these changes were 
generally limited to the economic field (e.g. rights of free enterprise, repealing 
economic prohibitions, privatization of state- owned enterprises, etc.). Despite 
policies like that of ‘socialization’ (see Waibel and Benedikter, this volume), 
many cultural and social institutions are still managed, or remain under direct 
control of, the state. What can be said of đổi mới is that it stimulated expecta-
tions for, and academic literature on, political change in the field of Vietnam 
studies. Although there is no reading consensus, one concept widely drawn from 
concerning post- đổi mới state–society relations in Vietnam is the idea of the 
‘dominating state’ (Kerkvliet 2001: 242) or ‘mono- organizational system’ 
(Thayer 2009: 12). Together, these terms acknowledge the Party’s hegemonic 
control over state institutions and other organizations through penetration by 
Party cells and committee structures. If one abides exclusively by this view, 
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there is little space for manoeuvre beyond the scope of the Party- led command 
structure. The composite terms ‘mono- organizational socialism’ and ‘bureau-
cratic socialism’ are typical characterizations of such systems, indicating that 
individuals and social organizations are essentially compelled to become 
members of the state structure. Political participation can thus be restricted to 
feedback on state policies through official channels, such as mass organizations 
and a few other acceptable associations.
 These state- dominated organizations, which can be viewed as forms of ‘semi- 
civil society’ or ‘quasi- civil society’, serve as channel for state control as well as 
a tool for, or source of, legitimation. The rise of CSOs in recent years, and the 
skills and strategies utilized by CSOs in relation to the state, are in part 
dependent on the stage of social mobilization and political transition. The mass 
organizations are essential to the Party because they provide an immediate force 
for mobilization, and they enable the Party to control key social groups. The 
Party, in fact, places members from the Central Committee in leadership posi-
tions to steer the organizations. But these organizations are not just used for the 
purpose of mobilization and control. They also serve a semi- democratic function 
by providing social groups with a channel for expressing their interests, albeit in 
a tightly controlled manner. These organizations act as the Party’s ears in 
society. Particularly from a Western civil society perspective, this control struc-
ture inevitably raises questions about civil society’s autonomy from the state. 
Nascent organizations are typically ‘absorbed’ into the state early on through the 
various processes associated with official registration. This lack of granted auto-
nomy may have prevented the development of certain groups, particularly the 
opposition, but it has also proved decisive for groups as they grow and differen-
tiate. This was the case for what was Vietnam’s first independent policy- oriented 
research think tank. In September 2007 the Institute of Development Studies, a 
non- profit organization, was founded by an interdisciplinary group of influential 
academics and intellectuals. Only two years later, the board decided to close 
down the institute as a protest against Decision 97/2009/QD- TTg. This decision 
‘allows’ (cho phép) people to associate in restricted ways, and civic organiza-
tions to be established under specific conditions (see Wischermann 2011: 391). 
As a result of this decision the institute encountered state regulations that the 
founding members considered counterproductive and in conflict with the func-
tioning of an autonomous body. This question of autonomy becomes even more 
critical in parts of society where the state has an abiding interest in maintaining 
control.
 Most commonly, organizations and associations operating in the areas of 
culture, education and community tend to be at the centre of the government’s 
‘nationalization’ (nhà nước hoá) and ‘administration’ (hành chính hoá) polices. 
These two terms blur the distinction between intervention (the official language 
says ‘state management’ of ministries and departments) and the delegation of 
functions to professionals attached to various social institutions. Professionals 
can find themselves nominally given posts, only to be continually directed how 
to carry out their work. This current situation for many such organizations can 
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be characterized similarly to that of the state- owned enterprises and collectives 
in the subsidization period before đổi mới (see Pistor and Le Thi Quy, this 
volume). For some other sectors, however, đổi mới entailed a detachment of 
state management functions from production and business functions.
 The disparity in expressions of đổi mới-period liberalization for certain actors 
compared to others has implications for the state–civil society divide because it 
illuminates the strategic considerations in the state’s willingness to give up social 
control. According to Koh (2006: 21), state–society relations are ‘between actors 
and institutions of governance on the one side, and the subjects of governance on 
the other side, but the distinction between them is not always clear- cut’. In 
Vietnam, one finds a lack of clear delineation between state and society (Kerkv-
liet 2001; Heng 2004), which is consistent with other communist regimes. The 
Vietnamese state equipped itself with a network of mass organizations placed 
under the umbrella of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, while officially prohibiting 
autonomous organizations. For a while, these networks ensured the Party’s pen-
etration into every sector and level of society, including the private lives of the 
individual (Heng 2004: 145; Koh 2006: 2). The intention of the Party to play an 
interventionist role is reflected clearly in existing laws (Landau 2008: 251). 
Outside observers have frequently commented on this aspect of Vietnamese 
society. Koh (2006: 7) argues that, because the state’s machinery brings ‘the 
party- state into every home’, a private sphere independent from the state does 
not exist. Due to the lack of distinction between the private and public realms, 
Drummond (2000: 2377) finds it difficult to detect a public sphere in Vietnam, at 
least when applying a Western concept of civil society. She also sees little in the 
way of an historical basis for civil society, suggesting that the ‘social vacuum . . . 
has been filled by the authority of the emperor/state with little place for Western-
 style public discussion or expression’ (Drummond 2000: 2512382). The Viet-
namese state can be imagined as reaching down into communities, intervening in 
a ‘top down’ manner to manipulate or plan society. Civil society, in this vertical 
topography, appears as the middle latitude, the zone of contact between the ‘up 
there’ state and the ‘on the ground’ people, snug in their communities. Follow-
ing Leninist doctrine, the state is seen as the organismic human body, possessing 
such ‘higher functions’ as reason, control, and regulation, guarding against the 
irrationality, passions, and uncontrollable appetites of the lower regions of 
society (see also Reis, this volume).
 To provide legitimacy to this top- down, patriarchal relationship between state 
and society, a narrative of the rule- of-law state is often referenced by Vietnam-
ese academics. The terminology ‘rule- of-law’ was officially used for the first 
time in the documents of the Eighth Party Congress in June 1996, as documented 
by social researcher Trương Trọng Nghĩa (2004). His impressions from this 
event, and subsequently, is that,
The rule- of-law state is a democratic state, and vice versa. It is understood 
to be a state embodying the law, but also abiding by the law. It makes laws 
to govern relations between the state and its citizens, state- to-state relations, 
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the relationships of citizens to one another, and the state itself (in contrast to 
the feudal state, which makes laws to govern others).
As the importance of a rule- of-law state increases apace with economic liberal-
ization, an expectation arises that civil society has the basic building blocks to 
take shape. Following this line of thinking, Trần Ngọc Hiên (2008), a social sci-
entist who often publishes in the Communist Review, argues that, in the ‘gradual 
reorganisation of the apparatus according to the nature of the “rule- of-law”-state 
of the people. . . ., civil society’s role as controller of the state is a crucial factor’. 
Indeed, he goes as far as suggesting that:
Where the market economy is, there must be also the ‘rule- of-law’-state and 
civil society. These three parts build up a system of political and economic 
institutions. However, the completion of the institutional system is based 
entirely on the interaction between the three parts. This is the process of 
democratization.’
(Trần Ngọc Hiên 2008)
Trần Ngọc Hiên (2008) notes that the switch to a market economy in 1986 had 
‘set the first brick’ of democratization, followed by the ‘second brick’ with the 
defining of the rule- of-law in 2001; the Party, however, has so far has ‘not dared 
to set the third brick (civil society)’ to ‘provide the full basis for a relationship 
between the political and economic institutions of our country’. Trương Trọng 
Nghĩa (2004), foreshadowing this state of affairs, warned that economic liberal-
ization does not automatically reconcile the inherent ‘differences between the 
socialist rule- of-law state and a bourgeois rule- of-law state’.
 In practice, the Vietnamese party- state asserts the right embodied in a social-
ist rule- of-law state to regulate, in a top- down manner, state–society relations 
(which includes civil society). In particular, the autonomy of civil society is not 
viewed as an important concern, which leads to a more proactive form of state 
involvement and intervention in civil society. By extensively drawing on narra-
tives of harmony and organic partnership between the party- state, the economy 
and society, the rule- of-law state aims for all- encompassing national unity 
enforced by hegemony. For this endeavour, civil society serves as an important 
legitimating sphere. The activities of civil society, if high consensus can be 
achieved, would strongly promote the mobilization of energy, initiative and the 
ability to initiate a very wide variety of achievements for the development 
process, and thus will implicitly reinforce the power and the presence of the 
state, as well as strengthening national unity. But it should be emphasized that 
this consensus can only be achieved through the establishment of hegemony 
over civil society by strategically configuring the legal and practical conditions 
by which CSOs operate, and voluntary activities orient themselves (Trần Hữu 
Quang 2010: 22). In other words, consensus and legitimacy are sought by 
forming a state- centred ideology around civil society. The hegemony, whether 
cultural or social, is thus built on consent as well as coercion.
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 This approach to long- term control, as suggested by Koh (2006: 10), is 
referred to as ‘accommodation’. More closely reflecting ‘functional substitution’ 
than command and control, the ‘accommodating state’ makes use of CSOs to 
meet social needs while, at the same time, exploiting them to maintain (or even 
reinforce) state rule. As I demonstrate below, Vietnam is also embracing the idea 
of civil society in a manner that retains and reproduces the socialist system.
The accommodating state
Western scholars tend to assume that, since đổi mới, there is room for dialogue 
and negotiation between the state and civil society (Heng 2004: 148). Because 
the Party’s grip on society has weakened in some respects (see Thayer 2008: 5), 
this conclusion is not altogether surprising. However, the ultimate outcome of 
the contest between state and society for space is more dynamic than many 
observers perhaps initially believed. According to the accommodating state 
approach (Koh 2006), there is a constant interaction that takes shape through 
resistance or coercion between residents, local officials and the party- state. In 
searching for suitable descriptions for this dynamic in Vietnam, Womack (1987) 
has characterized the party- state as being ‘mass regarding’ or ‘quasi- democratic’, 
a view that gained backing when observers began noting that the state tolerated 
some participation by organizations outside the mono- organizational framework 
in the 1990s (Koh 2006: 3). One of the primary explanations for this phenome-
non is that the state increasingly found itself with inadequate resources to imple-
ment its policies, which led to compromises regarding the engagement of CSOs. 
Proponents of this interpretation suggest that not only must the state tolerate 
more activities, but that social groups resist state control to shape society and 
influence state policy. White (1985, in Heng 2004: 147) calls attention to situ-
ations where pressure from various spheres of society has led to significant 
policy changes. In this section, I demonstrate how this contention has been con-
ceptualized by academics and policymakers, and how the state attempts to trans-
form its weakening command- and-control structure into an opportunity.
 The dominant representation of civil society since the mid- 2000s has aimed at 
pre- empting the idea that civil society might be oppositional or countervailing, 
instead preferring to render it as a modern and positive force that works with the 
state for development. Distancing civil society from oppositional content, Lê 
Bạch Dương (2008), a sociologist, suggests that the creation of associations in 
the field of economy, science and technology, and the service sector after đổi 
mới, have led to the establishment of a so- called ‘third sector’. According to the 
essence of these representations, civil society is not a ‘threat’ to the government, 
nor is acting ‘against’ the government, but instead is able to play a com-
plementary role in addressing the challenges the country is facing. The first pri-
ority remains promoting economic development, which may potentially, in time, 
lead to political development. Võ Khánh Vinh (2008: 24), a sociologist, for 
instance, argues that, ‘the development of a market economy creates the founda-
tion, especially the economic basis for the implementation and operation of civil 
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society’. He stresses that, in particular, ‘the rapid changes of our country to a 
modern civilized market economy are the most important prerequisites for the 
formation, mobilization and development of civil society’ (ibid.: 32). Echoing 
this sentiment at the policy- maker level, the former National Assembly Chair-
man Nguyễn Văn An (2007) declared that, ‘Moving towards a society of the 
rule- of-law means moving towards a civil society with a very high extent of self 
management, self- organization of the people. Then the state will get ever 
smaller, as Marx said.’ In other words, only in a stimulating economic environ-
ment can civil society move from its position of partnership and subservience as 
a ‘third sector’ to ‘full- fledged’ civil society in a normative democratic sense 
(Võ Khánh Vinh 2008: 24–5).
 Establishing civil society as a partner in development, however, is not a con-
crete activity that the state can undertake. References to the term civil society 
(‘xã hội dân sự’ or ‘xã hội công dân’, see above) are only reluctantly used in 
Party and state documents but, as suggested by Nguyễn Thanh Tuấn (2007), a 
Party theorist, the state and the Party are interested in ‘establishing an institu-
tional and legal basis for civil society’. In other words, the economic liberaliza-
tion of đổi mới has obliged the state to work quietly to provide a platform for 
civil society, without overtly promoting it.
The socialist- oriented market economy, based on the socialist rule- of-law- 
state and advancing toward integration into the international economy, has 
and continues to engender many ideas, even controversial ones for society 
about the role of civil society organizations in relation to the Communist 
Party and the rule- of-law.
(Nguyễn Thanh Tuấn 2007)
The state’s accommodation to civil society, and toleration of potentially destabil-
izing ideas mentioned by Nguyễn Thanh Tuấn, are linked to the need for polit-
ical legitimacy in a liberal market economy. In a limited way, the state’s 
commitment to economic growth and modernization has also compelled it to 
provide reluctant support to some emerging ideas and practices associated with 
civil society. Concerning this trend, Koh (2007: 235) has suggested that indeed, 
‘the state has conceded more ground to society by relaxing a wide range of con-
trols’. The development of professional associations and other types of charity 
CSOs, for example, is seen as part of a modernizing market- based society (see 
Bach Tan Sinh, this volume).
 Reinforcing the socialist rule- of-law- state, however, entails distinguishing 
between the political system and civil society, and laying out some form of 
democratic relations between them. An article that can be considered official, 
which is published on the website of the Ministry of Justice, states:
Democratization in the socialist rule- of-law- state requires the diversification 
of forms of public organizations, the diversification of forms of democratic 
practices of the people. The people are not merely exercising their role as 
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subjects through the state’s institutions and political system but also can 
perform their democratic rights through social organizations, professional 
industry, associations, and religious communities. Therefore, the political 
system has to reform relations and modes of their impact on civil society 
and create conditions for civil society formation and development.
(Nguyễn Xuân Tùng 2011)
Although forms of democratic participation appear to be officially sanctioned in 
such statements, in practice social forces may influence policy only through 
organizations and mechanisms that the state itself dominates. Dixon (2004: 
25–6) regards this as a form of ‘soft authoritarian- corporatism’, in which the 
state’s approach to society is based more on incentives and coercion than direct 
intervention.
 This approach also characterizes the recent efforts at strengthening the rule- 
of-law by restructuring institutions so that they support integration into the inter-
national market. For example, instead of using state power to spur production 
and clamp down on corruption, the state has generated measurable indices to be 
used for creating transparency and competition. In 2006 the Vietnam Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry started surveying competitiveness in the provinces 
through the Provincial Competitiveness Index (Chỉ số năng lực cạnh tranh cấp 
tỉnh). From a position of scepticism and opposition at the beginning, provinces 
now view improvements in index rankings as a goal to strive for. In 2011 they 
launched a new survey on ministerial- level implementation of business laws, 
called the Ministerial Effectiveness Index (Chỉ số hiệu quả hoạt động xây dựng 
và thi hành pháp luật kinh doanh). The first report about these indices was 
released in December 2011. Such indices are presented as a tool for measuring 
local economic mobility and state efficiency and transparency. However, this 
type of ‘mobilizational corporatism’ (Kerkvliet 2001: 243) or ‘mobilisational 
authoritarianism’ (Turley 1993: 269–70) could also be viewed as a way for the 
state to push a top- down agenda while simultaneously prestructuring and con-
trolling avenues for public criticism.
 According to this logic of ‘soft authoritarianism’, civil society and the state 
comprise a general social system of a country in which the state is to conduct 
coercive force and civil society is to participate in the implementation of this 
hegemony by creating consensus among members of society. By definition, civil 
society activities are thus not directed against the state since the state and (civil) 
society are not to be conceived as an antagonistic pair. Based on the writings of 
many Vietnamese academics, although civil society is theorized as offering a 
source of ‘critical feedback’ (phản biện), it is nonetheless understood in this 
sense as a ‘partner’ of the state. Tương Lai (2005), a senior sociologist, emphas-
izes this involvement of the people vis- à-vis the state, suggesting that:
civil society is the equal partner of the state, and not the tail of the state. The 
essential idea is that the state provides the conditions for people to be truly 
involved in planning, policy implementation and monitoring the state; to 
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exercise social criticism towards the state, including evaluating the quality 
and behaviour of government officials.
The essence of the accommodating state is hard to place in such statements, but 
it is implied that civil society is empowered on one level to provide critical feed-
back, but in the role of partner rather than in the role of opposition. How the 
state practically envisions this taking place has been discussed above in detail, 
but in general it includes creating bureaucratic transparency and proximity, and 
channelling feedback in a moderated manner through various sanctioned organs. 
To some degree, this has occurred because of the state’s diminishing capacity 
for direct control and the need for different strategies to shore up and legitimize 
continued structural dominance through state–society relations.
New paths in Vietnamese civil society
Vietnam finds itself in a struggle to conceptualize the state–society relationship 
since đổi mới, with one of the main arenas being that of civil society. Indeed, 
Vietnam is as much in the midst of an economic transformation as in the middle 
of a dynamic dialogical process, wherein the relative strengths of state and 
society remain contested. Although it is still an abstract and fluid concept to the 
majority in Vietnam, civil society is becoming a new reference point for under-
standing, and for studying, changes in the country’s political culture. The advent 
of đổi mới has meant a circumscribed role for the state in certain domains but, as 
I have argued here, the state still has many tricks up its sleeve for reinforcing its 
position and leveraging soft power. This is particularly visible in the academic 
and policymaking debates about civil society which I have reviewed above. In 
Vietnam, state agents tend to prefer a conceptualization of civil society in the 
abstract (i.e. connotations of modernity, civility, development) and support the 
controlled rise of CSOs, particularly those providing specific technical services 
that can be transparently registered and provide bureaucratic access to local 
areas. However, there is more hesitation and equivocation about identifying civil 
society as a national- level movement, which seems to imply opposition to the 
state. It is somewhere between the state’s dissolution of power and the agency of 
new forms of civic engagement that the unsteady view of civil society in 
Vietnam begins to emerge. This process of negotiation, to be sure, is also 
informed by historical views of civil society and the contemporary discourses.
 Indeed, the civil society discourse in Vietnam traverses the pre- modern, a 
society based on vernacular understandings, through socialism, to a modern ori-
entation on civil society including touches of democratization. The expectations 
of civil society are growing, and with this comes a struggle to appear mature, 
sophisticated and interactive, able to establish mutually respectful, if conten-
tious, state–society relations. Put in perspective, the state finds itself trapped in 
between the need for popular legitimation and its historically- rooted and ideo-
logical position of control. By being domineering and strategically accommod-
ating at the same time, the state manages to remain a dominant force driving the 
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country. As a result, the distinction between the meaning of ‘civil society’ in its 
technical dimension of service delivery by local development NGOs, and in its 
political dimension of a ‘public space [where] Vietnam’s one- party state can be 
challenged by the non- violent political mobilization of ordinary citizens’ (Oscar 
Salemink referenced in Thayer 2009: 12), seems to get absorbed in the debate 
around the harmony between the state and the civic sphere in accordance with 
the principle of modern socialist development.
 Most Vietnamese scholars see civil society as a kind of buffer between the 
low and the high, an imagined middle zone of contact or mediation between 
the citizen, the family, or the community, on the one hand, and the state, on the 
other. This is exemplified by the sociologist Hồ Bá Thâm (2009):
in the strict and modern sense, we just have a proto civil society; only if 
there is real rule- of-law- state, civil society can develop. There is no legiti-
mate state power without strong civil society and vice versa. In postmodern 
times, civil society is no longer based on individual rights anymore, but 
mainly based on social organization. With the socialization process increas-
ing, society requires civil society and it will actively build civil society. . . . 
Civil society functions as a bridge between the individual and the state.
However, practically speaking, civil society is now increasingly less of a buffer 
between state and society in terms of social welfare provision and economic 
development. Approaches which predominantly focus on the formal institutions 
of politics turn out to be incomplete for the provision of a deeper understanding 
of state–society relations. As Heng (2004: 147) notes, ‘they pay little attention to 
discrepancies between what the state has proclaimed as policy and what people 
in society actually do’. Indeed, civil society (in aggregate) seems to have a subtle 
stake in the transformation of political culture. Contributing to this is also an 
increasingly strong connection between international and Vietnamese civil 
society. For example, international media and attention (including the Vietnam-
ese diaspora) have begun to play a more focused role in various contentious 
activities.
 Changes in Vietnamese conceptions of state–society relations are also being 
strongly informed by emerging local dynamics. As Thayer (2009: 5) argues, ‘the 
all- encompassing matrix of party hegemonic control over society has been con-
tinually challenged from below’. In particular, this shift in the cultural environ-
ment and power structures is being prompted by actors such as the mass media, 
intellectuals and cultural groups, as well as the organized and/or spontaneous 
appeals of individual persons. Reflecting the uneasy position of the state vis- à-
vis these groups, Vũ Duy Phú, a sociologist, proposes the concept of a 
‘knowledge- based civil society’ (xã hội dân sự thông thái), based on building 
the ‘rule- of-law- state of the people, by the people and for the people’, under the 
leadership of the Party. This includes striving to become a ‘knowledge society’ 
whose members are well- educated, take part in voluntary activities for the 
common good, and build good social governance by incorporating themselves 
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into state functions through organizational channels, in compliance with laws. 
As such, it would fulfil well the role of an equal counterpart, equal partner of the 
rule- of-law- state. Civil society thus becomes a factor in carrying out ‘socializa-
tion policy’, counteracting the ill effects of an unscrupulous market, and being 
an agent of the state’s ‘soft power’ to build a modern society (Vũ Duy Phú 2008: 
345–55).
 All of these discourses and practices from ‘below’ exert influence on the 
country’s political culture and pose challenges for the state in some way. Polit-
ical culture plays a significant role in the political transition as ideology, beliefs, 
values, and other cultural factors underlie political relations, behaviours and 
institutional reforms. The change of political culture is both a necessity for, and 
in turn a result of, the development of civil society. The state is interested in a 
sort of ‘compromise’ that would help to bring balance into the political and cul-
tural discourse around civil society (see also Wischermann 2011: 25, and 
Hannah 2007: 174), but has shied away from granting autonomy or creating rela-
tions based on negative (oppositional) feedback. Nevertheless, the growth and 
differentiation of civil society is increasingly placing emphasis on the promotion 
of civic awareness, the internalization of foreign civil society values and ideals, 
participation and participatory culture, and on the capability to check the power 
of the party- state through various means. The party- state increasingly has no 
choice but to further accommodate civil society in ways that may begin to erode 
state dominance, or to hold on stubbornly to the declining model of a ‘strong 
rule- of-law- state’. Whether the state is up to this task, and whether the economy 
and social sphere fall in line with the state, is still very much up in the air.
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11 NGOs and the illusion of a 
Cambodian civil society1
Sivhuoch Ou and Sedara Kim
Introduction
In early development economics (back to the 1960s), the interventionist state was 
considered the central and driving force of development; from the 1980s, the neo-
liberal counter movement in development theory has taken stage, seeing the state 
as the major drawback to development and giving a greater role to the market 
(Mohan and Stokke 2000). This dramatic shift, particularly in the wake of the Cold 
War, has triggered development policy and aid transfers to be framed under what 
Robinson (1994) terms a ‘New Policy Agenda’ (Edwards and Hulme 1995, 1996). 
Under the Agenda, non- governmental organizations (NGOs) are considered central 
agents, playing an important role by exerting organized pressure on autocratic and 
unresponsive states, and thereby supporting democratic stability and good govern-
ance, providing welfare services to those who could not be reached by markets, 
and strengthening the thriving civil society (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 4; Mohan 
and Stokke 2000; Moore 1993; Pearce 1993; Robinson 1996). The agenda is not 
monolithic in that its content varies from one official donor to another; however, 
all cases are driven by two poles: neoliberal economics and liberal democratic 
theory (Moore 1993). The trend to utilize NGOs to fulfill those roles has led to the 
mushrooming of NGOs both in the north and the south,2 especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Carroll 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1995, 1996; Hulme and Michael 
1997). In practice, the emergence of NGOs and roles in development ‘represent 
both an opportunity and a danger’ (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 5). One main 
avenue of criticism questions whether the creation of NGOs has actually translated 
into the building of civil society (see, for instance, Carothers and Ottaway 2000). 
Other critical questions have centred, inter alia, around the following issues:
• NGOs’ positioning between the public and the private sectors; for instance, 
(Uphoff 1995: 18) contends that ‘NGOs are best considered as a sub- sector 
of the private sector’
• NGOs’ ineffectiveness in terms of sustainability and popular participation 
(Edwards and Hulme 1995)
• NGOs’ accountability orientation upwards, away from the grassroots (Desai 
and Howes 1995; Shah and Shah 1995)
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• NGOs’ failure to democratize their own structures which impedes their 
downwards accountability to the beneficiaries (Carroll 1992)
• Local people’s manipulation of foreign aid in the name of NGOs for their 
own advantage (Sampson 1996).
Despite these lingering questions, from the early 1990s Cambodia has experi-
enced exponential growth of NGOs. By the end of 2010 official figures showed 
that 2,9823 local organizations4 were registered with the Ministry of Interior 
(CCC 2012). While NGOs have contributed quite substantially to the nation’s 
development (Curtis 1998; Merla 2010; SPM 2003, 2006), this should not imme-
diately indicate the presence of a strong civil society but rather reflects the strong 
presence of the donor community in Cambodia (SPM 2006: 13). In addition, the 
shortcomings listed above, which are well documented for Cambodian NGOs 
and often related to donor intervention, raise questions about the ‘content’ of 
these NGOs. Indeed, the core discussion of this chapter, which examines the 
sheer number of these NGOs, asks to what degree they constitute a civil society 
and possess civil society characteristics as envisioned in theory and practice by 
the donors under the New Policy Agenda? Have NGOs been able to meet those 
expectations or have they formed an illusion of a civil society? To respond to the 
research question, we make use of secondary data and of qualitative interview 
results from about 20 NGOs, international NGOs and research institutes obtained 
at two different periods (in 2009 and between October 2011 and February 2012). 
This chapter pays particular attention to NGOs at the national level for three 
reasons. First, NGOs are popularly considered a key player in contemporary 
Cambodia. Second, though there is sizeable body of recent research on NGOs at 
the national level, the critical question asked in this chapter remains unanswered. 
Third, although Cambodia has its own distinct and organically formed civil 
society comprising pagodas, as well other types of groups and movements 
(Carmen and Chhim 2009; Collins 1998; Ebihara 1968; Ehlert, this volume), 
NGOs outnumber these actors.
 The chapter is structured in the following way. First, we lay out the analytical 
and theoretical framework. Second, we explore the characteristics of Khmer 
society and the history of civil society, which provides contextual background 
informing the question of the growth of NGOs. Third, we will delve into discus-
sions of NGO characteristics emerging from the interplay between the external 
support and the local societal structure. Finally, we suggest why and how NGOs 
have been shaped by this interplay.
Framing the chapter
Khilnani (2001) propounds that civil society is often marked by ambiguities and 
difficulties, and that contradictions arise because there are multiple meanings of 
the term in the Western tradition itself. While the concept is often interpreted 
from different perspectives,5 a widely quoted definition is that by White (1994: 
337–8), who defines civil society as
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an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by 
organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation 
to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or 
extend their interests or values.
The term NGO is also subject to definitional ambiguity as well. This study 
adopts a generally accepted definition by Clarke (1998: 2–3), defining NGOs as 
‘private, non- profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, 
concerned with public welfare goals’.6 Since the building of civil society via the 
support to and creation of NGOs has been one of the major initiatives of donors 
under the New Policy Agenda, the chapter uses this intersection as a backdrop to 
examine the characteristics of Cambodian NGOs. According to the definition by 
Clarke above, and in line with donors’ expectations and various theoretical dis-
cussions (e.g. Carroll 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1995), NGOs are primarily 
supposed to (1) act accountably to the targeted beneficiaries; (2) develop an 
identity conforming to the going definition of NGOs; (3) represent the masses by 
connecting with beneficiaries in a way that makes them responsive to their needs 
and demands, and; (4) possess a democratic governance structure,7 which is 
crucial since they are tasked to improve the state governance and act as role 
models. If NGOs possess these qualities, it is hoped that they would be both 
means (as catalysts to strengthen civil society) and ends (they would become 
civil society organizations themselves). However, if they fail to support and con-
stitute civil society, NGOs would then only represent an illusion of civil society.
Cambodian societal traits
The Western conception of civil society does not fit comfortably with Cambo-
dian society given its culture, history (Mabbett and Chandler 1996), and repres-
sion by the state during the last three decades (Ovesen et al. 1996, Ojendal, this 
volume). Historically, civil society has mostly included a realm of religiously 
based relations (Collins 1998; Ebihara 1968; Ledgerwood 2002). In rural areas, 
where around 80 per cent of Cambodians live, the village is not home to durable 
and functionally important groups or voluntary associations aside from family 
and kinship ties, and those of the Buddhist monastic structure. Ebihara (1968: 
181) concurs that ‘a striking feature of Khmer village life is the lack of indi-
genous, traditional, organized associations, clubs, factions, or other groups that 
are formed on non- kin principle’, and, in later work, that Khmer community 
households in the 1960s were bound together not organizationally but by socially 
embedded reciprocity supporting ‘institutions’ of kinship, proximity and famili-
arity (Ebihara 1974: 306).
 This loose structure is not only a consequence of the wars, as is often implied; 
indeed, it has been documented even in the colonial period (Chandler 2008; 
Delvert 1961; Hughes and Conway 2003). And if compared, the Khmer tradi-
tional society has had less of a sense of community than many other agriculture- 
based Asian societies (Hughes 2003). Until now, the lack of participation, 
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solidarity and collective action in rural areas remains a widespread phenomenon 
(Chea et al. 2011; Ros et al. 2011). A recent survey indicates that social capital 
in rural society remains mostly unchanged since the end of the wars (CDRI 
2012). More specifically, the survey (as well as other qualitative accounts, such 
as Kim 2011), find relatively strong social capital in terms of bonding among 
relatives and familiars, but little that bridges communities and almost none sup-
porting vertical linkages (ibid.).
Civil society, NGOs at a glance
The term civil society (sangkum civil) does not exist in the Khmer dictionary or 
in common conversation; it is a completely imported concept. In Khmer, only 
the word society (sangkum) is used. As illustrated above, historically speaking, 
Cambodian society is not conducive to the formation of associations or organ-
izations beyond kinship, and while some civil society- like groups (which are 
formed beyond kin level) are emerging, they are only found in particular con-
texts, such as trade unions, which are mostly established in the garment industry 
(Henke 2011).8
 From the early 1990s, the term civil society has been widely circulated and 
used in Cambodia, often without clear understanding about what it exactly 
means. Most commonly, this term is used in reference to the nearly 3,000 NGOs 
operating across the country, most of which were established with the influence 
and financial support of international donors rather than under local initiative 
(Carmen and Chhim 2009; Un 2006). In 1991 there was only one NGO called 
Khemara9; throughout the early 1990s, however, the number of NGOs mush-
roomed, an incident variously described as ‘a short burst followed by an explo-
sion’ (Burnip 1997: 24–5).10 The United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), operating under the assumption that an organic Cambo-
dian civil society was close to being absent, supported the creation of local 
NGOs (especially human rights groups) to, among other things, safeguard demo-
cracy and guarantee against state repression. NGO representatives and their 
leaders were often unhesitatingly labelled ‘civil society’ in the media (Hughes 
2003). Under the New Policy Agenda, the international community also pro-
moted NGOs that provided basic services to the people in a similar fashion to 
other countries where state institutions are extremely weak and unresponsive.
 NGOs are commonly known in Khmer and among local citizens as angka, a 
word meaning ‘organization’ but bearing additional connotations. Common 
citizens have mixed feelings regarding the concept of angka. On the one hand, 
angka recalls a recent tragedy in society, referring to the administration of the 
totalitarian Pol Pot regime notoriously known to have killed almost two million 
people. On the other hand, people also use the word angka to refer to the emerg-
ing development practitioners, as well as democracy and human rights groups, 
which they believe to have good intentions to assist society. The word, however, 
does bear some shadow of its former connotation. For many, angka is also asso-
ciated with resources, good employment and a class distinct from the private 
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sector and the state; local people typically refer to the staff of angka as being 
separate from them because they are salaried and educated people, and often stay 
somewhat detached from normal citizens.11
 In short, sangkum civil is a new concept in circulation and NGOs are a 
popular manifestation that is born of external intervention, yet inevitably embed-
ded using the cultural and linguistic distinctions of local society.
Analysing the substance of NGOs
Using the four- point framework laid out above for assessing the content of 
NGOs, this section scrutinizes some of the tangible characteristics of con-
temporary NGOs, looking at donor efforts in the social, cultural and historical 
context of Cambodia.
Accountability to whom?
Apparently, NGOs in Cambodia are largely dependent on donors for financial 
support and thus risk orienting their accountability upwards to donors rather than 
downwards to beneficiaries; this is well explained by both existing empirical 
studies and our own latest data. For the purposes of this study, accountability is 
defined as ‘the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recog-
nized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions’ 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996: 967). It is such an important aspect that a large study 
conducted by the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, Cambodia’s largest 
umbrella NGO that covers Cambodia’s civil society sector,12 views the upwards 
accountability of NGOs as the primary governance challenge.
Most accountability practices are predominantly upward. . . . As most NGOs 
are donor dependent, their decision making, not unexpectedly, is influenced 
greatly by their donors/development partners. In defining strategic focus or 
directions . . . the priority concerns or issues of communities become second-
ary to donor priorities and agenda.
(CCC 2010: 31–2)
Un (2006) echoes that financial dependence compels NGOs to compromise their 
own agendas and sometimes pursue those of their donors, for financial survival; 
this causes NGOs to become submissive, which damages the downward account-
ability so important to local NGOs. Carmen and Chhim (2009), likewise, 
contend that financial dependence induces local organizations to superimpose 
foreign concepts and agendas upon local cultural, political and social realities. 
From the early 1990s until recently, there have been few indications that Cam-
bodian NGOs would be able to survive without external resources. Out of 16 
NGOs studied by Ou (co- author of this volume) in 2006, only one was able to 
secure 50 per cent of their headquarters’ expenses from local resources; two pro-
vincial branches of the same NGO, however, were still largely dependent upon 
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donors’ support. The other 15 NGOs admitted that they would collapse immedi-
ately without external assistance (Ou 2006). Although it was found that well- 
established NGOs have more bargaining power and thus manage to claim more 
downwards accountability, the majority of NGOs remain fairly submissive, 
making them vulnerable to compromising their accountability (ibid.).
 Norman (2010) and Khlok et al. (2003) observe that Cambodian NGOs often 
subscribe to contemporary ideas such as empowerment, gender, participation 
and sustainability to please donors rather than to respond to the demands of ben-
eficiaries. Furthermore, over time, and as NGOs face more fierce competition to 
secure funds, donors are increasingly in a position to impose their expectations 
and agendas on applicant organizations (Norman 2010: 186). Pressure from the 
donors can often be felt right down to local NGO counterparts in the country, 
who have increasingly complained about difficulty in getting funding and the 
level of competition for it. This is the case, for instance, in the decentralization 
and deconcentration sectors. One informant told the authors in interview: ‘We 
suffer from a lack of funding support; though we have fundraising strategies in 
place and I work through weekends until I get sick, funding remains unsecured’ 
(interview, Phnom Penh, 27 December 2011). A representative of an inter-
national organization who has closely watched the funding trend for NGOs com-
mented that, ‘As of the end of 2011, whenever and wherever there is a grant, 
NGOs crowd in like ants gathering to eat sugar’.13 A provincial NGO director 
acknowledges that striking a good balance between working directly for benefi-
ciaries and serving donors is a critical matter as funding is getting more scarce.14 
As NGOs become worried about their survival and are increasingly occupied 
with resource mobilization, the time and energy left to serve their target groups 
comes into question.
NGOs and the crisis of identity?
If NGOs are tasked with building civil society in ways envisioned by the donor 
community, their long- term identities as independent units come under question. 
In describing the response to the emerging development or aid market (espe-
cially relevant in the 1990s), Norman (2010: 180–1) states that external support
resulted at first in the rise of a multitude of Come- and-go NGOs 
(ComeN’GOs) that were specifically targeting donor funding for entrepre-
neurial motivations, often disbanding once projects had expired. These 
NGOs start new projects, not because of bottom- up demand from societal 
needs, but because of the top- down supply of resources from donors.
Adding to this, Nowaczyk (2009: 25) reported on the incidence of corruption 
within NGOs, and in particular that some NGOs were ‘set up for employment 
purposes rather than assisting the poor’. While opportunism manifests more 
subtly for many NGOs, some NGOs would appear to have been established less 
for the sake of their supposed beneficiaries and more for the benefit of their staff. 
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Inside NGOs, other questions emerge, particularly regarding their capacity and 
effectiveness and the implications that this has on the long- term identity of 
NGOs sector- wide. In the early days (from early 1990s), NGOs were treated as 
child- like and supported in almost all areas, from computer networking to finan-
cial accounting, writing proposals, advocacy work and how to conduct relations 
with the press and government; furthermore, they struggled in terms of retaining 
qualified staff (Hughes 2003). Hughes noted that as far back as 1996, NGO 
leaders complained about high staff turnover and about training that was con-
ducted endlessly because of high staff turnover rates.
 The situation has not changed much since 1996. A recent complaint comes 
from the executive director of one NGO:
Our NGO used to be a big one supported by eight large donors; however, 
since its funding has shrunk, a number of potential and qualified staff have 
left for better paid jobs at international NGOs (INGOs), ADB, WB.
(NGO No. 7, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 27 December, 2011)
A number of issues arise here. First, though the positions left vacant by depart-
ing NGO staff are usually filled, and the organizations still function to serve 
those intended, the high turnover already indicates that people commit them-
selves less to the beneficiaries and the cause, and more to their own career 
advancement. Second, after around two decades, NGOs are still complaining 
about the lack of capacity as pointed out above. However, if one looks under-
neath these complaints, one often finds that the discontinuity caused by pursuing 
shifting donor whims has brought about skill fragmentation. NGO staff often run 
from one organization to another, or from NGOs to the private sector, or to 
multilateral agencies, embassies, etc., mostly in the hope of higher pay, and often 
abandoning accumulated skillsets. This effectively leaves their former work-
places with a deficit in trained personnel and continuity. The plight of beneficiar-
ies is adversely affected by this high level of turnover. Having critically 
addressed this state of affairs, we step back and recognize that Cambodia was in 
a dramatic post- conflict reconstruction period in the early 1990s, leading to poor 
career advancement potential in the public and private sectors, which may con-
tribute to the opportunistic nature of NGO staff. Despite the immaturity of the 
job market during this period, these NGOs were established, as outlined by 
donors, to benefit vulnerable people. But this aim has been compromised by the 
rent- seeking behaviour of the sector as a whole.
 Instead of changing, this dynamic appears to be becoming entrenched. Some 
NGO staff have enjoyed remaining in their comfort zone and are not committed 
to making situational change that supports beneficiaries at the expense of their 
own working conditions. They are accustomed to working in the ‘conventional 
style’ of the 1990s, a unique donor- driven period in which NGO staff did not 
necessarily have to reflect critically on what a civil society ‘worker’ should be 
like. A donor representative, commenting on the proceedings of a workshop in 
which NGO staff discussed criteria for recruiting partners, narrated that,
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people are now used to focusing on the technical aspects and organizational 
structure (professionalism) but I feel something is missing, as civil society 
strengthening is more than just the technical and organizational strength. 
The question is the identity of an organization and the question of what 
makes a difference. NGO or CBO staff have to put the beneficiaries in front 
of themselves but they complain that doing so is very demanding and diffi-
cult and they wish to stick to their old style of working.
(INGO No. 1, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 22 December 2011)
The authors, having worked on, and been involved in, this sector for around a 
decade, have witnessed similar incidents and anecdotally agree with the percep-
tion of the informant above. Distance from beneficiaries, however, is in some 
cases exaggerated further. Another INGO representative raised concerns about 
provincial NGO staff viewing themselves as superior to the beneficiaries. In the 
following quote this informant strategizes about how to teach the provincial staff 
to adopt a villager- friendly attitude:
NGO staff often behave like outsiders coming from the provincial town, not 
from the locality. I will put forward some simple strategies to make NGOs 
work on a more equal basis with the local people, say, by asking them to 
park their cars far away from the people’s houses and take a walk into the 
communities, wearing very casual clothes, speaking the language of the 
local people so that they will feel comfortable working with NGOs. But 
there is still a long way to go.
(INGO No. 2, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 28 December 2011)
The type of mindset, that privileges working conditions and valuing one’s own 
professional image over the welfare of beneficiaries, manifests itself in a reti-
cence to leave one’s comfort zone, and remains an ever- present hurdle in the 
way of civil society advancement in Cambodia.
Connecting with or remaining aloof from the masses?
While participation on the part of beneficiaries is often deemed crucial to ensure 
that NGO activities respond to people’s needs, the poor connection of NGOs 
with the masses has remained an unsolved challenge. As funds grow scarce,15 
this problem is only exacerbated further. Several studies using empirical evid-
ence share this view. Studies by a Swedish consulting firm working on develop-
ment aid management noted that Cambodian NGOs had low levels of voluntary 
and public participation (SPM 2003, 2006). Others authors note that, because 
NGOs are often externally created and not organically formed, they tend to 
lack  grassroots links (Carmen and Chhim 2009; Khlok et al. 2003). Characteriz-
ing this, Un (2004: 272) considers the Cambodian NGO sector as a ‘civil move-
ment without citizens’. Hughes (2003: 162) suggests that the emergence of 
professional NGOs, typically with an inward orientation focusing on internal 
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functioning along Western norms of management practice, and bias in the 
recruitment of urban elites, has produced a gap between the NGO movement and 
the rural villages they consider as their ‘members’. Yonekura (1999), adding to 
this, remarks that NGOs generally performed poorly in representing the target 
beneficiaries. Wells- Dang (this volume) even highlights that well- organized 
Cambodian rural community networks can come to be detached from Phnom 
Penh- based NGOs.
 Paradoxically, past successes in working closely with vulnerable people 
sometimes serves to create distance between NGO staff and beneficiaries. This 
is the case for a large NGO working on community development in 348 villages. 
The NGO sends their staff to the villages, where they remain working and living 
with the people for years in extremely remote areas untouched by the state and 
other services. Although they are considered relatively successful compared to 
other NGOs in the same field, a negative trend has emerged over time. On the 
one hand, the NGO workers engage closely with the people to empower them; 
on the other, the social cleavages of these inherently different groups become 
increasingly stark. The increasing salaries paid to NGO workers contrasts with 
the more static position of target beneficiaries, which only serves to distance 
them from local people, thereby hindering the continued empathy necessary for 
remaining passionate about the cause. A former staff of the NGO related,
There is a problem occurring along with the NGO’s success stories. Some 
staff have worked in the communities for 20 years and their salaries have 
risen to a very comfortable level that they find places them in a comfort 
zone they do not want to leave. The issue is that they are no longer innov-
ative and some of our activities get stagnant.
(CSO No. 5, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011)
Governance structure
Many accounts of the NGO sector in Cambodia note the weak internal govern-
ance. Cambodians have been steeped in development discourses that are influ-
enced by democratic principles such as accountability, transparency, equality 
and mass participation. Although good governance, an additional principle, is 
usually a stated part of the vision of many NGOs, it is not uncommon to find 
NGOs ‘owned by’ the founders and ‘characterized by autocratic, hierarchical, 
and centralized management, with patron–client relationships [as the] dominant 
feature’ (Richardson 2001: 7). A recent case study of a Cambodian NGO 
revealed that, despite being well funded, the NGO had not internally replicated 
civil society values. For instance, although the staff were well educated, 
decision- making and authority rested almost entirely with the executive director 
(Gellman 2010: 90–1). A similar trend was also anecdotally observed in NGOs 
beyond the case examined (ibid.). Such a key governance deficit is noted in a 
CCC study (2010: 31) as well, which posits that, ‘transparency is mainly under-
stood in financial terms and rarely in terms of decision making processes. The 
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practice of democracy is limited’. This undemocratic and hierarchical structure 
of NGOs has largely not improved over the years according to an empirical ana-
lysis conducted between 2003 and 2006 (SPM 2006). A recent informal inter-
view, with a colleague who has a work relationship with a Phnom Penh- based 
NGO and its network, illustrates this observation:
I can see how authoritarian her leadership is. She does not only exercise 
dominance over the staff but also owns the organization; she has fired staff 
she dislikes and sometimes recruits her own family members and relatives. 
For the network itself, it is getting more difficult to manage to ensure effec-
tiveness because now they have secured some funding and every member 
fights to run the secretariat.
(Social researcher, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, February 2012)
Perhaps the most worrying manifestation of poor governance in NGOs is what 
Nowaczyk (2009: 24–5) suggests from her recent study, namely that, ‘the over-
whelming evidence . . . is that NGOs are both forced into corruption and experi-
ence it’. Nowaczyk’s study notes that 82 per cent of her survey respondents ‘had 
been aware of some form of corruption in their own or other organizations in the 
past year’. Furthermore, she reports such irregularities as staff claiming per 
diems for fieldwork they did not conduct, managers producing fake receipts, 
nepotism, etc. Related to that, Nowaczyk further noticed that some NGO mana-
gerial staff face pressure to permit corruption, or they face extreme difficulties in 
enforcing anti- corruption policies. For instance, there were no avenues for 
resolving issues such as receiving death threats from staff they had dismissed or 
accused of engaging in corrupt practices (ibid.: 26).
Putting the illusion into perspective
Two primary objectives of donors under the New Policy Agenda are to support 
NGOs to provide services directly to people, and to strengthen civil society more 
generally. Over the past two decades, NGOs have made strides in fulfilling the 
former but have been less effective in carrying out the later objective. Specifi-
cally, many NGOs (1) remain more upwardly accountable (to donors) than 
downwardly accountable (to beneficiaries); (2) identify disproportionately with 
their professional status rather than their duty to beneficiaries; (3) are detached 
from the grassroots they are supposed to work with and serve; and (4) lack the 
democratic structures they often exhort as development agents. As a result, the 
extent to which NGOs share civil society characteristics and strengthen civil 
society is compromised. This is not to generalize that all (types of ) NGOs lack 
these defining attributes, or that these attributes consistently apply to all NGOs 
and all sectors, but that a general trend with national character is observable. 
Öjendal (this volume) highlighted the plurality of ‘civil societies’ in Cambodia, 
while this chapter argues that one of them – the externally supported NGOs – are 
a questionable constituent of civil society.
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Who is responsible for this illusion?
Why have NGOs in Cambodia developed in this manner? Internationally, the 
case of Cambodia is not unique; indeed, the idea that he who pays the piper calls 
the tune is quite pervasive in literature upon NGOs in general. Edwards and 
Hulme (1995: 5–6) explain that the dependence of NGOs on foreign aid puts 
them in the risky position of being co- opted by others’ (donors) agendas and 
erodes their independent social base. Similarly, in her provocative paper entitled 
‘NGOs’ Seat at the Donor Table: Enjoying the Food or Serving the Dinner?’, 
Hudock (2000: 17) argues that the relationships between donors and NGOs are 
regrettably unequal, with ‘Donor–NGO relationships [having] been dominated 
and even dictated by donors’ largely because donors provide the development 
resources. This is illustrated by a surprisingly frank acknowledgement from the 
former Cambodian country director of Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium
I have to confess that sometimes we come in and say ‘we want to do this’, 
and we don’t even bother asking if this is what [Cambodians] want. It is true 
that we are very arrogant – sometimes too much. . . . The problem with the 
NGOs today is that they are funded by donors, so what they do, and I cannot 
blame them, is follow where the money is going. It’s very tricky.
(Berneau, cited in Strangio 2009)
Looking deeper into the root of the problem, a donor representative commented 
that,
part of the current civil society problem was caused by INGOs and donors 
themselves in the design process; they were responsible for, in the early 
1990s, establishing NGOs without discriminating and examining what types 
they should assist and what consequences would arise out of their support. 
More importantly, it must be noted that some INGOs are like consultancy 
firms which carry out their activities improperly and often produce ill con-
sequences for local partners.
(INGO No. 1, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 22 December 2011)
Several commentators in the early 1990s speculated about whether Cambodia 
would survive the flood of foreign aid, even though it had survived the Khmer 
Rouge tragedy and the economic embargo of the 1980s. It was already conspicu-
ous from the 1990s that there was too much money chasing NGOs (see Öjendal, 
this volume) and a very favourable environment in which they could grow. The 
international community was enthusiastic about the opening of the country and 
there seemed to be no overarching planning concerned with building the NGO 
sector. Although, as mentioned earlier, Khmer society and culture are not par-
ticularly conducive for the kind of NGO formation and civil society develop-
ment hoped and envisioned by donors, the UN and attendant donors barely 
seemed to notice this. Although we acknowledge that several promising forms of 
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social energy have emerged in recent years (see, for instance, Ngin 2004; Wells- 
Dang, this volume; Hiwasa, this volume), considerable potential has also been 
left unfulfilled. Insufficient legislation or standards for managing the NGO sector 
is one explanation for the poor performance of many NGOs in terms of account-
ability to beneficiaries (Mayhew 2005). That said, the counterproductive charac-
teristics and operational problems have remained unchallenged by many NGOs 
and their staff, which has exacerbated any problems created initially by the 
donor community. Because many people have personally benefited from this 
state of affairs in the name of development, they also bear responsibility.
Khmer society and its culture: inhibiting or enhancing NGO 
formation and success?
In terms of numbers, Cambodian society and culture have little impact on the 
landscape of civil society over the years – the context is not conducive to auto-
nomous group formation. NGOs have emerged almost exclusively in reaction to 
resource availability, as demonstrated in the World Bank study by Carmen and 
Chhim (2009). The content of these organizations, however, does respond to cul-
tural and societal traits. With little experience in forming groups, NGOs were set 
up much like companies (Öjendal, this volume), or by learning from trial and 
error, or by modelling their foreign counterparts (Hughes 2003). With a basis in 
salaried staff and a ‘market’ that depended on donor demand, the fate of NGOs 
has waxed and waned in time with the vagaries of overseas aid to Cambodia. 
Öjendal (this volume) considers that contemporary civil society has reached a 
point of ‘normalization’ – the externally funded NGO sector is fading away or 
sustaining itself unconventionally, whereas others are transforming into social 
enterprises, businesses or being absorbed into government (Feuer, this volume). 
Those that cannot reinvent themselves and manage the transition will fall out. In 
Cambodia, NGO formation (at least when observed at the national level) has had 
little to do with whether a culture of civil society is evolving or is static. Instead, 
rather superficially, it has followed the money flow. In other words, the shrink-
ing or expanding of the NGO sector is not an indicator for cultural and social 
inculcation of civil society behaviour. However, one critical cultural factor, 
namely the difficulty in generating internal democratic culture, appears to have 
prevented NGOs from empowering themselves and evolving with the times. 
Democratic principles have failed to anchor in the way NGOs work, allowing 
hierarchy, class cleavages, patronage, nepotism and autocracy to pre- empt civil 
society tendencies and render NGOs an illusion, rather than a constituent part, of 
civil society.
Notes
 1 This work and the title are inspired by the arguments in ‘Promoting Democracy: 
NGOs and “civil society” ’ (Chapter 7) in Caroline Hughes (2003) The Political 
Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991–2001.
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 2 The north refers to aid- giving countries, while the south is understood to constitute 
developing countries receiving aid.
 3 Additionally, around 8,000 modern Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are 
operational in Cambodia’s 13,000 villages, mostly funded by overseas development 
aid (Carmen and Chhim 2009; Henke 2011).
 4 According to an official in charge of NGO and association registration at the Ministry 
of Interior, two types of organizations are registered: local NGOs and associations. 
However, in practice, there is no clear distinction between the two as they operate on 
similar basis (see Ou 2006).
 5 For a critical discussion on civil society there are many detailed references (e.g. 
Chandhoke 2001; Chandhoke 2007; Hyden 1997; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001).
 6 ‘Within this definition, NGOs include philanthropic foundations, church development 
agencies, academic think tanks and other organizations focusing on issues such as 
human rights, gender, health, agricultural development, social welfare, the environ-
ment, and indigenous people.’ (Clarke 1998: 3).
 7 Other assumed performances of NGOs as stated by the authors above include focus-
ing on poverty alleviation, cost effectiveness, sustainability, flexibility and innovation. 
The four points are fundamental in that they are widely expected by donors as docu-
mented in literature and policy documents.
 8 In addition, although union membership appears quite significant, ranging between 
160,000 and 377,000 according to different sources (or 40 per cent of Cambodia’s 
labour force (Makin 2006), ‘overall unionization remains low’ as unions are weak and 
not financially independent and political space beyond strikes at the factory level has 
shrunk following the murder of Chea Vichea, a high profile union leader (Henke 
2011: 293).
 9 The name Khemara literally means Khmer. It is the first NGO led by a Cambodian, 
established with the primary objective of tackling women’s and children’s issues.
10 The sudden rise of NGOs is due to several potential reasons such as the favourable 
atmosphere enabled by UNTAC, the availability of plentiful financial support, and the 
availability of educated human resources repatriated from the border camps (Hughes 
2003; Ou 2006).
11 Both anecdotal evidence and our 2009 fieldwork in six villages, in three different 
communes, in three different provinces, confirms this (see Thon et al. 2009).
12 The study claims to cover the whole NGO sector because it both examines some indi-
vidual NGOs as well as all of the networks representing NGOs that are registered 
with the CCC.
13 INGO No. 2, interview by the authors, Phnom Penh, 28 December 2011.
14 NGO No. 11, interview by the authors, Battambang, 6 October 2011.
15 It is necessary to note that while the feeling shared among most of the informants is 
that funding is generally in decline, one NGO director warned (in a phone interview 
by the authors, August 20 2012) that not all of the NGO sector suffers from reduced 
funding levels; for instance, he pointed to the case of NGOs working in the human 
rights arena, whose funding support remains stable largely because human rights 
abuse cases have not declined over the years and have thus attracted continuous atten-
tion and resources from donors.
References
Burnip, D. A. (1997) Developing Cambodian NGOs through Partnerships, Brattleboro, 
Vermont: School for International Training.
Carmen, M. and Chhim, K. (2009) Linking Citizens and the State: As Assessment of Civil 
Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank.
200  Sivhuoch Ou and Sedara Kim
Carothers, T. and Ottaway, M. (eds) (2000) Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Demo-
cracy Promotion, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Carroll, T. F. (1992) Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Links in Grassroots Develop-
ment, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
CCC (2010) Reflections, Challenges and Choices: 2010 Review of NGO Sector in Cam-
bodia, Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia.
CCC (2012) CSO Contribution to the Development of Cambodia 2011, Phnom Penh: 
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia.
CDRI (2012) Survey Report on Social Capital and Sustainable Development in Cam-
bodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Cambodia Development Resource Institute.
Chandhoke, N. (2001) ‘The “Civil” and the “Political” in Civil Society’ in Democrat-
ization, 8 (2): 1–24.
Chandhoke, N. (2007) ‘Civil Society’ in Development in Practice, 17 (4): 607–14.
Chandler, D. (2008) A History of Cambodia, 4th edition: Silkworm Books.
Chea, C., Nang, P., Whitehead, I., Hirsch, P. and Thompson, A. (2011) ‘Decentralized 
Governance of Irrigation Water in Cambodia: Matching Principles to Local Realities’, 
Working Paper No. 62, Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Cambodian Development Resource 
Institute.
Clarke, G. (1998) The Politics of NGOs in South- East Asia: Participation and Protest in 
the Philippines, London: Routledge.
Collins, W. (1998) Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia, Phnom Penh: Centre for 
Advanced Study.
Curtis, G. (1998) Cambodia: Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development, 
Washington DC and Geneva: Brookings Institution Press and the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development.
Desai, V. and Howes, M. (1995) ‘Accountability and Participation: A Case Study from 
Bombay’ in M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds), Non- governmental Organisations: Per-
formance and Accountability Beyond the Magic Bullet, London: Earthscan.
Ebihara, M. (1968) ‘Svay, a Khmer village in Cambodia’, unpublished thesis, Columbia 
University.
Ebihara, M. (1974) ‘Khmer Village Women in Cambodia’ in C. Matthiasson (ed.), Many 
Sisters: Women in Cross- Cultural Perspective, New York: Free Press.
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (eds) (1995) Non- governmental Organisations: Performance 
and Accountability Beyond the Magic Bullet, London: Earthscan.
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) ‘Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid 
on Nongovernmental Organizations’ in World Development, 24 (6): 961–73.
Gellman, M. (2010) ‘World Views in Peace Building: A Post- conflict Reconstruction 
Challenge in Cambodia’ in Development in Practice, 20 (1): 85–98.
Henke, R. (2011) ‘NGOs, People’s Movements and Natural Resource Management’ in C. 
Hughes and U. Kheang (eds), Cambodia’s Economic Transformation, Copenhagen: 
NIAS Press.
Hudock, A. C. (2000) ‘NGOs’ Seat at the Donor Table: Enjoy the Food or Serving the 
Dinner?’ in IDS Bulletin, 31 (3): 14–18.
Hughes, C. (2003) The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1992–2001, 
London: Routledge.
Hughes, C. and Conway, T. (2003) Understanding Pro- Poor political change: The policy 
process, London: Overseas Development Institute.
Hulme, D. and Michael, E. (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors? Too Close for 
Comfort? London: Macmillan Press.
The illusion of Cambodian civil society  201
Hyden, G. (1997) ‘Civil Society, Social Capital, and Development: Dissection of a 
Complex Discourse’ in Studies in Comparative International Development, 32 (1): 
3–30.
Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S. (eds) (2001) Civil Society: History and Possibilities, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khilnani, S. (2001) The Development of Civil Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Khlok, S., Ouch, P. and Nil, V. (2003) Margin to Mainstream. An Assessment of Com-
munity based Organizations in Cambodia, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kim, S. (2011) ‘Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interaction in a Cambodian 
village’ in J. Marston (ed.), Anthropology and Community in Cambodia: Reflections on 
the Work of May Ebihara, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press.
Ledgerwood, J. (2002) Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight essays, Dekalb, IL: 
Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois 
University.
Mabbett, I. and Chandler, D. (1996) The Khmers, Oxford: Blackwell.
Makin, J. (2006) Cambodia: Women and Work in the Garment Industry, Phnom Penh: 
ILO’s Better Factory Cambodia and The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor.
Mayhew, S. H. (2005) Journal of Development Studies, 41 (5): 727–58.
Merla, C. (2010) Civil Society Empowerment and Democratic Governance in Cambodia, 
Phnom Penh: United Nations Development Programme.
Mohan, G. and Stokke, K. (2000) ‘Participatory development and empowerment: The 
dangers of localism’ in Third World Quarterly, 21 (2): 247–68.
Moore, M. (1993) ‘Good government? Introduction’ in IDS Bulletin, 24 (1): 1–6.
Ngin, C. (2004) ‘Strengthening NGO Accountability through Beneficiary Participation: 
Lessons from Cambodia NGOs’, unpublished thesis, Nagoya University.
Norman, D. J. (2010) ‘Interrogating the Dynamics of “Cosmopolitan Democracy” in 
Theory and Practice: The Case of Cambodia’, unpublished thesis, University of Bir-
mingham.
Nowaczyk, M. (2009) ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Organizations and Institution-
alized Corruption in Cambodia’, unpublished thesis, Open University.
Ou, S. (2006) ‘Understanding Cambodian NGOs’ Relationships with International 
NGOs: Focus on CNGOs’ Autonomy and Sustainability’, unpublished thesis, Waseda 
University.
Ovesen, J., Trankell, I.-B. and Öjendal, J. (1996) ‘When Every Household is an Island: 
Social Organization and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia’ in Uppsala Research 
Reports in Cultural Anthropology 15, Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Cultural 
Anthropology, Uppsala University.
Pearce, J. (1993) ‘NGOs and Social Change: Agents or Facilitators?’ in Development in 
Practice, 3 (3): 222–7.
Richardson, M. (2001) NGO Sector Report, Phnom Penh: Cambodia NGO Support 
Network.
Robinson, M. (1994) ‘Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: NGOs and the New 
Policy Agenda’ in A. Clayton (ed.), Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: What 
roles for NGOs? Oxford: INTRAC.
Robinson, M. (1996) ‘The Role of Aid Donors in Strengthening Civil Society’ in A. 
Clayton (ed.), NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional 
Societies, Oxford: INTRAC.
Ros, B., Ly, T. and Thompson, A. (2011) ‘Catchment Governance and Cooperation 
202  Sivhuoch Ou and Sedara Kim
Dilemmas: A Case Study from Cambodia’, Working Paper 61, Phnom Penh, Cam-
bodia: Cambodia Development Resource Institute.
Sampson, S. (1996) ‘The Social Life of Projects: Importing civil society to Albania’ in C. 
Hann and E. Dunn (eds), Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, London and New 
York: Routledge.
Shah, P. and Shah, M. K. (1995) ‘Participatory Methods for Increasing NGO Accounta-
billity: A Case Study from India’ in M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds), Non- 
governmental Organisations: Performance and Accountability Beyond the Magic 
Bullet, London: Earthscan.
SPM (2003) Civil Society and Democracy in Cambodia: Changing Roles and Trends. The 
Fifth Report of the Sida Advisory Team on Democratic Governance, Stockholm and 
Phnom Penh: SPM Consultants.
SPM (2006) Civil Society and Uncivilized Politics: Trends and Roles of Cambodian Civil 
Society and Possibility for Sida Support. The Eighth Report of the Sida Advisory Team 
(SAT), Stockholm and Phnom Penh: SPM Consultants.
Strangio, S. (2009) ‘Plotting an NGO Exit Plan’ in Phnom Penh Post, Phnom Penh, Cam-
bodia, 24 July.
Thon, V., Ou, S., Eng, N. and Ly, T. (2009) ‘Leadership in Local Politics of Cambodia: 
A Study of Leaders in Three Communes of Three Provinces’, Working Paper Series 
No. 42, Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Cambodian Development Resource Institute.
Un, K. (2004) ‘Democratization Without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 
1993–2004’, unpublished thesis, Northern Illinois University.
Un, K. (2006) ‘State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The case of Cambodia’ in 
Pacific Affairs, 79 (2): 225–45.
Uphoff, N. (1995) ‘Why NGOs are not a Third Sector: A Sectoral Analysis with some 
Thoughts on Accountability, Sustainability and Evaluation’ in M. Edwards and D. 
Hulme (eds), Non- governmental Organisations: Performance and Accountability 
Beyond the Magic Bullet, London: Earthscan.
White, G. (1994) ‘Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Ana-
lytical Ground’ in Democratization, 1 (2): 375–90.
Yonekura, Y. (1999) ‘The Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the 
Democratization Process’, unpublished thesis, University of Sussex.
DOI: 10.4324/9781315885407-12
12 Proto civil society




Because of the Khmer Rouge, these people became less than animals. They 
lost the power to conduct their own lives. And it will take a long time to 
overcome this – several generations.
(New York Times 1995, quoted in Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002: 109)
After Cambodia opened to the international community in 1992 with the advent 
of UN peacekeeping operations and elections, Western researchers rediscovered 
a country which was, for many years, isolated due to civil war, auto- genocide 
and the politics of the Cold War. Access to this grimly fascinating and untouched 
country caused international donor agencies and Western scholars to launch 
themselves enthusiastically into studies on rural society and its socio- cultural 
fabric (Curtis 1998: 110; Hughes and Öjendal 2006: 415). As a product of those 
heady days, literature dating back to the 1990s offers somewhat ambivalent per-
spectives on the traditional forms of social cohesion and community dynamics in 
Cambodia. These early inquiries neglected the culturally situated spaces of social 
and spiritual belonging presented to Cambodians by Buddhism. Instead, and as 
detailed in Ou and Kim (this volume, see also Öjendal, this volume), foreign 
donors imposed their visions by investing heavily into the creation of NGOs, 
turning what was once an isolated country into a buzzing ‘NGO haven’ (Chap 
2005: 5). The 1991 Paris Peace Accords not only signified an end to the many 
years of civil war through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cam-
bodia (UNTAC, 1992–3) and subsequent disarmament and organized elections 
(see St John 2005: 407), but also initiated training and information programmes 
on human rights and democratic values (Mong Hay 1998; Khus 2004). Thou-
sands of civilian and military advisors were pushing for democracy and develop-
ment in a country that was assumed to be something of a social ‘tabula rasa’ (see 
Öjendal, this volume). Although associational activity was certainly present and 
had been likely recovering since the end of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, the 
UNTAC era might appear to be a ‘take- off ’ period for civil society. Cambodia 
became an international aid market ‘importing’ development knowledge, 
particularly concepts such as democratization and related virtues like good 
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governance and civil society (see Freske 1999). The consequent mushrooming 
of international and national NGOs was largely perceived as an important means 
of promoting democratic values and improving livelihoods.
 This chapter is based on a literature review and on empirical data collected in 
2006 during a four- month study in four different communes in Kampong Thom 
and Kampot province. While this study primarily examined the role of rural 
community- based organizations (CBOs) in the context of good governance (see 
Ehlert 2007), fieldwork also revealed that the pagodas constitute one of the most 
important focal point in people’s lives. This chapter explicitly goes beyond this 
dominant narrative of externally facilitated organizations present in much of the 
academic writings and reports about Cambodian civil society, focusing instead 
on the local socio- religious spaces that have historically centred around Buddhist 
temples or pagodas. This type of ‘proto civil society’, which is embedded in 
 people’s everyday realities and social coexistence, forms the empirical backbone of 
this chapter. As we shall see, social life and ceremony in rural Cambodia – activ-
ities concerning birth and death, festivals, rituals and the reproduction of societal 
norms (see Monychenda 1998: 9) – continue to be shaped by the presence of the 
local Buddhist temple and community. The development and politics orientation 
that predominates in popular development discourse tends to focus on formal-
ized spaces and sectors to the detriment of phenomena that do not immediately 
fit into predefined categories. The exploratory perspective in this chapter aims to 
crack open this rather formalistic view by accounting for the dynamically emerg-
ing social spaces and the diversity of actors that are often part of everyday life 
(see Lachenmann 1997). The perspective taken up in this chapter focuses on the 
interplay between religion, externally created groups, and the role of the state 
and the market economy (see Marston 2009) in order to look more comprehen-
sively at the socio- cultural transformations going on in Cambodia. In this period 
of change, religion in Cambodia has also stayed continuously in motion (see 
Ovesen et al. 1996: 76), providing at once a glimpse of embedded tendencies 
stemming from the religious sphere, and of alternative understandings of the 
changes in civil society in contemporary Cambodia. In accordance with Hann 
and Dunn (1996: 3), I argue that an anthropological perspective is needed to 
counterbalance the dominant civil society debates that ‘have been too narrowly 
circumscribed by modern western models of liberal- individualism’, and to 
broaden the view of civil society to include a ‘range of informal interpersonal 
practices’ that have, and still do, constitute associational life in rural Cambodia.
 This chapter begins with introductory briefs on the two main opposing 
schools of academic writing on Khmer socio- cultural legacies and the ‘export’ 
of the Western concept of civil society through UN intervention. Thereafter, I 
will challenge the post- conflict assumptions of social fatigue and fragmentation, 
nominally viewing local socio- religious mobilization around the temples as a 
form of civil society engagement with implications for rural development. The 
body of this text will account for, on the one hand, emic understandings of civic 
engagement and the loci of solidarity, which implies going beyond the overly 
politicized picture of state and society locking horns, instead looking at 
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alternative space that ‘naturally’ fuels cultural belonging and stimulates social 
engagement. On the other hand, the religious sphere and its associational life 
must also be critically reviewed in terms of its growing politicization and mon-
etarization. The chapter concludes by offering suggestions for an alternative 
understanding of civil society in Cambodia rooted in the religious realm of social 
life and how this can usefully complement studies on civil society that have 
exclusively focused on Cambodia as an ‘NGO haven’.
In between Khmer socio- cultural legacies and global models 
of civil society
Due to the disruption in social continuity brought about by the Khmer Rouge, 
observers of Cambodia are left with the task of recreating a conception of asso-
ciational behaviour prior to the revolution and squaring it with the distinct 
context after the revolution. Researchers are left to sift through historical pieces 
and disturbing memories, which do not always lend themselves to easy portrayal. 
Cambodians recoiled when the UN mission in the early 1990s applied the term 
‘democratization’ to its purpose, recalling the brutal Pol Pot regime, which 
called itself Democratic Kampuchea (1975–9). A commune chief, remembering 
the time after the arrival of the UN in 1993, related that,
When UNTAC came, the democratic regime started. This reminded some 
people of the democracy doctrine under Pol Pot. Because under Pol Pot they 
called it a ‘democratic doctrine’, too. They called it like this but in fact they 
killed the people with the hammer and axe and the gun – killing only.
(Kampot province, 13 September 2006)
Maoist–communist ideology of a socially engineered peasant state contributed to 
the economic and socio- political revolution from 1975–9 in which over one 
million Cambodians were killed and half a million more left in exile (Chandler 
1991: 236; see also Ou and Kim, this volume). By trying to erase all institutional 
legacies of former times, the Khmer Rouge wanted to commence year zero in 
Cambodian history; organized religion was destroyed, previous government 
institutions, private property and money were abolished, education suspended, 
urban–rural migration forced, and eating and working collectivized (see Blunt 
and Turner 2005: 76; Chandler 1991: 246/1).
 The pioneering academic literature on Khmer society concerning the impact 
of such cruel experiences on social cohesion and community commonly falls 
into two schools. First, the ‘atomized’ school of thought (see Frings 1994; 
Ovesen et al. 1996) contends that in the aftermath of the revolution, social ties 
and networks beyond family and close kinship groups were systematically dis-
rupted. Following this school of thought, the destruction of trust and social rela-
tions by the war and the Khmer Rouge doctrine have had long- term impacts on 
civil society. Downie and Kingsbury (2001:50) suggest that, ‘During the Khmer 
Rouge period, through experience, people realized that they could not trust 
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friends, neighbors, siblings or even their own children. This lack of trust has 
remained, and has hampered the development of civil society’. The title ‘When 
Every Household is an Island’ – a well- known book by academics from Uppsala 
University (see Ovesen et al. 1996) – is suggestive of a thoroughly individual-
ized society. Evidencing this, Frings (1994: 61) argues that, although collective 
organizations emerged during the socialist puppet state under Vietnamese rule 
(1979–89), these were artificially imposed and participation was insincere.
 The second school of thought, in contrast, argues that social cohesion and 
associational life in fact re- emerged after the war, though altered and weakened 
(Ebihara 1993; Ledgerwood 1998). Ledgerwood (1996: 140f.), for instance, 
gives ample evidence of intra- village cooperation including sharing food, donat-
ing or lending cash, exchanging labour, and providing emergency assistance. 
Although the assistance provided may have shrunk, she would rather relate this 
to the villagers’ limited resources than a priori to a lack of solidarity among 
neighbours (ibid.). Likewise, Luco (2002) portrays functioning local village and 
intra- village conflict resolution measures as another example of re- emerging 
social structures. In other writings, capitalism and monetarization of social rela-
tions since colonialism, more than the Pol Pot regime, have had detrimental 
effects on the associational realm (see e.g. Springer 2010; Vickery 1992). In the 
same vein, Bit (1991: 24f.), argues that Western influence has introduced a 
regressive materialistic value system with wealth as a new standard for judging 
personal achievement. The encounter with modernization and ongoing develop-
ment would thus facilitate the individualization of society and predilection for 
materialistic accumulation.
 Despite the ambivalent views of scholars of Cambodian social organization 
and culture, some of whom are mentioned above, the ‘atomized school’ has 
almost become hegemonic, having been taken up by UNTAC in the rush to 
implement a Western liberal democratic model of civil society. Whilst enthusi-
astically investing in the establishment of new formal social organizations man-
dated to carry out rural development, the donor community overlooked or 
discounted ‘less formal networks and mechanisms that have supported the 
village (particularly the poor) for generations’ (Curtis 1998: 126). An observer 
since UNTAC, Curtis (1998: 128) takes a critical perspective on this approach 
by referring to the relevance of the Buddhist sangha (clergy):
[I]t is surprising that the Buddhist sangkha was not utilized more specifi-
cally with respect to community development and social service activities. 
For example, as much as the lack of social ‘safety nets’ was bemoaned, little 
effort was directed to one of the most important social service institutions in 
the country – the community wat [pagoda].
Instead, international efforts to reconstruct and democratize the terror- torn 
country channelled the bulk of resources and technical support starting in the 
early 1990s to civil society actors in the form of NGOs. Besides the proliferation 
of NGOs based in Phnom Penh, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were 
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promoted nationwide starting in 1999, with one of the purposes being the man-
agement of incoming flows of international development aid. On behalf of 
donors and international NGOs, Cambodian CBOs initiated rice banks, cash 
associations and fishing communities at the village level (Kim and Ann 2005: 
5f.). Ou and Kim (this volume) mention that about 3,000 NGOs have been regis-
tered in Cambodia, and consider these largely to be the result of foreign advisors 
attempting to stimulate a modern democratic regime by applying to civil society 
the same guiding principles as in Western models of liberal democracy. This 
model is nicely outlined in the chapters by Waibel and Reis (both in this 
volume). In brief, this model is strongly rooted in European intellectual dis-
course from where it developed into a contemporary universalist paradigm rein-
forcing the image of an ideal type dualistic state–society nexus. Practical 
implementation was inspired by events occurring at the end of the Cold War, 
whereby freedom movements led by NGOs became features of the political 
landscape in the developing and former socialist bloc countries. As a counterbal-
ance to state dominance, these groups became an international benchmark for 
good governance (Weiss 2000: 799f.).
 As Marston (2009: 228) indicates, ‘[the] term “civil society”, of course, has 
larger implications than the existence of NGOs, although in Cambodia the terms 
are largely used interchangeably’. The strong technocratic orientation of devel-
opment NGOs drew attention away from other civil society structures in rural 
Cambodia based on local cosmology and religion. According to Kent (2003: 19), 
the temple and the activities centred around it would provide social and moral 
guidance to the villagers:
I find it useful . . . to examine the homogenising, centripetal power of the 
religious- magical-animistic realm of the pagoda and its attendant features. 
This may lead us towards the sources that Cambodians look to in their 
pursuit of moral order, legitimacy, trust and sharing – all of which are 
crucial in creating the fellowship that is essential to productive collective 
life. By giving serious attention to this field, it is possible that hitherto 
largely overlooked forms of solidarity may come to light and the ‘collective 
spirit of Khmer culture may be unearthed.
In light of Kent’s position, the following empirical account will look at the 
socio- cultural sphere of religion and the temple (wat) as a socio- religious space 
as expressions of agency in rural Cambodia, an important consideration with 
regard to civil society development. Whereas Ou and Kim suggest that NGOs 
are empty shells formally known as civil society, the pagoda activities will be 
viewed formally unrecognized, yet no less important, spaces of local solidarity 
and meaning.
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The role of Buddhism and the socio- religious mobilization of 
the pagoda community
In Cambodia, 95 per cent of the population is Theravada Buddhist (German 
Federal Foreign Office 2012). Together with the Cambodian kingship, Harris 
(2001: 74) considers the Buddhist sangha as the second major institutional pillar 
of the society. During the upheavals of war in Cambodia, however, this institu-
tion, as well as many others, experienced considerable trauma. Under the Khmer 
Rouge, the Buddhist clergy was systematically destroyed, pagodas torn down 
and monks killed. From a level of about 60,000 ordained monks before the war, 
this number decreased to practically zero (Ledgerwood 2008: 149) as monks 
were either executed, defrocked or pressured by the Khmer Rouge to abdicate 
their religious beliefs (Kent 2003: 7). Cambodia experienced a ‘virtual elimina-
tion of institutional Buddhism’ (Harris 2001: 74). The strategic elimination of 
monks contributed to severe hardships in the Cambodian education and religious 
system since the pagoda provided classes in Khmer language and culture (Kent 
2003: 4/7). On this subject, one commune chief recalled: ‘During the Pol Pot 
regime, no one was left educated – both men and women. The pagoda and the 
school were burned down. So, there was nowhere we could learn or get edu-
cated’ (interview, Kdei Doung commune, 7 August 2006).
 In spite of this, Buddhist culture and the monkhood slowly re- emerged after 
the Khmer Rouge regime (Harris 2001: 73; Kobayashi 2008: 170), although it 
was initially strictly regulated and supervised in the subsequent Vietnamese- 
ruled regime (the People’s Republic of Kampuchea). Allowed only along the 
Theravada monastic lineage, Buddhism was considered one of the mass organ-
izations, comparable to, for instance, the Women’s Union in Vietnam (see Pistor 
and Le Thi Quy, this volume). Because of their military suitability, men under 
the age of 50 were prohibited from (re)ordination (Kobayashi 2008: 170). Only 
in 1989 were young monks free to join different monastic orders again. Reli-
gious books were reprinted and newly published (Marston 2009: 227). After 
Vietnamese rule, the number of ordained monks continued to increase and, by 
2005, had nearly reached pre- war numbers (Ledgerwood 2008: 149). Temples 
were also gradually rehabilitated and newly constructed – especially through the 
support of Khmer living overseas and the growing wealthy urban population in 
Phnom Penh (Kobayashi 2008).
 Since the 1980s, Harris (2001) counts five forms of Buddhist groups spanning 
the full continuum from modernist to traditionalist religious orientations. These 
sects distinguish themselves by, for example, the language used in prayers and 
chanting (Pali and/or Khmer) and the belief in elements such as spirits (Koba-
yashi 2008: 179ff.). Furthermore, the sects differ on the bases of their involve-
ment in political affairs, development orientation and social engagement, as well 
as in urban and rural outreach (Harris 2001). Whereas, for example, some orders 
have a stake in social questions such as HIV/AIDS education and care for the 
sick (see Bourdier, this volume), others refrain from such secular concerns and 
understand HIV/AIDS as a form of karmic punishment (Harris 2001).
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 Outside of the formal monastic structure, and originating especially from the 
refugee camps in Thailand, Buddhism- oriented NGOs with social agendas were 
established. ‘Buddhism for Development’ for example, formed in the camps in 
1990 with the support of the Konrad- Adenauer-Foundation, and the ‘Association 
of Nuns and Laywomen of Cambodia’ funded by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
combine religion with social services (Marston 2009: 227ff.). Öjendal (this 
volume) presents the case of ‘Buddhism for Social Development Action’, as an 
issue- oriented NGO with a religious basis. Whereas some of those faith- based 
development- oriented NGOs are very successful, Marston (2009) questions the 
authenticity and sustainability of such Buddhism- oriented NGOs. According to 
him, most of them lack an actual connection to the grassroots level and the 
pagodas. This is partly explained by the imperatives of NGO- type professional-
ism for donor relations; hiring laypeople on the technical merits of resumés and 
job interviews, rather than religious integrity and direct involvement with monks 
and pagodas, facilitates technical service provision but distances the organiza-
tion from its cosmological basis.
 According to Nissen (2008), trust and moral integrity are automatically asso-
ciated with local pagodas which are seen as bastions of social and moral order. 
The local relevance of the pagoda to this day came across clearly in an interview 
with a staff member of a Phnom Penh- based research organization, who made 
the following recommendation to me:
I think, talking about Cambodia, if you leave out the role of the pagoda, you 
leave out a big part of the story. . . . A lot of things in local Cambodia get 
done through the pagoda. So it is a point that you should consider as well. 
You must have read an article a long time ago about pagodas and local tra-
ditional associations. We have the funeral association, the school support 
committee, which is a half traditional, half contemporary type organization. 
We all have these women’s groups, which is quite modern, the fishery and 
forestry associations. But once again, if it is a traditional association it 
always has got to do with the pagoda. . . . The way that such associations are 
set up is quite abstract. They do not have regular meetings but they have key 
people. If a family member of mine dies, I call people who know exactly 
who to go to and they make an announcement in the pagoda or somewhere 
so that people come to contribute to prepare for the funeral. So it is quite 
active, although it is not very obvious, it is quite abstract.
(Phnom Penh, 6 September 2006)
The pagoda associations had been the first after the Khmer Rouge to re- emerge 
on the scene as strong actors in developing self- help schemes and facilitating 
development and moral rehabilitation at a time when formal state institutions 
were fairly weak (Gyallay- Pap 2004: 36). According to Kim and Ann (2005: 
5f.), local self- help groups in Cambodia can be categorized as organic and man-
dated groups. The authors define organic groups as ‘indigenous associations and 
committees that have existed in communities for a long period of time and are 
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collectively initiated by local citizens’ in the framework of the local pagoda. In 
contrast to this, mandated groups are ‘associations or organizations that are 
established by international NGOs or initiated by the government’s regulations’. 
These definitions, as dichotomous as they are, reflect well on the current distinc-
tions between groups in Cambodia since the opening- up of the country.
 The pagoda represents a kind of umbrella organization under which not only 
self- help activities, but also general associational activity, can be incubated and 
legitimated. It offers a cosmological orientation and, at the same time, generates 
potential for community development and poverty reduction since pagoda asso-
ciations, which help fulfil spiritual aspirations (karma, see below) are often vol-
untarily formed to respond to the pressing needs of the villagers (e.g. rice and 
credit) (Aschmoneit 2004). Besides the cash and rice associations (samakum 
prak, samakum sraov, respectively), other grassroots groupings under the pagoda 
include, for example, boat racing groups and funeral associations (Narak 1998). 
Boat racing activities are very popular in Cambodia. The men of the group go to 
the forest and cut a big tree from which they construct the boat. The boat is kept 
in the pagoda compound where the construction process is accompanied by 
worship and various ceremonies to collect money to support the rowers for train-
ing and travelling to Phnom Penh for the annual national race. The winning team 
of the annual Water Festival brings great honour to the pagoda (ibid.: 6). The 
support of the boat racing teams can be understood as an expression of local 
solidarity and identity of the temple community. According to a female council-
lor, the funeral associations constitute a similar expression of self- help and solid-
arity that also finds it origins in local self- help traditions and the religious 
sphere:
When a member of the funeral association faces a problem with the funeral 
ceremony all the other members can go and help by giving rice or money as 
merit. On the seventh day of the funeral, every member gives five kilo-
grammes of Cambodian noodle and coconut. They give it to the family who 
faces the problem. If one family is the poorest, or vulnerable, and a child of 
theirs is really sick but they cannot pay for the medicine, then the money 
collection association (dharma association) can invite the achar and the 
monks with the microphone to appeal to the people in the village to know 
about this and to support as much as they can.
(Kampot province, 13 September 2006)
Serving as an important reference point of solidarity, the supporting community 
of a temple (chomnoh) is, nevertheless, not geographically determined; people 
can choose to participate in the activities of a number of pagodas (Kobayashi 
2008: 177). Kobayashi defines the chomnoh as an ‘unbounded social group, 
defined by shared participation in the activities of a certain temple’. The temple 
community comprises the monks and nuns,1 the achar wat (Buddhist laymen 
who organize ceremonies), the temple committee (working with secular issues), 
and ordinary people. The latter constituency not only includes the villagers but 
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also people living in the cities as well as the Khmer diaspora abroad who come 
back to their homelands for certain festivals in the rural area. The relevance of 
the local temple for the Buddhist population was explained by one member of 
the pagoda committee as follows:
The pagoda is like an evidence of Cambodia’s tradition from the past. I try 
to collect the people, who are Buddhists, and they come to celebrate the 
ceremonies here – like the Khmer New Year or the Water Festival. . . . So 
they all try to protect the ancient culture that they had before and lost in the 
past during the Pol Pot regime. Today they try to protect it again.
(wat committee member, Kampong Thom province, 7 August 2005)
Besides offering a cosmological orientation to Cambodian identity, pagodas 
fulfil a certain development function as well; they can appeal to the local popu-
lation to contribute donations for small- scale projects in the commune, such as 
the construction of bridges. One of the local Buddhist laymen explained:
The pagoda always helps, always participates in community development, 
too. In the ceremony, the Buddhists come from everywhere to celebrate in 
the pagoda and this is the time for the achar and the pagoda committee with 
the loudspeaker to tell about the planned construction (such as a bridge) and 
[to ask] who would like to participate to give the gift, the donation. But we 
do not say how much to give but they understand and help – not only the 
Buddhists but also the monks give a gift too, to support the construction. 
They think that when they give the gift for the community development, 
they can get a lot of merit for their next life.
(Kampong Thom province, 16 August 2006)
As mentioned in the quote, gaining merit is the most basic rationality constitut-
ing the reciprocal relationships of everyday Buddhist life. Besides following the 
five Buddhist precepts,2 other activities such as the financing of temple construc-
tion or repair, becoming a monk for a certain period of time, and giving gifts or 
daily food to the monks, all have positive effects on a person’s reincarnation (see 
Ovesen et al. 1996: 38). This applies even to the distant Khmer diaspora, who 
have turned out to be a highly influential group of philanthropists. These material 
transactions correspond to symbolic transactions: donating money, rice or in- 
kind to the pagoda contributes to personal merit- making (punna) and influencing 
the person’s karma (see Aschmoneit 2004: 26f.). This strong religious rationality 
was explained in an interview with an achar:
Cambodians believe in the Buddhist religion, saying if you do good, you 
will receive good. If you do evil, you will receive evil. If you do merit, you 
will receive merit. The people believe in this and they always go to the 
pagoda very crowdedly and do merit for the good merit of their next life.
(Kampot province, 19 September 2006)
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Consequently, karma is the result of the merit people gained in former lives; in 
an article, Ledgerwood (2008) confirms the contemporary importance of merit- 
making – especially in the form of making offerings to monks, as donations to 
the temple, and contributions to building projects. Despite the importance of the 
rationality of merit- making, one has to nevertheless be careful not to exclusively 
understand donations as a manifestation of religious faith. These can also be 
understood as very secular expressions of social pressure and community obliga-
tion. In his article on Khmer Buddhist self- help organizations, Aschmoneit 
(2004: 28) explains that these groups function predominantly according to the 
principle of solidarity, and declares this to be the core of the success of the 
pagoda activities in rural Cambodia. This finding is supported by Sasse, who 
argues that the groups under the pagodas are considered more reliable and trust-
worthy than newly created groups since they derive legitimacy from a location 
marked by high solidarity, where work is typically carried out for merit and not 
for profit (Sasse quoted in Pellini 2004: 6f.).
 Those latter statements, however, have stimulated some critical exchange. In 
the next section, the romantic and uncritical picture aroused by some scholars’ 
presentation of the temple as a ‘harmonious center of rural life’ (Kobayashi 
2008: 189) will be scrutinized in light of the growing politicization and monetar-
ization of religion. This will be followed by some conclusions about the socio- 
cultural realm of the pagodas and the relationship between these religiously 
bounded spaces and debates on civil society in Cambodia.
Co-­optation­and­conflicts­in­modern­Buddhist­Cambodia
The high social status of monks and the trust vested in them is apparent in 
society, but the way in which it manifests on an individual basis speaks about 
the nature of this status on a national level. This was illustrated in an interview 
with a former monk who is now the village chief. To the question of why he 
thinks he might have been selected as village chief, he explained:
One of the reasons was that I used to be a monk and I used to learn [about 
Buddhism] and so the people know about my character and behaviour. And 
so they think that I know what is good and what is bad by being a monk, 
what sin is and what is not.
(Kampong Thom province, 9 August 2006)
This ‘naturally- fuelled’ trust in the moral integrity of the monkhood has, 
however, come increasingly under pressure. In contemporary Cambodia, public 
debates about the relationship between politics and religion are growing (see 
Sreang 2008). Kent (2003: 18), for instance, draws attention to the threat of co- 
optation: ‘Financial support from secular organizations and from political leaders 
may also play a significant role in shaping the choices of the clergy, silencing 
the critical voice that has for centuries provided a moral check on the excesses of 
abusive leaders’. Whereas the state and politics are commonly distrusted by 
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Cambodians, the politicization of the monkhood represents a severe ‘symbolic 
pollution of the whole society’ (Nissen 2008: 283).
 Furthermore, the opening up of the country created avenues beyond religion 
for people’s cosmological guidance, as the following quote by a member of a 
local CBO illustrates:
If we talk about solidarity, in the past when you asked each other for some 
fish, they would give you without asking for payment. But today if you only 
want some spices, you have to buy. Only one fish, you need to buy. Every-
thing you need to buy. So they only think of money!
(Kampong Thom province, 13 August 2006)
According to this CBO member, capitalism becomes an important rationality for 
guiding people’s social interaction and competing with religiously based ideas of 
reciprocity and merit- making. This type of behaviour is more exhaustively dis-
cussed by Marston (2009), who describes the ways in which religion, the state, 
and the market creatively respond to, and reshape, each other. Within the scope 
of this paper, however, I will conclude with a discussion of whether an indi-
genous civil society exists in Cambodia (and if so, in what forms?) in light of the 
types of proto civil society enshrined in pagodas and the religious sphere.
Cambodian associational life: beyond an ‘NGO haven’
In the brief depiction above, there are challenges evolving in the religious sphere 
around pagodas that still require further research. As Kobayashi (2008) points 
out, for example, the actual relationship between temple and community has 
been rarely researched. Perhaps due to pre- war nostalgia, temple communities 
are oftentimes taken for granted, portrayed uncritically as harmonious entities. In 
the light of overall societal modernization and growing external influences, 
internal negotiation processes within pagodas – looking at, for instance, the role 
of women or the relationship between the traditionalist elder and the moderate 
younger monks of the same pagoda – have to a large extent not yet been 
addressed. This chapter, while cognizant of these issues, has skirted the larger 
contestations in pagodas in order to focus more specifically on the potential pres-
ence and role of the religious realm in Cambodian civil society. I discuss 
whether and how Cambodian associational life constitutes more than an ‘NGO 
haven’.
 The primary conclusion of this chapter is that the cultural embodiment of 
Buddhism in the rural area is indeed a relevant component of people’s associa-
tional lives. The enthusiasm of foreign development agencies intervening in 
Cambodia and creating civil society from the ‘outside’ largely failed to acknow-
ledge the potential of indigenous self- help traditions. Shared religious practices 
constitute social spaces and a moral community whose existence proves that the 
dismissive perception that Cambodia is experiencing ‘social fatigue’ after the 
war is untenable. Instead, this associational space was simply disregarded by 
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the development aid industry in its rush to apply familiar discourses to 
civil  society development in the 1990s. This was evident at the annual meeting 
of the NGO Forum in 1996, at which the Venerable Moneychenda, a prominent 
Buddhist monk and himself head of a local NGO, sternly advised the inter-
national community of the need to strengthen indigenous groups instead of 
initiating long- term dependency by duplicating Western- style NGOs (see Curtis 
1998: 136). Indeed, as I demonstrate, civil society in Cambodia was not 
inevitably an externally imposed sector as there were, and continue to be, actors 
and associations representing societal forces that predate UNTAC. The social 
spaces that emerge in the religious realm, which are based, among other 
things, on the rationality of merit- making, continue to function as strong social 
‘glue’ for community cohesion in rural Cambodia. More likely than not, these 
spaces do not fit with, or even contradict, the Western understanding of civil 
society in the context of development. In fact, Kent (2003: 23) reports that she 
often heard Western NGO staff complain about villagers using the credit 
provided by the NGO for making donations to the pagoda instead of investing 
the money into their family business. Responding to this exasperation, Kent 
(2003) suggests the need to take an emic perspective when initially trying to 
elaborate the meaning of community and civil society in any given local cultural 
context, by
[taking] the villagers’ knowledge and will seriously, and [trying] to under-
stand what it is that they value so highly and by which they set such store, 
but which does not necessarily correspond with the values promoted by the 
international community.
(Kent 2003: 23)
In this respect, the interface between so- called expert knowledge, derived from 
the global model of civil society, and local knowledge, often results in the cre-
ation of ‘systems of ignorance’, meaning that development knowledge is auto-
matically assigned a high status while the competences and the practices of 
everyday life and the cultural forms of the local population are disregarded (see 
both Lachenmann 2003 and Hobart 1993). I argue that the Western liberal demo-
cratic model of civil society is unable or unwilling to account for these diverse 
(and according to the rationality of the development aid industry, even ‘irritat-
ing’) forms of socio- cultural engagement, which are less formalized and thus 
less apparent, but which nevertheless strongly correspond to locally embedded 
modes of collective solidarity and belonging and represent alternative ways of 
dealing with problems of everyday life in the rural area. Forms of civil society 
and associational life can be subtle and do not inevitably need to have an explicit 
political agenda for the achievement of socio- political change. Nevertheless, 
given the role in shaping everyday life, providing safety nets, and their broad 
acceptance in society, I argue that not only Buddhist- oriented NGOs, but also 
less formalized self- help groups (which are both parts of socially engaged Bud-
dhism), qualify as civil society in Cambodia.
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 While there has been a shift among scholars working on civil society that 
increasingly favours the acknowledgment of actual activities of civil society 
(instead of only looking at formalistic organizations) (see Kerkvliet et al. 2008), 
conspicuously absent are discussions on civil society with a more (micro) cos-
mological orientation. This view would seek out the often- overlooked spaces of 
belonging, cultural identity, and meaning that might be a fundamental basis for 
civic engagement. In order to understand such emic grounds of associational life, 
one cannot leave aside the changing socio- cultural experiences and knowledge 
that make up the subtle framework that guides people’s actions.
Notes
1 Although there are a large number of (older) nuns, pagodas are dominated by monks. 
The head nun is subordinate to the pagoda committee, which itself is headed by a monk 
(Ramage et al. 2005).
2 Refrain from killing any living being, from stealing, from committing adultery, from 
lying and from drinking liquor – these constitute the five precepts by which one gains 
merit (Ovesen et al. 1996: 38).
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13 Voluntary or state- driven?
Community- based organizations in the 
Mekong Delta, Vietnam
Gabi Waibel and Simon Benedikter
The current debate on the development of civil society in Vietnam indicates that 
a large and growing number of community- based organizations (CBOs) exist in 
the country. By analysing the recent trajectories of CBO development in a rural 
area of Can Tho City in the Mekong Delta, this chapter critically challenges the 
idea of an emerging civil society independent of the state. The following back-
ground of the study starts with a brief introduction to the current understandings 
of Vietnamese civil society, in general, and CBOs, in particular.
Civil society in Vietnam – controversial approaches, fuzzy 
concepts
A couple of years after the introduction of Đổi mới Vietnam scholars started to 
investigate the emergence of civil society (organizations) and the uninterrupted 
growth in this body of literature suggests a continuous interest in the topic. 
Although the available publications generally exhibit considerable differences in 
theoretical and empirical approach, as well as in their eventual conclusions, a 
few aspects can be considered characteristic of the debate. First of all, the 
absence of an official definition of ‘civil society’ by the Vietnamese government 
led to a diverse and often confusing use of the term. As the concept of civil 
society is ‘not widely recognized by the authorities yet’ (Norlund 2007: 68), 
translations and interpretations between Vietnamese and English are also diffi-
cult. The ‘invention’ of terms, such as civic and issue- oriented organizations 
(Wischermann and Nguyen Quang Vinh 2003: 870),1 takes the official discourse 
into account but these terms have not been widely adopted. In addition, there is a 
strong tendency in the literature to develop normative categories (Hannah 2007: 
94), which indicates that civil society is often conceptualized as organizations 
with observable boundaries. Similarly, different classifications of civil society 
organizations have been developed, with a range of between four and nine group 
categories and organization types (for an example see endnote1) (e.g. Norlund et 
al. 2006; Sidel 1995; Wischermann and Nguyen Quang Vinh 2003). The differ-
ences between these classifications are partly due to the (frequently changing) 
legal framework. To date, no standardized typology of Vietnam’s civil society 
exists (Menge 2009: 104).
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 Second, a considerable number of studies have been commissioned by inter-
national organizations, mostly donor agencies. A prominent example is the oft- 
quoted CIVICUS study, which claims to be ‘the first step in identifying civil 
society in Vietnam’ (Norlund et al. 2006: 17). CIVICUS defines civil society 
according to the mainstream of development cooperation as ‘the arena, outside 
of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance 
common interests’ (CIVICUS 2003). However, for the Vietnamese results, the 
study broadened the definition of civil society but ultimately acknowledges that 
‘civil society is not separated from the state’ (Norlund 2007: 72). This example 
nicely illustrates Salemink’s argument that international agencies, in order to 
carry out their mandate of development in places like Vietnam where the 
Western concept of civil society is not immediately applicable, is forced to rede-
fine civil society to some degree (Salemink 2006). In fact, these agencies have a 
strong interest in employing civil society organizations as partners in develop-
ment (projects); so far, however, the impact of donor- driven approaches on civil 
society development has hardly been subject to research in Vietnam (Bui The 
Cuong 2005: 97).
 Third, research activities show a clear urban bias and expert interviews seem 
to be the predominant methodology employed. Anthropological and organiza-
tional studies ‘from within’ are basically missing, and little is known about how 
these organizations operate and how they manage their interfaces with the state. 
The range of findings also shows divergent experiences and practices between 
northern and southern Vietnam. With regard to rural- based associations, most 
studies stem from the north. In principle, CBOs are considered to be one type of 
‘civic organization’ in Vietnam. Fourth, most of the literature views the relation-
ship between the state and civil society organizations as the key issue, with a 
strong tendency to dichotomize between the two (Heng 2004: 144ff.).
 Despite the diversity of approaches, gaps, and shortcomings, the majority of 
Vietnam scholars agree that ‘civil society exists in degrees’ in Vietnam (Kerkv-
liet 2003: 15) and that state–society relations have gradually changed since the 
1980s. Legal reforms and economic liberalization provided the foundation for a 
growing organizational pluralism, whereby the predominant mono- organizational 
socialism, as described by Thayer (1995) in the beginning of the 1990s, has been 
partly transformed. In fact, before Đổi mới, private businesses were prohibited, 
and the few officially recognized non- state organizations were ‘subsidized and 
managed by the state’ (Bui The Cuong 2005: 94). In addition to new legal types 
of civil organizations, previously recognized organizations also continue to exist. 
The most prominent examples are the mass organizations, which were set up in 
the 1930s and are closely linked to the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP); their 
classification as civil society organizations however remains controversial (see 
Pistor and Le Thi Quy, as well as Bach Tan Sinh, both in this volume). This also 
holds true for a range of other organizations, which are connected to either state 
agencies or the Party (Norlund et al. 2006: 33f.). In fact, the boundaries between 
the state and civil society are far from clear and questions of a ‘state- led civil 
society’ (UNDP 2006: 8) are frequently raised.
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 The VCP continues to maintain its monopoly on political power, and restric-
tions for social organizations are still commonplace. Deficiencies in the legal 
framework also seem to be deliberate (the Law on Associations, initiated in the 
1990s, is still pending). In principle, organizations are allowed to work outside 
the political sphere, and the state keeps track of, and control over, the registra-
tion processes and their activities (Gray 2003: 111). In general, non- state actors 
are still perceived as a potential challenge by the government (Vasavakul 2003: 
25–6), although the so- called socialization of sectors such as health, education 
and environment aims at transferring state responsibilities to society, with 
private sector involvement being particularly encouraged.2 This policy is often 
supported by donor and INGO projects and, consequently, there has been a wave 
of new organizations providing facilities and services (Salemink 2006: 118; 
Vasavakul 2003: 33–4). In line with this, numerous structural ties are supposed 
to guarantee the harmonious relationship with the state, and most civil society 
organizations portray themselves as collaborative partners of state agencies, 
working for the benefit of the country and its people (Thayer 2009).
The proliferation of community- based organizations – 
a strand of civil society development?
In July 2005 it was estimated that about 140,000 CBOs were operating in 
Vietnam (Sabharwal and Than Thi Thien Houng 2005: 4), and Norlund et al. 
(2006: 48) registered a ‘boost’ in the number of CBOs, with a ‘remarkably high 
concentration in the South’. Nevertheless, there seems to be a lack of under-
standing of what the term CBO actually stands for, and the following definition 
illustrates its broad meaning:
Collaborative Groups (CGs) – a term that is recently used to address those 
groups/organizations that operate at the grassroots level (commune or 
village) . . . are also called community based organizations (CBOs) by devel-
opment organizations (donors, NGOs). CGs exist in many forms, including 
for profit or non profit, or for economic, social, or cultural purposes, or as 
combined- purpose organizations.
(People’s Participation Working Group (PPWG) Vietnam 2007)
A variety of legal provisions issued in the context of Đổi mới reforms allow for 
different forms of association, but there is also evidence that CBOs emerge ‘both 
within and at the margin of the state’s regulatory framework’ (Hy V. Luong 
2005: 123; Kerkvliet 2003: 3). The currently available literature, which is defi-
nitely not exhaustive, provides information on different mutual aid groups, 
micro- credit and so- called rural collaborative groups, as well as faith- based 
organizations. The literature also indicates that CBO development varies spa-
tially, depending to some degree on the combination of political and socio- 
cultural factors in different parts of the country. Historically speaking, the 
distinctions in local forms of traditional village and community life provided for 
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a different foundation of grassroots development. In pre- colonial northern 
Vietnam, people lived in close proximity, and village affairs were managed and 
organized by local committees, clubs and professional groups (Grossheim 2004; 
Marr 2004; Pike 2000). In the Mekong Delta, in contrast, people settled along 
waterways and villages and remained loosely structured (Biggs et al. 2009; 
Jamieson 1995: 5). Community ties in the south generally remained weak, 
although peasants used to collaborate on land preparation, seeding and harvest-
ing (Nguyen Ngoc De 2006: 69–70).
 The regional differences in CBO development diverged further when, after 
independence (1954), northern and southern Vietnam ended up with different 
political regimes. Woodside (1976: 284) points out that, under colonialism and 
the first independent Saigon administration in the south, the development of 
‘uncontrollable rural organizations’ was restricted and, as a result, peasants were 
hardly motivated to develop their organizational capacity. In northern Vietnam, 
to compare, the communist government integrated all forms of organization into 
the one- party-state structure; the increasing predominance of mass organizations 
worked to undermine formerly active institutions (Hy V. Luong 2005: 125). 
Another important policy measure of the new regime in the north was the collec-
tivization of rural households, which was implemented in combination with land 
reforms. This policy was rigorously enforced and, after reunification (1976), 
continued nationwide, though with little success in the south, particularly in the 
Mekong Delta.3 With Đổi mới and the return to household- based production in 
1988, membership in agricultural cooperatives (hợp tác xã) and collective groups 
(tập đoàn sản xuất) finally became voluntary. As a result, the number of cooper-
atives significantly decreased and most of the collective groups dissolved. When 
the government issued new legislation in 1996 promoting so- called ‘new- style 
cooperatives’, farmers demonstrated a clear lack of interest (Le Meur et al. 2005: 
37ff.; Nguyen Ngoc De 2006: 73–4).
 What happened instead was the return to and (re)establishment of mutual self-
 help groups throughout the country. In northern Vietnam, such voluntary associ-
ations tend to be kinship- based and rooted in traditional institutions (Phan Dai 
Doan 2007: 56f.). Dang Thi Viet Phuong and Bui Quang Dung (2011) recently 
found a significant number of voluntary groups (tổ chức xã hội tự nguyện) in the 
Red River Delta, whose activities ranged from sports to traditional music, gar-
dening, and the organization of community festivities. Migrants in big cities 
often engage in same- native-place associations of mutual assistance (Hy V. 
Luong 2003: 104). In the south, farmers started to initiate self- help groups to, for 
example, escape poverty traps (Hicks 2004), while ethnic minorities began 
building local safety nets (Taylor 2004: 265). Moreover, banking reforms and 
the breakdown of rural credit cooperatives led to the establishment of numerous 
savings groups (Seibel 1992: 64, 77f.). Similarly, other service gaps created by 
the collapse of rural collectives had to be filled by peasants (Kirsch 1997: 3) and, 
by the turn of the century, Fforde (2008: 17–18) documented the co- existence of 
formal (state- organized) and informal farmer groups. In the context of funda-
mental changes in the rural production system, farmers were compelled to 
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engage in groups in order to manage pumping and drainage activities. Further-
more, governmental agencies continued to promote cooperative groups by offer-
ing incentives and technical equipment (Kono 2001: 77–8). To what extent 
group formation was ‘voluntary’ remains unclear.
 Furthermore, it is a popular perception that ‘NGOs’ are initiated by foreign 
agencies and, indeed, numerous donor reports point out that a large number of 
CBOs have been set up in the context of project work (CIDIN 2006: 8). In fact, 
thousands of water and sanitation groups (Wyatt and Huynh Thi Ngoc Tuyet 
2008), small- scale business clubs, micro- credit groups, and the like, have been 
established. These activities have closely followed national policies; micro- 
finance schemes, for example, became a prominent instrument for poverty alle-
viation (Bloh 2007).
 The trend of group formation is indicative of another shift in the policy frame-
work. Following the enactment of the Grassroots Democracy Decree (1998), 
which provides the legitimate foundation for CBO development and ‘participa-
tory’ approaches (Benedikter 2008: 66–77),4 a range of other legal instruments, 
such as the regulation of water user groups, have been issued. In the Red River 
Delta, entities called clubs (câu lạc bộ) are registered under decree 88/2003/
ND- CP (Dang Thi Viet Phuong and Bui Quang Dung 2011), which regulates the 
organization and operation of certain types of association (Government of 
Vietnam 2003). Moreover, another decree (Decree 151) addressing the organiza-
tion and operation of cooperative groups at commune level was enacted in 2007 
(Government of Vietnam 2007).
 Finally, despite widespread acknowledgements of the proliferation of volun-
tary associations, empirical research on CBO development is basically absent. In 
addition, strong regional disparities and a variety of responses to CBOs by local 
authorities are being reported (Kerkvliet et al. 2008). Kerkvliet et al. (2008: 46) 
therefore conclude that studies on CBOs should concentrate on concrete activ-
ities and what is physically happening in a given case study area. To that end, 
the following section presents the trajectory of group formation processes in Can 
Tho City and analyses current institutional change processes in a given environ-
mental and socio- political context.
CBOs on the rise: insights from Can Tho City
In the framework of a large scientific research project on water resources man-
agement in the Mekong Delta,5 a number of questions related to the interface 
between state management and water users have emerged. With a view to cap-
turing institutional change processes, a survey covering 120 CBOs in eight dif-
ferent communes in Can Tho City was conducted in 2009–10. The survey was 
complemented by a series of interviews with state officials at district and provin-
cial levels, and separate group discussions with local leaders and water users. 
Given the focus of water resources management, the following CBOs were 
included in the survey: 47 production groups (tổ hợp tác sản xuất), 12 irrigation 
groups (tổ bơm tưới), 56 micro- credit groups (nhóm tín dụng) engaged in water 
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and sanitation, and one club (câu lạc bộ) and four groups which were involved 
in both production and micro- credit activities.6
 Can Tho City is located in the heart of the Mekong Delta. Despite significant 
urbanization and modernization, rural production remains predominant. This 
includes, first and foremost, (irrigated) rice cultivation; but aquaculture and, to a 
lesser extent, horticulture, are also expanding. Water constitutes a major resource 
and state agencies undertake huge investments in flood management, salinity 
control, and the development of irrigation facilities (Evers and Benedikter 2009). 
Although water resource management is under state responsibility, water users 
get increasingly involved in managing the water for production and domestic use 
(Nguyen Xuan Tiep 2008: 297–9). A local narrative of CBO development, pre-
sented below, illustrates the origin of this shift (group interviews, October 2009):
 In 1996, farmers experienced severe difficulties controlling water levels during 
the flood season. Following dramatic production losses, state agencies started to 
campaign for the formation of cooperative groups in fruit orchards and rice cultiva-
tion communities and, as a result, a number of self- help groups came into being. 
Other groups emerged when, as a result of dyke building, the nature of irrigation 
management changed. Pumping activities had to be coordinated and aligned with 
cropping calendars, and commune authorities strongly promoted and guided the 
process of establishing pumping groups (in 2004 in Thoi Dong commune, Co Do 
District, and in 2005 in Thanh An Commune, Vinh Thanh District).
 From the mid- 1990s, group formation was on the rise: In 2001 a total of 1,466 
production groups were officially recorded, and by 2008 the number had more 
than doubled to 3,356 groups (DARD 2008: 18). Production groups tend to 
specialize in rice, gardening, fishery or aquaculture, but also include irrigation 
and pumping groups. In addition, a boost in micro- credit groups could be 
observed.7 The data on the 120 groups covered by the survey demonstrate an 
acceleration of group formation from the mid- 1990s. Interestingly though, 36 
out of the 120 groups had formed out of previously existing agricultural col-
lective groups or cooperatives.
 According to the findings of the survey, the majority of respondents formed 
the new groups in order to share experience and knowledge, save costs and time, 
and improve their access to external support, including credit. The core activities 
of these production and irrigation groups include hydraulic works (dykes, canals 
and culverts), drainage and pumping, and mutual assistance for field preparation 
and pest management. As a minor activity, they engage in social welfare, while 
a few (less than 10 per cent) operate saving schemes.
 Micro- credit groups (in this survey) aim at obtaining funds for improving 
their water supply and sanitation and also operate savings schemes. They also 
commonly engage in small enterprise development, notably animal breeding, 
farming and crafts. Education on family planning, hygiene and HIV/AIDS, as 
well as social welfare projects, round off their activity profiles.
 The groups’ scope of activities can change over time, and while some groups 
increase and diversify their activities, others may end up dissolving (although 
they might continue to exist on paper).
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 The majority of groups are active throughout the year (67 per cent). However, 
almost all irrigation groups and some production groups only operate seasonally, 
depending on the agricultural production cycle. The spatial scope of operation of 
CBOs tends to be limited: 34 per cent of the groups function at the hamlet level, 
while the rest stay within commune boundaries. In terms of membership, an 
average of 29–34 members was calculated, though differences among the groups 
are significant.8 Group membership seems to be stable. Gender plays a very 
important role, with few micro- credit groups having male members and only one 
production group having predominantly female membership.
Internal and external regulations of CBOs
If one looks at common group formation processes, it is evident that mass organ-
izations and state agencies often play a significant role. Furthermore, a set of 
formal requirements as well as (internal) rules and regulations indicate a strong 
tendency of formalization. Seventy out of the 120 groups surveyed reported that 
their establishment was initiated either by local authorities, usually the commune 
People’s Committees or hamlet heads, or by the hamlet units of the Women’s 
Union and Farmers’ Association. In two cases, an international development 
agency played a role in encouraging group formation. Forty- four groups said that 
they were established on their own initiative. In all the communes surveyed, dif-
ferent types of community meeting were used to encourage people to become 
involved in self- help groups while local cadres frequently pointed out the bene-
fits of mutual collaboration.
 Most groups adopted a set of guiding principles, typically including some of 
the following stipulations: group members must be at least 18 years old (80 per 
cent) and need to be of moral and social integrity (68 per cent). The capacity to 
comply with financial contributions was a key requirement for taking part in 
both micro- credit groups (66 per cent) and irrigation groups (66 per cent), as 
farmers are requested to pay for joint pumping campaigns (contributions are 
based on the individual demand). Furthermore, 77 per cent of the production and 
91 per cent of the irrigation groups require individual landholding as a prerequi-
site for membership. With regard to tasks and duties, basically all groups have 
developed internal regulations, such as compulsory attendance at group meet-
ings. Compliance with such regulations is, however, considered weak in roughly 
a fifth of the groups. In addition, groups generally set up a leadership structure 
managed by a head, a deputy head and, in 94 per cent of the surveyed groups, a 
secretary. The head officially represents the group in external affairs and signs 
documents on behalf of the group. Less than a third (27 per cent) of the groups 
also appoint a treasurer. Financial management is thus not uniform: either the 
treasurer or the secretary is in charge of accounting, while the collection of fees 
falls under the secretary’s (54 per cent), and the head’s mandate (71 per cent).
 Almost all of the surveyed groups were officially registered with either the 
People’s Committee or a mass organization, and sometimes both. About a third 
of the groups were of the opinion that registration was a formal requirement 
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(although not prescribed by law). In interviews, representatives of many groups 
noted that registration would improve their chances for accessing support 
schemes. The registration process seems to be uniform, requiring a few discrete 
steps (see Table 13.1). First of all, a list of group members is compiled, group 
leaders are elected, and group regulations are drafted. Based on our findings, the 
regulations are basically modelled on blueprints provided by local authorities 
and mass organizations, whose guidelines supposedly follow the provisions of 
Decree 151. As a next step, the minutes of the inaugural meeting, with a mem-
bership list attached, is submitted to a mass organization for approval. At this 
point a registration fee must be paid. In addition, most groups also seek the 
consent of the communal People’s Committee, with the mass organizations often 
facilitating this by forwarding relevant documents.
 As a result of this fairly standardized procedure for registration, mass organi-
zations and local authorities are in a favourable position to keep track of, and 
intervene in, CBO development. The following quote illustrates how local offi-
cials closely monitor group establishment:
All group members meet together with state representatives of the hamlet 
and the commune administration. In this meeting group candidates for 
leadership positions are elected by the members.
(irrigation group, Thanh An Commune, Vinh Thanh District, 
Can Tho City, 2009)
One reason why it is important for local cadres to keep track of groups is because 
these data are then used to produce reports for more senior agencies, which – 
since the enactment of Decree 151 – officially encourage the development of 
farmer groups and hold local agencies accountable for the respective policy 
implementations. This is demonstrated openly in the following report:
The district of Vinh Thanh at present has a total of 357 cooperative groups 
and 23 clubs, accounting for a total membership of 9,779 households, all of 
which are engaged in agriculture. Cooperative organizations and clubs . . . 
need to be promoted as a type of collaborative organization of peasants that 
matches their practical needs in present- day agricultural production . . . in 
order to develop effective production models.
(Vinh Thanh District Office of Agriculture and Rural Development 2009, 
translation by the authors)
Table 13.1 Registration procedure for establishing a CBO
Type of procedure Prevalence in groups (%)
Written application to mass organization 94
Consent of the People’s Committee 96
Official membership list 45
Reporting scheme for meetings 34
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The national policy of promoting and strengthening CBO formation under state 
guidance finds its expression in provincial government reports, such as those of 
Can Tho City, which encourage local cadres to act accordingly (DARD 2008). 
These efforts are embedded in the state- promoted concept of the so- called col-
lective economy (kinh tế tập thể), which ideologically stems from the pre- reform 
era but is still maintained as a key economic principle of the socialist- oriented 
market economy, as emphasized by the political leadership in the latest Eleventh 
Party Congress (Tạp Chí Cộng Sản, 21 August 2011). As Article 12 of Decree 
151 states, cooperative groups have ‘the right . . . to participate in the elaboration 
and implementation of plans, programmes and projects in support of collective 
economy’ and socio- economic development in general. In other words – farmer 
CBOs represent a vehicle to boost rural development, agricultural production 
and poverty alleviation.
 Another revealing aspect of state–group relations is the involvement of offi-
cials in group membership and leadership (Norlund 2007: 84). With regard to 
the first aspect, local cadres were listed as members in 37 per cent of all the 
groups. As local cadres also do farming, this finding is not surprising. However, 
only nine groups (out of 120) reported that officials in state management func-
tions also hold leadership positions. Instead, group leaders are more often than 
not affiliated with the local mass organization, as illustrated in Table 13.2.
 In addition, 97 per cent of all groups consider themselves affiliated with a 
mass organization. This clearly demonstrates that mass organizations have an 
important role in CBO management. Moreover, they are in charge of implement-
ing government policies and selected programmes, and can thereby offer incen-
tives and further strengthen the state–group relationships. For agricultural 
development, training and advisory services, in close collaboration with the 
extension service, are provided to facilitate new production technologies and 
integrated pest management (Nguyen Ngoc De 2006: 76ff.), and subsidies can 
be offered. From the survey data on production groups, for instance, 93 per cent 
of them received training, 65 per cent advice, 12 per cent material support and 
equipment, and 30 per cent gained access to credit through the facilitation of the 
Farmers’ Association. With regard to training and advisory services, it must 
however be critically examined whether this corresponds to farmers’ demands. 
According to Nguyen Quy Hanh9 (2011, personal communication), this is often 
not the case. In fact, state- run programmes must correspond with national pol-
icies – and these do not necessarily align with peasant’s views and ideas (Dang 
Kieu Nhan et al. 2007: 169).
Table 13.2 Involvement of group leadership in mass organizations
Membership in 
mass organization
Official function in 
mass organizations
Group head (total 120) 95 79% of whom 39 33%Vice group head (total 120) 81 67%  8  7%
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 In the wake of the government’s socialization policy, the collection of fees, 
the organization of labour campaigns, and the alignment of cropping and 
pumping schemes in accordance with the district and communal production 
targets are often carried out by CBOs (Benedikter and Waibel 2013). It can be 
assumed that, in return, CBOs are granted privileged access to existing support 
systems.
 Finally, and as the sex- disaggregated data on group membership reveals, mass 
organizations pursue a gendered approach to community mobilization: male 
farmers affiliate with the Farmers’ Association, while females predominantly 
engage with the Women’s Union. Specifically, it appears that domestic waste 
management, health, and hygiene are considered ‘women’s issues’, such that 
mainly women’s groups are targeted for related training programmes.
The management of micro- credit groups in water and 
sanitation
For micro- credit groups, registration with the state is an administrative necessity. 
Individuals or households who lack the requested collateral for loan applications 
have a chance to apply for loans as members of a micro- credit group, but only 
groups which are registered with either the mass organizations or the state agen-
cies can access such credit schemes.10 The funds are mainly provided by rural 
banks as part of the implementation of national and local policies or develop-
ment cooperation objectives. Agreements between the bank and mass organiza-
tions regulate their respective responsibilities. In general, mass organizations 
provide the guarantee to the funding institution on behalf of the group, support 
the administrative process of loan application, and supervise the correct usage 
and repayment of the funds (Dufheus 2007 cited in: Bloh 2007: 98; ILO 2005: 
16). Notably, the Women’s Union plays a prominent role in the formalized 
micro- finance sector (Bloh 2007: 19).
 In Can Tho City, the Women’s Union is generally involved in environmental 
protection, the development of water and sanitation facilities of rural households 
(a project of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) since 
1999), and water treatment education (Vietnam Women’s Union 2008). Since 
2004 the Women’s Union has operated as a credit facilitator for a large govern-
ment programme which offers subsidized group loans for the construction of 
water supply and sanitation infrastructure (mostly household latrines) with a 
comparatively low interest rate over a period of three to five years (Reis and 
Mollinga 2009: 11ff.). The loans are granted by the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policy11 and the Women’s Union actively promotes credit groups that qualify for 
these loans (Vietnam Women’s Union and Social Bank for Policy 2003). Out of 
our sample, almost a third (30.9 per cent) of all the surveyed groups directly 
acknowledged that they were mobilized by the Women’s Union.
 With regard to their motivation to establish a micro- credit group, the raising 
of credit naturally ranks high (89 per cent); indeed, all groups intended to operate 
group internal savings schemes (probably with the purpose of eventually 
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qualifying for external credit schemes). So far, not all groups have been success-
ful: less than half actually received a loan. Nevertheless, almost all the credit 
groups indicated that they have benefited from their affiliation with the mass 
organizations, as they have received training and advice. Indeed, capacity build-
ing appears to be a strong component in the relationship between mass organiza-
tions and CBOs. Capacity building includes a variety of activities, such as state 
propaganda that benefits mass organizations, as well as technical or legal training 
that benefits groups. It would be interesting to observe the ongoing development 
of these groups. What will happen once they have paid back the loans? Will 
group relations strengthen and alternative visions for group activities develop?
Relationships with other organizations and state agencies
Table 13.3 summarizes the different support structures reported by all CBOs 
covered in the survey.
 Although the affiliation with mass organizations is very strong, the local gov-
ernment apparently offers more support overall. Only nine groups stated that 
they do not work with local government agencies at all. In comparison, 47 
percent of all groups registered an increase in government support since the 
group was established and since policies promoting so- called ‘model groups’ 
began (Huynh Thi Phuong Linh 2012, personal communication). In general, 
however, material support, in terms of funding or equipment, was reported to be 
marginal. In any case, alternative support systems hardly exist and no develop-
ment projects are currently run in Can Tho City.
 The group’s relationships with mass organizations and state agencies are, 
however, far more developed than relationships between the groups themselves, 
as evident in Table 13.4.
Table 13.3 External support received by CBOs (%)
Equipment/production 
material
Training Advice Funding Access 
to credit
Local government 8 76 63 5 38
Women’s Union 1 49 40 1 21
Farmers’ Association 6 62 46 0 18













No cooperation 33 58  8  4 23
Low level of cooperation 42 39 42 10 17
Intensive cooperation 25  3 50 86 60
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 The highest level of inter- group interaction has been reported by irrigation 
groups (59 per cent intensive and 33 per cent low level of cooperation), while 
approximately a third of production and micro- credit groups do not cooperate 
with other groups at all. It is not immediately evident whether these findings 
confirm or reject Norlund’s contestation that CBO development is fragmented 
(Norlund 2007: 79). However, overall the findings of the survey suggest that the 
groups do not engage in activities beyond their immediate group objectives and 
practical tasks, nor do they demonstrate the capacity to link up and develop into 
larger networks and engage in advocacy.
Conclusion
The profiles of, and trends in, water user and micro- credit groups in Can Tho City 
attest to the growing institutional diversity and emergence of CBOs, particularly 
in the Mekong Delta. It has been shown that CBO development accelerated from 
the mid- 1990s and that rural production and micro- credit groups constitute an 
important subset of CBOs. Although some of these groups emerged from and 
replaced former collective groups and new- style cooperatives, the majority of 
CBOs were established through new initiatives. Seventy- six per cent of the sur-
veyed groups were established prior to the promulgation of Decree 151 in 2007, 
but the survey shows that party- state agencies actively promoted the development 
of many of them. Research findings from other provinces in the Mekong Delta, 
however, show that a large number of farmers groups emerged without any state 
support (Fforde 2008, Wells- Dang 2011 oral communication).12
 Many groups started with a clear scope of activity and with the intention of 
improving their livelihoods. Significant changes in the rural production system 
and agrarian modernization, for instance, raised the demand for joint irrigation 
management (Nguyen Duy Can et al. 2007: 77) and incentivizing the foundation 
of groups that would evolve to be an alternative to the new- style cooperatives 
designed by the state. The fact that people in rural communities preferred to 
organize outside official channels is a product of the negative experiences people 
had with state- imposed structures in the past (Fforde 2008). With the issuance of 
Decree 151, the government officially recognized this alternative type of farmers 
group and demonstrated an interest in engaging with these groups. This move 
represents a typical facet of the reform processes in Vietnam, whereby ‘policy 
has tended to follow reality’ (Fforde 2009: 28).
 Kerkvliet (2003; 2005) understood the evolvement of Đổi mới as a state 
response to ongoing change processes initiated by peasants and other segments 
of the population. In this tradition, the progressive formalization and concomi-
tant attempts to guide CBOs is considered a strategic step by the party- state to 
maintain control over civil society development in rural areas. In the context 
of top- down policy implementation, and perhaps owing to a certain continuity 
of central planning in the post- Đổi mới era, CBOs are considered convenient 
‘partners’ for central agencies to promulgate and implement their policies. In 
agricultural production in the Mekong Delta, for instance, national directives 
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have clear provisions on how water and land resources are to be used in order to 
achieve national output and growth targets. In this context, training and techno-
logy transfers are preferentially disseminated through CBOs. The groups are also 
involved in generating funds and mobilizing labour for local infrastructure 
development and maintenance in accordance with set plans (Benedikter and 
Waibel, forthcoming). Local agencies also actively promote micro- credit and 
production groups as part of an envisaged rural collective economy (which is 
also part of a market- oriented system) and follows the principles of socialization. 
The following summary illustrates this ideological linkage:
Cooperative groups and clubs act as the groundwork for developing the col-
lective economy and constitute one of the indispensable economic compon-
ents of the national economy. The Sub- department of Cooperatives and 
Rural Development therefore intensified propaganda work and legal con-
ditions for cooperative groups and enhanced the awareness of peasant 
households to engage in the sustainable development of cooperative groups.
(DARD 2008)
A number of Vietnam scholars have identified potential socio- economic threats 
inherent to economic liberalization and socialization. This has not been directly 
confirmed by the data, but the rising number of micro- credit groups, functioning 
savings schemes, and initiatives striving for business and job development, actu-
ally points in the same direction: farmers have to engage in community- based 
groups in order to secure and possibly improve their livelihoods.
 The research findings additionally demonstrate a clear tendency to formalize 
group management. This is achieved by standardized procedures of group regis-
tration, the establishment of a group leadership, and the administration of these 
formalities through mass organizations and local authorities (as prescribed in 
Decree 151). Moreover, when hamlet heads and mass organization leaders attend 
group meetings, act as facilitators for bank credits, and offer training opportun-
ities, the collaboration between these authorities and the groups is enhanced 
through interpersonal interaction as well as formal links. Prescriptions for group 
registration and monitoring activities enable party- state agencies to keep records 
of CBO development and report the relevant data to higher levels of 
administration.
 As it turns out, CBOs fit well into the current ideology of the socialist one- 
party state with regard to farming communities, as they represent a spirit of col-
lective production and recruit their members among peasants and rural labourers. 
The mass organizations, namely the Women’s Union and the Farmers’ Associ-
ation, are also strengthened through this process, since they benefit from increas-
ing membership rates, income generation opportunities, and a broadening scope 
of activity. As a result, the party- state structure, at least at the local level, is even 
further reinforced.
 Although the line between rural CBOs and the state has become more distinct 
after decollectivization, the boundaries remain permeable. The fact that the 
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majority of the surveyed groups perceive themselves as closely linked or even 
part of either the Farmers’ Association or Women’s Union makes that point 
quite clear. Nevertheless, further research is needed to assess the daily practices 
of these relationships. The public discourse in Vietnam centres upon state 
support and promotion and negotiation processes, while some fieldwork obser-
vations revealed incidents of disagreement and a widespread phenomenon of 
group disbandment (not reflected in official statistics) (Nguyen Quy Hanh and 
Huynh Thi Phuong Linh, 2011 and 2012, personal communication). These 
accounts point to the following conclusion: the policy shift towards CBO 
promotion has apparently not been as effective as some government reports 
might suggest. Moreover, policy implementation practices and outcomes seem 
to largely depend on the daily interaction between local cadres and local people, 
on the one hand, and the vagaries of the local context, on the other. This finding 
suggests that  national directives are being reinterpreted, sometimes ignored, or 
only partially implemented. In other words: at the grassroots, central state 
policies remain weak.
 Another finding of this research is the apparent low potential for the develop-
ment of CBO networks. In contrast to this, CBOs develop ties with state agen-
cies and, even more importantly, the local branches of the mass organizations. 
With state organizations acting as the major contact point of CBOs, the repres-
entation of the interests of the rural population remains institutionalized through 
the mass organizations at intermediary and macro levels. In 1994, Nguyen Ngoc 
Truong (1994) stated, ‘[it is] illogical to view the recent emergence of formal 
and informal grassroots associations and societies as a separate and accidental 
event or phenomenon’. Almost 20 years after this statement was made, those 
words appear to have only gained in explanatory power. The number of CBOs in 
the rural areas of Can Tho City continues to grow, but, as has been shown, this 
process appears to be increasingly engineered through policies formulated by the 
party- state. Nevertheless, slippage in enforcement at the local level is perhaps 
higher than national or provincial policy- makers anticipated. The question must 
still critically be posed, To what extent can these CBOs truly be referred to as 
‘self- initiated’ and/or ‘voluntary’? From this answer emerges another question: 
which role do CBOs actually play in Vietnam’s civil society landscape? Having 
asked these questions, it is nonetheless important to note that farmers reported 
having joined groups for strategic reasons of their own: for example, if they 
anticipate certain personal or material benefits, or because they might otherwise 
fail with an individual loan application if they lack membership iof a micro- 
credit group. Improved access to state support systems, such as training, sub-
sidies, relevant technical or market information, and other services seems to be 
another crucial factor for group mobilization. Further research on these strategic 
behaviours and the possible difficulties (as depicted by Wischermann 2010 in 
urban Vietnam) would help to throw more light on local governance and civil 
society development. Finally, an assessment of mutual cooperation and self- help 
initiatives beyond any of the described structures could also provide valuable 
information on social practices in a changing environment.
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Notes
 1 Wischermann and Nguyen Quang Vinh (2003: 186, 223) define civic organizations as 
‘non- state, voluntary, non- profit-oriented societal organizations’. The term ‘civic organi-
zations’ is a literal translation of the Vietnamese tổ chức xã hội (Norlund et al. 2006: 25). 
These include four sub- groups, namely mass organizations, professional associations, 
associations of businesspeople, as well as so- called issue- oriented organizations. The 
latter includes social work, research and consulting as well as religious organizations.
 2 As Painter (2005: 274) explains, socialization in Vietnam means that the state will 
maintain the principal role of exercising state management functions, while respons-
ibility for delivery of and payment for services is increasingly passed on to the people, 
notably the clients and users of such services.
 3 While the membership quota of households in northern Vietnam reached 96.7 per cent 
in 1979, the quota in the Mekong Delta remained rather low (24.5 per cent in 1980) 
(Ngo Vinh Long 1988). Farmers obviously resisted any enforcement of the collectivi-
zation policy (Hicks 2004: 293). However, in 1983, more than 27,000 collective pro-
duction units were operating across the delta (Ngo Vinh Long 1988), although Porter 
(1993: 43) argues that a ‘vast majority of cooperatives existed in name only’.
 4 The Grassroots Democracy Decree 29/1998/ND- CP, later amended by Decree 
79/2003/ND, provides directions for people’s engagement in local governance affairs. 
The decree grants this to the community and not to the individual, which is often mis-
understood (or intentionally misinterpreted) by foreign agencies. Inherent to the 
decree is a famous quotation of Ho Chi Minh: ‘People know, people discuss, people 
execute and people supervise’ [Dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra].
 5 The survey was conducted by the Center for Development Research (ZEF, University 
of Bonn, Germany) and the Mekong Delta Development Research Institute (MDI, 
Can Tho University) as part of the social science research agenda of the WISDOM 
project (www.wisdom.caf.dlr.de).
 6 The identification of the groups captured by the survey was done in collaboration with 
the respective Commune People’s Committees. Prior to this a number of field trips 
were organized during a first explorative phase of the research, during which the 
existence of so- called informal groups was categorically denied.
 7 A large variety of clubs, comprising gardening, nutrition, population and HIV/AIDS 
clubs, sports, legal and culture clubs (poetry, traditional music), as well as charity 
associations, were identified in the pilot (interviews with representatives of various 
state agencies in four districts in 2009). As most of these clubs were not involved in 
water- related activities, they were excluded from the survey.
 8 Membership is either defined on an individual basis or by household (44%). In excep-
tional cases, both the household head and spouse were registered individually as 
group members. Production groups have a membership ranging from ten to 145 
members, while irrigation groups reported 14 to 47 members per group. Micro- credit 
group membership varied between 12 and 75.
 9 Nguyen Quy Hanh and Huynh Thi Phuong Linh are junior researchers at ZEF; both 
conducted intensive field research in Can Tho City and provided very useful com-
ments on the first draft of this chapter.
10 Loans are provided for various purposes, but the focus of the following will be kept 
on micro- credit groups operating in the field of water and sanitation. Since organiza-
tions other than the Women’s Union facilitate credit delivery in the district, the fol-
lowing findings represent only a specific segment of such groups.
11 The Vietnam Bank for Social Policy, founded in 2003, is state- funded and disburses 
subsidized ‘policy loans’ to the poor. In the given example, loans were provided in 
the context of the national Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy; by 2008 the 
total number of 15,000 households had benefited from such loans in the municipality 
(Vietnam Women’s Union 2008).
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12 Similarly, research findings from other parts of Vietnam detail the presence of regis-
tered and unregistered groups; in practice, these two categories have somewhat differ-
ent patterns of activity (e.g. Dang Thi Viet Phuong and Bui Quang Dung 2011).
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14 Competitive discourses in civil 
society
Pluralism in Cambodia’s agricultural 
development platform
Hart N. Feuer
The paradigmatic debates surrounding differing development goals and agendas 
occurring internationally are inevitably played out in developing countries. This 
chapter focuses on how socio- technical paradigms embodied in certain develop-
ment discourses are instrumentalized in civil society initiatives and led to 
compete with each other on the ground for legitimation by both the public and 
the state. In Cambodia, the civil society ‘representatives’ of global movements 
or powerful international institutions are often large, charismatic organizations 
that follow externally provided archetypes of issues such as gender, agriculture, 
justice and the environment. Due to their international roots, these organizations 
typically view their respective initiative (i.e. their development discourse) as suf-
ficiently universal and paradigmatic to be enshrined countrywide – a goal which 
is often only attainable through widespread endorsement or even absorption by 
the state. Civil society, in this case, is thus seeking to bridge the ‘gap’ in state–
society relations (see Öjendal, this volume) by filling the political and technical 
space between the family and the state (following White 1994: 379) in order to 
develop into a national project.1 As a suggestive case in this chapter, I focus on 
the paradigmatic contest between proponents of alternative and mainstream (or 
green revolution) agricultural development (see Beus and Dunlap 1990).
 A stepping- off point of this chapter is that civil society groups, even the tech-
nically oriented development ones, are not apolitical in nature. On the contrary, 
they are often rooted in a development discourse that implies some socio- cultural 
or political arrangements (Fforde and Seidel 2010). To the degree that these 
arrangements are taken on board through the various processes of development, 
they alter the political landscape, often by privileging and building up institu-
tional inertia behind certain worldviews (following Hughes 2010). Often, one 
worldview, such as ‘productivist’ agriculture,2 becomes the officially sanctioned 
(or perhaps simply the de facto) framework for agriculture development in 
the state or civil apparatus, creating a path dependency that pre- empts the 
institutionalization of other development models. The comprehensiveness of 
this path dependency, however, is not inevitable. The agricultural and rural 
development policy of contemporary Cambodia, I will argue, is politically more 
neutral toward competing discourses. This is due to historical factors and 
because the selection of models for agricultural development is more contested 
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by development agencies and other groups. In particular, I discuss how the state 
strategically arbitrates between civil society initiatives (and their underlying dis-
courses), balancing their populist and technocratic merits as well as the response 
by international donors. In practice, this has created space for plurality in the 
legitimation of seemingly divergent development models, and drives competi-
tion between civil society agents with different worldviews.
Openness, deference or agency?
With competing discourses for development waxing and waning on their own 
time- frames, aid- receiving countries can be expected to respond strategically by 
striking a balance between maximizing aid flows and fixing a coherent and long- 
term development model of their own. As Hughes (2010: 46) describes,
the space for contestation of donor policies depends upon the way that aid 
money and policies function in the context of the local political economy. In 
countries where there is high aid dependence, for example, this may lead to 
technocratic elites internalising donor models, as in contexts such as 
Rwanda and Tanzania. Alternatively, different local political economies of 
aid may see a variety of context- specific strategies of co- optation, negoti-
ation, manipulation and outright resistance.
Subsequent to this quote, she specifically mentions Southeast Asia as a region in 
which these political economies of aid lead to more agency by national govern-
ments. However, in practice, doing so is challenged by the fact that various 
models of development tend to be embedded in more encompassing discourses 
that cannot easily be ‘mixed and matched’ by the state apparatus without mud-
dying their discursive coherence. In a separate work, Hughes (2009: 168) 
describes how politicians often attempt to present themselves as being able to 
manage donor ideals (what she calls ‘gatekeeping’) while simultaneously sup-
porting populist (or, as she calls, ‘authentic’) development practices that seem to 
run contrary to donor aims. I broaden this idea into a typology of three strategies 
for managing competing developing discourses.
1 Openness. In an effort to assert its sovereignty over the development 
process, the state absorbs and institutionalizes the myriad developmental 
functions carried out within its domain, often resulting in internal contra-
dictions and haphazard development for a period of time (Guibernau 
1999: 13).
2 Deference. The state can ‘hover’ for a while, allowing third- party develop-
ment activities to compete with each other until a desirable configuration 
emerges or political pressure obliges the state to adopt a certain model.
3 Agency. The state can stay aloof of non- governmental and third- party activ-
ities by plying a middle path until it develops its own unique configuration, 
which may or may not resemble one of the dominant development models.
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Although not using these terms, these scenarios are often used by academics and 
observers of Cambodia to explain the colourful mixture of developmental 
models coexisting in the country.
 The first view, corresponding to the openness strategy, is that Cambodia, due 
to various conditions such as reconstruction, low human capital, and a desire to 
reassert its international credentials after the Vietnamese occupation, would offi-
cially embrace almost anything suggested by donors and carried out by non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) if it served to bring in development aid or 
investment. According to Curtis (1998: 72), this view gained traction during the 
United Nations interventions in the early 1990s. To development veterans, Cam-
bodia appeared ‘unsullied by previous developmental mistakes’ and open to 
applying all the new and fashionable development trends.
 The second view is that Cambodia’s ingrained culture of deference to author-
ity provided space for a range of powerful donors and development agencies to 
compete with each other in an attempt to win over the state and the citizenry 
about the merits of various development models (Curtis 1998: 115; Landau 
2008: 248). This occurs by simultaneously moulding the public sector through 
‘capacity building’ projects while directly supporting civil society organizations 
(CSOs) that create a developmental reality (i.e. facts on the ground) around one 
model (see for example, SPM Consultants 2003: 25).
 The third view explaining the mixture of development models in Cambodia, 
corresponding with the agency scenario above, regards the government as being 
more strategic in its encounter with donors and development agencies than many 
observers admit (see Hughes 2010: 46; Vickery 1984), allowing it to play 
various development models off against each other. Following this view, only a 
clear threat to state authority would prompt overt defensive reactions (Öjendal 
and Kim 2007: 510–11), while in the meantime the government would quietly 
enhance its legitimacy by claiming the achievements of NGOs as national 
achievements and, in doing so, crystallizing its own development model (Curtis 
1998: 142).
Historical conditions of pluralism
The contemporary situation of civil society activity, as illustrated by Ou and 
Kim (this volume), is largely the result of a neo- liberal mode of development 
intervention, in which NGOs compete with each other and with the state to 
attract funding and gain legitimacy. However, due to constant changes in the 
funding whims of donors, support for NGOs is at risk unless they develop altern-
ative models for sustaining themselves. Initiatives with broad appeal and politi-
cally palatable platforms, such as AMARA (see Öjendal, this volume) can 
leverage community support structures as well as tap into official government 
institutions to help ensure their existence. In agricultural development, the scale 
of the national project (i.e. infrastructure needs, extension, research and develop-
ment, university training, etc.) practically necessitates state partnership in addi-
tion to grassroots appeal. NGOs attempting to influence policy to promote their 
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initiatives, however, must contend with cultural inertia and other preconditions 
that are embedded in the broader historical narrative. Broadly speaking, agrarian 
change in Cambodia has largely mirrored historical fluctuations, resulting in 
periods of centralization and decentralization that have followed the rise and fall 
of various political regimes. During the height of the Khmer civilization in the 
twelfth to fourteenth centuries, one of the world’s largest urban centres at 
Angkor thrived due to expansive irrigation and centrally coordinated rice cultiva-
tion.3 The decline of Angkor from the fourteenth century led to the decay of 
waterworks and planned agricultural development for several centuries, but it 
proved that the ingenuity of Cambodian management could lead to agricultural 
achievement (particularly in rice cultivation). During the French protectorate and 
on through the limited agricultural modernization of King Norodom Sihanouk’s 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Great Society) regime, few changes in rice agriculture 
took place (Ear 1995: 35–7; Samphan 1959: 23–5) before the spreading war in 
Vietnam began to eclipse development goals (Ear 1995: 67–8). In 1975 the 
Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot came into power; the ensuing upheaval led to the 
almost complete rearrangement of agricultural infrastructure and labour rela-
tions. Urban citizens were forced into the countryside and an agrarian social 
economy based on collective agriculture predominated until the Khmer Rouge 
was deposed by the Vietnamese in 1979 (Chandler 2000 [1983]; De Nike et al. 
2000: 352–3).
 During the 1980s, people were focused on returning to their land and rebuild-
ing communities, while the government was focusing on reconstruction rather 
than assembling coherent agricultural policy. Although sporadic elements of 
‘productivist’ agriculture began filtering into Cambodia during this period, this 
was not in the framework of a comprehensive agricultural policy. For example, 
throughout the 1980s, uncontrolled pesticide imports from Vietnam and use of 
subsidized mineral fertilizers became widespread (EJF 2002; McNaughton 2002; 
Yang Saing et al. 2000), causing severe health problems and compromising soil 
quality over the following decades. In this same period, the government initially 
endorsed and then abandoned the promotion of so- called high- yielding varieties 
(HYVs) of rice (Mak 2001). It was within this context that the first aid- funded 
projects focusing on agricultural development arrived in Cambodia. The most 
notable of these, the Cambodia- IRRI-Australia Project (CIAP), implemented by 
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and funded by the Australian 
Agency for International Development (AusAID), began a pilot project in 1989 
with government encouragement. The project initially focused on farmer prac-
tices and local soil conditions, subsequently implementing fertilizer banks, pro-
moting HYVs and making policy recommendations (Nesbitt 2002). After the 
departure of the Vietnamese and the opening up of the country to development 
aid as a result of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, Cambodia was exposed to 
the less unified international discourse in agricultural development (Ellis and 
Biggs 2001; Pingali et al. 1995), including aspects that contrasted with the CIAP 
project, such as those focusing on food sovereignty and ecology (Altieri 1987; 
Vandermeer 1995).
Competitive discourses in civil society  241
 Ultimately, this had the effect of broadening the scope of the development 
model for agricultural development and diminishing the CIAP project to one 
voice among many. And while the lasting physical influences of this project can 
only be seen in the pilot districts in the southern lowlands, there are two endur-
ing national results of this project: (1) the adoption of HYVs for early and dry 
season cropping (around 30 per cent of the cultivation) (Agrifood Consulting 
International 2002), and (2) the eventual establishment in 1999 of CARDI, the 
Cambodian Agriculture Research and Development Institute (Nesbitt 2002) 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF ). In the mean-
time, a contrasting paradigm of agricultural development, embodied in altern-
ative agriculture, found fertile ground in Cambodia. Many farmers were still 
‘organic’ by default,4 and others felt betrayed by the health impacts of pesticides 
and by the soil degradation resulting from fertilizer use (Sok Siphana in De 
Launey 2005; Keam 2007). Ecological agriculture was promoted as a more 
locally appropriate, neo- traditional form of agriculture for peasants in poor coun-
tries (Altieri 1987; Clarke et al. 2008; Goodman 1999; Singer 1974). This 
explains the rise of the main ecology- based rural development organization, the 
Cambodian Center for Research and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC),5 
founded in 1997. As the largest rural development NGO, its programmes had 
reached more than 140,000 families (approximately 8 per cent of Cambodian 
citizens) by the end of 2010.6 Furthermore, in 2004, CEDAC’s ecological rice 
farming system became officially integrated into the Department of Agronomy 
and Agricultural Land Improvement (DAALI) of the MAFF (Feuer 2007). 
Figure 14.1 anecdotally illustrates the relative degree of institutionalization of 
CEDAC and CARDI (including its predecessor the CIAP Project), indicating in 
which years these initiatives were officially promoted by the government.
 While agricultural development in Cambodia has become more politically 
contested over time, and particularly since 2004, the practical face of agriculture 
change is influenced by global agricultural institutions and movements as well as 
by inertia in Cambodia’s historical agro- social narrative. Alternative agriculture 
has made major inroads in academic, political and social spheres since the 1990s 
(Beus and Dunlap 1994), but mainstream industrial agriculture nonetheless com-
mands the majority of research funding and is perpetuated internationally by 
multilateral agronomic institutions and private companies. The CIAP rural 
development project and CARDI are only individual instantiations of productiv-
ist agriculture discourse, which is reproduced by international agronomy 
research institutions, some development agencies, and the entire agribusiness 
complex. Perhaps more influential than its concrete institutions are the expecta-
tions of modernity and hopes for development that are linked with productivist 
agriculture. Indeed, during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum period between 1955 and 
1970, King Norodom Sihanouk exhorted agricultural mechanization, infrastruc-
ture and external inputs, representing this as populist advancement toward 
modernity (Ear 1995: 51–3). This time is often nostalgically remembered by 
Khmers as the contemporary golden age of Cambodia, although it is also 
documented for urban bias, unjust land consolidation and rural displacement 
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(Ear 1995: 53–4). While typical of the rural development experience in many 
countries, the impacts of centralized agricultural change are more critically 
received in Cambodia, where socio- political and structural upheavals have long 
been associated with the decline of Angkorean productivity and the slow collapse 
of the fourteenth century Khmer civilization. Through the contemporary period, 
the Cambodian historical narrative contains recurring incidences of state- 
sponsored agrarian change, all of which have promised much, possibly succeeded 
for a time, but were ultimately unsustainable. The result is an enduring scepticism 
and conservatism regarding agricultural change, which has provided space for 
exploring the promises and realities of contemporary rural development.
Managed pluralism in civil society
Regardless of which view(s) – openness, deference, and/or agency – one uses as 
a lens to interpret the heterogeneity of civil society actors in Cambodia, it is 
increasingly clear that the government allows certain sectors to develop their 
own internal politics. Seemingly opposing organizations and viewpoints coexist 
and compete. Hughes (2010: 63) refers to these as ‘controlling alliances’, in 
which the government uses co- optation and contractualism to depolarize and 
integrate groups that would otherwise be in opposition. Looking to the agricul-
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Figure 14.1 Institutionalization of CARDI and CEDAC over time (source: author).
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opposed, can simultaneously receive official sanction from, and promotion by, 
the Council of Ministers and the MAFF. Practically speaking, both organizations 
inhabit different socio- technical regimes and have other paradigmatic differences 
in their methods and outlook (Beus and Dunlap 1990). CARDI is an outgrowth 
of a project implemented by the IRRI, the institute that developed many of the 
varieties responsible for the Green Revolution in rice. CEDAC was established 
in 1997 with French funding by a cadre of charismatic Cambodians passionate 
about alternative and ecological agriculture. From the government’s perspective, 
however, both organizations (and their respective agricultural models) have a 
pedigree in development aid and both have worthy things to offer agricultural 
policy. Indeed, functionally speaking, the two organizations are not very differ-
ent. CARDI is a semi- autonomous research wing at MAFF, while CEDAC’s rice 
extension is internalized under the DAALI. CEDAC and CARDI both have inde-
pendence in staff selection and funding (Mak 2001), yet both are beholden for 
funding to their respective international development institutions. In turn, both 
are affected by, and try to affect, agricultural policy and programming.
 While CARDI and CEDAC do not independently cooperate with one another 
and often contradict each other in internal memoranda, a space of political plur-
alism created by the MAFF in this sector allows and requires both of them to 
coexist without open conflict. The government, which clearly values some devel-
opmental models underlying both organizations, even tries to encourage syner-
gies between the two rivals. In a speech acknowledging CEDAC’s work in 2009, 
the Minister of MAFF praised the high productivity and adoption rates of ecolo-
gical rice intensification for smallholders, and then instructed CARDI to assist in 
improving its efficiency.7 Although it is unlikely that CARDI will directly coop-
erate with CEDAC on this, the minister demonstrates that the government does 
not necessarily see the paradigmatic contradictions between their respective 
activities.8 To observers accustomed to the adoption of more discrete develop-
ment models, this might appear perplexing. Landau (2008: 249) highlights this, 
noting that, ‘it is difficult in the Cambodian context to identify which ideology is 
the dominant one seeking hegemony and which are the subordinate ones’.
 The equanimity with which the government of Cambodia and the MAFF treat 
the agriculture and rural development sector is likely the result of the political 
palatability of both models of agriculture and their respective utility in promot-
ing the government or political party itself. On the one hand, the discourse and 
development model presented by CARDI embodies modernist expectations of 
rational scientific progress, with the focus on centralized intervention in water 
management, plant breeding and inputs. Looking to the past, particularly the 
Green Revolution and its emergent forms in South and Southeast Asia, this 
model has obvious entry points for government control. On the other hand, the 
alternative discourse, represented primarily by sustainable or ecological agricul-
ture, also presents many advantages for government apparatuses. This is exem-
plified by the 2007–10 National Export Strategy of Cambodia, which featured 
organic products as one of five main focuses (and the only one in the agriculture 
sector). Embedded in the discourse of sustainable agriculture is also modernity, 
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but of a post- industrial sort, which provides a strong populist dimension and val-
orization of productive smallholder agriculture and rural culture. This position 
also mirrors trends in international discourse in agricultural development, which 
has become increasingly critical of Green Revolution agriculture and open to 
alternative agriculture (e.g. Jacobs 1999; Lélé 1991; Tripp 2006; UNCED 1992a: 
Section II; 1992b). For the Cambodian state, both modernist and alternative agri-
culture offer legitimacy in the eyes of the world, productivity increases, and spe-
cific tools for enhancing government authority. Moreover, both forms of 
agriculture allow the government to make a presence in the countryside where 
most of the voters live. In the following, I analyse what each model of agricul-
ture offers the political system, how the government seeks to assert itself, and 
which trade- offs each model presents for the state.
Modernist agriculture
CARDI, as the local representative of a sprawling scientific community and 
agrobusiness industry, is able to mobilize large- scale scientific research efforts 
regarding soil, hydrology, plant breeding and processing. This provides the gov-
ernment more transparency over the natural resource base for planning purposes 
while highlighting potential infrastructure interventions for the future (Sarun 
2009). The breeding of new varieties (for now rice, but in the future, additional 
crops) assists in developing export- oriented agricultural commodities and, more 
generally, for evidencing Cambodia’s progress toward modern agriculture, inter-
national trade and economic growth (IRRI 2007; James 2010; Sophal 2010). On 
a functional level, these new plant varieties provide the MAFF with an artefact 
that it can present to villagers during political ceremonies that reinforces the 
government’s traditional position as caretaker and overlord (Landau 2008: 249; 
Öjendal and Kim 2007). These varieties, which are more standardized than tradi-
tional varieties, are also more easily processed and prepared for export. Export, 
in turn, promotes investment in high- tech rice milling infrastructure and presents 
Cambodia (and, by extension, the government) as a more important player and 
competitor in the region (Rasmey Kampuchea 2007). Processing improvements 
add value domestically, reduce imports, and allow the state to promote patriot-
ism through food sovereignty.
 The modernist agriculture system, however, is also understood by the MAFF 
as a victim of its own systematization. Each aspect of the modernist technology 
package can and might be abused if implemented without considering the 
farming system, the farmers themselves, and the existing economic relations. In 
the Cambodian People’s Party magazine, Pracheachun, the Minister of the 
MAFF, H.E. Chan Sarun, frequently comments that agricultural inputs are 
largely uncontrollable and invasive to the environment and society. For example, 
in writing about the pest management in Cambodia, he concludes,
Actually, pesticides are a double- edged sword. If used properly, they can 
help to manage pests and increase yields but used wrongly they can impact 
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health and other good animals and critters, as well as polluting the soil and 
environment. It also creates obstacles for exporting agricultural products to 
other countries and discourages tourism. . . . Furthermore, most pesticides 
sold in the market are illegal and are of low quality.
(Sarun 2005)
In the same article, Minister Sarun points out that even international efforts to 
control pesticides are challenging, and describes how Cambodia’s latest efforts 
to ban and control problematic chemicals are limited in effectiveness. But his 
critique is rather neutral, namely that new technologies arise faster than we can 
develop the organizational capability to control their social and environmental 
side effects (Norgaard 1994: 56). The minister is echoing the views of many 
Cambodians farmers involved in natural production,9 for whom one of the most 
salient philosophical desires is to maintain control over the process and pace of 
transformation (cf. Cleveland et al. 1994; Fitzgerald 1993). Farmers and the 
minister are, in a manner, admitting that the necessary technical and cultural 
conditions for systemic industrial agriculture are not present in Cambodia and 
that, furthermore, the nature of the industrial agriculture and the aggressive 
markets they accompany, are difficult for the government to control (Boyle and 
Chakrya 2010; Kampuchea Thmei 2008a; Koh Santepheap 2008b, 2008c). In a 
recent edition of Pracheachun, Minister Sarun (2009) describes in populist terms 
how the government supports the ecological system of rice intensification (SRI) 
because it provides an opportunity for farmers to begin adjusting their habits, 
particularly to prepare for climate change. The continuation of this article, which 
focuses on irrigation while critiquing synthetic fertilizer, is essentially an admis-
sion that a combination of factors including the timing, prevailing government 
capacity, and inherent problems in the technical package itself make deployment 
of the whole Green Revolution system problematic.
Alternative agriculture
Diverse in its expressions and forms, alternative agriculture is understood by the 
government as a form of rural development that speaks to sustainability, moder-
nity, productivity, and populism and that, through these aspects, has com-
plementary utility in promoting the legitimacy of the state. CEDAC, as the 
largest rural development NGO in Cambodia, monopolizes the discursive space 
as well as directly intervening in wide- ranging rural development initiatives. Its 
primary entry point into ecological agriculture has been to promote the now- 
famous SRI, which has been institutionalized by the government in the SRI Sec-
retariat. By 2008, official statistics showed that Cambodia led Southeast Asia in 
share of produce that is organic (IFOAM and FiBL 2008, 2010).10 As a result, 
both domestically and internationally, alternative agriculture has achieved 
notoriety and demonstrated benefit to the government. Through its autonomous 
activities, CEDAC serves many other important roles for the government, 
including training government extension workers, promoting a domestic market, 
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championing sustainable development internationally, valorizing small farmers, 
and providing a populist model of agricultural development (Feuer 2007: 32–5; 
Muol 2008). Furthermore, farmer participation in training, small credit groups, 
or other programmes, increases their visibility to the government (cf. Scott 1998) 
and increases the bureaucratic interface. Emerging from CEDAC’s work is also 
tangible evidence of the improvement of rural life, as symbolized by organic 
rice, vegetables, palm sugar and other ecological- oriented products that can be 
experienced and consumed in the city. Dimensions of alternative agriculture pro-
moted by CEDAC, such as local and traditional, and organic, food, are useful for 
generating patriotic sentiment and supporting domestic market value- added initi-
atives (Vida and Reardon 2008). Internationally, support for ecological agricul-
ture is increasingly viewed as a positive trait of progressive and modern 
developing countries (UNEP et al. 2011; UNESCAP 2002).
 The main reservation on the part of the government concerning alternative 
agriculture is the indirect political involvement of rural people following agri-
culture training and empowerment programmes. Agricultural training, on its 
own, consists of rather basic gatherings that do not necessarily engender civic 
engagement. However, following international trends in alternative agriculture, 
CEDAC programmes are designed to draw rural people into continually higher 
levels of community engagement (Feuer 2007), beginning with savings groups 
and producer cooperatives, and ending in national- level farmer associations. The 
farmer- to-farmer training mechanism employed by CEDAC allows farmers to 
have technical encounters (Kampuchea Thmei 2008b), which the government 
appreciates, but these also lay the groundwork for increasingly differentiated 
engagement in civil society. Even small producer groups of ten families, which 
primarily focus on improving trading conditions in their villages, can become 
platforms for grassroots organization if threats to the village are faced, whether 
they be environmental (e.g. floods, crime, epidemics) or political (e.g. land grab-
bing, infrastructure projects, corruption, predatory traders). At higher levels of 
organization, such as the national Farmers’ Association, the collective agency of 
the rural community is increased relative to the government. While the Farmers’ 
Association has maintained very amicable relationships with the government 
(Koh Santepheap 2008a), the existence of large rural organizations is already an 
initial challenge to the monopoly of state authority in the countryside.
Spaces of plurality, spaces of innovation
Despite representing competing agricultural discourses in development, CARDI 
and CEDAC can be made to coexist in the same socio- technical landscape 
because of government intervention to create plural political space for them. 
This departs from the axiom in development policy that governments must even-
tually choose between discrete models; rather, it follows market logic, in which 
models are disaggregated and different parts appeal to different audiences. In a 
way, the peaceable coexistence of CARDI and CEDAC in Cambodia is a phys-
ical manifestation of the state of the (more neutral) international debate about 
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agriculture and rural development among academics and policymakers. The 
debate within industrialized countries, in contrast, is largely between a structur-
ally, politically and scientifically dominant school and a popular, but small, 
minority viewpoint. In Cambodia, this dichotomy has not emerged for two 
reasons. First, the government, as I have demonstrated above, has reasons to 
support and be suspicious of both schools of agricultural development and act-
ively stays in the middle ground. Second, CEDAC and CARDI have so far 
largely followed complementary directions in agricultural development: CARDI 
focuses on dry season rice and export standardization whereas CEDAC focuses 
on wet season rice and productivity of farming systems and the organization of 
farming communities. In many ways the latter is the result of the government’s 
ability to capture the strengths of each system and avoid some of the paradig-
matic differences between them, though this may change over time.
 This is demonstrated by the varying ways in which ecological and productiv-
ist agriculture are technically supported or politically leveraged in Cambodia 
(following the framework of Raynolds 2002). To start with, government plan-
ning documents and speeches carefully promote the organic sector and discour-
age agricultural chemicals while encouraging high- yielding varieties and 
irrigation infrastructure (MAFF 2006; Ministry of Commerce 2006). The media 
gives attention, air- time, and consistently favourable commentary to sustainable 
agricultural issues, training programmes and commentators.11 CEDAC has a 
regular radio and television presence, and its director, Dr Koma Yang Saing, is 
interviewed for most reportages and newspaper articles concerning smallholder 
agricultural development. CARDI, in turn, is consistently interviewed in the 
context of agribusiness and export promotion, and their varieties are promoted 
by the MAFF. The current market itself is also evidence of the successful coex-
istence of both sides. Cambodia is the regional leader in organic production and 
the organic output is almost entirely consumed domestically, which is unusual 
for a less developed country. CEDAC, as quoted above, has reached around 8 
per cent of Cambodia’s farming population as well as having trained many 
extension agents in the provincial departments of agriculture. CARDI, in com-
parison, has developed varieties that are widely used for 30 per cent of rice 
cultivation (early and dry season), and has created some popular wet season vari-
eties, some of which are even used for organic cultivation (e.g. Phkar Rumduol). 
They have helped improve agricultural processing, particularly milling quality, 
and have contributed extensively towards characterizing the soils across 
Cambodia.
 However, due to paradigmatic differences in their respective development 
models (as elaborated in Beus and Dunlap 1990), it is only a matter of time 
before the discourses underlying both of these organizations come into open 
conflict. CARDI and its international supporters, for example, would likely 
prefer commanding or centralized government intervention in the distribution of 
its technological package in ways that bypass local populist conservativism. 
CEDAC, as a representative of the broader alternative agriculture movement, 
would likely prefer to improve the economic and political power of producers 
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and promote decentralization through autonomous civil society, such as helping 
to empower farmers and valorize local (as opposed to expert) knowledge. Ulti-
mately, the state and political parties will be the arbiters of this conflict but, in 
contrast to contemporary industrialized country governments, it will enter this 
conflict with less institutional and structural inertia. To the extent that this 
process does not fall prey to elite capture, business interests, or multilateral pres-
sures, whether the government develops a novel middle ground or chooses a spe-
cific side will depend on the evolving merits of each development model.
Notes
 1 This differs from other types of civil society initiatives, such as human rights and 
democracy organizations (Khus 2004 elaborates further on this delineation in Cam-
bodia; Un 2006), whose motivations evolve with domestic conditions such that they 
maintain distance from the state (Landau 2008: 248–9).
 2 Productivist agriculture is outlined by Wilson and Riggs (2003), referencing the 
package of agricultural practices (and often rounded out by certain policies) that rely 
on infrastructure and capital intensive cultivation. In this paper, and in general for 
development purposes, it is synonymous with the term green revolution agriculture.
 3 Angkorean hydrological development has been studied by a series of researchers, 
most notably Bernard- Philippe Groslier, Christophe Pottier, and the team of the Uni-
versity of Sydney’s Greater Angkor Project. See: http://acl.arts.usyd.edu.au/angkor/
gap/.
 4 Default organic is a term to describe farmers who minimally do not use (or have never 
used) agricultural chemicals such as inorganic fertilizer or pesticides. It can also 
include farmers who practice soil erosion control, crop rotation, use of natural fertil-
izers and manures, and mulching. Often it refers to farmers who do not intentionally 
practice natural agriculture, but lack resources (cash, credit, etc.) to purchase inputs 
(see the case study of Uganda in Källander and Rundgren 2008: 167–74).
 5 The acronym CEDAC derives from the French name of the organization, the Centre 
d’Etude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien.
 6 Statistics are provided by CEDAC (2008; Yang Saing 2010).
 7 Speech by His Excellency Dr Chan Sarun, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
eries at the closing ceremony of the meeting entitled ‘Lessons Learnt and SRI Tech-
niques Reflection from 2008–2009’, April 2009. Translated by CEDAC. Accessed 13 
December 2011. Online. Available at: www.cedac.org.kh/sri_pdf1.pdf.
 8 In public speeches and ceremonial gift- givings, the Minister of MAFF often provides 
rice varieties from CARDI while instructing farmers to eliminate or reduce fertilizer 
and pesticide use and employ the ecological system of rice intensification.
 9 Farmers in natural production include those engaged in the System of Rice Intensifi-
cation as well as certified and non- certified organic production.
10 This is based on the percentage of organic agricultural output and excludes Timor 
Leste’s coffee exports.
11 This is based on a six- year sampling of coverage of agricultural issues in three Khmer 
newspapers (Koh Santepheap, Rasmey Thmei, Kampuchea Thmei), two English- 
language dailies (Phnom Penh Post and the Cambodia Daily), two popular radio sta-
tions in rural areas (Radio France Internationale, Radio Bayon), and two television 
channels (Bayon TV and Cambodian Television Network).
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15 Conclusion
The civil society gaze
Hart N. Feuer, Phuong Le Trong and Judith Ehlert
The challenge we laid out as editors for this book was to assess, in a very func-
tional sense, how practitioners, academics and other observers have defined, 
implemented, and evolved the concept of civil society over the past few decades. 
We did so in this collaborative book project by gathering together a diverse and 
interdisciplinary group of people either explicitly or implicitly working on civil 
society, who were tasked with exploring the ways in which the concept was 
applied in their (primarily empirical) work. While we do not ignore the lively 
debate about civil society that lies in the background of these efforts, we felt that 
the endogenous development of the theory of civil society, alongside its mani-
festations, often results in ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemmas that leave academics 
chasing their tails. What can at least be said is that the phenomenon of civil 
society, as a material object of study and as a conceptual sphere, is informed by 
temporally and spatially relevant factors. While theoretical conceptions of civil 
society are helpful and have proved salient in certain contexts, they may or may 
not prove particularly relevant in other contexts, except perhaps as a means for 
comparison. As a result, even if an encompassing definition for civil society 
could be found, applying it in any meaningful way would still require adaptation 
to match underlying characteristics of each setting, such as the composition of 
the state, historical trends, and influence of external discourses (all of these, inci-
dentally, are discussed in various chapters in the book).
 The individual authors in this volume complement and challenge many pre-
vailing assumptions about the development, role, and persistence of civil society 
through their embedded research, much of which has focused on novel forms of 
civil society. Furthermore, as endogenous actors themselves (i.e. as researchers 
on the ground) in the ongoing conceptualization of civil society, the authors 
must reveal their personal views and theoretical comprehension of civil society 
through their selection of a topic, conceptual framing and methodology. The 
diverse frames and points of departure of the contributing authors’ works suggest 
that civil society is often used as a lens (or an instrument) for studying associa-
tional activity a given domain. As some authors have suggested, this has also 
become the case for studies of what could be perceived as global civil society 
(Amoore and Langley 2004). More generally, however, we argue that observers 
often cast a civil society gaze on broader themes such as religion, HIV, human 
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rights enforcement, or development programmes, which more often than not 
leads to explorations of the evolving types of associational activity generated in 
these areas.
The diversity of civil society
The original purpose of the book was to explore the bounds of the civil society 
debate by drawing inspiration from two neighbouring, but in many ways very 
different, countries. Many of the similarities and differences between Cambodia 
and Vietnam are reflected in the diverse regional and disciplinary backgrounds 
of the contributing authors, some of whom do not explicitly study civil society 
or even subjects typically encountered in civil society literature. Reflecting this, 
the resulting contributions are a collage of civil society that is both aligned with, 
and divergent from, contemporary research trends and theory. Some authors are 
well- steeped in contemporary civil society theory and chose to test the limits of 
various conceptions in practice. Others study phenomena that could readily be 
called civil society- like in the going debate, but they had not previously identi-
fied with nor applied the terminology of civil society in their work. Hiwasa, who 
had carried out an ethnography of women’s groups and the engagement of 
women in local and national advocacy, primarily identified her work as contrib-
uting to feminist studies. Although her work empirically speaks to civil society, 
she had previously not elected to take on board the terminology or interface with 
normative definitions of civil society. In contrast, the civil society dimension in 
the contribution of Bourdier, who studied very similar associational activity in 
Cambodia, is very strongly pronounced. Feuer, similar to Hiwasa, identified his 
original research on large NGOs as a study of the environmental movement and 
social change, rather than on civil society. His contribution to this book, 
however, explicitly engages with debates in civil society and looks at typical 
subjects found in civil society literature, such as the relationship between gov-
ernment and NGOs. As a preliminary conclusion drawing from these cases in 
Cambodia, we suggest that, at least in empirical work, the civil society lens does 
not arise naturally from the subject matter but is rather a personal choice based 
on the orientation and goals of the author, which are, in turn, influenced and con-
strained by international and local conceptions of civil society.
 In Cambodia, popular conceptions of civil society generally correspond to 
definitions and programmes that have been developed and implemented in the 
context of international aid and reconstruction. Indeed, in his survey of the evo-
lution of civil society in Cambodia, Öjendal (this volume) suggests that develop-
ment and advocacy activities are hegemonic in discussions of civil society. The 
civil society lens employed by many observers of Cambodia, therefore, tends to 
focus on formal organizations, human rights groups and other typical forms of 
civil society, such as unions. This emphasis comes through strongly in the con-
tributions by Feuer, Hiwasa and Bourdier. Ehlert’s work, in contrast, explicitly 
challenges this trend in her study of embedded religious- sphere associational 
activity. She argues that the predominance of development assistance in the 
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conception of civil society has caused local institutions to slip between the 
cracks. Her work, like many from the authors writing on Vietnam in this book, 
takes the perspective that associational activities are inherent to society and that 
it is the task of observers to seek it out, highlight it, and thereby bring it into 
larger debates about civil society (including for foreign audiences). The contri-
bution by Thim similarly tries to challenge dominant conceptions of civil 
society. In his chapter, what begins as a small local group of concerned citizens 
dealing with flooding becomes a significant and well- recognized civil society 
group through continual differentiation, formalization, and networking at mul-
tiple scales. Thim suggests that the actors themselves become aware of the legiti-
mating power of being labelled ‘civil society’. Wells- Dang, in his chapter on 
civil society networks in Cambodia and Vietnam, also seeks to uncover and 
legitimate informal associational activity. Through his comparison of meta- level 
associational activity and cooperation in Cambodia and Vietnam, he tests the 
boundaries of popular conceptions that have largely viewed civil society as 
diffuse groups acting unsystematically within bounded areas of interest. Like 
Ehlert, he argues that more (forms of ) engagement, activism and coordination 
are undertaken by Cambodian and Vietnamese actors than is commonly 
recognized.
 Many of the authors in this book writing about Vietnam similarly attempt to 
search for and identify emerging associational activities as civil society, or high-
light the civil society content of well- established institutions and ideas. As pre-
sented in the discourse analysis by Phuong Le Trong, Vietnamese officials and 
academics are complicit in twisting around the concept of civil society in order 
to situate it in socialist historiography and in contemporary political- cultural 
ideology and social organization in Vietnam. Bach Tan Sinh’s overview of the 
sprawling state and non- state associations demonstrates how this is, in practice, 
carried out. State- sponsored associational activity, such as the Vietnam Women’s 
Union (elaborated in Pistor and Le Thi Quy), is officially seen as the core of 
civic participation in the Vietnamese conception of state–society interface. Pistor 
and Le Thi Quy, however, contend that breakdowns and evolving hybrid 
arrangements at the local level of implementation (in the case of gender advo-
cacy) are evidence that top- down groups, in spite of their intentions to do so, are 
not fulfilling the diverse local aspirations for civic participation. And further-
more, as Waibel and Benedikter suggest, the growing and diversifying cohort of 
community- based organizations in southern Vietnam is indicative of expanding 
notions and relevance of alternative forms of civil society.
 In contrast to authors in this volume seeking out and explaining existing asso-
ciational activity in terms of civil society, two contributors take a critical stance 
against the aptitude of civil society explanations more generally. In her chapter, 
Reis questions whether turning the civil society lens on all types of associational 
activity in Vietnam is really just paying lip service to the core concept of civil 
society based on the division between state and society. She argues that many of 
the fundamental premises of civil society emerging from its historical manifesta-
tions in western Europe cannot naturally be merged with the cultural context and 
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political economy in Vietnam. Even in Cambodia, where development aid has 
apparently transferred more Western conceptions of civil society, Ou and Kim 
argue that associations and organizations, which are popularly understood to 
constitute civil society, are often empty shells, bereft of the social orientation, 
volunteer spirit and grassroots focus that is hoped for in international civil 
society discourse. While the arguments made by Reis, and by Ou and Kim, may 
hold if one strictly compares the ‘content’ of civil society to various socially 
constructed ideals, most of the authors outlined above allowed the definition of 
civil society to emerge from empirical realities. In other chapters a middle course 
was taken, whereby the civil society lens was purposively applied, but the ana-
lysis ultimately shied away from normative comparisons concerning the content 
of civil society. This suggests that the civil society gaze is both a product of indi-
vidual authors’ thematic and conceptual points of departure, as well as a reflec-
tion of the contested discourse of civil society at the national level.
Micro themes, macro tendencies
While the backgrounds of the authors, their country of study, and their respec-
tive areas of expertise condition them to select certain ‘micro themes’, and inves-
tigate them in certain ways, their work often goes towards examining broader 
‘macro themes’. The authors gravitated toward two such macro themes: (1) ana-
lysing changes in political space, particularly through advocacy, and (2) teasing 
out the traces and tendencies in associational activity emerging from the political 
and cultural context as well as from foreign intervention. These macro themes 
are illustrative of two common ways the authors investigated civil society. 
Authors falling into macro theme 1 generally took an outward- orientation – 
looking at the goals and results of various activities. Authors falling into macro 
theme 2 had a more introspective orientation, looking at the structural and con-
ceptual make- up of different activities. In short, some authors elected to look at 
what civil society tries to accomplish while the others looked at what underlies 
and influences civil society.
 The predominance of these two macro themes is not surprising when one con-
siders how the concept of civil society is commonly instrumentalized in devel-
opment discourse. In mainstream development, ‘civil society’ is hoped to be a 
facilitator of liberal development goals such as good governance and decentral-
ization, which leads to aid for advocacy and activism, and non- state service pro-
vision (Goetz and O’Brien 1995; White 1994). Historical conceptions of civil 
society also speak to the question of carving out political space for citizens in the 
public sphere. And with so much aid channelled to advocacy, thereby creating 
physical objects to study (usually formal organizations), it is to be expected that 
many observers tend to focus on advocacy and political space (macro theme 1). 
The discussions taking place as part of the authors’ writeshop reflected this – 
with frequent, and often vigorously defended, references to the competitive, or 
even hostile, relationship between the state and civil society. However, when the 
dust settled after these debates, and the different experiences within and between 
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Cambodia and Vietnam had been represented, it was evident that the divide 
between public and private, and between state and society, does not manifest as 
a zero- sum relationship. One the one hand, although the state perceives that civil 
society plays a positive role in the governance of social welfare, poverty allevi-
ation, public health, environmental protection, business administration and the 
organization of academic and cultural activities, the state is commonly prompted 
to act pre- emptively and reactively to control civil society because of its one- 
dimensional competitive view of local power. On the other hand, authors shared 
many instances of ‘mutual’ relationships between the state and civil society, in 
which emerging social groups and civil society organizations form a social 
space, even the infrastructure, for socio- economic development that both the 
state and civil society can also leverage to their own ends.
 A corollary assumption coming out of historical views of civil society is that 
the growth of associational activity (often in the form of organizations) is a uni-
versal part of development (Lewis 1997; SustainAbility 2003; Tandon 1994) and 
helps to make transparent local people’s needs and aspirations (Edwards et al. 
1999; Farrington and Bebbington 1994; Sen 1999). This optimistic view of civil 
society was followed by critical perspectives concerning ‘uncivil society’ and 
the hijacking of civil society discourses in international development for polit-
ical purposes (Boyd 2004; Monga 2009; Stewart 1997). One prominent strand of 
this critique warily views the directed support for non- state actors as a thinly 
veiled way of pushing a neo- liberal agenda (Gill 1998; Kamat 2004) and/or pro-
moting Western political values using technocratic- oriented organizations (Fer-
guson 1994: 66; Judge 2003). It is therefore also not surprising that many 
observers, including those in macro theme 2 who are ostensibly investigating 
civil society, look at the underlying drivers and cultural roots of various associa-
tional activities.
Utility of the civil society lens
If, as in the case of this book, observers of civil society are already attached to 
various disciplines and well conceptualized subject areas, what is the purpose of, 
and intention behind, explicitly employing a civil society framework? Why not 
express the subject in simpler terms using traditional theoretical frameworks, 
such as ‘the political economy of agriculture policy in Cambodia’ (Feuer) or 
‘institutional analysis of the Vietnam Women’s Union’ (Pistor and Le Thi Quy)? 
Based on ideas suggested in the country overview chapters by Öjendal and Bach 
Tan Sinh, and drawing from the cohort of contributing authors to this volume, 
we have garnered a few cross- cutting rationales of researchers and practitioners 
for bringing the concept of civil society into empirical work, namely: claiming 
legitimacy; exploring the political dimension of civil society; and understanding 
the ethics of identifying civil society.
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Claiming legitimacy
Due to its illustrious historical pedigree and its strong presence in contemporary 
nation- building and development discourses, the term civil society is more than 
just a conceptual container. For academics, governments, development agencies, 
and local people, civil society wraps a layer of meaning and significance around 
certain activities, elevating their relevance and legitimacy. For governments, 
civil society may be viewed as a threatening sector of activism, but it is also 
often viewed as a universal part of state–society relations and an integral partner 
in service provision. The entry by Phuong Le Trong elucidates how Vietnamese 
academics and officials transform and co- opt potentially destabilizing foreign 
concepts in order to render them politically palatable and useful in Party policy. 
In Cambodia, ‘civil society’ has been viewed by the state as a partner in service 
delivery and policy (see Öjendal and Feuer, respectively) as well as a challenge 
to state monopoly on power (see Thim). For contemporary researchers and prac-
titioners, the aura of civil society can also be useful in branding one’s own work. 
Appropriating the terminology of civil society to frame your research or devel-
opment project can often bring legitimation and recognition from academic 
circles and donors. In this case, recognition would be largely a strategic endeav-
our relating to the availability of funding and popularity of certain definitions of 
civil society. Because international aid agencies have become increasingly inter-
ested in supporting certain types of initiative that they deem to be part of civil 
society (NGOs, human rights organizations, environmental groups, etc.), 
research or development projects that fit these descriptions are often more fund-
able. The contribution by Bourdier, which describes the mobilization of people 
living with HIV/AIDS and the growth in anti- retroviral treatment programmes, 
highlights how the identification with civil society is employed as a means to 
legitimize their activities and to conceptualize their growing institutionalization. 
Doing so makes individual initiatives seem to be part of an inevitable and 
socially relevant process in society. As Wells- Dang’s overview of civil society 
networks highlights, the impacts of identification as civil society vary with the 
audience. On the one hand, popular civil society discourses in Cambodia bear 
connotations of grassroots resistance, as exemplified by an activist quoted in the 
chapter: ‘We will rise up and speak for the people. We are Cambodia’s civil 
society.’ On the other hand, Wells- Dang also follows networks of activists that 
purposefully avoid formal registration as an organization because it would draw 
unwanted political scrutiny to local organizers. In general, however, the high 
profile of the civil society debate can provide incentive for academics to ostens-
ibly study civil society, as well as for practitioners to promote activities that can 
be defined as civil society. The prominence of civil society in leading develop-
ment agencies, in addition to academic discourse, sends a signal to practitioners 
that aligning with this conceptual space may lead to support.1 In academia, as 
one scholar noted, civil society has become ‘a growth industry in Chinese 
studies’ (Nevitt 1996) and the same observation can be made elsewhere. In fact, 
this book itself contributes to this process.
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Exploring the political dimension of civil society
If one distils many of the empirical chapters in this book (particularly those in 
the section ‘Advocacy and Political Space’) down to the core developmental 
themes being investigated, one often finds politically or socially controversial 
processes under way. These range from local people seeking justice and com-
pensation in transnational diplomacy (Thim), to negotiating the role of women in 
decentralization (Pistor and Le Thi Quy; Hiwasa), to the evolving influence of 
independent scientists and ecological movements in natural resource manage-
ment (Wells- Dang; Feuer). Often, however, the political controversies and 
debates inherent to these topics can become obscured by the focus on civil 
society. As Ferguson (1994: 253–65) wrote in his seminal work on Lesotho, 
international development agencies often seek to sequester the normative polit-
ical dimension of their interventions in technocratic projects and jargon. Sup-
porting various activities under the guise of civil society can be exploited as an 
indirect way of, among others, promoting liberal political regimes, interfering in 
national politics, or transferring social ideology such as feminism (Bui The 
Cuong 2005). In the programming of various agencies, these intentions are 
advertised with differing degrees of discretion. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), for example, explicitly promotes civil 
society as an aspect of democratization and governance, while the World Bank 
more generally conceives of civil society as the respective activities of various 
organizations, movements and unions.2 The governments of Cambodia and 
Vietnam are nonetheless becoming increasingly aware of the political nature of 
civil society but are forced to balance their responses. In Vietnam, as highlighted 
by Bach Tan Sinh and Phuong Le Trong, there is the sense that civil society is 
something of a moral imperative – a social concept to be adapted and included in 
ideology, albeit with modifications for the political and cultural context. This 
includes, as described by Waibel and Benedikter, decrees aimed at regulating, 
integrating and co- opting these developments. In Cambodia, in contrast, after 
initially being flooded by organizations and interventions from the early 1990s 
(see Öjendal; Ou and Kim), the government has recently taken legal steps to 
assert political control over civil society. Although undoubtedly responding to 
overtly political activities carried out by human rights organizations and unions, 
the attempt to pass an ‘NGO Law’ in Cambodia is likely also an acknowledg-
ment that the government is increasingly aware of, and concerned with, the 
everyday politics of development initiatives (see Bratton 1989; Kerkvliet 2009). 
As evident in the contributions on Vietnam (with the exception of that of Reis), 
the government and Party have already subsumed much of the civic space of tra-
ditional practices and go further by attempting to co- opt Western civil society 
discourse (see Phuong Le Trong, this volume); official initiatives nevertheless 
struggles to match the dynamism of new civil society initiatives. In both the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese cases, the state is increasingly forced to control civil 
society from a distance by shaping (and restricting) the environment in which 
associational activity can emerge.
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Understanding the ethics of identifying civil society
Although conceptions of civil society remain unsettled in theoretical debates, 
decisions are nevertheless made regarding who or what constitutes civil society 
in many publications, initiatives and policies. Because they are made within a 
context of contestation and uncertainty, the decisions themselves become inter-
esting subjects of research. As discussed above, being labelled as civil society 
either through self- identification or by external parties, has political con-
sequences and can influence a group’s legitimacy. State–non- state boundaries 
can also be forged in this context, resulting in socially constructed conceptions 
of autonomy and the public/private divide. Scholars who write about various ini-
tiatives using a civil society lens, or publish in a book about civil society (par-
ticularly if they enumerate it), are thereby constituting a reality whether they 
intend to or not. This goes beyond Hann and Dunn’s (1996) critique about 
judging local activities on the basis of Western models of civil society, and 
refers instead to judging local activities using any model of civil society. With a 
civil society lens, the object of research cannot be studied independently of 
various preconceptions and notions of civil society. Bourdier addresses this point 
in his chapter, arguing that assessments about the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS 
interventions are interchanged with judgements about the grassroots and embed-
ded nature of the attendant organizations and groups. Whether one eventually 
concludes that the objects of study are genuinely part of civil society or not, an a 
priori assumption has already been made that various social phenomena have 
something to do with civil society.
 All of the contributions to this book speak to different aspects of this 
dynamic. A typical point of departure, which is critically discussed in the chapter 
by Ou and Kim and more generally elaborated upon by Bach Tan Sinh (2011), 
are reports that physically ‘count’ civil society, usually by tallying the numbers 
of certain organizations or the amount of funding received in various sectors. As 
Ou and Kim demonstrate, forcing a definition of civil society for the sake of tal-
lying not only pays lip service to the diversity in institutional dynamics within 
various organizations, it also makes implicit judgements as to the legitimacy of 
various associational phenomena. Waibel and Benedikter, similarly, chronicle 
how official recognition (and registration) as CBOs often leads to integration 
into, or at least intervention from, the government. In other words, counting not 
only legitimizes, it also makes groups transparent, for better or worse. Another 
point of departure considers the agency of the actors in managing their identifi-
cation as part of civil society. In this regard, the contributions by Ehlert, Hiwasa 
and Thim complement each other. Thim describes how a regional network of 
civic groups grows, differentiates their activities, and deliberately tries to gain 
official recognition so that they can be taken more seriously in national debates. 
Ehlert, in contrast, argues that many embedded and pagoda- based associational 
activities are not recognized as civil society by development agents and the state 
but that they nonetheless play a critical role in communal relations in Cambodia. 
Hiwasa complements this view, viewing village- level women’s groups in 
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 Cambodia as opportunistic platforms for communication, empowerment and 
civic participation even when they dissolve as formal groups. In sum, whether 
groups are perpetuated or dissolved, become registered or stay under the radar, 
announce their membership in civil society or keep to themselves, remains a 
contentious process that parallels other discussions about what civil society is or 
what it does.
Conclusion
The primordial attraction of scholars to the ideas surrounding civil society 
stretches back to Aristotle and Cicero, and weighs heavily on contemporary dis-
courses on political transition and development. Co- editor Judith Ehlert once 
described the concept as having a certain ‘charisma’. Indeed, this book is an 
attempt to draw together scholars and practitioners to write about Vietnam and 
Cambodia with the expectation that the concept of civil society would create a 
unified platform for academic exchange. The authors, who are mostly not experts 
in civil society per se, can nevertheless leverage the terminology and a general 
layman’s familiarity of civil society to create dialogue with the other authors. 
Although the editors originally assumed that the contributors would write about 
civil society in a literal sense, it turned out that civil society became more of 
what Mollinga (2008) has termed a ‘boundary concept’. In interdisciplinary 
studies, boundary concepts ‘allow us to think, that is conceptually communicate 
about, the multidimensionality of the issues we study and address’ (Mollinga 
2008: 23). In the summary above we referred to this primarily as the ‘civil 
society lens’ – a shared set of concepts that, although defined by each author and 
in each empirical setting, facilitate interdisciplinary and cross- thematic dialogue 
about the respective associational activities we study. This is, however, not 
strictly an argument that civil society does not exist as such, but merely that it 
manifests through debate, contextual adaptation, and external influence. While 
certain manifestations may crystallize over time under specific circumstances, 
such as the NGO- dominant definitions popular in Cambodia, they also become 
destabilized and renegotiated as new authors and new cases test the boundaries 
of the concept.
 This book is an experiment in testing the boundaries of civil society as they 
have been variously conceptualized and applied in Cambodia and Vietnam. We 
purposefully drew authors from a variety of national backgrounds and discip-
lines to write on their respective areas of expertise. When possible, we solicited 
works on themes or ‘forms of civil society’ that were relatively underserved in 
contemporary literature. Although some of these authors had not previously 
written using a civil society lens, their topic areas covered some part of the asso-
ciational realm in Cambodia and Vietnam. The overviews written by Joakim 
Öjendal and Bach Tan Sinh are meant to serve as reference points, presenting 
the range of activities studied and the perspectives in use over various periods 
in the two countries. In their topics and in their analytical perspectives, however, 
the authors often diverged from, or expanded on, many of the national trends. 
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Their themes ranged from topics that are more routinely covered, such as state–
society relations, organizations and associations, and political activism, to 
themes that emerged from the specific context, such as women’s empowerment, 
associational activity embedded in the religious sphere, and health sector mobil-
ization. More importantly, however, the authors studied what they knew, while 
framing the cases with a civil society perspective. Consolidating this range of 
perspectives, both in their diversity and in their commonality, is the primary goal 
of this volume.
 Even contributions that outwardly appear to be investigating the concept of 
civil society itself are actually exploring more general social processes. The 
chapter by Reis, for example, characterizes the Vietnamese social imaginary and 
its openness to foreign concepts of social organization by looking at confrontation 
between Western and Vietnamese cultural precedents and political economy. The 
contributions can be largely clustered into two macro- level themes: advocacy and 
political space, and traces and tendencies in civil society. In the former, authors 
tended to focus on how people and their associational activities draw attention to 
their causes in the political sphere, while in the latter, authors described how 
culture, history and the political environment left an imprint on associational 
activities. However, while the collective focus on advocacy and political space is 
more clear- cut among chapters on this theme, a political dimension permeates 
almost all of the chapters. The activities studied are themselves often of a political 
nature, as are the mechanisms of development and international aid that incentiv-
ize, generate, or inspire them. The governments of Cambodia and Vietnam have 
also recognized this, taking measures to regulate, co- opt, or discursively nullify 
the activities of civil society that they view as undesirable. As many of the con-
tributing authors demonstrate, this and other considerations shuffle the incentives 
for actors to formalize or officially announce their membership in civil society. 
On the one hand, transparency, i.e. ‘being counted’, allows for open political 
manoeuvering, legitimation and support from development agencies. On the other 
hand, this can lead to government intervention or draw unnecessary attention to 
local or embedded initiatives.
 This last point raises the question of the academic’s (or development agen-
cy’s) ethical role in writing about and researching civil society. While civil 
society can be a useful boundary concept for interdisciplinary studies and col-
laboration, and naturally lends charisma to one’s work, the act of carrying out 
research into civil society draws attention to, and often implies legitimacy of, 
certain activities. Regardless of which of the varied models of civil society 
researchers in a developing country context select, this book argues that civil 
society research, in itself, is a political act.
Notes
1 The World Bank publishes a biannual report on engagement with civil society, as well 
as providing a fund for civil society. Many bilateral agencies and foundations also 
provide specific programmes for civil society, such as the UK Department for 
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 International Development (DFID), Irish Aid, the US Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), the Global Fund and the Carnegie Endowment, to name a few.
2 Referenced from the following programme websites for USAID (http://transition.usaid.
gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/civil_society/) and the World 
Bank (http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0) (accessed 24 August 2012).
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Country profiles: Cambodia and 
Vietnam
Figure A.1 The Greater Mekong Subregion.
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Vietnamese legal documents on civil 
society (order of appearance in the 
book)
Table A.3  Vietnamese legal documents on civil society
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of 12 June 1999
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Glossary: Vietnamese and Khmer terms
Table G.1 Vietnamese terms
ấp văn hóa ‘good hamlet’
hội associations
bẩn dirty
câu lạc bộ club
Chỉ số hiệu quả hoạt động xây dựng và 
thi hành pháp luật kinh doanh
Ministerial Effectiveness Index
đoàn thể mass organization
Chỉ số năng lực cạnh tranh cấp tỉnh Provincial Competitiveness Index
chính nghĩa exclusive righteousness
công public (sphere)
công dân citizen
Dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm 
tra





hành chính hoá administration policy
hương  ước village conventions/codes
hội đồng kỳ mục (self-regulatory) village council  
(sixteenth century – 1945)
hội quần chúng popular associations
hợp tác xã cooperatives
cơ quan quản lý nhà nước state-managed entity
kinh tế tập thể collective economy
Liên hiệp các Hội Khoa học và Kỹ 
thuật Việt Nam
Vietnam Union of Science and Technology 
Association
kinh tế economy, economic
kỳ dịch executive (village) council  
(sixteenth century – 1921)
kỳ mục legislative (village council)  
(sixteenth century – 1945)
kỳ lão senior village advisory  
(sixteenth century – 1921)
Mạng lưới Sông ngòi Việt Nam Vietnam Rivers Network
nhà nước hoá nationalization policy
nhóm tín dụng micro-credit groups
phản biện critical feedback continued
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phản biện, phản biện xã hội advise, give critical feedback
phường craft guilds
tập đoàn sản xuất collective groups
tổ bơm tưới irrigation groups
tổ chức phi chính phủ organization not of the (main) government (NGO)
tổ chức chính trị xã hội, chuyên nghiệp political, social, and professional organization
tổ chức xã hội tự nguyện voluntary groups (Red River Delta)
tổ chức xã hội civic organizations
tổ hợp tác sản xuất production groups (Mekong Delta)
tư family or private (sector)
quan government officials (in ancient Vietnam)
văn hoá culture
văn minh civility, civilization
xã hội society/social
xã hội công dân civil society (society of citizens)
xã hội dân sự thông thái knowledge-based civil society
xã hội dân sự civil society (emphasizing the role of community)
Table G.2 Khmer terms
achar Buddhist laymen, ritual specialists 
angka (angkar) organization – term often used for NGO; but historically 
different meaning
ataun oknia indulgence
chbap srey Women’s Code of Conduct
chomnoh dharma association fundraising group (for social welfare 
purposes)
devaraja God – King
karma accumulation of merit gained in current and former lives
kochorum robo sahakum extended community, including administrators, families and 
monks; community participation
neak sahakum member of the community/villagers
phdal amnach oy satrey women’s empowerment
Phka Rumduol a modernized traditional rice variety
phum village
pnort chas nouv dordeil ‘old way of thinking’
punna personal merit-making
sahakum community: helping each other 
samaki solidarity
samakum voluntary association of people
samakum prak credit group (cash association)
samakum sraov rice association
sangha (sanghka) Buddhist order/Buddhist clergy
sangkat downtown residential area (district) 
sangkum society (see also Sangkum Reastr Niyum)
sangkum civil civil society
sangkum krusar family matters
Sangkum Reastr Niyum Great Society Period
srey kroup leakkh a perfectly virtuous woman
wat pagoda/temple
access: to credit 119, 223, 226, 227, 228; 
to education 104; to healthcare 114, 118, 
119, 120, 125, 126, 127; to knowledge 
and information 118, 231; to services 
231
accountability 23; bottom-up 187; of 
NGOs 27, 67, 187, 188, 189, 191–2, 
196, 198
Accra Agenda for Action 106
advocacy 13–14, 29, 30, 127, 254, 256, 
262; community 61, 63, 66–70, 69, 73, 
158–66; cross-border 70–1; embedded 
63, 65–6, 69, 72; environmental 63, 
64–71, 157–66; gender 255; healthcare 
120; human-rights 69, 120; media 63, 
69, 72; networks 61–73, 158–66; for 
policy reform 161, 165, 166; types of 63
agency 260; actor-oriented approach 157, 
165; interface approach, Norman Long 
157; state 238, 239
agriculture: agricultural development, 
Cambodia 136, 237–52; agricultural 
extension 51, 52, 53, 136; women’s role 
in 133, 136, 137; see also Cambodian 
Center for Research and Development 
in Agriculture (CEDAC); farmer 
associations; farmer groups; rice 
production; Vietnam Gardening 
Association
Aing, S. 131, 133, 134, 137 
Alagappa, M. 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11–12
Almond, G. A. 79, 80, 81
Altieri, M. A. 240, 241
AMARA 26, 31, 31–2, 131, 239
Amoore, L. 253
Angeles, L. C. 100
angka 190–1
Anheier, H. 62
Ann, S. 207, 209
Annan, K. 115
Antiretroviral Users’ Association (AUA), 
Cambodia 116
aquaculture, Vietnam 51, 52, 223
Arato, A. 62, 81
Arce, A. 154, 155
Archer, M. 78, 88
arena analysis 155
Aristotle 2
Arnason, J. P. 89
Aschmoneit, W. 210, 211, 212
ASEAN Free Trade Area 55
Asia Foundation 50, 67
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 51, 104; 
Gender Report (2005) 93–4, 96, 100
Asian value theory 11
association: art of 3; freedom of 81
Association of Cambodian Local 
Economic Development Agencies 
(ACLEDA) 30
Association of Economics, Vietnam 48
Association of Nuns and Laywomen of 
Cambodia 209
Association of Physics, Vietnam 48
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 55
Association of Vietnamese Architects 48
Association of Vietnamese Folklorists 47
Association of Vietnamese Musicians 48
Association of Vietnamese Writers 47, 48
associational behaviour 4, 9, 39, 179, 180, 
220, 221, 229–30, 253–4, 254–5, 256, 
257; after Đổi mới 39, 179, 180, 220, 
221, 229–30; and capitalism 206; 
colonial era 10, 42–3; under the Khmer 
Index
Page numbers in italics denote tables.
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Rouge 205–6; in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology 82
associational forms, Vietnam 43–4
Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) 240
authoritarian regimes 3, 4, 10, 11; 
deference to authority 239; one-party 
state, Vietnam 39, 77, 84, 221, 230; see 
also Khmer Rouge regime; Pol Pot 
regime
authoritarian rule, within NGOs 196
auto-genocide, Cambodia 21, 26, 203
autonomy 41, 67, 126, 127, 173; and 
community participation 117; as concept 
62; financial 46; Gordan White on 22, 
189; moral 82; from state 22, 50, 62, 72, 
176, 178, 184, 189, 260; of Vietnam 
Women’s Union (VWU) 101; of women 
143
Bach Tan Sinh 1, 9, 39–57, 255, 259, 260, 
261
Baird, I. 66
Bajunid, O. F. 10
Bass, S. 66
Bebbington, A. J. 257
Benedikter, S. 62, 87, 218–36, 255, 259, 
260
beneficiaries: accountability to 188, 189, 
191, 196, 198; of development 
intervention 6, 116, 118; NGOs 
connection with 189, 194–5, 196; 
participation 194
Bernader, B. 113
Beus, C. E. 237, 241, 243, 247
Biggs, D. 221
Biggs, S. D. 240
Bit, S. 206
Bloh, H. v. 222, 227
Blunt, P. 205
boat racing associations, Cambodia 210
Boeung Kak Lake campaign 69–70
boomerang strategy 69–70, 72
bottom-up development 26, 51, 123; critic 
on NGOs 192; grassroots orientation of 
NGOs 51
boundaries: between state and civil society 
5, 6–7, 61, 219, 230, 260; and networks 
61








Buddhism 11; in Cambodia 26, 29–30, 
189, 203, 204, 208–13; under the Khmer 
Rouge 26, 208; merit-making 211–12, 
213, 214; monks and nuns 208, 210, 
212, 213, 215n1; pagodas see pagoda 
associations; pagodas; in the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea 208; political 
co-optation of 212–13; politicization of 
213; the sangha (clergy) 206, 208; 
socially-engaged 214; in Vietnam 81, 85
Buddhism for Development 209
Buddhism for Social Development Action 
(BSDA) 31, 32–3, 131, 209
Buddhism-oriented NGOs: 
professionalization of 209; service 
provision 209; social agendas 209; see 
also Buddhism for Development; 
Buddhism for Social Development 
Action (BSDA)
Bui Quang Dung 172, 221, 222
Bui The Cuong 219, 259
Bukovansky, M. 78, 88
Bureau, E. 114, 124, 125
bureaucratization 118
Burnip, D. A. 190
Cambodia 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 256, 259; 
agricultural development 136, 237–52; 
see also Cambodian Center for Research 
and Development in Agriculture 
(CEDAC); auto-genocide 21, 26, 203; 
Buddhism 26, 29–30, 189, 203, 204, 
208–13; civil society 1–2, 9, 12–13, 
21–38, 61, 62, 63, 66–73, 113–30, 
131–52, 157–66, 187–202, 190, 203–17, 
237–52, 254–5, 256, 257, 258, 259, 
260–1; civil war 21, 26, 30, 203, 205–6; 
commune councils see commune 
councils; community-based 
organizations (CBOs) 2, 25, 27–8, 31, 
33–4, 118, 131–52, 199n3, 204, 206–7; 
community participation 23, 72, 115, 
116–18, 120, 127, 135; decentralization 
reform see decentralization reform; 
democratization 13, 21, 24, 116, 203; 
Department of Agronomy and 
Agricultural Land Improvement 
(DAALI) 241, 243; domestic violence 
148; education 28, 205; fishing/fisheries 
27, 28, 31, 33–4, 207, 209; gender 
norms 131, 132–5, 147–8; health sector 
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 development 113–14, 117–27; hierarchy 
in 131, 147; HIV/AIDS see HIV/AIDS; 
Khmer diaspora see Khmer diaspora; 
Khmer Rouge see Khmer Rouge; 
kinship structures 21, 30, 189, 205–6; 
liberal–anarchic order 24, 25; local 
government see commune councils; 
media 63, 66, 69, 72, 247; Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) 241, 243, 244, 247; Ministry of 
Water Resources and Meteorology 
(MOWRAM) 160; Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs (MoWA) 135, 146; 
NGO law 259; NGO networks 61, 62, 
63, 66–73, 255; NGOs 1–2, 13, 14, 25, 
26–7, 29, 31–3, 118, 131, 187–202, 203, 
206; pagodas see pagoda associations; 
pagodas; patronage system 21, 22, 23, 
26, 30; post-conflict reconstruction 21, 
22, 26, 27, 193, 203, 204; poverty 
alleviation 29, 199n7, 210; Rectangular 
Strategy 135; research on civil society in 
1, 2, 8–9; research institutes 188; see 
also Cambodian Agriculture Research 
and Development Institute (CARDI); 
Cambodian Center for Research and 
Development in Agriculture (CEDAC); 
rice production 27, 136, 240, 241, 243, 
244, 245; saving groups 136, 139, 146; 
service provision 28, 29, 258; social 
mobilization 114–18, 126, 127; state–
society relations 21–38; trade unions 25, 
30, 190, 199n8; traditional associations 
25, 28; trust, destruction of 30, 205–6; 
UNTAC in see United Nations 
Transitional Administration in 
Cambodia (UNTAC, 1991–3); Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) 
206–7; water resources management see 
water resources management; Women’s 
Code of Conduct 133; women’s groups 
see women’s groups, Cambodia; 
women’s rights 31–2, 147; youth 
organizations 30
Cambodia-IRRI-Australia Project (CIAP) 
240, 241
Cambodia National Mekong Committee 
(CNMC) 160
Cambodian Agriculture Research and 
Development Institute (CARDI) 241, 
242–3, 246–7
Cambodian Center for Research and 
Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) 
27, 30, 146, 148, 242–3, 246–7; creation 
of female space 146, 148; empowerment 
of farmer’s and women’s groups 136, 
142; organic/alternative agriculture 241, 
245–6, 247–8
Cambodian Human Rights and 
Development Organization (ADHOC) 
31
Cambodian National Council for Women 
135
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 31
capacity-building 5, 50, 70, 239; and 
CBO-mass organization relationship 
228; health sector development 121, 
123; of local communities 161, 165; 
Vietnam Rivers Network (VRN) 64; of 
women/women’s groups 101, 144, 149
capitalism 3, 213; and associational 
behaviour 206; Đổi mới reforms see Đổi 
mới
Carmen, M. 188, 190, 191, 194, 198
Carothers, T. 187
Carroll, T. F. 187, 188, 189
cash associations, Cambodia 207, 210
Castells, Manuel 62
Catholic church 11
Center for Education, Promotion and 
Empowerment of Women (CEPEW), 
Vietnam 94
Center for Gender, Family and 
Environment in Development (CGFED), 
Vietnam 94
Center for Promoting Development for 
Women and Children (DWC), Vietnam 
94, 100
Center for Studies and Applied Sciences 
on Gender and Adolescents (CSAGA), 
Vietnam 94
Centre for Biodiversity and Development 
(CBD), Vietnam 64
Centre for Water Resources Conservation 
and Development (WARECOD) 64
Chakrya, K. S. 245
Chambers, R. 6
Chan, S. 132
Chandler, D. 21, 23, 24, 25, 189, 205, 240
Chap, S. 203
charities, Vietnam 43, 49, 180
Chea, C. 190






civic engagement 1, 7, 11, 13, 77, 80; in 
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